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ABSTRACT
SMART POWER IN THE IRAQ SURGE 2007-2008
Russell N. Reiling
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

This dissertation explores U.S. actions in the military “Surge” in Iraq from 2007-2008.
Focus is on the entwined utilization of coercive and attractive power or smart power as an
enabler of success and change from prior U.S. strategies in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The
analysis is based upon an extensive set of interviews with operational participants in the Surge
from across the Executive Branch. Results show that smart power was an important element of
the Surge and its use facilitated success, but that doing smart power was not a simple matter of
achieving some mix of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, but rather effectively marshalling and combining
attractive and coercive power resources to meet the problems at hand. The lessons learned
during the Surge of developing the right “smart power” synergy of hard and soft power can be
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency or “near war” environments the United States may
find itself in around the world.
The key contributor to this work was the interviewees themselves, who patiently
answered my questions regarding events that happened over a decade ago. The most fun part of
this project was the hour (or two+!) spent doing live interviews with the people who actually
made the Surge happen. Often and unsurprisingly these individuals have subsequently gone on
to bigger things, so their graciousness in volunteering their time as well as providing names of
other people who could contribute made “snowballing” possible. Thank you for providing me
the opportunity to tell your story.

To my children Nathan and Grace who have lost their relativity standard of comparison
for not getting their homework done. Loving thanks goes to my wife Pam who has faithfully
accompanied me on a rewarding journey longer than either of us expected.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

FORWARD

“Thinkers” and “doers” live in worlds with different solution sets. It has been both my
great challenge and great fortune to live in both worlds (albeit as with most hybrids, this is likely
an admission that I am not particularly good at either). The point most forcefully struck home
when I began working as an adjunct professor at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia,
shortly after retiring from a 26-year active-duty military career. In my first semester, I was given
the honor of instructing their undergraduate Introduction to International Relations (IR) Theory
course, where I must sadly confess that I probably learned more about IR theory than many of
my students.
One of the textbooks was the excellent Controversies in International Relations Theory
by Charles Kegley. In Chapter One, Kegley describes the four tasks of an IR theorist: describe,
explain, predict and prescribe (or DEPP, as in Johnny. Thank you, Dr Yetiv, for teaching me the
value of acronyms as mnemonic aids). As I attempted to describe these tasks to my students, I
was struck by the fact that, during my military service as a staff planner I had also focused
efforts on these four tasks. The interesting insight to me was that the relative ratios of effort
expended in academia and operations in each task varied greatly, almost to the point of being
opposites.
In an academic work such as this one, roughly 25% will be devoted to describing the
situation, usually as four of the five “Ws” (Who, What, Where, When). The next 2/3 of the book
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will be devoted to explaining the situation, or the fifth “W” (Why). Then the last chapter of the
book, typically the shortest one, is devoted to both predicting and prescribing. And of that,
almost all the pages are prediction. At most a page or two of the chapter was the writer saying
what needed to be done about the situation.
When working as a staff officer in a military contingency, the following reflects my alltoo-frequent experiences “downrange.” I would walk into my bosses’ office and describe the
problem (hypothetical) to him: “Sir, there is unrest in Anbar Province.” He responds, “Okay
J.R., what do you want me to do about it?” Next, I explain the problem to him: “Sir, I think it is
due to the upcoming elections.” He responds, “Okay J.R., what do you want me to do about it?”
Then I give my prediction of what could happen: “Sir, if the situation continues, it could
negatively impact our operations in the area.” For the third time, he responds, “Okay J.R., what
do you want me to do about it?” Finally, I give him a prescription: “Sir, I would recommend we
develop some newspaper ads and radio spots to be broadcast in Anbar to publicize election
events and registration requirements to counter the rumor mill.” Then he would say, “Okay,
route a staff package to me with your funding/resourcing requirements and I’ll sign it”
(particularly in Special Operations units. One great thing about working with them: they never
blink at spending money).
After that, the rest of my rotation would be implementing the advertising campaign. If
my time in-country were the aforementioned academic book, the first 30-page chapter was all
four of the tasks in the DEPP acronym and the last 270 pages was implementation, a task not
even conducted by the IR theoretician.
This dichotomy was a continual source of frustration for me as a military officer. When I
would select an academic work to help me better perform my job, I would begin with a great
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deal of excitement as I read the” describe” opening and felt that the author was spot on in
capturing the situation. I got more excited as their “explanation” crystallized the situation in my
mind and helped me appreciate situational nuances that until then had escaped me. I was eagerly
awaiting the final DEPP elements even as my concern mounted over their ability to give me a
blueprint for success in the decreasing number of pages remaining.
Then I reached that last chapter. I skimmed through the predictions, which made sense to
me, to get to the part where the author would finally tell me how to do my job. Then I got to the
last page (maybe two), which typically said something like “the UN should form a commission
to further study this issue.” What a gyp! I felt like Ralphie in A Christmas Story after he saved
his box tops to finally get his secret decoder ring and cracks the message played at the end of the
Little Orphan Annie radio show to find out that the message is “Be sure to drink your Ovaltine.”
Even the civilian cultural experts hired by the military demonstrated similar challenges
from the viewpoint of an implementer. They were all dedicated, intelligent, well-meaning
people; the problem was that if you asked them a question, they would come back to you three
months later with a 50-page answer. As a staff officer who has to answer a question from the
commander at the evening update briefing on my single slide, this time frame and depth of
analysis is not going to help me keep my job for another day (thank you for that line Colonel
Becker). I need the 80% solution you can give me right now, not the 95% solution you can give
me next quarter.
On the other hand, academicians reading the above description of military planning
should see red flags jumping off the page. Our efforts were always hampered in two important
areas—time and expertise.
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The military typically does not get involved in a region until after the crisis begins. On
9/11, the Department of Defense had three people who spoke Pashtu and/or Dari, the primary
Afghan languages. Training a new linguist takes a year. Sending an officer or NCO to earn a
master’s degree in a region of interest is going to take a year or more. Adversaries and the
domestic political constituency are not going to wait while the U.S. gathers sufficient
information and experts to make a high-confidence plan. As a result, commanders have little
choice but to make the best decision possible based on the information and advice available to
them.
High turnover also afflicts U.S. efforts to garner and retain expertise. One year’s service
is a long time in a combat environment for uniformed U.S. military personnel (civilians deploy
for even shorter periods, typically a few months). Consequently, just about the time the staff is
getting to understand the environment and work effectively together, they start rotating out and
the process begins anew.
Expertise was usually another planning shortfall. The U.S. military wants its forces to be
modular, i.e., they can deploy a military unit anywhere in the world and it will be able to perform
the job, even if it is not “from there.” That concept works well enough for a tank battalion or
fighter squadron: changing their appearance to match the color scheme of the local flora and
fauna will mostly do.
However, this does not work as well with cultural/linguistic organizations. The 4th
Psychological Operations Group at Ft Bragg, North Carolina has several battalions grouped by
region. Members go through months of linguistic and cultural training before being assigned to
their specific units. I was a member of their 8th Battalion, tasked to supporting Central
Command, from 2003 until 2005, a time of heavy commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. Our
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unit was supporting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when the other battalions were not
supporting major military contingencies. Even if we were augmented by members of other
battalions, their value would be limited to us. Spanish and Korean linguists, or scriptwriters who
had studied Europe or Asia, could not simply be recast as South-West Asian experts with a fresh
coat of paint.
Even within 8th Battalion knowledge was compartmentalized. We required linguists
covering half a dozen major languages. Our Urdu speaker was not going to be any help
translating Arabic and vice versa. I personally performed rotations in Afghanistan serving as a
planning officer to operational staffs. I was frequently looked to as a SME (subject matter
expert) during planning and implementation. I would respond that I was happy to offer my
opinion, but that my field of study was the Middle East. I would explain that Afghanistan was
different from the Gulf Arabs: that it is a different culture, different language, even a different
language group. When I finished, they would say “Okay, so what do you think?”
In fairness to the leadership, they did not have a lot of other choices. In either Iraq or
Afghanistan, there might not be an officer on the staff with post-graduate work related to the
region. If there was a local or expatriate advisor available, they often lacked the security
clearance needed to participate in extensive planning. So yes, someone with a Top-Secret
clearance who had studied anything within a thousand miles of the area of operation was in fact
“close enough.”
The Middle East also demonstrated the challenges of coordinating and cooperating
activities with a different culture (challenges which are bound to occur in any foreign
environment: only the nuances of the challenges will change). Interviewees will talk about how
in post-Saddam Iraq people were afraid to make decisions: consequently, approval for new
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construction projects or budgetary expenditure could take weeks or months, creating problems
for U.S. workers who then had to explain the delays to a Washington D.C. that was already
impatient for results.
Thinking an agreement meant prompt action was also a cultural gap. Agreeing to do
something is also just as important as actually doing it in much of the Middle East, a stand at
odds with Americans who tend to be more results driven. Particularly if their initial response to
your request had been “That would be difficult,” there was probably a low likelihood that your
wish would be fulfilled even if agreed to. 1
Saving face was another challenge. The Arabs are particularly reluctant to disagree with
a superior. This trait made it particularly difficult to get advice on courses of action. My boss in
Psychological Operations called it “yes yes.” You would ask your interpreter what he thought of
a draft leaflet or poster and he would say “Oh yes yes it looks very good.” As an American I am
probably more willing to accept criticism from a subordinate than they are used to. Particularly
so if the alternative is having my boss tell me it is a piece of garbage at the staff meeting after we
disseminate 100,000 of them in the city and get the opposite effect of what we wanted. It is a
cultural roadblock difficult to surmount.
Coercive and attractive power as most visibly represented by the military and civilian
sides respectively each have strengths and weaknesses. An organization or society lacking one
will not advance. “Brains and brawn” are a powerful combination when utilized together. One
of the themes that came out of the research for this work was the importance of cooperation and
coordination between the various agencies working in Iraq during the Surge. With some
flexibility, each can help to cover the weaknesses of the other and bring their strengths into play
together. Working together smartly is a journey, not a destination.
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INTRODUCTION

This work is an opportunity to hear and learn about the U.S. Surge in Iraq in 2007-2008
directly from participants in that conflict. Both military and civilians who helped make it
possible were interviewed from an array of jobs and perspectives on the counterinsurgency effort
there. Grounded theory is utilized to identify common threads among the qualitative viewpoints
of the participants who were selected and interviewed with a common question set based on
referral sampling with previous interviewees recommending others for follow-on interviews.
Problems besetting the previous effort in Iraq are recounted. Some were problems
internal to the U.S. government structure. Some were external factors on the ground in Iraq or
the surrounding region. Some were unique to the cultural and sectarian situation in Iraq. Most
were nested into broader principles of defeating insurgents. Planning for the change in strategy
are discussed, including the publication of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
Interviewees then describe how they implemented the new strategy and the changes that they
observed. They also provided a detailed account of their lessons learned and how these could
assist future counterinsurgents.
The Surge was not a magic potion. Everything in Iraq was not being done wrong prior to
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker arriving. Everything in Iraq was not being done right
after they arrived. Fortuitous circumstances such as the Anbar Awakening and increases in oil
prices augmented the change in strategy. The people participating in the Coalition had been
learning and adapting prior to 2007. The Surge fostered and encouraged these initiatives with
increases in both coercive and attractive force that produced a smarter synergy of power and
helped alter the course of events in Iraq.
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THESIS

Smart power was an important element of the Iraq Surge, effectively marshalling and
combining attractive and coercive power resources to achieve success. Surge lessons can be
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency environments.
Research for this work primarily consisted of interviews with American participants in
the Surge effort, including General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. A mix of people from
across the Executive Branch provided invaluable insights into the inner workings of the U.S.
effort. They believed that the establishment of security was a necessary precursor to developing
the stability to allow stalled economic and political process to proceed. This security could not
be established by Iraqi Security Forces operating alone. Cooperation in the form of improved
training and establishment of Joint Security Stations provided the synergy needed to tame the
violence in Baghdad through coercive measures, while arming and paying Sunni militias helped
drive the Al-Qaeda presence out of Anbar Province.
Interviewees saw the stabilization of Iraq as providing the environment to allow attractive
initiatives to be more successful. Improved cooperation between the various Coalition elements
translated into more effective interaction with Iraqi military and government leaders. Better
reconstruction projects were mutually selected and effective oversight was established.
Interviewees saw the Provincial Reconstruction Teams as helping enable political and economic
contact with local leadership and creating an environment of trust and cooperation throughout
Iraq.
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THE SURGE IN BRIEF

The Surge refers to the increase in capability and change in strategy that the Coalition of
the Willing applied in Iraq beginning in early 2007 and lasting through the end of 2008.
Additional military and civilian capabilities were added to the existing in-country strengths to try
and stabilize a deteriorating security situation marked by sectarian violence and foreignsupported insurgency. Greater efforts were made to increase Iraqi formal and informal security
force strength and work directly with Iraqi partners at all levels of the government.
Violence and Coalition casualties initially rose as the increased military capability
clashed with insurgents in strongholds that had been uncontested for years. After a peak period
they steadily decreased until they reached levels not seen since the initial stages of the invasion.
A more assertive U.S. presence helped restart the political process in Iraq and turned to the
reconstruction efforts need to maintain stability. The calm would continue beyond the time
period of the Surge and even after U.S. military forces departed Iraq in 2011.

PRELUDE

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 after a military and political buildup that began in
the wake of the Trade Tower terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The
U.S. publicly put forward several reasons for the necessity of the attack, primarily featuring
claims of Iraq retaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) equipment and capabilities, direct
ties between the Iraqi government and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and changing the Iraqi
government to empower leadership that would be more responsive to the will of the citizens. It
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was a challenging list of objectives, but not one that was necessarily impossible. Prioritization of
these objectives would change over time, particularly in the aftermath of the invasion when it
was discovered how little WMD equipment or capability remained in Iraq.
The 2003 “shock and awe” campaign proved able to defeat Iraqi military forces and
remove Saddam Hussein’s government from power with relative ease. However, the military
“light footprint” strategy implemented at the behest of senior U.S. leadership proved to be far too
small to successfully occupy Iraqi after the invasion. Some pre-war critics of the small force size
such as Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had envisioned this problem and thought the
occupying force should be at least twice the size of the actual force allocation. U.S. planners
may have expected that “cutting off the head of the snake” would facilitate a quick transition to a
more favorable government, hence occupation would be brief and shallow. Instead, the U.S.
found itself forced to deal with an insurgency movement centered on Sunni-held areas in western
Iraq and including large numbers of foreign fighters. The lack of occupying presence also
contributed to a rise in fighting between Sunnis and Shia, as well as both sects fighting with (to a
lesser degree) the Kurdish minority situated primarily in the north.
The original U.S. stabilization strategy emphasized working “by, with and through” Iraqi
partners, hoping that indigenous capacity could be rapidly and effectively built up to meet
political, social and security needs in Iraq and permit withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces. This
strategy was in line with U.S. thinking at that time that foreigners are an ineffective counterinsurgency force for several reasons, including illegitimacy in the eyes of the local populace,
inferior ability to gather intelligence on insurgent activity and serving as a spur to insurgent
recruiting. Successfully executing such a strategy would also reduce costs and casualties thus
lessening the onset of war weariness among the U.S. public.
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The “by, with and through” strategy envisions a transition from hard to soft power whose
focus is enhancing indigenous governance capabilities. Civil Affairs forces would work to build
up infrastructure, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs would help inform the populace
of Iraqi programs and initiatives, and combat elements would dispatch large insurgent elements
and train Iraqi security forces.
One of the most important assumptions of this strategy is that the indigenous populace
will be able to create and maintain an effective, credible government. This did not happen in
Iraq. Occupation planning may have been fueled by optimistic assessments. U.S. leadership
such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and key political appointees leaned heavily on
the advice of exiled Iraqi Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi National Congress. Intellectuals
such as author and political commentator Fouad Ajami and journalist Jim Hoagland advocated
for the Bush administration to take action, with little discussion of the ability of Iraq to
reconstitute itself after an invasion.
This ability to self-rule was largely missing in Iraq by the middle of 2006. Iraqi
governance was weak, corrupt and proving unable to cope with the Sunni insurgency augmented
by foreign fighters entering Iraq from throughout the Middle East and beyond. This weakness
and perception of favoritism towards the Shia in Iraq was also fueling sectarian violence between
the suddenly dominant Shia and the disenfranchised Sunni minority, as well as the traditionally
ostracized Kurdish minority located primarily in the north of Iraq. Sectarian violence was
particularly exacerbated by the bombing of the Shia al-Askari Mosque in Samarra on 22
February 2006 and continued to increase in intensity throughout the remainder of the year.
This was the situation when General David Petraeus took command of Multi-National
Force – Iraq (MNF-I) on 10 February 2007. He had formerly served as commander of U.S.
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forces around Mosul and had been commended by Americans and Iraqis for his ability to
stabilize his area of control and work cooperatively with the local Iraqi leadership, both national
and local. He wrote the book on counter-insurgency – literally. Between his Mosul and MNF-I
tours, he led the planning group at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that promulgated Field
Manual (FM) 3-24, US Army Counterinsurgency Handbook. This was the first time in 20 years
that the Army had published a field manual dedicated to counterinsurgency. It cited successful
counterinsurgency practices from several past thinkers, including David Galula, T.E. Lawrence
and Carl von Clausewitz. Nothing in the manual was particularly groundbreaking: the important
thing was that it was promulgated and thus became U.S. military doctrine. Foreshadowing of
Petraeus’ MNF-I initiatives can be gleaned from FM 3-24 chapters titled “Unity of Effort:
Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” “Intelligence in Counter-Insurgency” and
“Developing Host Nation Security Forces.”

A NEW PLAN

General Petraeus wanted to change the way the U.S. military was interacting with the
Iraqi population. However, this could not be accomplished without first taming both the
insurgency and sectarian violence. To do this, the simple fact was that even as Iraqi security
forces were increased, more U.S. troops were needed. General Petraeus had already convinced
the U.S. leadership of this need, and in fact in January 2007 President Bush had already publicly
announced his intention to send more U.S. forces to Iraq. By December 2006 the U.S. force
level had dropped to 128,000 troops. The plan was to introduce one additional Army brigade
(roughly 4-5,000 troops per brigade) per month from January to June. The additional units were
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a mix of infantry, heavy and Stryker (armored car) brigades, although their selection may have
been based more on availability than desired capability. They included:
January 2007: 2nd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
February 2007: 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
March 2007: 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division
April 2007: 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division
May 2007: 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division
Force levels were also maintained by extending tours of units already in-country,
particularly the Marines operating in Anbar Province. At the peak of the Surge, General
Petraeus commanded 166,000 troops. This was the largest U.S. force level of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, including the initial invasion, and represented an increase of about 30,000 troops
over the force level prior to the Surge. Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and US
Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad opposed the strategy, fearing that reintroduction of US forces
would slow the development of the Iraqi Security Forces.
In addition to the increase in raw numbers, a change in types of forces also
occurred. GEN Petraeus specifically asked for 2 additional Civil Affairs battalions as well as
PSYOP and Public Affairs force augmentation. General Petraeus himself had a dedicated Public
Affairs officer in addition to the one assigned to MNF-I headquarters as a whole.
As the reinforcements arrived in Iraq, they would become part of an overall force
movement back into the urban areas, reversing the policy of General Casey. They would be
responsible for clearing out insurgent concentrations, then holding the terrain while Iraqi security
forces consolidated the gains. They would work in partnership with these Iraqis, building small
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outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods and conducting joint patrols to gain the confidence of the local
residents and increase their forces’ intelligence capability.
These Iraqi forces would be part of the new approach to attracting the Iraqis to the new
American presence. Previously, the Americans had been advised to maintain a low profile as
part of the “by, with and through” strategy wherein the preference was to have Iraqi leaders
conducting photo ops and interviews. Gen Petraeus changed this and encouraged his
commanders to utilize their Public Affairs capabilities to communicate with the local populations
as much as possible. They were also utilized to resolve local disputes and forge connections
between local leaders and Iraqi government officials.

SURGE EXECUTION

The Surge was not a “silver bullet” that brought stability to Iraq overnight. In fact,
Coalition deaths increased during the initial months (Mar-May 2007) of the Surge, a logical
outcome when military forces move into areas controlled by the enemy. General Petraeus’
strategy was to concentrate his reinforcements initially in the greater metropolitan area of
Baghdad. Joint patrolling with Iraqi Security Forces was more aggressive. Outposts were
established throughout the city to improve intelligence-gathering and improve Iraqi confidence
in the U.S. presence. “Jersey barriers” were erected along neighborhood sectarian fault lines by
U.S. Army engineers. These activities inevitably resulted in more frequent contact between U.S.
forces and the insurgents. The plan was that reducing insurgent capabilities would increase
stability, bringing about a long-term decrease in casualties, both U.S. and Iraqi.
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The other major activity occurred in Anbar Province, where the Marines were able to
effectively partner with the Sons of Iraq to push al-Qaeda out of the province.
Finally, one Surge brigade (4th Bde, 2nd Inf Div) was sent into Diyala Province as part of
the stabilization effort between Baghdad and its sources of insurgent support in Iran.
MNF-I also utilized its soft power capabilities more effectively. Approval procedures for
message products were streamlined and delegated to subordinate commands, reducing time for
message dissemination. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) budgets were
increased and delegated, allowing commanders to provide Civil Affairs projects better tailored to
local needs. Procedures were developed to increase promotion opportunities for Iraqi force
trainers, improving the quality of U.S. soldiers willing to be assigned as trainers.
Figure 1 summarizes monthly deaths data from Iraq. Across a number of indicators, there
were substantial declines in the death rates.

Figure 1: Force Fatalities in Iraqi 2006-2008
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Figure 2: Civilian Deaths/Significant Acts in Iraq 2006-2008

Looking at the numbers for the four indices tabulated, we can see similar patterns for
three of the four. U.S. military fatalities saw their first spike in October 2006, three months
before the Surge forces began flowing into Iraq. The peak three months were April through June
of 2007, averaging over 110 deaths per month. By October of 2007 they had declined to levels
below that seen in the first half of 2006, where they remained for the remainder of 2007 and
2008. U.S. deaths at the beginning of the study averaged about 2 per day: by the end of the
study, they averaged about one every two days, or a 75% decrease.
U.S. fatalities follow an initial path expected from a force increasing in both size and
aggressive posture, combined with an adversarial response to a perceived deteriorating
situation. Deaths had increased prior to the Surge but increased again as the US forces finished
flowing into Iraq. However, it took only four months of full Surge operation for U.S. fatalities to
begin dropping, and they stayed down with no sustained spike for the remaining 15 months of
the survey period, unlike the other indicators which all demonstrated a spike in early 2008.
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Iraqi civilian deaths followed a similar pattern. They steadily increased beginning in
March until hitting their three-year peak of 3298 in July 2006, six months before the Surge
began. Deaths remained at a high level through August of 2007 averaging over 2,779 per month,
then saw a “step” decrease from September 2007 through May 2008 averaging 1,220 per
month. After that they dropped decisively below even early 2006-levels, to 667 per month from
June 2008 until the end of the year. Averaging over 1500 per month at the beginning of the
study, they were in the mid-500s by the end, a decrease of over 60%.
The statistics for Iraqi civilian deaths demonstrate the destabilization of the situation in
Iraq that led to President Bush’s decision to order the Surge. It wasn’t until September of 2007,
four months after the full complement of Surge forces were in place, that civilian casualties
began to decline. Then it took until June 2008 before the second “step” decrease in deaths
occurred, after US troop strength had returned to its pre-Surge level.
The last similar category was significant acts (SIGACTS), or Coalition force reporting of
anything militarily significant occurring in their sectors. SIGACTS steadily increased beginning
in January 2006 and first breached 10,000 in October. After that they remained at well over
10,000 per month through July 2007. They steadily decreased again from August, declining to
5484 in February 2008. They spiked up by nearly 1000 in March 2008, then declined every
month for the remainder of the year, hitting their study-period low of 3290 in
December. Overall, they dropped from a monthly average of about 5500 at the beginning of the
study to about 3400 at the end, a decrease of almost 40%.
The SIGACTS and Iraqi civilian deaths had the strongest correlation. Both increased
throughout 2006. SIGACTS continued to increase into the first half of 2007 after civilian deaths
had plateaued. This diversion may reflect the greater U.S. and ISF presence throughout Iraq. In

18
other words, the issue may not be that Iraq became steadily more violent into 2007: the
Americans just became more aware of what was occurring in Iraq.
The least correlation with the other categories occurred in the data for Iraq Security Force
deaths. Their numbers also demonstrated the largest fluctuation. In general, they can be
characterized as running between 132 and 201 for the first six months of 2006, spiking to an
average of 206 per month from July through October 2006. They then actually declined to an
average of 112 per month from November 2006 through January 2007. As the Surge began, ISF
deaths jumped to a monthly average of 215 from February through July 2007, with a study high
of 300 in April 2007. They declined to an average of 86 per month from August 2007 through
January 2008. They experienced a four-month spike, averaging over 123 per month during
February through May 2008. ISF deaths did not go above 100 again for the rest of the year,
hitting their 3-year low of 24 in November 2008. Averaging about 175 per month at the
beginning of the study, they declined to about 50 per month at the end, a decrease of about 70%.
The ISF numbers may indicate that their role in the Surge has been
underappreciated. Their statistics were the only ones that demonstrated a decline during the last
three months of 2006. When the Surge began, ISF deaths jumped from 91 in January 2007 to
300 in April, before the full U.S. Surge component was in place. Whereas U.S. fatalities
dropped fairly rapidly once the Surge forces were fully in place, ISF fatalities remained
stubbornly high, bore the brunt of the SIGACTS spike in early 2008 and did not substantially
decline until June of 2008, nearly eight months later than their U.S. counterparts.
Insurgent fatalities are more difficult to find data for. Best estimates of annual fatalities
as provided by Coalition forces were 3,902 in 2006, 6,747 in 2007 and 2,028 in 2008. The Iraqi
Ministry of Defence estimate for 2007 was 4,544, nearly one-third lower than the U.S. estimate,
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although both represent a substantial increase over 2006 reflecting greater contact between
security forces and insurgents. Based on the increase in U.S./ISF fatalities in 2007, the U.S.
estimate seems more credible.
It is widely accepted that the Surge succeeded. By success, we mean that it helped
suppress the insurgency. Peter Mansoor, a key staff officer in Iraq during the Surge, wrote that
“The Surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to
play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs.”2 As will be seen, interviewees for
this work almost all said it at least produced short-term benefits of stability. Even opponents of
the Surge strategy had to concede its success in retrospect. Hillary Clinton was quoted as saying
that “the Surge worked.” Barack Obama acknowledged that the Surge “succeeded beyond our
wildest dreams” and was emboldened to order a Surge in Afghanistan shortly after taking office
in 2009. These statements are supported by several counter-insurgency progress indicators
including human movement, business and agricultural activity, participation in elections and
employment as well as reductions in acts of violence (number of attacks, friendly/host-nation
casualties) and specific attacks on infrastructure.

SCOPE

The U.S. effort in Iraq can be divided into four general phases: invasion, occupation,
Surge, and withdrawal. This dissertation will discuss the first two phases, which contain
elements of many forms of warfare, such as invasion, interstate war, intrastate war, and
counterinsurgency. This work would not suffice to evaluate in-depth each of these elements, any
of which would merit a separate study. It does introduce the first two phases in order to facilitate
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proper evaluation of the third phase, or Surge. The withdrawal effort was discussed by
interviewees in detail in response to the survey question “Did the Surge produce results?” In
particular it explores the ways in which General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker changed the
role and capability of the “soft power” resources during the Surge, and the ways in which this
“smarter” power contributed to the success the Surge experienced.
Chapter Two is a review of the key literature found by the author relating to this work.
Power and its theoretical underpinnings are explored. Counterinsurgency literature is also
discussed. Writings specific to Iraq play an important role in understanding the Surge: in some
cases they include books or articles by this project’s interviewees.
Chapter Three describes the theory and methodology for this work. Some definitions
relating to power are proposed based on the research for this project and utilized later in the
work. It also describes how the database was created utilizing grounded theory and a series of
interviews via referral sampling of people who participated in the Surge with a list of the
questions asked of interviewees.
Chapter Four will use this operationalization to lay out the problems present in Iraq
prior to the Surge, primarily as seen by Surge participants. Some of the problems lay with
decision-making being done in Washington DC. Some were related to structural challenges
within the U.S. Executive Branch such as manning shortfalls, short tours of duty and unclear
lines of authority. Some were related to execution on the ground such as insufficient partnering
with Iraqi Security Forces or government officials responsible for reconstruction. All
contributed to the early lack of success in Iraq prior to 2007.
Chapter Five analyzes FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, looking at its relationship to 2007
U.S. Army doctrine and how it developed a holistic approach to applying smart power that
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brought together the military and civilian efforts in Iraq during the Surge. Surge participants
describe the changes they saw and developed in Iraq that demonstrate a foundation for
operationalization of smarter power. Coercion and attraction were applied together in varying
degrees by people on the ground in response to the local situation.
Chapters Six through Eight analyze the interviews with Surge participants to demonstrate
how the better strategy translated into results in Iraq. It started with a more supportive domestic
strategic structure in the U.S. that better supported General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker in
terms of both resources and domestic support. In Iraq, improved partnership within the U.S.
agencies and with the host nation governance and security apparatus dramatically reduced
violence and set the stage for reconstruction and reconciliation.
Chapter Nine provides interviewee perspective on the Surge. Much of the information in
this chapter came from three survey questions:
1) Did the Surge produce benefits?
2) What were your lessons learned from the Surge?
3) Are the lessons of the Surge applicable to other/future conflicts?
Chapter Ten concludes this work with some general observations and ideas for potential
further research. It includes a list of the lessons learned from this work and author personal
thoughts.

LESSONS LEARNED

Lessons learned during the course of this project can be grouped into three general
categories and are described below:
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1) Lessons reinforcing the literature
2) Lessons different than the literature
3) New lessons
The detailed explanation of each of the lessons is available in Chapter Eight.

LESSONS REINFORCING THE LITERATURE

Much of what happened during the Surge was not new, hence these are not new lessons.
Prior counterinsurgents had understood and documented these. It was largely during the Surge
that they were “remembered” and reapplied in Iraq. They included:
1) Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned
2) Counterinsurgency environments are complex
3) Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcileThe government is often the cause
of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency
Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies
4) Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficultModern transportation/communications
make counter insurgency difficult
5) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed
6) Smart power is normative
7) Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly
8) Adaptability is critical
9) Working with the host nation is harder, but in the long run more successful
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LESSONS DIFFERENT THAN THE LITERATURE

Interviewees provided insight to a number of issues that can be found in
counterinsurgency literature but may be interpreted in a different manner or treated as a less
important item. Their illumination provides an opportunity to reevaluate critical thinking on
these topics. These included the items listed below:
1) Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time
2) Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DoD nor DoS are enthusiastic about entering
3) There are many ways to incorrectly apply power
4) The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it
5) Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated
6) Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understood
7) Iraq has little concept of a national will
8) Someone will be unhappy about any change made
9) Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance
10) Part of the fight occurs in detention facilities

NEW LESSONS

Several interesting new lessons came out of the Surge participant interviews. In some
cases it is the mere fact of accumulation of data and responses to this work. The new ideas are
listed below:
1) Capabilities are not inherently hard or soft
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2) The importance of personalities is often underestimated
3) Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq
4) Surge participants thought the lessons learned are applicable to other conflicts

GOAL

Historical works tend to focus on the decision-makers at the top. Due credit should
certainly be given to President Bush for his personal courage in ordering a change in mission that
most opinion at the time thought was not going to work. Secretaries Gates and Rice also should
be credited for implementing change and cooperation to reflect the new strategy. Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus formed an excellent working relationship in Iraq that was key to
success. These people have all been justly recognized and mostly praised for creating the
conditions for success during the Surge.
This work is an opportunity to hear from the people who worked at an operational and
tactical level to make the Surge in Iraq a success. Commanders of Army brigades and Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. Career employees and people called into active service from the military
Reserves or temporary hires. Contractors and trainers who worked and lived with their Iraqi
counterparts. People who worked with detainees, developed plans that integrated Coalition
efforts or were responsible for communicating with Iraqis, Americans and the world at large.
They came from a wide variety of backgrounds and performed a wide variety of missions
while serving in Iraq. Most interacted with Iraqis on a regular basis both at their place of
business and/or travelling “outside the wire.” Almost all of them got shot at (practically every
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Coalition installation was mortared on a regular basis). Some continued to serve their country in
Iraq or Afghanistan after the Surge ended.
Their success was made possible by the strategic change the U.S. leadership made prior
to the Surge, but only possible. In the end it was the people on the ground who improved their
cooperation and coordination with each other, got smarter in using each other’s strengths to
overcome weaknesses, and implemented a more effective version of counterinsurgency than had
been seen in Iraq prior to that time. It was their efforts that brought the “breathing space” the
leadership hoped to achieve in order to give the Iraqis a fair opportunity to stabilize their country
and renew the political process.
Their stories provide an opportunity to learn, or often relearn, the techniques that work or
do not work in a counterinsurgency environment. A number of common themes emerged that
will be explored in this work. Some are interesting in and of themselves, some can be pieced
together with other insights to provide a richer mosaic of successful counterinsurgency. All are
provided by people who were in Iraq in 2007-2008 helping make the Surge work.

CONCLUSION

The Surge came at a key point in the Coalition effort in Iraq. Many people felt the U.S.
was doomed to fail in achieving its objectives in Iraq and needed to simply leave. With
improved support from decision-makers in Washington D.C., the interviewees for this work and
their comrades were determined to prove the critics wrong. Their part in the Surge is retold in
this work.
They worked to overcome a myriad of structural and operational problems to restore
stability to Iraq and give the host nation and its citizens a better chance to move forward
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politically, economically, and socially. Changes that had been taking place before the Surge
were emphasized and expanded. Veterans applied procedures often learned the hard way from
previous tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. First-timers brought enthusiasm and willingness to
cooperate across the military-civilian line.
Utilizing referral sampling a pool of interviewees was developed that included a wide
variety of people and missions during the Surge. Their words shed light on a number of common
themes that they saw as being part of success in counterinsurgency. This work will explore those
common themes in detail and compare them with the extant literature on counterinsurgency in
general and Iraq in particular. Some of the themes should come as no surprise. Some take a
different perspective from that commonly found in the literature. Almost all are telling their
story in a public forum for the first time. As such, they provide a new and unique insight into the
Surge.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Counterinsurgency does not tend to capture the public eye to the extent that conventional
warfare does. There are a number of potential reasons for this which will be explored while
reviewing the state of the existing literature. This chapter will focus on literature related to
counter-insurgency warfare in general, which includes works from antiquity to modern times.
These works describe elements of insurgency that still must be dealt with today and presented
challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. Better understanding of these challenges was an important
element of the Surge. A review of U.S. military doctrine demonstrates the fact that the U.S. was
in many cases relearning lessons it had learned during prior conflicts.
Understanding the state of the current literature regarding power will demonstrate the
opportunity to further refine what soft power means and its relation to hard power. This work
will move beyond the theoretical hard and soft power debates with operationalized definitions in
Chapter Three. These definitions can lay out a roadmap for evaluating a power strategy to see if
it is “smart.”

THEORIZING ABOUT AND APPLYING POWER

In addition to providing important insights into the counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq
during the Surge, this study contributes to the broader literature on the nature and application of
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power in international relations. This more theoretical contribution comes through the
application of the concepts of soft power and smart power to the activities engaged in by the U.S.
government in Iraq.
The very nature of power has long been a subject of debate, not only in political science,
but throughout academia. A reasonable modern era start point can be the initial works of Robert
Dahl, who moved beyond a rigid power structure in a group and postulated that, particularly in a
democracy, there are a number of competing power elites who must work with each other and
compromise.3 Iraq demonstrates some of the qualities of Dahl’s ideas and the potential for
conflict that lies therein. At the top are the competing Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and Kurdish elites
who sway the allegiance of their respective sectarian populations. Each also has sub-group
power brokers such as tribal chiefs, sheikhs and wealthy individuals and families.

BACHRACH AND BARATZ

In response to Dahl and others, an interesting modern treatment of power was conducted
by Bachrach and Baratz in Two Faces of Power, written in 1962. Their idea was that power
actually has two faces, neither of which are understood by sociologists and only one by political
scientists.
Bachrach and Baratz agreed with the political scientists that one face of power is resultsbased, the measure of participation in decision-making. To them, this means observing who
participates in decision-making, the nature of their participation, and the measurable results that
accrue from the process. Because the results and interactions are visible and measurable, they
consider this the recognized face of power.
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What they also saw as a second face of power was the ability to control the decisionmaking agenda. Just because an issue does not come up for discussion does not mean it isn’t
important. A group or individual with power to control the agenda will not want to raise issues
that could be decided in their best interest, or ones not personally important to them. To them,
organization, rules and structure exist largely as a self-reinforcing agenda of what is important
and what is not. Because this face of power does not produce decisions and measurable results,
Bachrach and Baratz hypothesize that it can be hidden to outside understanding and evaluation.
They believe both faces must be understood to properly evaluate power and its control
among a group. Keeping an issue from being raised can be as important as how raised issues are
decided. A frequent complaint among minorities or women throughout the world is that their
nation does not even discuss issues such as voting, education opportunity or fair participation in
public life. They and their issues are kept off of the agenda of decision-making by others.4
The person or persons who can control the agenda may often be behind the scenes.
Interviewees for this work often found this to be the case in Iraq. Even though there may be an
elected mayor or governor officially “in charge,” interviewees often found that person curiously
reluctant to work on issues that seemed to be of importance. In many cases there was a tribal
chief, religious leader or businessman who controlled the actions of the elected official.
As an interesting note to the influence of Bachrach and Baratz, When Dr. Dahl published
Democracy and Its Critics in 1989, one of his five criteria for the ideal democracy was control of
the agenda. This is a corroboration of the Bachrach and Baratz idea of the importance of hidden
power.
The Bachrach and Baratz model of two faces of power is interesting and important, but
not necessarily the best fit for studying soft power. It can be argued that not bringing agenda
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items forward for decisions is a decision as well, even though made by a smaller group. In fact,
it could be treated as a form of hard power, with the community being coerced into not
discussing items of importance to them. Soft power is about attraction and is unlikely to be seen
in a situation where the community is not getting what it wants.

BOULDING

A notable in-depth treatment of the topic of political power was actually conducted by an
economist, Kenneth Boulding, when he wrote The Three Faces of Power in 1991. Boulding
stated in his book that he had never seen a treatise on power written by a political scientist,
although this is not correct as has been seen.
Boulding divided power into three types and assigned a component of that power to each.
First was destructive power, which he commonly associated with threats as embodied in
political-military activity. To Boulding, these threats could be active or passive, such as the
difference between sending a gunboat to a port and having it fire on the port. This was a crucial
distinction to Boulding, who emphasized that people often conflate power and force whereas he
felt that force was a subcomponent of threat. Boulding also postulated that destructive power is
the easiest to employ.
His second type of power was productive, with a power component of exchange as
embodied in trade or simple reciprocity. As an economist, he postulated that a bargaining
situation can only take place when there is an overlap between two parties of what they are
willing to buy and sell. This would mean that productive power can only be utilized when the
two parties have a mutual interest in cooperating: it is not a push (destructive) or pull
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(integrative) situation. Boulding spent less time discussing productive power than integrative,
even though his academic background was as an economist.
To Boulding the third type of power, integrative, along with its component of love as
embodied socially, was the longest-lasting. To work, he said that the phenomena of conversion,
or identification with an existing structure or group, was necessary. Although it is the most
difficult to achieve, integrative power endures the longest and is a necessary component of
legitimacy. He felt that destructive and productive power that lack legitimacy will not persist,
that destructive and integrative power have a non-linear relationship, and that the tendency for
unbalanced threat destructive power was in the end to destroy itself.
Boulding does not conceive the power categories as distinct sets. He discusses the idea
of the three components of power as having “fuzzy logic” boundaries, so that there are elements
of all three in each component of power, although one will predominate in each. For example,
exchange is the dominant component of productive power. The exchange normally plays out in
the economic sphere of human activity. However, threat can exist in economics in the form of
price wars or boycotts. He mentions that love can also exist, but discusses it as an internal
phenomenon, such as the morale of organizational employees.
When discussing his fuzzy logic, Boulding comes right to the edge of the idea that an
institution composed for threat power, such as the military, can exercise his other forms of
power. He points out that the military has productive and integrative elements. However, he
then discusses these elements as more internal to the organization: for example, a military needs
productive power in the form of money in order to buy what it needs to sustain itself. One would
presume from reading his work that he would also view integrative power as internal, such as
building cohesion and trust within the unit, rather than external (building love outside the unit).
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He does mention that a ruler needs integrative power to legitimate his rule, but then he
says the ruler must be loved, or at least respected. By adding on the minimal requirement of
respect, Boulding turns away from advocating a pure integration componence for the military
and instead relegates it back to its traditional threat role. Thus, his tendency is to revert to
treating organizations as having a niche role within a specific component of power, and largely
by default they operate within a specific type of power.
Further, Boulding advocates for three types of power, but his work basically seems to
come down to whether targets of power act because they are coerced to act or because they want
to act. His productive power type presumes a precise, equally-beneficial exchange which is
probably almost never the case in reality. How often do friends have precisely the same amount
of love and respect for each other? Won’t virtually every relationship be composed of one party
that feels slighted and one that feels smothered, no matter how slightly? Sometimes we cannot
find a good deal when we shop: we must take the best of the bad deals available. Most
Europeans probably do not like having to rely on OPEC or Russia to meet their petroleum needs,
but the alternatives are worse.
With such a razor-edge middle ground, wouldn’t it make more sense to simply define
power as binary rather than trying to develop an unwieldy three-categorization construct? This
could be where Boulding’s background hindered his work: an economist would only be human if
he wants to elevate his academic niche to a position of co-equality in a power model. The
problem is not that economics are unimportant to power considerations: they are. The issue is
assuming that there is a significant element of mutually satisfactory economic exchanges that
occur among humans, when in reality most probably lean toward being either threat or love
based.
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The more obvious is the threat element as has been discussed with the OPEC example
above. But inequality can be shifted towards love as well. A young girl might buy a pricey
ticket to a Justin Bieber concert where she also manages to get his autograph. To Justin, it was
primarily an economic transaction. He got his percentage of her ticket price, and certainly
derives a rush from her as an adoring fan, but she was only one of 10,000 people at the concert
and 100 or so for whom he signed an autograph (as one of 50-100 performances he does
annually), so the love element is severely diluted (i.e. he would not have noticed the difference if
she were not there). But for her, it may be the highlight of her social calendar for the year. She
will talk about it with her friends for weeks. If she took a selfie near him, it may become a
blowup Flat Head poster on her wall. Decades later she will pull out her autograph book and
fondly reminisce on the experience. She may have paid for the ticket but for her, it was a love
interaction.
Although Boulding does not really go through the door of cross-utilization of traditional
power component organizations, he does leave the key for us to do so. One could postulate an
integrative function of traditional productive organizations such as corporations if their products
are singularly desired by consumers (status symbols vs generic brands). Many children do not
want to eat a cookie unless it came out of a package with a picture of an elf on it. Culture and
politics can play a role as well, such as the exhortation to “Buy American.” One can also
postulate a true integrative function for military organizations as well, for example peacekeepers.
Boulding’s ideas are a starting point that other thinkers could build upon.
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LUKES

Steven Lukes developed a better basis to expand the concept of two faces of power. He
also believed that the two faces described were inadequate to cover the full potential of power.
For him, the third face of power is described as the power “to prevent people, to whatever
degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such
a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things.” 5
Lukes is skeptical of Marxist or other theories that believe there is a greater will or role
(proletariat or worker for example) that people will willingly subsume themselves in and strive to
make their identity. But if so many people appear to be complying with an oppressive or
exploitative system, his question is why do people appear to willingly submit themselves to
domination rather than continuously resist?
Lukes builds upon the checklist developed by Charles Tilly in 1991. It includes things
such as the idea that people are continuously rebelling, but in smaller, covert ways, or that
resistance is costly, or that force and inertia hold them in place. Lukes singles out one in
particular, that “As a result of mystification, repression, or the sheer unavailability of alternative
ideological frames, subordinates remain unaware of their true interests.” 6
Lukes used this idea of Tilly’s as a launching point for evaluating power in terms of three
faces. He felt that Tilly was on the cusp of an important element that was capable of standing
alone as a “face of power.” To Lukes, this could take a variety of forms such as tradition,
culture, or misinformation both deliberate and unintentional. He thought that this psychological
element would be able to bias decision-making against the interests of the individual. In other
cases, the people may be aware of it, but their “rebellion” only exists in the form of jokes or
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secret conversations. This can be occurring even while people are “officially: supportive of the
domination regime.
Lukes saw concerns by other writers that defining power in too broad terms risked
turning it into a meaningless concept. However, he felt that it was such an important concept
that it was better to see power in an all-embracing way than not to try and do so.
Interviewees for this work consistently felt that the Surge was successful in part because
it made a greater effort to work with Iraqis below the national level. The military conducted
robust joint patrolling with Iraqi Security Forces and co-inhabited smaller outposts. Provincial
Reconstruction Teams were established by Department of State at provincial level. This allowed
the U.S. to establish trust and a belief in the Iraqis that they did not have to have centralized
direction in order to be successful. In some cases, the Iraqis were already aware of this, but U.S.
support helped enable events such as the Anbar Awakening by Sunnis who wanted to rid
themselves of al-Qaeda but did not trust the Shia-dominated Iraqi government to help them
achieve their goal.

NYE AND KEOHANE

Theories about soft power provide a critical framework for this analysis. Much of the
scholarship on soft power is put forth by liberal authors such as Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane and
Robert Pape who have written extensively on the value of soft power.
Nye first proposed the concept in his 1980 book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of
American Power. Along with Keohane, he further refines the term in Power and
Interdependence. Keohane and Nye define soft power as “the ability to get desired outcomes
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because others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through
attraction rather than coercion.”7 Pape explored the idea that the current US hegemony in terms
of coercive power forces states trying to balance against the US to employ soft power approaches
such as diplomacy, international institutions and economic statecraft to counter US global
policies.8
Another good group study of hard versus soft power is found in Soft Power and U.S.
Foreign Policy, edited and based off a collection of speakers from a May 2008 symposium
conducted at the University of Manchester. 9 The timing for the study is near the end of the
Surge in Iraq, an extremely fortuitous circumstance for this work.
In it, Dr Nye discussed his views of hard and soft power in more detail. He emphasized
that the effectiveness of soft power should be judged from the perspective of the target, not the
instigator. He believes that realists tend toward a materialist bias that causes them to downplay
the importance of soft power. He defines smart power as the “…ability to combine the hard
power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy.” He
listed five recommendations from a Smart Power bipartisan commission he co-chaired that
included:
1) Restoring alliances, partnerships, and multilateral institutions
2) Prioritizing global development
3) Emphasizing a more personal public diplomacy
4) Economic integration
5) Addressing climate change and global security
In Chapter Two, Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos explored the fungibility of what
Boulding would call power components. They criticized Nye’s concept of power as lacking
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rigor, making a strict definition difficult to obtain. They discuss how states can use hard power
as a foundation to develop soft power, such as the U.S. using WWII to develop the United
Nations. However, they posit a problem for states being that much of the power being utilized in
a soft role lies outside the control of states, such as non-governmental organizations (NGO) or
religious groups. They also criticize the idea that a “universal culture” as a basis for soft-power
activities exists: in other words, even institutions and concepts commonly associated with soft
power can conflict. They say that smart power is a state strategy characteristic, not power itself.
Zahran and Ramos use the idea of hegemony to demonstrate their criticisms. After
World War II (WWII), most countries have tolerated U.S. hegemony not because they thought it
was the best deal, but rather the best deal available. Similarly, after the War of 1812 the U.S. did
not contest Britain’s domination of the high seas for nearly a century, not because they preferred
it, but because it was perceived as fair enough for the U.S. After WWII, the U.S. followed a
similar model, making some effort to acknowledge the interests of other states and not creating a
system that totally favored U.S. interests. As a result, global balancing against the U.S. among
friendly and neutral nations did not occur. One could contrast this with the less successful
regional hegemony established by the U.S.S.R., which failed in part due to perceptions of
domination by the Soviets, and particularly Russians, among the other members.
In Chapter Three, Edward Lock posits that Nye’s unstrategic conception of soft power
results from conflating relational and structural power. He thinks that Nye confuses between an
entity attempting to exercise power versus the social system under which power is viewed as
attractive. Lock believes this is because Nye wants to address soft power in the context of U.S.
foreign policy making. Similar to Zahran and Ramos, he thinks this can lead to a problematic
assumption that power is something which can be possessed. Lock concludes that Nye’s
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unstrategic conception results from inadequate appraisal of the interdependence between the
agent and subject of power. He describes power employment as a clash of interdependent
strategies.
Personal experience and the interviews for this project corroborates the constructivist
element of Lock’s concept. The author’s experience with reconstruction programs in Iraq and
Afghanistan were instructive. Americans in particular have a tendency to tell the local people
what they need rather than let those people tell them what they want. The author found that most
of the planning sessions for local projects at headquarters did not have a single local leader
present. The return on expenditure in refurbishing a village school is going to be far less if the
tribal chief really wanted a well dug. It also causes the Americans to come across as aloof and
not interested in the needs of the local population. If outsiders do not operate in concert with
local perceptions of themselves and their environment, the outsider’s efforts will inevitably end
up less successful than envisioned by their leadership. Interviewees for this work emphasized
that successful projects started with close coordination with local leadership.
In Chapter Four, Christopher Layne laid out a case for the limited abilities of soft power.
He makes a strong point that states probably do not make foreign policy decisions because they
“like” another state or its leaders. This would be in line with the thinking of Washington and
Jefferson that states have interests, not friends. Layne also believes that foreign policy decisionmaking by state leaders is little influenced by public opinion. Layne specifically points to the
Surge as a decision by the Bush Administration to increase commitment in Iraq even after the
Democrats had scored huge gains in the 2006 national elections. He also tends to be dismissive
of soft power because it is harder to measure than hard power.

39
Other studies have disagreed with Layne’s assertion that the public has little influence on
policy decisions. Paul Burstein concluded that the impact of public opinion is substantial,
although our ability to generalize conclusions is limited. Wlenzein and Soroka said that there is
a fundamental link between public opinion and public policy, although influence can vary across
political domains. Layne uses the Surge as an example of a politician (President Bush) not
following public opinion, citing the 2006 electoral victories by the Democratic Party as proof
that the American public wanted to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq. However, Bush’s policy
can be viewed as akin to that of Soviet Premier Gorbachev when he increased the Red Army
presence in Afghanistan upon taking office: a short-term increase with the long-term goal of
stabilizing the country and setting the stage for a military drawdown. Many of the interviewees
for this work described how the U.S. change in presidents in 2009 played a huge role in changing
the U.S. policy in Iraq.
Many analysts may miss the subtle impacts that soft power can have, not from a state
exercising it, but the principles underlying it. Americans opposing a sitting president will often
turn to the court of world opinion to air their viewpoints. Tyrants the US opposes may gleefully
pass the criticisms along to their citizens through the state-run media. The criticisms may
astonish the foreign listener, but not in the way the critic or tyrant expects. Many of the
members of the foreign audience are not astonished that America has such a horrible president:
they are astonished that an American can say horrible things about their president and not be
“disappeared” by the authorities. Information like that is difficult for a pollster to capture; they
may not even realize they should be looking for it. But it is there.
The difficulty in measuring soft power is one of the reasons that bureaucratic
organizations are reluctant to support it with funding and resources. States can track how many
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insurgents are killed by Predator missiles. What they cannot track is the number of previously
neutral people who got so angry with the U.S. attacking their village that they decided to join the
insurgency, or at least begin supporting it with money or resources. This opaqueness cuts both
ways. Hard power advocates will tend to downplay the potential impact of soft-power efforts,
asking for objective proof that is difficult to positively determine.
Conversely, soft-power practitioners are also prone to exaggerate the impact of their
tools. If you drop leaflets on an enemy unit encouraging them to surrender and they surrender
the next day, did they surrender because of the leaflets, or was it because they were surrounded,
cut off from supplies, and under continual bombardment? Absent concrete information, soft
power practitioners who are struggling for actual or perceived relevancy (and funding) may be
prone to take credit even where credit cannot be proven. Interviews for this work shed light on
the challenges involved in demonstrating soft power’s “bang for the buck.”
A problem may lie in reading too much into Keohane and Nye’s definition of attraction,
including by Keohane and Nye themselves. Their definition does not go into detail over whether
attraction can be ephemeral or permanent. This may lead them and other academicians to lean
toward the idea of permanent attraction: reshaping politics, economies, friendships and even
societies. Nothing in the definition says this must be the case.
The specific power act this plays out most visibly in is bribes, which Keohane and Nye
described above as the “hard power of payment.” Why is a bribe coercive? The recipient
reaches out in a voluntary act to accept the payment. They are attracted to the payment and
desire it: they are not being forced to accept it.
By example, the U.S. as an occupying power may be experiencing attacks on its supply
convoys. The U.S. goal is to stop the attacks. They make an offer to the offending tribe of
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payment in exchange for ceasing the attacks. The tribe accepts the payment, and the attacks
cease.
Where is the coercion in this case? The U.S. was able to create a shared desired outcome
with the tribe of U.S. convoys not being attacked. Just because it is temporary or not heartfelt
does not mean it is not a shared desire, even though it probably will not last beyond the U.S.
payments.
Britain discovered the latter to their dismay during the 1st Anglo-Afghan War. The
supply line for the British occupation army in Kabul ran through the Northwest Frontier back to
India. For two years the British paid the local tribes not to attack their forces. There were no
problems. Then the India office eliminated the tributes as a cost-cutting measure. The tribes
promptly rebelled, forcing the Kabul garrison to evacuate and be slaughtered on the retreat to
safety (one man made it back to Jalalabad).
The British experience demonstrates the downside of the ephemeral nature of bribes, but
nonetheless for two years they had created a situation where they and the tribes were mutually
attracted to the goal of British forces not being attacked. Sometimes that is the best an occupier
can realistically hope to achieve. It is usually unlikely that an occupied nation will become
attracted to their occupiers. In fact, any initial gratitude that may have accrued from the
occupation, such as by being liberated from a ruthless dictator, will also prove ephemeral.
Part of the problem may be the Western/liberal/colonial desire to “improve” the locals by
bringing them more into line with “modern” ideals and systems. Though admirable, the desire to
help may It also carries a somewhat paternalistic assumption that “improving” the lot of the
locals will decrease their desire to attack U.S. convoys. One interviewee for this work was
critical of the Dollard-Doob frustration-aggression theory that people join the insurgency
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because they are frustrated because they are out of work.10 A case can even be made that forcing
structural change on an occupied country will be to the detriment of the established elites, hence
is itself coercive. Decreeing that the new Iraqi Parliament had to have at least 25% women may
be admirable, but it essentially meant that ¼ of the males who were formerly part of the
leadership lost their place of privilege and are unlikely to be happy about it.
A related problem may lie in the distasteful nature of bribes. No one wants to admit that
the only way they can elicit compliance in another short of coercion is through handing them a
stack of cash. A parent may wish their children would get good grades simply because they want
to: most parents find that a financial sweetener helps.
Finally, writers may be incorrectly linking bribes to noncompliance threats normally
associated with them. In this case, the U.S. may make clear to the tribes that failure to accept the
bribe will result in U.S. military action to proactively protect their convoys, i.e. cleaning out
insurgent strongholds such as villages providing them shelter. This confuses the issue because
any carrot can be proffered with a threatened stick as the alternative. The tribe may not be given
a great choice, but it is a choice they voluntarily enter into.

BALDWIN

For Handbook of International Relations, David Baldwin contributed a chapter titled
“Power and International Relations.” He believed that all politics involved power, although they
were not always about power. To him, the discussion of power shifted from power as a
possession of actors to power as a relationship between actors. As a result, the discussion shifts
to a multi-dimensional one encompassing scope, domain, weight, costs and means. 11
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What is important to Baldwin as a result of the shift is understanding that because power
is a relationship, different types and degrees of power may be more effective in some situations
than others. For example, the U.S. was far more powerful militarily in Vietnam, but military
power lacked the fungibility to address the non-military problems the U.S. faced. The same
problem occurred in Iraq. Every U.S. Army division has an artillery brigade, a tremendous hard
power asset. After the invasion, most were repurposed as infantry or Civil Affairs because
artillery was useless in a counter-insurgency environment. Armor, ground-attack aircraft and
naval gunfire were among other U.S. assets that were rarely employed, repurposed or removed
from the battlefield entirely.
Considering relationships also allows for integrating unintended effects into analysis,
effects that are nonetheless consequential to relationships. A brigade commander stationed in
Iraq prior to and during the Surge related a story that epitomized this problem.
A senior commander arrived in (his sector) with a very large check to restart a bakery that
had been defunct since about 2003 when the owner left. The office issued the check to
some guy who claimed he was the bakery owner. I had not heard anything about this
before this senior officer arrived: I thought he just wanted to see the bakery. Little did I
know that he would issue a check, along with all these people with cameras and people
from these various organizations. Afterward I advised this officer that what he had done
was demonstrate favorability towards a business owner and just put at risk several other
Mom-and-Pop shops that had grown up and were providing baked goods to the Iraqi
citizens and security forces. Now they had direct competition based on U.S.-government
funding for an activity that had long since not been an issue. The locals had figured out a
way to solve the problem, so why not just embrace these locals and give them the
money?12

OTHER WORKS

All schools of international relations thought can advocate for soft power to some degree.
Karl Marx and his political theories were based on the inevitable attraction that would result
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from a prosperous world as his economic theory of communism took hold.13 Alexander Wendt
talked about how attraction will bring about changes in a state as collective norms shift over
time.14 Even the realist Samuel Huntington talks about culture, although Keohane and Nye
disagree with his assertion that soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard
power.15 Joseph Grieco highlighted the importance of relative versus absolute gains but also said
that states will enter voluntarily into agreements if they feel it is in their best interests to do so. 16
Robert Gilpin and his obsolescing bargaining theory postulated that over time sunk costs allow
states to get the upper hand in their relations with multinational corporations (MNC), but the
initial agreements are based on mutual attraction. 17 Marc Sageman writes about terrorist social
networks and says that in many cases social bonds between members predate ideological
commitment, and that these soft bonds are what induce young recruits to join these radical
organizations.18
International relations practitioners often categorize elements of national power as being
either hard or soft. For example, the comparative politics textbook The Good Society lists the
three forms of state power as political (including military), economic and cultural. It tells us that
“cultural power exists when people can convince others to adopt their values, ideas and premises
as their own,” clearly seeing cultural power as soft power. Regarding economic power, they say
that “people who control scarce resources…obtain compliance from those who need them,” thus
categorizing economic power as hard. Similarly, they say “political power is grounded in
coercion.”19 Draper and Ramsey reflect a common tendency among political scientists to
pigeonhole forms of power as being definitively hard or soft.
Literature exploring soft power elements of the Surge include Krowley and Rutherford on
U.S. influence campaigns and their effectiveness.20 Kimberly Kagan’s The Surge: A Military
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History describes initiatives developed by US forces working in tandem with Iraqi Army and
Police units to improve their capabilities, understanding that locals are the best
counterinsurgents.21 Hammes and Bakir describe challenges the U.S. faced with insurgent
intimidation and the explosive growth of media in Iraq.22
This work will advocate for the concept that almost any form of power can be hard or
soft depending on how it is employed. In the case of the Surge, this will demonstrate that the
tools of power available to decision-makers are more flexible than previously understood. The
success of the Surge lay in part with the ability of the U.S. to repurpose part of its military
strength to soft power missions.

SMART POWER

Smart power is both a relatively new political science term and a normative one. The
concept itself is of course not new: the “carrot-and-stick” approach has been understood for
millennia. FM 3-24 emphasizes that you cannot kill your way out of an insurgency. However,
one of this work’s interviewees pointed out in an article he wrote that you cannot buy your way
out of one either.
The challenge in developing a common definition is that smart power is normative.
Confusion is worsened by the tendency to bin capabilities as either hard or soft. Dr. Nye is one
of the leading smart-power thinkers, but demonstrates an “either/or” train of thought. He talks
about hard and soft power resources with the implication that a specific tool is only useful as
hard or soft. For example, The Center for Strategic and International Studies says that smart
power is “an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily
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in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one’s influence and establish
legitimacy of one’s action.”
Not only does this definition assume military capability is hard, but that things like
alliances are soft. Alliances are typically viewed as hard power by the nation or nations they are
directed against. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement was clearly a precursor to the
invasion and division of Poland. The Warsaw Pact was formed in response to the perceived
threat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Arab unification efforts in 1967
resulted in the pre-emptive Israeli strike known as the Six-Day War. The security dilemma first
espoused by John Herz is exemplified by alliance/counter-alliance moves by multiple parties,
even if they see these moves as a soft power effort of attracting like-minded nations.
Likewise, Chester Crocker starts by listing the capabilities and recommending they be
mixed wisely, but then describes the engagement of “both military force and all forms of
diplomacy.” Again, the “both” implies certain tools are limited to certain tasks, even that
diplomacy is a soft power, although it includes options such as recalling the Ambassador or
severing diplomatic relations entirely. Such thinking can be potentially hazardous to decisionmakers who take such actions thinking “The other side won’t feel threatened because this is just
soft power.”
Specifically describing challenges in Iraq, West, Russell and Robinson talk about the
importance of soft power, pre-Surge steps U.S. forces were beginning to make in employing
smarter power and bringing in the right numbers and force mix to properly do the job.23
Building on the idea that any tool of power can be hard or soft, this work will explore
how this concept increases the options available to decision-makers in a counterinsurgency
environment. It can also help them understand that soft power is in the eye of the beholder.
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Surge participant interviewees provide a number of examples of military and civilians
synergizing their capabilities to implement smart power solutions to the situations confronting
them in Iraq.
Personalities were critical. West talks about coordination problems among senior U.S.
officials. Ricks discusses some of the initial problems General Petraeus had coordinating with
Admiral Fallon, Central Command commander. 24 See Sky for tensions between U.S. military
and civilians in Iraq, as well as West for scarcity of U.S. civilians dispersing reconstruction
funds.25 Pre-Surge problems with reconstruction efforts such as little Iraqi input, inept rollout
and rewarding of DoD contractors were described by Allawi. 26
Interviewees will discuss how important positive working relationships were to success
in Iraq. They also underscore the importance of spending money on the right economic projects.
They also talk about the importance of military action to stabilizing Iraq so that soft power
efforts would have the chance to take hold, confirmed by the nation-wide drop in violence by the
end of 2008. In Chapter Three a working operational definition of soft power, hard power, and
smart power will be provided and defended, so that these concepts can be applied to U.S.
operations in Iraq.

COUNTERINSURGENCY LITERATURE

Counterinsurgency study and literature may suffer because it lacks the “curbside appeal”
of major combat operations. Military history readers tend to be more interested in conventional
war. D-Day or Pearl Harbor are much tidier and compelling stories than intermittent small-scale
conflicts that often take place in obscure locations with complex motives and unclear objectives.
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Also, the public tends to be more interested in reading about or recreating the large-scale
conflicts.
Consequently, it can be anticipated that historians and other researchers would tend to
gravitate toward large-scale combat. Combined with a valid concern that lessened public interest
would lead to smaller book sales or interest in publication by magazines and journals, it is
understandable that counterinsurgency warfare often fails to attract the same level of interest as
Operation Barbarossa or the Yom Kippur War.
This paucity of literature does not reflect global U.S. interests. Since WWII, the U.S. has
fought perhaps five conventional conflicts when defined as state vs state conflict: Korea,
Grenada, Panama, the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, and the initial occupation phase of Iraq in
2003). By contrast, even a partial list of US involvement in insurgency/counterinsurgency
efforts would include Greece, Lebanon (multiple times), Cuba, Somalia, Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Libya, Bosnia, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. Many attribute the U.S. failure in Vietnam to its
insistence on attempting to treat the conflict as a conventional one.
Insurgency/counterinsurgency campaigns are a rich environment for employment of soft
power. An important part of the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
has been efforts to delegitimize the ISIS leadership, and publicize their excesses. Similarly, the
U.S. shaped the global perception of the Taliban to gain support for its effort to remove them
from power.
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WHY IS WRITING ON COUNTERINSURGENCY OFTEN SPARSE?

Insurgencies are often internal to a single state. Consequently, a single government has
the opportunity to contain it. States in general and dictatorships particularly do not like publicly
airing the “dirty laundry” of the mere fact that they are home to an insurgent environment, let
alone getting into the details of its scale and the expenditure of lives and resources in their
attempts to defeat it. The Westphalian system also tends toward a default option of treating these
situations as internal affairs that neutral countries prefer to avoid.
Insurgencies are prone to foster violations of international laws pertaining to armed
conflict as well as human rights, which governments in particular are reluctant to publicize.
Opposition groups usually try to publicize government excesses whenever possible, a challenge
to governments that has become more acute with telecommunications advances. Even worse
from the government’s point of view, some insurgents welcome publicity of their own excesses:
to them, notoriety may be preferable to anonymity.
Insurgent writing may be hampered by a combination of high fatalities and low literacy.
Much insurgent leadership will perish during the course of the struggle. The high-ranking
leadership of an insurgency is often made up of educated people. However, much of the midlevel leadership are often people who advanced through the ranks by being able to survive, not
necessarily due to academic prowess. Even on the government side, war tends to winnow out
poor leaders even if they went to all the right schools, in favor of selecting leaders based on
combat skills. During WWII, the U.S. Army saw promotion of “mavericks,” enlisted men who
earned direct commissions, and pilots who had not completed high school. Neither is even
imaginable today, where a bachelor’s degree and officer candidate school are required.
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Obstacles to academic study of counterinsurgency persist even after the conflict. Most
insurgencies fail (see Plakoudas for rebuttal of the assertion by Van Creveld and others that most
counterinsurgencies succeed 27), and the victorious government typically does not wish to
remember or write about it in detail. Most states continue to downplay the scope of a rebellion
even after they successfully subdue it for the reasons discussed above. Sources and complete
records are often hard to find and sketchy in detail, making empirical analysis difficult. Release
of classified records can take decades.
If we classify the American Civil War as an insurgency, it will appear to be an exception.
Yet it can be argued that Americans on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line commemorated the
battles, yet never fully addressed the underlying causes of the war, particularly slavery, which
persisted afterward in the form of the Ku Klux Klan and Jim Crow laws in the South. Despite all
the Southerners who were slave-owners, slave traders, or overseers, the only person tried and
executed after the war was Henry Wirz, commandant of the Andersonville prisoner-of-war camp,
which housed an almost all-white population.28

WRITINGS

There is nevertheless important literature dealing with insurgency. The current debate
begins over whether counterinsurgency (COIN) is even feasible anymore, specifically when a
foreign power joins the government in attempting to suppress the insurgency. Writers such as
Gentile, Metz, Greene, Branch and Wood, Joseph, and Hammes all bring out various points in
support of this idea. Gentile feels counterinsurgency is morphing into Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) but doubts introducing foreign military forces protects the locals, and fears that developing
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a counterinsurgency strategy insinuates that COIN is winnable. 29 To Branch and Wood, if the
ingredients necessary for counterinsurgency, such as reliable intelligence and host nation ability
to deliver services to its citizens are present, then there will not be an insurgency.30 Hammes and
Greene bluntly state that a foreign power cannot establish the legitimacy of a host-nation
government, with Hammes saying that it is not a cost-effective solution.31 Chapter Seven will
recount interviewee lessons learned and applicability to future conflicts with opinions regarding
the viability of counterinsurgency.
Others feel assistance still possible, though in an indirect role. Metz and Hammes wrote
about using temporary expeditions or providing assistance and training without direct
engagement against insurgents, as was the case in the early stages of Vietnam. Metz,
Fitzsimmon and Chin feel that modernist, materialist COIN practices fail to take into account
religious or cultural motivations that cannot be stymied through improving social services. To
Chin, these concepts are Maoist and Cold War ones that will not meet desired objectives in the
post-modern environment.32 Metz and Byman also point out that host-nation elites are expected
to act irrationally in order to meet Western concepts of modernization, and are pessimistic of
desired results beyond the margins. 33 Chapters Six and Seven will include interviewees’ accounts
that a direct presence was an important stabilizer in Iraq.
At a more practical level, the debate often touches on the soft vs hard power dilemma.
Common themes can be seen from the earliest writings to modern times. Many of these were
being ignored or misapplied during the early stages of the U.S. operation in Iraq. There is also
discussion of the relatively new concept of “smart” power. There is evolving discussion over the
“right” mix of soft vs hard power and ensuring that the right capabilities are being properly
employed for both. Plakoudas expanded upon the concept of dividing counterinsurgency into
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two basic approaches. The first is enemy-centric or focusing on combat operations against the
insurgents, such as done by the Romans or Ottomans.34 An extreme version put forward by
Downes even suggests that when civilian loyalty is not flexible, indiscriminate targeting may be
required to stop support to insurgents. The second is population-centric, focusing action on the
population. He then sub-divides this into either coercive action against the population or a
combination of selective violence and reform.35
As will be discussed later, evidence from the interviews suggests that the Surge was
successful in part because it moved in the direction of recognizing that additional hard power
was needed to bring stability to Iraq. Plan success included the need for an increase in military
troop strength and expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces. Byman wrote before the Surge of the
need to provide security and order before any lasting reconstruction could take place, an idea
echoed by numerous interviewees for this work. Chapters Five and Six demonstrate the belief of
a majority of interviewees that smart power had to include hard power.
Another important theme in the counterinsurgency literature involves sensing and
effectively adapting to local conditions. Sun Tzu understood the importance of manipulating the
local political situation to your advantage. Julius Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul describes the
various local alliances Caesar developed to assist his military campaigns. The American
Revolution has been written about extensively and well by authors such as David McCullough
and Robert Harvey, describing the poor job Britain did of finding common ground with the
colonists.36 Popkin and Kilcullen provide excellent theories of reasons people become
insurgents beyond ideology or even religion, reinforcing the importance of proper evaluation of
local conditions.37 De Tray stresses that working with local governments—districts, towns, and
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communities—offers the best chance to strengthen people’s ties with their own government. The
interviews show just how vital this was in the successes experienced by the Surge. 38
Another important theme involves the contest for the support of the local population. By
A.A. Cohen, Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of
Counterinsurgency demonstrates the US military beginning to absorb historical lessons on
counterinsurgency, in particular the French campaign in Algeria in the 1950s in which Galula
was a participant. Galula went on to lecture at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and
worked with U.S. Air Force General Edward Lansdale, one of the leading U.S. counterinsurgents
of the 1950s and 1960s.39 Galula believed the population was the object of both sides in
counterinsurgency, and that their support was conditional. This was a lesson the U.S. slowly
relearned in both Vietnam and Iraq as demonstrated in Chapter Five when discussing
development and implementation of FM 3-24.

COUNTERINSURGENCY CHALLENGES IN IRAQ

No country ever has the luxury of entering a counterinsurgency with a perfect plan,
resources or organization to participate in the conflict. Even totalitarian states are beset with
challenges. Democracies have an additional layer of problems brought on by the requirement for
transparency. In The Post-modern State and the World Order, Robert Cooper pointed out that as
a hegemon policing pre-modern states, the U.S. cannot be as good as the rules it tries to uphold. 40
In trying to develop democracy in Iraq, the Coalition to an extent found itself in the dilemma Ed
Mansfield alluded to in Electing to Fight that developing democracies are the most violent
countries of all.41 Plakoudas agrees that suppressing an insurgency has always constituted a
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challenging task for every government no matter its military power. 42 Chapters Four and Five
include interviewee belief that Surge success was in part due to the ability of General Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker to justify the Surge to the U.S. Congress and public.
Being the sole remaining superpower is/was not easy. We can see writing on the subject
encouraging a stable international system but cautioning that maintaining one requires national
will. Robert Keohane saw the decline of the superpowers but felt that international institutions
would help maintain system stability. 43 Charles Kindleberger felt that a hegemon was required
to create a stable international system but cautioned in that that hegemon needed the will to
enforce the rules of the system. 44 Writing in the Harvard Journal of International Affairs in
1998, Lisa Martin hypothesized in a similar vein, saying that the international institutions built
by the U.S. became self-binding.45
U.S. efforts were initially slowed by the reluctance of the administration to admit that an
insurgent problem existed in Iraq. As late as 2005 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had
difficulty acknowledging the insurgents in Iraq as anything greater than “dead-enders” from the
Saddam regime. Allawi described these mischaracterization problems which kept the U.S. from
properly responding to the threat at hand. 46 Schiff advocates her concordance theory which
posits a more interactive relationship between the military and senior civilian leadership.47 She
may be overrating the pre-Surge civilian-military separation: the National Security Council and
Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as advisory bodies to the White House. The issue was not that
Bush/Rumsfeld could not listen to the military; they just did not. In Chapter Five interviewees
discuss the importance of General Petraeus’s ability to access the White House.
The U.S. also needed to achieve greater internal cooperation. Kilcullen, along with
Pirnie and O’Connell, talked about the importance of developing a planning process that
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embraces all departments of the U.S. government and is on the same battle rhythm as troops in
the field.48 To Kilcullen this may matter more than formal unity of effort. Joseph asks if war is
the continuation of politics, and politics at the ground level is never considered in strategic
interaction, why should we be surprised when defeat occurs? 49 Schifrin feels that the very
decision to Surge gave Iraqis the impression—and U.S. troops the opportunity to foster the
impression—that the United States had recommitted to Iraq. 50 Chapter Five lays out in more
detail than past authors how the U.S. bolstered its interagency planning process for the Surge.
Authors who discussed the structural challenges the U.S. had to overcome in Iraq include
Ricks,, Brinkley and Kaplan. Confusion over authority inhibited reconstruction efforts.
Insufficient military force was in place to tamp down both anti-government forces and the Shia
militias. Overoptimistic assessments of the Iraqi government was causing disillusionment
among the Iraqi citizens. Russell stipulates that bureaucracy exists precisely to slow change so
it should not be a surprise that increasing Iraqi bureaucracy would slow the process of
reconstruction.51 Interviewees go into great detail describing these problems and how they
affected operations.
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports provide a number
of insights regarding staffing and organizational shortcomings that hindered the U.S. efforts in
Iraq. There was a lack of overall regulatory guidance. There was no template for a “typical”
reconstruction team in an occupied country. Manning was haphazard and rarely long-term. This
work will expand on the manning and structural problems encountered as the U.S. tried to
implement a coherent reconstruction strategy in Iraq. Interviewees provided details and deeper
insight regarding the practical problems created by the U.S. Executive Branch’s structural
problems such as short periods of service, the importance of effective working partnerships
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within the Executive Branch as well as with the Iraqis and making sure that political and
economic initiatives better meet the needs of the population.
Building trust in a multi-ethnic war is difficult. Problems included abandonment of the
Kurds and Shia in 1991 during the First Gulf War. 52 Russell and Sky talked about the initial
unwillingness of Americans to meet with former regime leadership and other insurgent groups. 53
Allawi described the secretive nature of Ambassador Bremer’s decision-making.54 Ali discusses
Iraqi distrust of U.S. motives, particularly feeling they were primarily oil related. 55 West
describes U.S. Army surveys indicating 40% of the soldiers did not like the Iraqis and 38% felt
they did not need to be treated with respect. 56 Also see Ali and Ahmed for endemic Iraqi
corruption and sectarian issues that needed to be understood for an effective counter-insurgency
campaign.57 In Chapter Six, interviewees show how getting off the large bases and back into
Iraqi communities improved trust and respect issues between both sides.
International players with differing goals than the U.S. sought to influence events in Iraq.
In Soft Balancing Against the United States, Robert Pape showed that the U.S. was not going to
be able to “seal off” Iraq from other international actors who would utilize economic and
political soft power to disrupt U.S. activities and objectives in Iraq, particularly Iran and Syria. 58
The Bush administration refused to meet with the Syrians or Iranians while ignoring Saudi
support to Sunni insurgents and was also reluctant to provide a larger role to the United Nations
(UN).59 Allawi went into detail about Iranian goals and techniques that were at odds with the
U.S. effort, although they also favored installation of a Shia government. 60 See Kilcullen for a
description of al-Qaeda’s global base of support and for the idea that the security force “area of
influence” needs to include neighboring countries.61 Buchanan emphasizes two key points of
influencing Syria constructively to stop the flow of terrorist activity into Iraq and the same goal
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for Iran while also recognizing the sovereignty of Iraq.62 Interviews demonstrate that some
effort was made in this area, but it proved difficult to stymie activities of international players
with objectives different than those of the U.S. although the emergence of some common
interests with key international intervenors may have played an important role in near-term
Surge success.
Domestic U.S. politics also played an important role. Ricks shows loss of popular
support for the war in the U.S., but also Democratic reluctance to take responsibility for the
situation.63 Hammes explains that the factor of time must be a central consideration in any
counterinsurgency campaign that requires major U.S. forces, but also believes that the U.S.
public has demonstrated patience if they feel the cause is worthy: they are not time-averse, but
incompetence-averse.64 Mansoor details how GEN Petraeus invested a great deal of time on his
confirmation process with Senate leadership. 65
Other writers have also discussed the tactical approach to counterinsurgency. Eastin and
Gade think that too little hard power can actually help insurgents by allowing them to signal
strength and resolve without threatening them with annihilation. 66 Gentile is concerned that
COIN expects fence-sitters to become loyalists if the right strategy is applied. 67 Gompert wanted
to see less Western propaganda and more influencing by Muslim scholars. 68 Malkasian and
Marston, Pirnie and O’Connell, and Greene describe concerns with empowering the Iraqi
authorities. Pirnie and O’Connell even advocated preparation for host nation support in the
event of a government collapse (in Iraq). 69 Chapter Six will detail interviewee accounts of the
tactical approaches during the Surge that usually worked best when smaller, more realistic goals
were sought.
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U.S. MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE

The U.S. military interest in updating its counterinsurgency guidance is episodic: when it
is involved in a counterinsurgency. The following table demonstrates this tendency:

Doctrine

Date Published

Conflict

Select Headings

USMC Small Wars

1940

Central America

Relationship with the State Department, Military-Civil

Caribbean

Relations, Armed native organizations, Military

Manual70

government, Supervision of elections and Withdrawal
FM 31-15

1961

Vietnam

Ideological Basis for Resistance, Political Factors,

Operations Against

Cold War situations, Propaganda and Civic Action,

Irregular Forces

Police Operations

FM 100-5 Field Service

1962

Unconventional Warfare, Military Operations Against

Regulations Operations
FM 31-16

Irregular Forces, Situations Short of War
1967

Internal Defense and Development forces, The Hostile

Counterguerrilla

Guerilla Force, Advisory Assistance Operations, Civil

Operations

Affairs

FM 100-5

1968

Unconventional Warfare, Cold War Operations,

Operations of Army

Stability Operations

Forces in the Field
FM 3-24

2006

Counterinsurgency

Iraq

Unity of Effort: Integrating Military and Civilian

Afghanistan

Activities, Developing Host Nation Security Forces,
Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency

Table 1: U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Guidance 1940-2006

All of the works share common elements. There is recognition that U.S. forces are
operating in a foreign country. There is discussion of the need for cooperation between the
military and civilian branches of the U.S. executive agency, typically the Department of State.
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There is an understanding that the goal is not permanent occupation, but to reach a point where
the U.S. forces can be withdrawn.
One previous analysis of the U.S. military and counterinsurgency doctrine was conducted
by the RAND Corporation. Published by Austin Long in 2008, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
focuses on U.S. military counterinsurgency during Vietnam and the period up to and
immediately after publication of FM 3-24 in Iraq. Long concludes that publication of
counterinsurgency doctrine did not materially alter attitudes or operations by U.S. forces. In
fairness to Mr. Long, his work was published in 2008, before the full effectiveness of the Surge
was evident. The interviews in this work suggest that FM 3-24 and General Petraeus’ command
did have a substantial impact on conduct in Iraq during the Surge.
This work will argue in Chapter Five that doctrine is not necessarily intended or expected
to change attitudes. What it did in this case was provide authorization for individuals who
already espouse those ideas the latitude to carry them out in practice. FM 3-24 did not open
General Petraeus’ eyes to a potential new way to combat insurgents in Iraq: it codified an
approach he already felt would be superior to the strategy of his predecessors. It also reinforces
the importance of individual leaders. Most of the interviewees for this work emphasized the
personality-dependent nature of success or failure in carrying out their duties in Iraq. That the
U.S. would try this new strategy started at the top with General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker and filtered down to their subordinates. Thus, doctrinal innovation synergized with
command commitment in Iraq during the Surge.
The Long study may not have appreciated how mentioning issues such as building local
trust or reintegrating insurgents into the body politic are mentioned only infrequently in prior
publications. By contrast, analysis of FM 3-24 will demonstrate that the importance of the host
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nation population permeates the entire work. Cooperation, communication, minimizing
collateral damage and effective partnering are the building blocks of the manual, not merely
mentioned.
This work will analyze in Chapter Five how FM 3-24 moved beyond the ideas of its
predecessors. It demonstrated a superior ability to treat the local population and leadership with
respect. Consider this line from the Small Wars Manual: “The future opponent…will have the
inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater
extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern
armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces.” The
earlier works have a paternalistic, condescending air that writers of FM 3-24 worked to
minimize. Keep in mind that none of the documents were classified, so the target populations
can access them.
One person who participated in the drafting of FM 3-24, Frank Hoffman, published an
analysis of it in Parameters (2007). He said that the authors tried to mesh traditional approaches
with the realities of the modern world. He classified this merger as “neo-classical
counterinsurgency.” Hoffman felt that the manual gives commanders an understanding of the
complex environment in which counterinsurgency operates but did not give them an
understanding that different organizations may require different approaches. He also felt that it
did not sufficiently treat religion or communication. He summarizes the manual as being “a step
in the right direction.”
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CONCLUSION

As this review of the past literature has demonstrated, counterinsurgency has received
limited scholarly and military attention, and some argue that the lessons of counterinsurgency are
repeatedly relearned by a military that frequently fails to apply them. History demonstrates that
effective counterinsurgency requires a mix of soft and hard power deployed smartly. Many
contemporary authors even argue that counterinsurgency is no longer a feasible option, even for
a superpower.
Several challenges are suggested by the literature that make it particularly difficult to
mount an effective counterinsurgency operation for the U.S. including endemic U.S. government
structural problems, employment challenges, a complex environment that includes a role for
other external powers, and the ceaseless search for the proper mix of hard and soft power. The
U.S. was even slow to develop doctrine to deal with the situation in Iraq, waiting until the
situation had become seemingly irredeemable.
The next chapter will lay out the methodology used by this work to explore through indepth qualitative interviews with key participants in the Surge in Iraq the ways in which
improved counterinsurgency approaches were applied during the Surge, and the consequences
that followed.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Terminology will be defined in this chapter. One of the key elements of this study is a
common understanding of power. With a working definition, this study will be able to better
distinguish between hard and soft conceptions of power as well as analyze states utilizing them
in combination. This will be important as this work will also argue that capabilities should not
necessarily be treated as either hard or soft. It will also offer a definition for smart power or
attempting to put the right resources to use in the right combination. This work will further
distinguish between smart power and simply mixing hard and soft power, which of itself does
not guarantee the correct combination. Hard and soft power will be operationally defined in
terms of coercive or attractive power.
Methodology for this study will also be explained. To explore soft power in Iraq during
the Surge, this work employed grounded theory and its applicability to gathering primary-source
data from interviews. Interviewees included military and civilians who were stationed in Iraq
during the 2007-2008 Surge. The interviewee data was compiled via the method of gathering
known as referral sampling or snowballing. Most interviewees were recommended by prior
interviewees whom they had worked with in Iraq or knew had knowledge germane to soft power
in the Surge. This research enabled the development of a rich database drawing previously
unpublished or analyzed data from a broad range of interviewees. Their participation and
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insights opened up a number of interesting avenues of analysis, including ones not envisioned by
the author prior to research.

TERMINOLOGY

Power

The Oxford Online dictionary defines power as “The capacity or ability to direct or
influence the behavior of others or the course of events.”71 The definition broadly encompasses
what this work will discuss as hard (direct) and soft (influence) power.
Parsing this broad definition allows breaking out the difference between hard power,
which Joseph Nye defines as “The ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military
might to make others follow your will” and soft power which he treats as “getting others to want
the outcomes you want.” In other words, it is the difference between coercion and attraction,
both of which would fall under the above definition of power.
Dr. Nye’s definitions suffice as a theoretical starting point for defining power. There is
broad agreement on the concepts he is describing as being either coercive or attractive in nature.
This work will also explore the idea that almost any action can be coercive or attractive
depending on the point of view of recipients and other interested parties.
A working definition of smart power is also needed. The difference is that smart power
is a normative concept. History does not demonstrate a precise admixture of hard and soft power
that invariably creates smart power. Furthermore, even if there was such a ratio, it assumes the
right tools are being employed in each role, which is not always the case. The U.S. was spending
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billions on reconstruction in Iraq prior to the Surge: the problems stemmed from ill-chosen
projects, poor implementation and little to no oversight. Chapter Eight will detail how part of the
success of the Surge can be attributed to not just more resources, but better use of those
resources. A central theme that emerged in research was the need for a greater effort on the part
of the U.S. leadership to better employ the tools of national power in Iraq. In many cases they
were relearning lessons that had been successful in previous conflicts.
This work will employ the following new definition:

SMART POWER: Employment of the range of available tools of power in a combination
of attraction and coercion to efficiently accomplish national objectives.

This definition allows the tools of power to be utilized in either a hard or soft role
depending upon circumstances. Military power is not predetermined to be hard, cultural power
is not predetermined to be soft. This opens a wider range of options for policymakers and allows
for creativity in the employment of available assets. The size difference between DoD and DoS
means that, like it or not, if the U.S. wants to expand soft power activities overseas, utilization of
the military in an attractive mode is necessary. Interviewees confirmed that DoS manning
shortfalls made this necessary during the Surge, even assigning DoD members to DoS billets in
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
This definition does not predetermine the optimal mix of hard and soft power but allows
that ratio to be tailored to the operation. The World Wars were overwhelmingly hard power.
The relief operations in Haiti and Indonesia were mostly soft power. The ratio can even change
within a counterinsurgency effort, as adversary strength ebbs and flows around the battlefield.
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Interviewees frequently described the first six months of the Surge as “a gunfight.” As the U.S.
military gained the upper hand in the fighting, it could devote more resources to soft power
efforts in Iraq.
This definition strives for an efficient balance between hard and soft power. National
resources are finite, thus being able to use them wisely reduces the strain on the national purse
and gives the taxpayer more confidence in the likely success of the operation. The Surge
leadership demonstrated a marked improvement in the ability of the U.S. to synchronize its
efforts in Iraq and move toward achievement of smart power.

Soft Power

Social scientists tend to categorize power capabilities as being either soft or hard.
Military capabilities and some economic actions are usually considered hard. These are
commonly thought of in terms of threats or use of military force, embargoes, or even bribes. On
the other hand, social and cultural capabilities are typically considered soft. These can include
things such as education, innovation in political structures, or religious proselytization.
By these traditional measures, the U.S. military would be treated as an element of hard
power. College textbooks such as International Relations by Pevehouse and Goldstein talk
about the military in terms of the ability to exercise short-term power to influence another state.
However, The U.S. military does not consist solely of hard power elements. It does have
components that can engage in the “war of ideas” described by Pevehouse and Goldstein. The
military is usually by far the largest element of a U.S. government occupation effort (called
“stability operations” in U.S. military manuals) in another country, to such a degree that even its
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soft power elements may be larger than the entire Department of State contribution. Therefore, it
is critical to consider these forces when evaluating U.S. use of soft power.
The U.S. military approach to soft power can be best understood by looking at its
doctrine as promulgated by the Department of Defense. The two most important for influence
activities are Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, and JP 3-13.2, Military
Information Support Operations, also known as Psychological Operations. For planning
purposes, the U.S. military treats Psychological Operations as a subset of Information
Operations, which also coordinates Military Deception, Operational Security, Electronic Warfare
and Cyber Warfare. Note this is not a perfect delineation. For example, Electronic Warfare and
Cyber have offensive components whose primary purpose is to support kinetic operations by
military forces.
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, is the US military force guidance for working directly
with local officials and population. It defines Civil-Military Operations (CMO) as “…the
activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships
between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support US
objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.”
Because all three publications have a “3” prefix, they are considered part of Operations.
This is an important categorization. Operations is normally the focal point of U.S. military
activities, and as such normally has first call on resources and manpower with all other elements
of the force such as the J-1 (Administration) or J-4 (Logistics) in support. The fact that PSYOP,
Information Operations (IO) and CMO have 3-prefix designators gives them a “seat at the table.”
That is the good news.
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The bad news is that there has to be a separate “3” prefix for soft power capabilities.
Although there are publications covering land, air and maritime operations, there are none for
armor, bombers or destroyers. It is true that CMO in particular can be performed by units other
than civil affairs, but such specialized coding is a subtle sequestering of soft power functions
such as messaging and rebuilding.
Like any bureaucratic organization, the military says the right things about many topics.
Equal Opportunity is important, Operational Security is important, morale is important. No one
has the time to devote full attention to all the areas the military claims are important. Leaders
will consequently focus on several things they think are truly important while paying lip service
to the remainder. Members of the unit will take their cue from the leaders. The same effect
occurs based on doctrine. It is the difference between just being “important” and actually being
important.
Because these assets and operations are at least included among joint and Army
regulations, they do allow a leader such as General Petraeus to determine that they are important
and stress them in his operations. This was the true contribution of FM 3-24 when it was
published. It gave General Petraeus and other leaders the ability to decide that the soft power
elements of counterinsurgency were important and emphasize them during the Surge.

Operationalizing Power

How do we know hard or soft power when we see it? The current literature goes into
detail on theoretical aspects of hard and soft power. These theoretical discussions will typically
be bolstered by specific examples. However, none have provided a working definition that
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operationalizes hard and soft power in a way to allow case-by-case categorization in a
satisfactory manner.
Boulding talked about destructive power and placed it in a primarily hard power context.
He said it could be active or passive, delineating between the threat and employment of power.
He also postulated that his three types of power (destructive, productive, integrative) can overlap
in employment, making it hard to break them into distinct categorizations for analysis. Both
Lukes and Baldwin help move the debate toward the power recipient rather than the capability
itself. It is the effect on the recipient that will help determine whether the power is hard or soft.
Keohane and Nye give us the theoretical distinctions of coercion and attraction, providing a
starting point for potential operationalization of hard and soft power.
To empirically evaluate the data collected for this study, working definitions that
encompass theoretical hard and soft power concepts need to be defined based on these theoretical
constructs provided in the literature. Keohane and Nye’s coercion and attraction provided the
best basis for operationalization of the hard and soft power concepts. This work proposes the
following new operational definitions of coercive and attractive power:

COERCIVE POWER: Actions whose consequences the recipient would not want repeated.

ATTRACTIVE POWER: Actions whose consequences the recipient would want repeated.

To parse the advantages and disadvantages of each, the following definitions are also
required and will be explained following the table:
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Time: The amount of time required to go from decision to conduct an action to action
completion.
Permanence: A measure of the length of time the effect of a completed action will persist.
Undesired Consequences: Results of an action that are not in the best interest of the actor but can
be reasonably expected to correlate with the action.
The following table demonstrates operationalization of these definitions:

ACTION
Bombing a House
Severing Diplomatic Ties
Erecting Barriers
Economic Sanctions

DO NOT WANT
MORE
Insurgents, innocents in
the house
Government, local
citizens
Insurgents

Influence Messaging
Uncoordinated Civic Action

Local Citizens,
government
Insurgents, Local
Citizens
Insurgents, family
members
Insurgents, local
citizens
Insurgents
Insurgents, government

Information Messaging
Joint Presence Patrolling

Insurgents
Insurgents

Political Oversight

insurgents, power
brokers
Insurgents

Cordon-and-Search
Internment Facilities
Checkpoints

Coordinated Civic Action
Bribes
Education/Training/Support

non-recipients

Hard/Soft Spectrum: Red = Hard, Green = Soft.
BOLDFACE =
Intended Targets
Time: 1 = Slow, 10 – Fast
Effect Duration: 1 = ephemeral, 10 = permanent

WANT MORE

TIME

DURATION

UNDESIRED CONSEQUENCES

Locals terrorized by
the targets
Inimical states

10

10

10

2

Collateral Damage, Martyrs, 3rd party
response
Resentment

Citizens and business
owners
Smugglers

5

5

Inhibits reconciliation

1

2

Reduce respect for rule of law

Citizens outside the
search zone
Other citizens

6

3

Roundup of innocents, spillover

4

6

Abu Ghraib

Local citizens

7

5

Slows traffic, fosters corruption

Local citizens
Contractors, looters

2
3

9
3

Local citizens
Local citizens,
security forces
Local Citizens,
governance aspirants
Government, local
businesses, citizens
Recipients
Bureaucrats, govt,
citizens

9
3

4
4

Message fatigue, cynicism
Mismanagement, looting, indifference
of local citizens (true intended target)
Dependency on occupying forces
Dependency on occupying forces

1

8

Perceptions of bias, ingratitude

5

7

Mismanagement, looting

10
5

1
9

Favoritism
Possible dependence

Plain Font = Others

Table 2: Operationalization of Power in Iraq
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The first column outlines a series of typical actions in a counterinsurgency environment.
They can be performed by either military or civilian elements acting alone, or a combination of
the two. It is not an exhaustive list: there are hundreds if not thousands of activities that can be
performed in an insurgency environment.
The color coding of the first column attempts to roughly place actions along a spectrum
from coercive (red) to attractive (green) power. Employment of weapons can be considered the
most coercive of measures, even firing warning shots. Education or training programs are
usually soft in nature. It is important for this work to note that not all diplomatic actions are
attractive and not all military actions are coercive. This is a departure from much of the
literature on power which often equates a capability with a type of power. For example, the
military is considered hard power, cultural programs are considered soft power. Many of the
activities shown in Table 3.1 can be carried out by either military or civilian personnel, even if
one is not the best choice.
The second column gives a short list of people who would likely not want to see the
action, or others like it, repeated. It can consist of people intentionally or unintentionally
recipient of the action. Intentional recipients are bold-faced in the chart. It can consist of people
directly or indirectly affected by the action. People indirectly affected may view hard power as
beneficial, or soft power as detrimental. Insurgents are almost always one of the members of this
list. As power gets more attractive, they are often the only ones on this list.
The third column gives a short list of people who likely would want to see the action or
similar actions repeated. As with those who would not want the action repeated, they can be
indirectly or directly affected, and can be intended or unintended targets. Note that even
coercive actions will have supporters among the local citizenry. Repeating actions should be
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treated as a general category. A village that has had a well dug does not want another well dug
but may want further civic actions such as refurbishing their school or being visited by a medical
team.
The determination of whether an action is hard or soft is based on the direct recipients.
Looking at a cordon-and-search operation, it is conducted in a specific geographic area with the
intent of finding insurgents. This makes it employment of coercive power, even though there
may be people outside the cordon area who are happy to see insurgents being captured and
would want to see other areas (probably not theirs!) cordoned and searched. Note that it is also
coercive power to the people inside the cordon area who are being sealed off and having their
dwellings searched. Although innocent people living in the cordon area are undeserving
recipients of coercive power, a secondary effect can be convincing those locals to turn in
insurgents they are currently hiding.
The fourth column breaks out actions by assigning a time factor for the desired effect to
be achieved. Severing diplomatic ties can be done in the time it takes the Ambassador to be
driven to the Foreign Minister’s residence. Trying to install a new political system can take
years or even decades. Note the difference in time between informational messaging and
influence messaging. Things such as warnings of impending military operations or date/times of
local elections pass immediately upon completion of the subject action. Influencing Sunni Iraqis
not to support al-Qaeda was maintained throughout the time of the U.S. commitment in Iraq and
beyond.
The fifth column assigns a permanence score to the action. Killing someone is
permanent: they will not directly impact the insurgency environment again. Bribes are
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ephemeral: recipients cannot be counted upon to continue to perform the desired action or
inaction once the bribe is removed.
The sixth column is a short list of potential undesirable effects of the action. For
example, this takes into account that even though killing one insurgent permanently solves that
problem, if his death inspires three of his brothers to join the insurgency, then the net effect of
the action is to turn the battlefield odds even more against the striker. Undesired effects usually
involve the local citizenry, but they can also include international players or even domestic
audiences.
This chart helps picture why weapon employment is a favored action for decisionmakers.
It is fast and it permanently solves the problem at hand. Further, a country like the U.S. with
advanced weaponry such as Predator drones and Tomahawk missiles can employ them with little
risk of its military personnel getting hurt. It is also readily available to the U.S. and its global
military presence. The disadvantages basically accrue to third party effects and responses.
Collateral damage may occur to property and innocent people. Killing a prominent insurgent can
inspire others to join the cause. The international community may condemn the weapon
employment and its effects. Domestic audiences may not be willing to underwrite death and
destruction if they do not perceive a vital national security objective at stake.
On the other hand, the chart demonstrates the plusses and minuses of working to install a
government system or overseeing the political process. It is a softer approach to effecting
change, and the change can carry a great degree of permanency, which are important. But it is
slow. It can also not create the outcome desired by the instilling country. When given an
opportunity to express their views, the people will often not select the course of action preferred
by the occupier. For example, Western powers keep trying to develop democratic institutions in
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Muslim countries in the hope of getting secular, moderate leadership, but Islamist groups keep
getting elected, often overwhelmingly.
Two sets of closely related actions can help elucidate the complexity of actions in a
counterinsurgency environment.

Information Versus Influence Messaging

The first is the difference between information and influence messaging. Information
messaging is typically a Public Affairs function, and comprises things like information about
curfews, voting registration and details of past violent acts. It typically supports immediate,
definitive events and does not directly attempt to permanently change audience behavior. As a
result, the products can be developed and disseminated quickly, but their effect may not last
beyond the event of interest. The goal is that eventually the local government and media will
take on this role.
Influence messaging in the U.S. Army is handled by Psychological Operations, and
comprises things like inducing insurgent desertion, turning the local population against the
insurgents, or encouraging local population support for the government. It usually is more
subjective in nature and hence is more open-ended than information messaging. Influence
messaging can take longer to take effect, years or even decades. If it is well-planned and
conducted, it can result in permanent behavior changes from the target audience. If inaccurate,
poorly carried out or lacks deeds that back its message, it can create message fatigue or even
cynicism among the target population.
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Neither information nor influence messaging is desired by the insurgents, who are rarely
the target of the first but often the target of the second. Local citizens can be targeted by both.
They are usually receptive to information messaging, but not as receptive to a foreigner trying to
change their behavior.

Civic Action

Another paired set worth examining is uncoordinated versus coordinated civic action.
Civic works projects are most common here. The difference is whether the occupier asked the
local citizens what they wanted or decided what they needed. Going it alone was a continual
U.S. problem in Iraq. Though ill-advised, these actions do not meet the definition of hard power.
The issue is not that the local citizens do not want the consequences repeated: they just do not
care. They would probably prefer the occupier talk to them about what they want, but they are
not trying to alter their behavior to make the occupier stop the action. About the only categories
that want to see uncoordinated civic action repeated are contractors content to keep taking U.S.
dollars even to build useless projects, and looters happy to have something to steal that no one
will try to recover.72
A squadron commander in Baghdad prior to the Surge illustrated the problem. In the
middle of his district was a fountain ringed by several lions. A general ordered his unit to repair
it. They spent over $200,000 with local leaders telling him he was the third American to fix it.
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Figure 3: Baghdad Fountain, Photo Provided by Interviewee

It worked for exactly one day: within weeks the grass was dead and anything useful had
been stolen. When he asked the Iraqi District Advisory Council Chairman if they could dedicate
some money to maintain the fountain, he replied, “No one cares about the lions except you.” 73
Coordinated civic action takes longer to initiate because time is taken to work with the
local leadership to select projects they see as useful (and not all the locals may agree on project
prioritization). However, getting local involvement in the decision process means they will be
less tolerant of a contractor dragging out the project to increase the cost, or improper building.
They will also be loath to see pilfering or other sabotage of the project during or after
completion. Coordination does not eliminate these problems but brings the locals in as an
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interested party to a successful outcome. With an uncoordinated project the locals will not care
if it being built properly, on-time or under budget. Coordination takes time but increases the
likelihood that the effort will have a lasting effect.

Measures of Effectiveness vs Measures of Performance

When available, direct measurements of U.S. efforts include things such as numbers of
pamphlets/radio broadcasts/newspapers circulated in Iraq or clinics built. Direct measurements
(known as measures of performance or MoPs by the military) do not necessarily indicate
effectiveness. However, they are easier for a staff officer to track. They also “brief great” at
staff meetings. The PSYOP officer puts up a Power Point slide showing a map of the country
depicting circles indicating radio coverage on the three largest population centers in the country
and says “General, your message is reaching over 60% of the local population 18x a day via our
radio broadcasting.”
Savvy commanders know to look past these metrics. They ask questions like “Does
anyone listen to our broadcasts? Are the dialects and themes familiar to the local audience? Are
our broadcasts interfering with local broadcasting? Have we considered buying airtime on local
stations instead of trying to run our own broadcasts?” He or she will be more concerned with
indirect benchmarks known as Measures of Effectiveness (MoE), which indicate whether the
audience performed the actions recommended in the messages. Are attacks on US forces
decreasing? Is there an increase in TIPS-line reporting? Did more of the population participate
in the last election? Are people utilizing the court system to adjudicate disputes?
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This work will utilize both MOPs and MOEs in its analysis. When feasible, weight of
importance will be given to MOEs. MOPs are valuable information and should not be entirely
discarded, but should be treated with caution as they are an indirect indicator of operational
effectiveness.

METHODOLOGY

Getting data from a war zone proved difficult. The original intent of this work was to
obtain and analyze data related to manning, employment and observed effects as recorded by
units operating in Iraq. Most of this data, though known by the author to have been tabulated
and reported, is still not releasable to the public. As a result, the author determined to capture the
unclassified information available from Surge participants utilizing a grounded theory approach.

GROUNDED THEORY

This project has inductive and deductive elements and utilizes an approach similar to
grounded theory in which each interview, and other data collection leads to revision of key
theoretical claims, and the revised theoretical claims then help guide future interviews and lines
of questioning. Grounded theory was developed in the 1960s by Barney Glazer and Anselm
Strauss. They were sociologists seeking a means to objectify qualitative research data such as
patient interviews. They wished to restore a balance between it and quantitative research, which
by the 1960s had taken primacy in the field of scientific research. Many scholars at the time felt
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that qualitative research was inductive and hence speculative, and wanted to see a focus on
empirical, real-world data.
There were four basic stages of grounded theory research elaborated by Glazer and
Strauss:
-

Codes: anchors around which key data points gather. This involves taking data
from interviews and written works and identifying key phrases or ideas and
marking them for further analysis. Work focuses on a posteriori knowledge from
first-hand participants, trying to identify and codify as much as possible actual
events and experiences by the individuals on the spot.

-

Concepts: groups of similar codes. In this step recurring codes are identified,
tabulated and categorized. Concepts often stretch across a spectrum of
interviewees.

-

Categories: broad groups of similar concepts. Now the work brings together
similar or correlative concepts into more generalized batches.

-

Theory: product of subject categories. Finally, theories are induced from the
aggregated categories. Ideally a range of categories will provide a range of
specific ideas from which generalized theories may be developed.

A similar approach was adopted for evaluation of the interviewee data for this work.
Phrases or observations that appeared in multiple interviews are brought together and treated as
common codes among interviewees. For example, both military and civilian interviewees
remarked on the problems created in Iraq by the issue of short tour lengths. Treating short tour
lengths as a code, it can be grouped with other issues such as difficulty in getting qualified
personnel into billets in Iraq as a broad concept of manning issues. The concept of manning
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issues can then be grouped with other concepts such as force protection issues into a broad
category of structural limitations. Structural limitations can be placed alongside categories such
as execution problems to develop encompassing theories of reasons for ineffectiveness when
conducting counterinsurgency.
Evaluation must keep in mind that interviewees responses were in most cases generated
by interviewer questions. For example, a large amount of data on messaging was gathered. This
should not be surprising given that there was a specific interview question on messaging. To
some extent the staging is being guided by the researcher.
The grounded theory approach was employed to modify questions over the course of
conducting interviews based on unanticipated avenues of interest that opened up based on prior
interviews. For example, two interviewees volunteered that they had participated in the 2009
“Surge” in Afghanistan. Most interviewees after that were asked if they had participated in the
2009 “Surge” in Afghanistan, providing another data point of interest to the research.

THE SAMPLE

All research was conducted in accordance with Old Dominion University guidelines
regarding human subject research. Research proposal package 1574657-1 was approved March
3rd, 2020 and is available at IRBNet for review.
Data was gathered utilizing referral sampling. This is a non-probability sampling
technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances.
It was developed to increase sampling among hidden populations such as drug addicts. Also
known as snowball sampling, the idea is for the subjects themselves to guide the interviewer
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toward future research subjects. New subjects can reinforce existing research or spur branch
research ideas.
Referral sampling was the best approach to develop the current database. A random
approach would have required far more interviews than one researcher would be capable of
conducting and might not have adequately covered interviewee characteristics important for this
work. Timothy Johnson points out that this technique allows for selection of further
interviewees based on these characteristics of interest.74 The intent was to gather snapshots from
a spectrum of agencies, locations, and jobs. Referral sampling was able to meet this goal with
far fewer interviews. A questionnaire would not have been as effective in soliciting opinions and
recollections that were not anticipated by the researcher but provided valuable insight into the
Surge effort. The impact of attractive power can be hard to capture in a box-checking format.
Conducting live interviews allowed the researcher to ask follow up questions as interviewees
provided unanticipated paths to explore facts germane to the Surge.
Referral sampling proved an effective technique for all categories of Surge participants.
Only five of the interviewees were personally known to the author prior to the study.
Interviewees were quick to recommend additional potential subjects, did so within and across the
military-civilian divide, and normally facilitated introductions to the new person. This study did
not seek classified information. It captured unclassified data, recollections and generalized
observances and trends.
Interviews were typically built around broad questions following upon “yes/no”
questions. For example, “Did you work with Coalition partners?” would, in the event of an
affirmative answer, be followed up with “Were there any you thought were particularly effective
at soft power and why?” Interviewees might go into detail about effective techniques they
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observed from Coalition partners. Alternatively, they might on their own detail Coalition
partners or strategies they felt were not effective, even though this was never an interview
question. This format allowed the interviewee leeway to move into areas that may not have been
previously considered by the interviewer or categorized as inconsequential. As a result, the
research developed and often branched off into areas not anticipated by the researcher.
Referral sampling carries inherent weaknesses as a non-random process. Subjects will
tend to refer people they knew and worked with. This potentially reduces the geographic
“spread” of interviews. For instance, a majority of the interviewees worked in Baghdad during
the Surge. Interviewees will tend to recommend people they worked with, so it logically follows
that once the snowball rolled to Baghdad, it tended to stay in Baghdad.
On the other hand, this interview “bulge” can also be taken as a demonstration of a flaw
in the U.S. counterinsurgency effort that General Petraeus sought to reverse, the “big base”
mentality. At its height, the Victory Base Complex (VBC) housed 46,000 people, over one-third
of the total U.S. strength in Iraq. Then include the U.S. Embassy complex with over 5,000
Americans, and it is easy to understand how personnel strength in Iraq did not directly transcribe
into the “in the grass” capability most effective in countering insurgency.
Interviewees will tend to recommend like-minded participants and friends, complicating
the process of gathering viewpoints across the spectrum of opinion on an issue. They are more
likely to remain in contact with people they were friends with during the deployment. They are
more likely to recall them as people they successfully worked with, making progress in the
mission with them. There was not a single instance of someone speaking negatively about the
person who recommended them during interviewing.
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Post event interviews do not represent raw data, which is both a strength and weakness of
the methodology. Interviewees have had time to crystallize their thoughts and beliefs regarding
the Surge and reflect upon what they experienced and learned. On the other hand, time allows
for bias to enter their memory and possibly distort the true picture of what actually occurred
during the Surge.
Forty-three people were interviewed for this work. Seven were specialized interviews or
otherwise were not interviewed using one of the standardized interviews, the remaining thirty-six
followed the standard interview format reproduced in Tables 3.2 or 3.3. All interviewees save
one agreed to be recorded, although that one did allow notetaking. Two subjects who published
works on the Surge declined interviews but did answer specific questions. Most interviews were
conducted by phone: some were done via the Skype, WebEx or Zoom meeting platforms. Some
interviewees provided documentation to support their answers or to further this project’s
research. No interviewee ever declined to answer a specific question. Most interviewees seemed
eager to participate in this study and were interactive during the interview process.
Transcribed interview average length was 8.5 pages. Military interview length averaged
10.7 pages. Civilian interview length averaged 6.2 pages.
Results were broadly representative of a variety of roles and positions within the U.S.
effort in Iraq on a variety of dimensions. Interviews were roughly divided between military and
civilian roles, including individuals who worked in Baghdad and elsewhere. There were both soft
power and hard power specialists, leaders and staff, and a majority of people who regularly left
their base and interacted with Iraqis. It also included people who had been in Iraq prior to the
Surge and/or participated in the subsequent “Surge” in Afghanistan. The following table
summarizes interviewee data:
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Category
In Category
Military
21 (54%)
Career
24 (62%)
SPS
32 (82%)
PEII
28 (72%)
Leader
16 (41%)
BDE+
37 (95%)
Conventional
36 (92%)
Baghdad
29 (74%)
TOTW
27 (69%)
MWI
33 (85%)
Detainees
11 (28%)
AFG Surge
14 (36%)
SPB
36 (92%)
SPA
32 (82%)
Table 3: Interviewee Data75

Out of Category
18 (46%)
15 (38%)
6 (15%)
7 (18%)
22 (56%)
2 (5%)
3 (8%)
10 (26%)
2 (5%)
1 (3%)
17 (44%)
18 (45%)
0
1 (3%)

Not Categorized
0
0
1(3%)
4 (10%)
1 (3%)
0
0
0
10 (26%)
5 (13%)
11 (28%)
7 (18%)
3 (8%)
6 (15%)

Of the thirty-six standardized interviews nineteen were military, seventeen were civilian.
This was consistent with the sample diversity goals. Intent was to generate a balanced database
of interviewees based on their service as either military or civilian participants. Sufficient
samples of each were obtained to explore the soft versus hard power issues in detail across the
spectrum of department perception.
There was some diversity in both the civilian and military department assignments,
although this mix was slanted heavily towards DoS and U.S. Army. Sixteen interviewees were
U.S. Army, two were Marines, thirteen were Department of State, four were other U.S.
government agencies, one was a British national.
No Iraqi nationals were interviewed. Snowballing to them was not effective. By and
large the interviewees had not maintained contact with Iraqi or Coalition partners they worked
with during the Surge. Some also stated that on subsequent returns to Iraq they found that all the
Iraqis they had previously worked with had been murdered. Fear of retribution may have also
played a role in interviewee reluctance to snowball Iraqi friends. When the author reached out to
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a British Army friend who works in Psychological Operations, he told him that by 2007 they
were mostly out of Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan.
Twenty-five interviewees were full-time careerists of their respective department. Eleven
were individuals such as military Guardsmen or Reservists, contractors or Department of
Defense temporary hires known as 3161’s after the regulatory section authorizing their hiring.
This category is intended to search for differentiation in opinions of full-time careerists versus
others to discern if one or the other was more likely to appreciate and embrace soft power
techniques. Full-time careerist specifically excludes Guardsmen and Reservists, who may spend
30 years in the military but not on a full-time basis. This categorization does not imply
superiority of careerists over others. 76
Thirty-one interviewees were specialists in a field commonly associated with soft power,
Five were hard power specialists, usually Army brigade commanders. Military soft power
elements are normally dispersed to units across the battlefield. Even though there are stateside
brigades or groups of soft power Army elements, and sometimes these headquarters deploy as
controlling/oversight elements to a higher (corps and higher) command, they rarely operate in
combat as an autonomous, complete unit. This categorization allows analysis to look for
differences in opinions on the efficacy of soft power between practitioners and combat leaders.
Soft power practitioners can be expected to advocate for their field of endeavor, although
interviews demonstrated some who questioned if not the soft power concept, its application in
Iraq. Of interest is combat leaders who came to see soft power as a preferable alternative to hard
power.
Twenty-five interviewees had previously served in Iraq prior to the Surge. This includes
interviewees whose tour substantially overlapped both the Surge and the prior period. The
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dividing line was set as February 2008, when General Petraeus assumed command of MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), although Surge units had begun flowing into Iraq in January. In
this case, subjects were preferred who had spent at least two months both prior to and after
February 2008. This categorization allows exploring whether Iraq veterans saw a difference in
soft power employment during the Surge versus prior experience. All Surge participants did not
serve tours congruent with General Petraeus’ time as MNF-I commander. Interviewees were
considered to have served in Iraq prior to the tour if their tour began at least two months prior to
General Petraeus’ arrival.
Thirteen interviewees were leaders such as unit commanders or Provincial
Reconstruction Team chiefs. Twenty-three were staff or other support personnel. Deputy
commanders were treated as commanders for this category. This split will allow evaluation for
differentiation in opinions between leadership and subordinates on how the U.S. in general and
their organization specifically implemented soft power during the Surge. Subordinates might be
more inclined to be open about implementation shortfalls, while leaders might be expected not to
stray from the “company line”. Sufficient sample sizes of each were gathered.
Thirty-five interviewees operated at Brigade level or higher: only one was at a lower unit
level. PRT’s are treated as brigade level for this study. Referral samplers tended to snowball
sideways or up, i.e., they would recommend people at an equal or higher level to them. The
interviews as obtained do not provide an expansive opportunity to explore the opinions of Surge
participants working at battalion level or lower.
Three interviewees worked in Special Operations: the remainder of the military
interviewees were conventional forces. U.S. Army Special Operations is primarily composed of
the Special Forces Groups, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. Special Forces elements
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normally work in small groups among the population of an area of interest. As a result, they
often practice many of the precepts of soft power as a matter of course and can be quickest to
embrace and support soft power activities. Special Forces in Iraq had a separate reporting
authority back to Special Operations Command in Tampa: they did not report directly to General
Petraeus, although liaison was maintained from both sides.
Twenty-six interviewees primarily worked in Baghdad or the band of nearby towns
during the Surge, ten worked outside of Baghdad. Another consequence of referral sampling
trending sideways or up was that the interviews tended to be Baghdad-centric. MNF-I and
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) were both located there. Approximately one-third of all the
U.S. troop strength in Iraq was housed on the Victory Base Complex near Baghdad International
Airport. Sufficient non-Baghdad samples were gathered to allow for comparison between
Baghdad and the rest of the country. These samples also allow for comparison between the two
prime insurgent sources. The focus in Baghdad was against the Shia militias, whereas most of
the non-Baghdad interviewees were facing Sunni insurgents in a combination of al-Qaeda and
former Saddam regime elements.

“BOB on the FOB” was a recurring cartoon published by SSG
A.J. Merrifield, a soldier deployed to Iraq. FOB stands for “Forward
Operating Base.” Many of the military and civilian personnel deployed to
Iraq rarely or never left their base, usually because their job did not require
them to do so. It does not mean their job was unimportant or that their
opinions are irrelevant, but simply that they were not in position to directly
observe the effects of attractive-power activities in Iraq, the focus of this
work. Any FOB over company size was very safe. It was not going to be
overrun and insurgent indirect fire was inaccurate. SSG Merrifield
humorously lampooned the few Iraq participants who seemed to equate
their support role risk with that of combat soldiers.

Figure 4: Bob on the FOB Cartoon, Reprinted with kind permission of SSG A.J. Merrifield
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Twenty-four interviewees regularly conducted missions “outside the wire”, defined as
departing their installation multiple times weekly. These departures could be as part of larger
elements and missions or smaller groups with more specific tasks. Sufficient samples were
generated of Surge participants who were regularly conducting ground-level missions in the field
and getting first-hand information on what was happening in Iraq. Some care must be taken
because in many cases, particularly for senior leaders, as they often had sufficient security that
they were close to “bringing the wire with them” when they left their compounds.
Thirty interviewees regularly met with Iraqi locals and leadership, defined as multiple
times weekly. These could be formal, scheduled meetings or a consequence of regular travel
outside the wire. The bulk of the interviewees regularly worked with Iraqis, whether going to
their offices, bringing them to their offices or via telecommunications. This allows exploration
of the importance of direct communication with the host nation leadership and citizens in soft
power endeavors. Interviewees will repeatedly demonstrate their opinion of the value of direct
contact with Iraqis.
Five interviewees regularly worked with detainees, not necessarily as a prison facility
guard or overseer. Recidivism among captured insurgents is a concern in any counterinsurgency
environment. Sufficient samples were obtained to allow exploration of U.S. efforts to prevent
captured insurgents from rejoining the fight upon release. It is an audience that allows for the
type of long-term approach that tends to be most effective for soft power.
Fourteen interviewees are known to have participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan.
An initial interview question was whether interviewees thought the lessons of Iraq were
applicable to other/future conflicts. After multiple interviewees volunteered that they had been
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in Afghanistan in 2009, a question specific to the Afghanistan Surge was added. This provided
an opportunity to explore whether interviewees immediately applied lessons learned in Iraq to
the Afghanistan Surge, and to what extent they were successful. It also allowed the researcher to
uncover an interesting opinion of “Two-Surge” interviewees that is explored in Chapter Seven.

THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The strength of the interview method is that it allowed for collection of primary source
data of Surge participants, not secondary data. Primary source data is collected first-hand from
participants.77 This allows for direct interaction between the researcher and the interviewee,
eliminating possible confusion from derived sourcing. It is considered captured data, meaning it
was purposefully collected for this work.78 It also allows the researcher to direct the interview
into unanticipated but interesting areas.
Post-event interviews represent raw data, which is both a strength and weakness of the
interviews as a source of information. They allow for reflection and hindsight on the part of the
interviewee that can place events into a broader context. Amanda Bolderston described 30-50
interviews as being necessary for a grounded theory approach to ensure that the researcher can
saturate categories and detail a theory. She also pointed out that these interviews are ideal for
looking at perceptions and experiences of interviewees.79
Drawbacks include concerns of accuracy when utilizing source interviews. Additionally,
the interviews are being conducted over ten years after the events in question. Several subjects
joked about memory issues in trying to recall events that far in the past. Official records and
cross-checking with other interviewees reduces the potential magnitude of the problem and is
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recommended by Bolderston. The author personally transcribed all interviews, which
Bolderston demonstrates best allows the researcher to become familiar with the data.
The following initial statement was read to all interviewees: “My name is J.R. Reiling. I
am a retired US Army Psychological Operations officer. I am currently a PhD candidate at Old
Dominion University. My dissertation focuses on the soft power component of the U.S. Surge in
Iraq from 2007-2008. I am interviewing people who participated in the Surge as decisionmakers, operators or both. Based on your Surge experience, I would like to interview you to
improve my understanding of the Surge. Interview should take approximately one hour and is
unclassified. Your participation is voluntary. You may stop the interview at any time. Your
information will be kept confidential and only released with your permission. May I record the
interview? May we proceed?”
There were two basic categories of interviews: military and civilian. Interviewer would
interject or alter questions as deemed applicable during the interview, particularly if points of
interest were touched upon. Elite-level interviews, particularly with General Petraeus and
Ambassador Croker, were also conducted. In those cases, a tailored set of interview questions
was utilized. Interview length was kept at approximately 20 questions. This section will list
basic interviewee questions and explain their importance.
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Military Interview Questions

QUESTION #
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

QUESTION
Can you tell me your unit and role related to the Surge?
What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?
Also called non-lethal or non-kinetic. Did you deploy to Iraq prior to the Surge?
As part of pre-deployment planning, how did you view the utility of soft power elements
such as PSYOP, IO, PAO and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)?
Can you describe your unit’s organic soft power capability? Did you or your unit request
additional soft power elements and/or integrate them into pre-deployment training? For
example, cultural awareness briefings for deploying soldiers or exercises including actors
portraying civilians/tribal leaders? To what extent were these requests filled by your unit and
higher headquarters?
Upon arrival, what was your initial assessment of soft power “gaps” in your unit operations?
Can you describe interagency relations, particularly with the Department of State and PRTs?
Did you feel DoD and DoS were proactively cooperating or competing?
Were there Coalition partners you believed were particularly effective at soft power and
how? How were you able to integrate and cooperate with these partners?
Was soft power worked by, with and through Iraqi partners (government, military)? How did
this impact pursuit of U.S. national security objectives? How or why not?
Did your unit interact with local tribal/religious figures? Did this change your ability to
conduct operations?
Did your unit interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, Al-Jazeera)? How or why
not?
Did your unit interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? How or why not?
Were you involved in messaging? How long was the staffing process? Did this change
during the Surge? To what extent was accuracy sacrificed? Did you feel your messages
were getting out in time to be useful?
Did your organization work with detainees? If so, were soft power elements such as
vocational training, counterindoctrination or educational opportunities provided?
Can you describe the interaction between hard and soft power? For example, did soft power
supplant hard power (compliance through coercion)? Did you see the “ratio” of hard to soft
power change over time? If so, how was this achieved?
Was hard power used to support soft power such as providing security for reconstruction
teams or Rewards for Justice programs? What ways proved most effective?
Did the insurgents practice soft power? If so, did the insurgents change/increase their soft
power focus in response to Coalition efforts and how? Were there insurgent soft power
tactics you felt were particularly effective?
Did you perceive the ratio of U.S. to ISF casualties shifting during the Surge? How?
Were there elements of soft power (written vs audio vs video messaging, Civil Affairs, faceto-face interaction, leaflet drops) that were more effective than others? Which and why?
Did the Surge produce benefits in Iraq? If so, were they long-term or transitory?
What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge?
Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts? Why or why not?

Table 4: Military Interview Questions
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The questions were formulated to gather information specific to the soft power
component of the Surge in Iraq as seen through the eyes of the military people stationed there.
The following section details the specific purpose of each question asked.
1) Can you tell me your unit and role related to the Surge?
This question established that the interviewee was present during the Surge, where they
were stationed, and what type of work they were performing during the Surge. Desire was to
have interviewees who were stationed throughout Iraq and served in a variety of locations and
differing levels of authority and responsibility. Intent was to see if any of these factors
influenced answers.
2) What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?
Also called non-lethal or non-kinetic. Did you deploy to Iraq prior to the Surge?
This question established whether the individual had previously worked in or with
international soft power efforts. Intent was to establish whether they were already familiar with
soft power concepts or would have to learn “on-the-job.” Not all participants arrived in Iraq with
General Petraeus. Asking whether they had deployed to Iraq prior to the Surge included full
tours from a prior time or people who had been in Iraq for several months prior to GEN Petraeus’
arrival.
3) As part of pre-deployment planning, how did you view the utility of soft power elements
such as PSYOP, IO, PAO and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)?
This question explored whether interviewees had any preconceived notions of the value
of military elements associated with soft power that could have impacted how they employed or
worked with these elements.
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4) Can you describe your unit’s organic soft power capability? Did you or your unit request
additional soft power elements and/or integrate them into pre-deployment training? For
example, cultural awareness briefings for deploying soldiers or exercises including actors
portraying civilians/tribal leaders? To what extent were these requests filled by your unit and
higher headquarters?
This question established what soft power elements commanders in particular had at their
disposal. Follow-on questions provide insight into the commander’s appreciation of the
importance of non-kinetic capabilities throughout his command, and whether he was supported
in this by higher headquarters.
5) Upon arrival, what was your initial assessment of soft power “gaps” in your unit operations?
This question demonstrates shortfalls the interviewee had to overcome while working
during the Surge. It is also an indicator of the interviewee’s perception of the importance of soft
power projection.
6) Can you describe interagency relations, particularly with the Department of State and PRTs.
Did you feel DoD and DoS were proactively cooperating or competing?
This question is intended to reveal how the individual felt interaction with the other
primary implementor of the Surge improved or inhibited their ability to carry out their assigned
duties. Follow-on question provides insight as to interviewee’s perception of whether the
cooperation was forced.
7) Were there Coalition partners you believed were particularly effective at soft power and
how? How were you able to integrate and cooperate with these partners?
This question provides insight as to whether the interviewee felt there were other nations
who demonstrated effective counterinsurgency procedures, assuming there were other Coalition
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partners in their area of operations. Follow-on question indicates whether good practices were
shared and synergized across the Coalition.
8) Was soft power worked by, with and through Iraqi partners (government, military)? How did
this impact pursuit of U.S. national security objectives? How or why not?
This question shows the ability of the interviewee and their unit to integrate their actions
with the host nation. Follow-on questions can shed light on whether this partnering remained in
the overall U.S. interest.
9) Did your unit interact with local tribal/religious figures? Did this change your ability to
conduct operations?
This question provides insight on the willingness and necessity of working outside
official Iraqi channels, which may not have always been the “key figures” in the area of
operations. Follow-on question allows the interviewee to discuss whether this interaction
positively or negatively impacted U.S. efforts.
10) Did your unit interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, Al-Jazeera)? How or why
not?
Question indicates whether the interviewee’s organization capitalized on the opportunity
to bring local media into the messaging process. Follow-on question can shed light on whether
any shortfalls were due to lack of opportunity or willingness.
11) Did your unit interact with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? How or why not?
Question indicates whether the interviewee’s organization capitalized on the opportunity
to engage others in getting the work done. Follow-on question can shed light on whether any
shortfalls were due to lack of willingness or opportunity.
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12) Were you involved in messaging? How long was the staffing process? Did this change
during the Surge? To what extent was accuracy sacrificed? Did you feel your messages
were getting out in time to be useful?
Question indicates whether the interviewee was involved in framing the dialogue explain
to the Iraqis the actions and intent of U.S. forces. Follow-on questions for applicable
interviewees indicate whether the Surge adapted messaging to make it more useful.
13) Did your organization work with detainees? If so, were soft power elements such as
vocational training, counterindoctrination or educational opportunities provided?
Question indicates whether the U.S. was capitalizing on the opportunity to influence Iraqi
prisoners. Follow-on question may not be applicable to most units, who were operating
temporary detention facilities.
14) Can you describe the interaction between hard and soft power? For example, did soft power
supplant hard power (compliance through coercion)? Did you see the “ratio” of hard to soft
power change over time? If so, how was this achieved?
Question allows the interviewee to describe smart power efforts in his area of operations.
Follow-ons provided insight as to whether the goal of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker
to increase soft power efforts was realized.
15) Was hard power used to support soft power such as providing security for reconstruction
teams or Rewards for Justice programs? What ways proved most effective?
This is a variant of the previous question as a concrete demonstration of whether the unit
was in fact attempting to practice smart power. Follow-on allows the interviewee to explore
how.
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16) Did the insurgents practice soft power? If so, did the insurgents change/increase their soft
power focus in response to Coalition efforts and how? Were there insurgent soft power
tactics you felt were particularly effective?
This was the question most likely to have interviewees respond, “That is an interesting
question.” Primary intent is to discern whether the interviewee’s unit was factoring insurgent
response into the campaign plan.
17) Did you perceive the ratio of U.S. to ISF casualties shifting during the Surge? How?
This question is intended to indicate whether the burden of fighting shifted to the Iraqi
Security Forces during the Surge.
18) Were there elements of soft power (written vs audio vs video messaging, Civil Affairs, faceto-face interaction, leaflet drops) that were more effective than others? Which and why?
This question was intended to discern if there were elements of soft power that the
interviewee felt were more effective than others. If so, follow-up question was to determine the
ones the interviewee felt were effective.
19) Did the Surge produce benefits in Iraq? If so, were they long-term or transitory?
This question is intended to reveal whether the interviewee felt that the Surge improved
the overall situation in Iraq, regardless of their opinion of the whether the entire U.S. intervention
itself was beneficial to Iraq. Follow-on question allows the interviewee to opine on the
permanence of the Surge benefits.
20) What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge?
This question allowed the interviewee to summarize their overall experience with soft
power during the Surge, both positive and negative.
21) Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts? Why or why not?
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This question allowed the interviewee to speculate on whether they felt that the soft
power tactics and techniques they employed in Iraq would work in other conflicts. A related
question was added asking interviewees if they had participated in the 2009 surge in Afghanistan
after two volunteered that they had.

Civilian Interview Questions

QUESTION #
1
2

15
16
17
18

QUESTION
Can you briefly tell me your organization, role and timeframe related to the Surge?
What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?
Did you ever work previously with U.S. government employment of hard power (compliance
through coercion)? Had you been assigned to Iraq prior to the Surge?
Had you previously worked with U.S. military Psychological Operations, Information
Operations, Public Affairs or Civil Affairs?
How often did U.S. military proactively come into contact with your organization? Were
military liaisons embedded with your organization or vice versa?
Was joint planning and coordination conducted with U.S. military? What types of
interactions and frequency? How did these contribute to the success of the mission?
Did you travel “outside the wire”? If so, were non-security U.S. military elements also part
of the mission?
How often did you work with Iraqi partners (government, military)? How did this impact
pursuit of U.S. objectives?
Did you interact with local tribal/religious figures? Were any techniques or activities more
effective than others?
Did you interact with local/regional media (local TV/radio, al-Jazeera)?
Did you see your efforts impacting violence in Iraq and if so, to what extent?
Did you see the “ratio” of hard power to soft power change over the course of the Surge? If
so, which elements of each increased or decreased?
Did the insurgents change/increase their soft power focus in response to Coalition efforts if at
all?
Did international players (Coalition partners, proxy states) employ soft power effectively?
How?
Were non-governmental agencies integrated into soft power planning and execution? Which
ones and how?
Were there elements of soft power that were more effective than others? Which and why?
Did you see the Surge as providing long-term solutions and how?
What were your “lessons learned” for soft power efforts during the Surge?
Are the soft power lessons of Iraq applicable to other/future conflicts? Why or why not?

19

Do you have anything else you would like to add?

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Table 5: Civilian Interview Questions
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Most of the questions asked of the civilians were the same as asked of the military.
Variations are discussed below.
2) What was your soft power (compliance through attraction) background prior to the Surge?
Did you ever work previously with U.S. government employment of hard power (compliance
through coercion)? Had you been assigned to Iraq prior to the Surge?
As a reverse of a question asked of military members, intent of this question was to
determine if any of the civilian interviewees had been involved in a prior international coercive
operation by the U.S.
3) Had you previously worked with U.S. military Psychological Operations, Information
Operations, Public Affairs or Civil Affairs?
Intent of this question was to determine if the civilian interviewee had prior familiarity
with the military elements traditionally associated with soft power.
4) How often did U.S. military proactively come into contact with your organization? Were
military liaisons embedded with your organization or vice versa?
Intent of this question was to determine if the civilian interviewee felt the military made
an effort to interact with his organization. Follow-up question would demonstrate the strongest
form of proactive contact, a permanent liaison.
5) Was joint planning and coordination conducted with U.S. military? What types of
interactions and frequency? How did these contribute to the success of the mission?
Intent of this question was to determine whether the U.S. military was able to tamp down
its tendency to “go it alone” during the Surge. Follow on questions determine depth of
effectiveness and whether the interviewee saw this interaction as beneficial.
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6) Did you travel “outside the wire”? If so, were non-security U.S. military elements also part
of the mission?
Intent of this question was to determine whether the interviewee left their parent base on
a regular basis. Follow-on question provides insight as to whether or not joint soft-power
missions were being conducted.

INTERVIEWEE DATA

The following chart tabulates key data and questions regarding the interviewees for this
work:

Category

In Category

Out of Category

Not Categorized

Military
Career
SPS
PEII
Leader
BDE+
Conventional
Baghdad
TOTW
MWI
Detainees
AFG Surge
SPB
Applicable Elsewhere

21 (54%)
24 (62%)
32 (82%)
28 (72%)
16 (41%)
37 (95%)
36 (92%)
29 (74%)
27 (69%)
33 (85%)
11 (28%)
14 (36%)
36 (92%)
32 (82%)

18 (46%)
15 (38%)
6 (15%)
7 (18%)
22 (56%)
2 (5%)
3 (8%)
10 (26%)
2 (5%)
1 (3%)
17 (44%)
18 (45%)
0
1 (3%)

0
0
1(3%)
4 (10%)
1 (3%)
0
0
0
10 (26%)
5 (13%)
11 (28%)
7 (18%)
3 (8%)
6 (15%)

Table 6: Interviewee Data
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CONCLUSION

Terminology discussion focused on the key definition of power and its delineation into
hard and soft for this work. A new definition was proposed for smart power. New and
operationalized definitions were proposed for coercive power and attractive power. These
definitions will help separate power capabilities from the power categorizations themselves.
Smart power is a normative concept, but one which integrates contemporary theory regarding
power projection and will also prove valuable in demonstrating how the Surge differed from the
previous U.S. effort there.
Grounded theory and referral sampling were described to lay the foundation for the data
accumulation basis of this study. Forty-three interviews were gathered for this study with a
healthy mix of civilian and military participants who served in a variety of positions and
locations in Iraq during the Surge. Most of the interviewees were unknown to the author prior to
introduction by previous interviewees. Their willing cooperation resulted in an excellent
database that will allow this study to empirically pursue points of interest regarding the U.S.
application of power in Iraq in 2007-2008.
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CHAPTER IV
PRE-SURGE PROBLEMS

INTRODUCTION

Counterinsurgency is not easy. Smart power is a normative term: hence there is not a
formula that tells planners the right mix of hard and soft power to create smart power. Success
normally requires a large investment of people and resources by the occupier over an extended
period. Problems both internal and external will beset a country attempting to apply power
against an insurgency, particularly if they are operating on foreign soil.
This work has defined smart power as “employment of the range of available tools of
power in a combination of attraction and coercion to efficiently accomplish national objectives.”
Smart power is normative. Consequently, there is no precise allocation of hard and soft power
that will produce the desired result for every contingency, or every time or location in a
contingency, or even a different day in the same location. Metz and Byman wrote about the
inherent problem that as a foreign power increases the capabilities of the host nation government,
its ability to influence them declines. 80 Branch and Wood talked about lack of intelligence,
particularly in the early stages of the insurgency, hindering the ability of the intervening power to
plan a proper strategy.81
Many of the problems begin before assets even begin to be deployed. This chapter will
detail these structural flaws in the U.S. starting with the limitations imposed by the unique U.S.
form of government. Interviews shed light on problems related to force composition, tour
lengths and lines of authority, and some of the steps taken to correct these flaws before and
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during the Surge. Guidance from senior leadership at times hamstrung operations. Financial
considerations played a role in limiting effectiveness of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The patience of the
U.S. voter acted as a nebulous but ever-present “statute of limitations” often forcing the U.S. to
favor short-term versus long-term approaches.
Further problems arose after arriving in Iraq. Interviewees consistently emphasized the
personality-dependent nature of their efforts and that getting along with peers, particularly from
other agencies, was crucial to success. International problems ran from Coalition partners with
differing national objectives to regional states and non-state entities who also desired to shape
the course of events in Iraq. Reminiscent of Vietnam, local government corruption, bias and
incompetence dogged U.S. efforts to establish a legitimate governing authority.

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

Proper exercise of power in Iraq was made difficult by structural flaws in the U.S. and the
international system. The ideas of Dahl about exercise of power being a result of compromise by
elites was evident when looking at the fractured Iraqi political mosaic. Almost as important was
the need for compromise by the elites involved. Those in Iraq and Washington, military and
civilian, and U.S. and Iraqi, needed to develop a more cooperative effort emphasizing the
strengths and weakness of each. This chapter will detail some of the institutional problems that
had to be worked through or around.
The second “facet of power” can be understood by looking at Bachrach and Baratz and
their treatment of the second face of power, which to them was the agenda-controlling ability of
senior leadership during the early stages of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Even before the
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invasion, recommendations by the military of needed force levels were ignored. State
Department concerns about post-liberation governance were also marginalized as that role was
even initially handed to the military. After liberation, military concerns about the growing
insurgent threat and how to respond to it were downplayed by Donald Rumsfeld in particular.
The U.S. military and civilian leadership in Iraq were intelligent people who had ideas for
changing the Coalition approach in Iraq, but they were disregarded.
The third facet of power postulated by Lukes could be applied to any number of the
misperceptions and misinformation extant in Iraq. Sunni, Shia and Kurdish misperceptions of
each other and Coalition intentions were paramount. External actors such as Iran and al-Qaeda
appeared to be beneficial to the Iraqis because they opposed the Coalition. The leadership in
Washington D.C. was forcing a flawed strategy on its subordinates in the belief that it was the
correct strategy. Military and civilians in Iraq were reluctant to work together because of
preconceived notions about the other and were not working effectively with their Iraqi
counterparts.

OCCUPATION

Any occupying power can expect difficulty adapting to an insurgency environment in a
foreign country. A senior DoD official who worked reconstruction in Iraq described the
problem:
One of the biggest gaps was sending 18 and 19-year-old kids to a place where they don’t
speak the language and asking them to restore security and maintain local order as a kind
of police action post-invasion…. Use the U.S. as an analogy. We have trained, extremely
well-prepared police officers working in communities where they not only speak the
language, but they live and they work and they understand every aspect of the culture
they are in. Yet they fail in those daily jobs in ways that create tremendous unrest. On
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that scale, think of the burden we placed on young men and women when we sent them
into Iraq with none of those backgrounds, asked them to do a role much more
complicated and gave them no support. 82
The best solution in Iraq was to stand up Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and enable them to
take on the task of restoring stability and order in the country, moving toward Hammes’ idea that
indirect support of local contingencies is a better strategy than employing foreign forces 83. This
proved difficult due to issues of time, funding and factional mistrust. Unfortunately, prior to the
Surge the U.S. continued to act as if these forces were effectively taking on the pacification role
and proceeded with drawing down its presence when it was obvious that the ISF was not ready to
take the lead in restoring order. A consistent theme among interviewees for this work was that
the ISF were manifestly unready to take on the security role in 2007.
The problem was even more difficult because the policymakers in Washington did not
want to simply restore an old order in Iraq: they were trying to create a new one built around a
democratic system. An interviewee who worked influence operations in Iraq felt that the U.S.
never really mapped out what it would mean to build a new social order and take to do so. He
felt there were sufficient resources in Iraq, the U.S. just did a poor job with them. 84 Gentile
correctly warns that no amount of military adaptation can rescue a flawed policy.85 Nonetheless,
adaptation can produce short-term results such as the Surge demonstrated.
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U.S. PROBLEMS

Division of Power

The Founding Fathers wrote a ground-breaking document of governance, but it was
deliberately designed not to be fast. Diffuse lines of authority make it difficult for any one
person to effectively control the whole. This spirit of diffusion permeates throughout the
Executive Branch in particular. Various agencies jealousy guard their prerogatives of authority,
funding and manning, and are loath to see other agencies interfere in “their” area. Gompert saw
that a related problem was the U.S. tendency to address “problems” by creating new layers of
bureaucracy.86 Interviewees will demonstrate that success was usually predicated on the
opposite tack, eliminating the “red tape.”
These problems were occurring from the beginning in Iraq. Ambassador Timothy
Carney, who was one of the interviewees for this work, was initially in Iraq with ORHA, the
Pentagon’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. When he returned, he wrote
an editorial for the Washington Post titled “We’re Getting In Our Own Way.” This piece was
critical of the effort there. 87 Ambassador Carney (who had previously served as Ambassador to
Sudan and Haiti) mentioned some of the minor problems such as housing accommodations and
water shortages he endured throughout his time there, which may be humorous but are
symptomatic of the larger coordination and resourcing issues in Iraq prior to the Surge detailed
below.
ORHA was organized by and reported to the Pentagon, not State Department. This is not
unusual. Direct military rule of a conquered area ends up being the only realistic option when
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countries occupy other countries. There is usually a high threat level, and diplomatic/civilian
resources are typically not ready to assume control over the occupied area. This did not in and of
itself have to be a problem: William H. Taft was an exceptionally effective military transitional
governor in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War.88
The problems arose with planning and implementation. Little time was allotted to ORHA
to organize and develop their plan. ORHA Director Jay Garner knew this would create
difficulties. He recounted that when he went in to see Secretary Rumsfeld in January 2003, he
told him that George Marshall had started working on post-WWII planning in 1942, while they
were just beginning to plan for a problem that would probably happen in March or April. 89 A
senior stability commander who was on the CENTCOM operations staff in 2003 said ORHA was
mostly designed as a fly-in package to help the Iraqi ministries get back to business.
Unfortunately, after the invasion all the Iraqi technocrats walked away. 90 Bringing back the ones
willing to come back took time.
Some staffers at ARCENT had begun planning for a post-invasion occupation, but it was
a haphazard effort not coordinated with the main planning effort or State Department.
Furthermore, an officer who worked in planning during the Surge pointed out that the
Administration decided to do something different before the ORHA personnel had even begun
deploying.91 Schiff’s concordance theoryworks under an idea that lack of communications
structure was preventing adequate input to the Administration from the White House, but
interviewee evidence indicates that the input was there: the Administration simply chose not to
listen.
ORHA was not prioritized by the military leadership in Iraq. Ambassador Carney
described continual problems trying to get functional telephones (their satellite phones only
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worked outside). The military dictated multiple-vehicle force-protection requirements to leave
their compound, then provided only a fraction of the transportation they needed to get out and
perform their mission. Because of the state of Iraq’s banking system, Iraqi government officials
had to be paid in cash: vehicles carrying boxes of cash frequently had to move with no security.
ORHA was subordinate to the land forces commander in Iraq, hence they did not have a
direct line back to Washington D.C. This meant that when problems cropped up, they had no
ability to go around bureaucratic or personal obstructions to get those problems solved. Director
Garner and his staff lacked the stature to overcome these obstacles. All they could do was get
into arguments with military staff who had little understanding of or interest in their mission. He
also ran afoul of authorities in Washington who wanted a faster de-Ba’athification process.
ORHA would soon be replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Paul
Bremer, who also assumed the titles of U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq. The
organization still resided within the Department of Defense, meaning Bremer was technically not
an ambassador. However, everyone understood that he had the backing of the White House,
along with United Nations Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 which recognized the United States
and Great Britain as occupying powers in Iraq and transferred authority for expenditure of Iraq’s
oil revenue from the United Nations to the CPA, as well as responsibility for developing
institutions for representative governance. 92
Bremer secured his administration backing by promptly promulgating orders dissolving
the Iraqi army and mandating extensive de-Ba’athification. Most interviewees agreed with the
State Department Chief of Staff who said that army dissolution and de-Ba-athification sowed the
seeds of the insurgency.93 The problem was particularly acute in the Sunni-majority provinces
such as Salah al-Din, Saddam’s home province, where the U.S. brigade commander there was
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faced with large numbers of senior Iraqi officers, generals with no jobs who felt
underappreciated. It also resulted in inferior membership in the new Iraqi Security Forces.94
Many of these disenfranchised officers had fought in the Iran-Iraq War.
When sovereignty was transferred to Iraq on 28 June 2004, the Department of State was
at last able to establish an Embassy in Iraq and resume a more traditional diplomatic role in the
country. However, the military retained outsized responsibility for governance and
reconstruction in Iraq in addition to its security function.
Interviewees have stated that the Embassy and military were actually integrating prior to
the Surge. Embedment and liaison between both agencies did occur. However, military were
often placed into civilian slots due to manning shortfalls. There was also lack of coordination
between the Embassy and the DoD-funded Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
(TFBSO).95 Part of the problem was security restrictions that made it difficult for State
Department people to travel outside their compounds. A legacy of the 1998 Embassy bombings
was mission travel authorization being moved to security officials in Washington who imposed
much greater safety-based restrictions on movement of non-uniformed personnel.
A senior member of the TFBSO said that this led to other coordination problems.
Because the Embassy personnel were largely restricted to their compound, they were reliant on
second-hand information. He felt that they turned into a self-generating organization, simply
passing the same information back and forth amongst themselves. In 2006 there were 25
separate weekly meetings at the Embassy devoted to economics. The TFBSO found it difficult
to even send representatives to all of these meetings. When they did not attend, it created
resentment among the State Department officials who felt that the TFBSO was doing whatever it
wanted and would not talk to them. The TFBSO sympathized with their frustration but the
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senior member acknowledged that the TFBSO de emphasis on inter-agency coordination came
back to haunt them later when the organization was eventually shut down with the enthusiastic
support of the State Department. 96

Insurgency: War or Peace?

Is insurgency a small war or a tenuous peace? Metz described insurgency as not military,
but military-centric.97 In practice, it falls into a gap in U.S. Executive Branch international
affairs. There is no one agency specifically designed to deal with all of the challenges inherent
in an insurgent environment. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report Hard
Lessons reflects the multitude of agencies that had to be assembled to deal with post-invasion
Iraq. Plakoudas recognized that some of the challenge to counterinsurgents come from the
bureaucratic politics within their own government. 98
A short-term hire with private sector experience described the problem. A Foreign
Service Officer suddenly thrust into the role of a project manager for a major economic
construction or operational project simply does not have that sort of background. It is not what
they are trained for and capable of doing. Asking them to do it would be as unfair as taking a
private sector manager and asking them to walk in and negotiate a treaty. 99
The same is true of a career officer, although that person may have had more interaction
with the defense industrial sector. Military officers do have unit budgets: however, these are
rarely intended for construction projects. Civil Affairs and the Corps of Engineers are the only
U.S. Army components who continually oversee construction projects beyond remodeling an
office or repaving a parking lot. Most officers are only going to take on projects that can be
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completed in their tour of duty (cynically, so it reflects on their fitness report), so their bias tends
to be toward short-term projects.
The Executive Branch lacks a middle class of leaders capable of moving into the full
spectrum of soft power requirements. Worse, both DoD and DoS will claim that they do have
the ability to perform the role because they want the resources that come with it. The TFBSO
official described this as an institutional gap driving problems on the ground. 100 It should be
noted that this is typically a play for funds that the gaining organization will subsequently
attempt to divert to what it sees as its core missions. It is not because either organization wants
to take on the counterinsurgent mission.

Intraagency

A huge problem within DoD was getting the different messaging organizations of
Information Operations, Psychological Operations and Public Affairs to plan together. Public
Affairs is tasked to provide information to the public from the owning military unit. An MNC-I
planner talked about the distinction between PSYOP and PAO and the IOTF, which is
understandable but continually frustrating because none of them could talk to each other and the
commander had to try to integrate them at his level. He felt that their different “silos” were
appropriate in WWII but are irrelevant today.101
The Embassy was not just Department of State workers. It also contained people from a
number of agencies such as Treasury, FBI, Commerce and the DEA. In his interview for this
work, Ambassador Crocker made it clear that as the President’s representative in Iraq, he had
control over all of the non-DoD agency entities operating in Iraq. 102
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The challenge is with the transient nature of the assignment. Someone seconded to Iraq
understood that they would have to return to their parent organization at some point. As a result,
they had to keep in mind the goals and objectives of that organization or risk censure upon their
return home.103 What the interviewees saw was similar to the problems described by De Tray
(2008) regarding the reluctance of qualified people to take positions in Iraq.

Interagency

Dixon described the success of the British approach to counterinsurgency as partly
attributable to their ability to recognize the importance of cooperative civil-military relations.
His logic is that if only 20-25% of successful counterinsurgency is shooting, then the bulk of the
responsibility lies with the civilian presence. He believes that if this is the case, then the
politicians should be in charge. 104 This would not play out in Iraq: however, interviewees
stressed the importance of the excellent working relationship between General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker in revitalizing the authority of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. This is more in
line with Kilcullen and his thinking that a common diagnosis of the problem may be more
important than formal unity of effort across multiple agencies.
Perhaps the most common flaw interviewees mentioned was the service and personalitydependent nature of interagency cooperation in Iraq. Interviewees agreed with a Civil Affairs
officer who pinned much of the blame on individual stress, not an organizational plan. If a
person was being a jerk, it wasn’t because their controlling agency wanted them to be a jerk, it
was usually just the stress of combat. 105 A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader
described a meeting with the military camp commandant where he told her that her team was
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lucky he was feeding and housing them and had not pushed them out onto MSR (Main Supply
Route) Tampa (i.e. “the street”). And this was after the interagency cooperation memo had been
signed.106 Often the military leadership considered the civilian presence to be a nuisance that
added no value to their operation.
An Embassy planner prior to the Surge said that the military was attempting to flex its
muscles and take over some aspects of soft power, but not in a coordinated way. He said that
this was a particular problem with CERP money, which was nearly $2 billion. 107 A Special
Operations commander said that he would run into State Department people who felt the military
was doing their job. Others might be happy as long as the spending was integrated with what the
State Department was doing. 108 An MNC-I planner said that the biggest soft-power gap was that
DoD had all the resources and money, DoS had all the authority and much of the expertise. 109
An Embassy analyst prior to the Surge described the difference in analysis. The Embassy
utilized Iraqi data as part of its metrics. MNF-I did not do so relying instead on Coalition data
only. The joke at the Embassy was “If an Iraqi was shot by a civilian, was he still dead?” 110
Joseph wrote about similar problems with the Human Terrain Teams, whose effort he felt never
translated into transforming military perceptions of the battlespace. 111

Domestic Support

In 2007 Congress had switched to Democratic control of both houses for the first time
since 1995. This naturally ramped up the partisan nature of the debate concerning the effort in
Iraq, with funding a critical part of being able to maintain the U.S. rebuilding effort. Every
confirmation hearing for a general officer assuming a command throughout DoD, not just in Iraq,
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became another opportunity for Congress to question the war effort in an open forum. General
Petraeus and his staff understood that his Congressional testimony would be as vital to the war
effort as military success in Iraq and would spend a tremendous amount of time preparing him
for his Congressional hearings.
Public support for military action in Iraq declined as the conflict dragged on with little
measurable progress. Easton and Gade emphasized the importance of home nation support and
how eroding that support is often a key insurgent goal.112 Impatience for results drove
Washington to demand quick solutions in Iraq even though this was not realistic. An
Ambassador working in Iraq prior to the Surge said that they were on six-month clocks.
Washington would say, “You have six months to fix this” even though no non-profit would ever
say they could do that sort of work in so short a time. He called it the “7,000-mile
screwdriver.”113
A senior USAID official also said that it was difficult to hash out agreement with the
military, who tended to operate on a shorter timeline than the civilians. By comparison, USAID
was on the ground in South Korea and Turkey for decades before they were able to leave when
the host nation no longer needed them. 114

NON-U.S. PLAYERS

International Players

Any ideas the U.S. and its selected “Coalition of the Willing” had of being able to “wall
off” Iraq from outside influence were dashed by nations and non-governmental organizations

114
determined to pursue their own objectives in the country. A senior CENTCOM planner said that
by 2004-2005 there was a clear international effort to create influence inside of Iraqi society and
prevent the influence of the U.S. According to him this changed the dynamic so that it was no
longer about stabilizing Iraq: it was about fighting against deliberate efforts to accrete or deprive
power.115 These efforts came in particular from Iran, Sunni Arab states, and non-governmental
organizations. There was a greater understanding if not ability for the Coalition to inculcate the
idea of Kilcullen that effective counterinsurgency needs to influence neighboring states.

Allies

The Coalition of the Willing proved problematic. It was important politically for the U.S.
to avoid the appearance of engaging in a bilateral war with Iraq. However, President Bush was
unable to duplicate the success of his father in obtaining a UN resolution authorizing the 1991
liberation of Kuwait. He was also unable to invoke a formal international agreement to develop
his coalition as had been the case in Afghanistan, where the 9-11 attacks had activated the
NATO defense pact to protect the U.S. as the victim of aggression (This was ironic, as it is
doubtful if any of the drafters of the NATO agreement had ever envisioned that the U.S. would
be the country asking for assistance). The alternative became an informal grouping of nations
under the heading of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I).
Many of the contributing nations provided only small contingencies, often with little soft power
capability. One brigade commander described the Eastern European brigade with him as lacking
capabilities such as PSYOP or Civil Affairs in addition to the language barrier: it was mostly
young infantry guys who wanted to “go out and shoot stuff.” The commander’s troops led by
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example, and the Europeans learned to do things like pass out flyers and shake hands, but they
did not do it as a unit.
Some smaller Coalition partners demonstrated positive results when placed in the right
environment. The South Korean Zaytun Brigade deployed to Erbil from 2004-2008. There was
little violence in the Kurdish region, allowing the Brigade to focus on reconstruction activities.
Their lone fatality was a suicide. One Civil Affairs officer described them as being very well
received116, while a USAID official said they demonstrated good results in jobs and economic
growth.117 The Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group was a smaller unit that operated
primarily around Samarra in the Shia-populated south from 2004-2006. It was the first Japanese
foreign deployment of troops outside of UN mandates since World War II. Along with the
troops, Japan committed nearly $5 billion to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, nearly a third of the
U.S. amount.
Overall, both the Korean and Japanese contingents were described by multiple
interviewees as having good success, although one pointed out that the U.S. usually took the
most difficult sectors. Both military contingents were eventually withdrawn due to domestic
unpopularity.
The British generally received high marks from those who saw them in action. One
planner felt that the civil-military link for economics was much stronger than in the U.S. Their
Department for International Development (DFID) was an independent agency and worked well
with the Ministry of Defence. It was as if USAID did not have to go through the Embassy to
work with DoD. The biggest drawback for the British was lack of funds: they continually had to
ask the U.S. for money to fund their ideas. The British often contributed excellent insights to
the process as co-participants, planners and advisors. A Psychological Operations officer said
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that they helped the Americans focus on sources of violence such as sectarianism rather than
where it was occurring.
Unfortunately, by 2007 the British focus was on the insurgency in Afghanistan, not Iraq,
because it was a NATO operation, and they were concerned about the opium flow into London.
The author contacted several British friends for potential interviews for this work, but the
consensus was that by that time Iraq was no longer a priority for the Ministry of Defence. A preSurge planner in Baghdad felt that by that point the British presence in Iraq, proactive and
valuable in the initial phases, had degenerated into a defensive perimeter around Basra airport,
the sort of big base mentality that was precisely what General Petraeus was trying to reverse
during the Surge.

The United Nations

The United Nations was unenthusiastic about the idea of overthrowing Saddam by force
in the first place. Their attempt at direct post-invasion involvement was severely curtailed by the
bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 that killed 22 people including
Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. A contractor for the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) in Baghdad pointed out that after the attack the UN pulled
most of its people back to Amman, Jordan. This meant that the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank had no presence in Iraq: the USAID workers modernizing the Iraqi
banking system had to leave the country to meet with the IMF. 118 This hindered the U.S. ability
to obtain international funds for the reconstruction effort and forced individual member states,
particularly the U.S. and British with some help from the Japanese and Koreans, to directly
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contribute most of the funds.119 An MNC-I planner said that they would either have to go to
Jordan to conduct meetings with the UN or coordinate by phone or video. 120
On the other hand, the minimal UN role gave the U.S. more freedom of action. When
interviewed for this work, Ambassador Crocker was critical of several aspects of UN operations.
His experience working with the relief effort during the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan led him to
believe that a multinational effort without a strong U.S.-led presence is usually ineffective. He
felt that the UN and many of the NGOs are more interested in headlines than relief, and that they
spend too much of their time criticizing the U.S. 121

Non-Governmental Organizations

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was an important piece of the
puzzle in Iraq. Their focus was on the detention facilities run by the Coalition, particularly after
the abuses at Abu-Ghraib were publicized. A stability operations Army commander in Baghdad
prior to the Surge pointed out that the bad guys facilities never get inspected. Only those
thoughtful enough about the importance of the ICRC get inspected. 122
USAID is a government organization, but most of their contract partners are nongovernment organizations (NGO). These entities usually preferred to downplay their
relationship with the U.S. and distance themselves from the Coalition to avoid insurgent
retribution. Unfortunately, this means that the partners are operating with less U.S. oversight.
The stability operations commander voiced the concern that this lack of oversight can turn the
NGO into the insurgent supply chain, not for weapons but for sustainment. 123
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Iranian Smart Power

Iran was understandably unhappy with the creation of an American military presence on
their western and eastern borders. Deep-seated antagonism against the U.S. dates to the CIAsponsored countercoup that removed Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 and restored the Shah
to power. U.S. support to Iraq during the 1980s war started by Saddam Hussein continued to
exacerbate the hostility of the two countries. An Embassy lead planner who worked during the
Surge said it was unrealistic to think that the U.S. would not have to partner with Iran to
implement change in Iraq, pointing out that Shia and even Kurds fleeing Saddam’s massacres
frequently ended up in Iran.124
Iran proved to be a formidable adversary utilizing both hard and soft power in Iraq for
their own brand of smart power. Hard power support included funding of Shia militias and
development of weapons including the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), a shaped charge
specifically engineered to create molten copper “bolts” capable of penetrating the armor on U.S.
military vehicles.125
The Iranian soft power effort was even more extensive. Several interviewees for this
work described how they employed effective propaganda directly and indirectly through their
proxies in Iraq such as Badr Corps. A U.S. Embassy economics coordinator also said that the
Iranians would steal food basket deliveries and deliver them to the locals. Several interviewees
described how when a project such as a bridge was completed a placard saying “A gift to the
people of Iraq from the people of the United States” would be attached. They would come back
a month later and the placard had been replaced with one saying, “A gift to the people of Iraq
from the people of Iran.”126
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Numerous people interviewed for this work credited the Iranians with expertly filling soft
power gaps in Iraq overlooked or under-resourced by the U.S. and its allies. As one ambassador
leading economic planning in Iraq put it, “The U.S. tried to build power plants: the Iranians built
libraries. We tried to do all the hard stuff in Iraq. The Iranians came in, did the easy stuff, and
got all the credit.”127

Sunni Countries

Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations are ambivalent toward the idea of a powerful
Iraq, as is Syria. Iraq has a larger population that is overwhelmingly Shia. The other Sunni Arab
leaders had no love for Saddam Hussein but considered a potential confederation of Iran and Iraq
to be a bigger threat. They also knew that Saddam kept Iraq stable and feared that anarchy
would allow terrorists and other groups to attempt to come in and alter the balance of power.
Syria was frequently a refuge for Sunni leadership when threatened, either by the Coalition, Iraqi
government or insurgents throughout the U.S. time in Iraq. This was a problem Metz understood
when he said that traditional counterinsurgency concepts assume that partner and neighbor
nations support modernizing and reforming the target nation 128 although this was not the case in
Iraq.
There was also the problem of differing schools of Islam. Saudi Arabia is dominated by
the Wahabi branch of the Hanbali school if Islamic jurisprudence, the smallest but most austere
of the four schools. The Saudis have used the opportunity provided by their oil wealth to further
the spread of Wahabi practices throughout the world and naturally took advantage of the
opportunity provided in Iraq to increase their effort there.

120
A former ambassador and senior member of the Baghdad Embassy described the problem
the U.S. faced in underappreciating the importance of external powers such as Syria and the Gulf
States, instead thinking in terms of one state, Iraq, that they believed was contained around the
edges. He felt that the extent to which these countries could make all of the U.S. planning
irrelevant was an under looked factor. 129 For example, U.S. efforts to limit violence in Iraq
would be ineffective if Sunni nations were providing logistic support and recruits to antigovernment forces in Iraq utilizing the tribes in Anbar Province disaffected by the loss of
lucrative smuggling opportunities created by the UN sanctions after the First Gulf War.
An Army stability commander said that soft power occurred in the form of food
deliveries to Sunni enclaves from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He described the international
competition for power and influence in Iraq as one of the untold stories of the conflict.130 A
State Department PRT member said the relationship between Syria and Iraq was complex
because of the historical antagonism between the two Ba’athist strands, but support for the Iraqi
Sunnis including basing out of Syria existed. 131

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda relished the opportunity to challenge the U.S. directly in a Sunni Arab state. It
meshed with their strategy of trying to instigate conflict to turn the Muslim world against the
Christian West.
Jihad in Islam is complex. The Arabic word literally means “struggle.” Most Muslims
take it to mean the inner struggle all people wage to try and do good and avoid evil. Many
Muslims consider this the “Greater Jihad.” There is also the concept of the “Lesser Jihad,”

121
which is considered the defense of the faith, either by the sword or by persuasion. Both versions
are subject to dispute among Muslim scholars.
Groups such as al-Qaeda seize upon the lesser Jihad with their vision of spreading Islam
via military conquest followed by conversion of conquered populations. Both are widely
considered distortions of the commonly accepted concept of Lesser Jihad, which is generally
agreed to be defending Muslim lands rather than conquering new ones, and logical persuasion
rather than forced conversion.
It is disappointing that the U.S. did not really foresee the possibility of Iraq becoming the
new Jihad for ambitious young Muslims. Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya should have
demonstrated that conflict against Christian nations in particular was almost guaranteed to be a
magnet for the next generation of would-be mujahedeen, with unofficial support from the
veterans of those previous campaigns now living in Sunni Arab countries. Their religious fervor
would make them tenacious and uncompromising opponents. AQI was even utilizing the
Internet as part of its propaganda campaign. As one Embassy analyst in Iraq said, “If you’re
using PowerPoint, you’re good.”132
It is also disappointing that once there, the U.S. did not mount an effective campaign to
divide the al-Qaeda jihadists from the local population. This was in part because the Shiadominated government was reluctant to cooperate with the Sunni population. The Surge would
be successful in part because the Americans finally began to provide direct assistance to the
Sunnis trying to get rid of the jihadists, although this violated normal counterinsurgency
emphasis on empowering the local government. This was a long-overdue unity of effort between
the Western tribes and the U.S. which Byman had described as the Iraqis understanding that the
U.S. was the “least worst” side to be on. 133
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A Treasury Department official working in Baghdad prior to the Surge described the
power of money in enabling the insurgency. She described cash as the ultimate attractive
nuisance. It is a flexible tool for non-government entities such as al-Qaeda because there is no
legal tangle or accountability trail comparable to what government financing dictates, which still
results in charges of corruption or fund misuse.134

EXECUTION PROBLEMS

Authority limitations inhibited the ability of Executive Branch agencies to carry out
actions required in Iraq. An Army stability commander described the disconnect between
institutional knowledge and policy. The military might pass along the lessons of the past, but
policy people come in with little knowledge of the circumstances or history of the area of
interest. He felt that they are driven by politics at the time and the operators end up repeating the
mistakes of the past even when they push back against the policies, and according to him they
pushed back quite a bit.135 This further demonstrates the limits of Schiff’s Concordance Theory
that assumes a willingness on the part of senior authorities to listen to recommendations from the
field.

Manning Limitations

Posting shortfalls affected all agencies in Iraq. During the days of the British Raj,
English officers were posted to areas of interest as commissioners for five years or even longer
with no vacations. They had sufficient time to become familiar with the area and earn the trust
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of the local population. The U.S. has no comparable system for long-term emplacement of
officials in foreign countries. Pirnie and O’Connell talked about the difficulty of trying to
develop a coherent and balanced counterinsurgency strategy in the type of partnering role that
requires a long-term commitment, which was becoming problematic in light of the waning U.S.
willingness to remain in Iraq. 136

Military Manning Limitations

U.S. Army conventional force members might be posted to Iraq for 12-15 months, with a
two-week leave during their tour. There was some effort to rotate units to the same locations so
that veterans would at least be able to pick up established relationships within the local
community, but this would mainly be applicable to full-time active-duty Army forces. Most of
the Army’s soft-power practitioners such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations reside in
the Reserves, which were not being rotated into Iraq as frequently. 137
Special Operations forces would also deploy to the same locations, although on shorter
deployment cycles. They were also more likely to have active-duty Civil Affairs (CA) and
PSYOP elements attached to them during their rotations, providing a better soft power continuity
than in the conventional force. One CA officer who worked with Special Forces in Iraq said that
it gave him the flexibility to focus on human-terrain mapping and incentivizing behavior of key
individuals, in contrast to the regular force units conducting more traditional CA missions.138
It is also important to note that all 160,000 Surge participants did not arrive in Iraq and
depart the same days as General Petraeus. It was not a D-Day situation where everyone started
at the same time working off a developed and rehearsed plan. Many of the assets were already

124
in-country and fighting before the Surge was even announced. General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker faced the challenge of trying to reshape the mission in many cases of extant
organizations already in contact with the local environment, citizens and insurgents alike, in
order to align with the Surge grand strategy.
Units were often assembled piecemeal. One brigade commander said that of the five
battalions he commanded in Iraq, two were not from his brigade. They were units already in
country when he arrived and were later replaced by two other battalions he had never
commanded or trained with.139 Another had two of his maneuver battalions and his artillery
battalion detached to other missions, not working for him.140

Civilian Manning Limitations

Inadequate as this was, State Department postings were even shorter. Because service in
Iraq was classified as a hardship location, tours were limited to one year. Eleven months and one
day counted as a year. They were also entitled to two 30-day leaves during their tour. In other
words, State Department workers spent nine non-continuous months in Iraq. A military
Information Operations planner in Baghdad prior to the Surge described his State Department
counterparts as great Americans hampered by the rules requiring them to depart every 90 days.
As a result, he had to deal with blank spots where there was zero coordination. 141 It was difficult
to even get civilians to head the PRTs according to another planner, let alone provide their full
staffing complement.
The resulting manning issues were illustrated by a team leader in Baghdad who said that
he had five State Department people working for him, and there was not a single day when all
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five were present to work due to individuals being gone on leave. 142 The same team leader gave
another example of the problem. He had negotiated a procedures agreement with some of the
military, State and USAID managers in-country. When he returned several months later, he
found that not one of the managers he had negotiated the agreement with were still in-country,
and none of their replacements had even heard of the agreement.
Secretary of State Rice wanted to implement “Vietnam rules” regarding Iraq. During the
Vietnam conflict State Department people who refused assignments to Vietnam were also
expected to resign their position. She was not able to impose this strict measure: consequently,
Foreign Service Officers would refuse Iraq assignments and State would just keep going down
the list, with a predictable drop off in quality. Interviewees saw that many of the ones who did
deploy were straight out of school. They were smart and conscientious but had no experience
and were now running a section in arguably the most important U.S. embassy in the world. 143
A USAID contractor said the State Department people were nice, but they spent 3-4
months trying to adjust, worked for a while, then started working on their next assignment.
Going to Iraq was something they had to do to get ahead.144 A brigade commander with
extensive experience in Iraq also said that many of the State Department personnel he worked
with viewed Iraq as a failed policy. 145 Some of the State Department personnel even agreed that
they viewed the invasion of Iraq as a mistake and many policies as failed: however, many felt
that they were there to try to rescue a “screwed-up” situation.146
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Soft Power Without Hard Power Is Not Smart

Walk softly and carry a big stick.
- Theodore Roosevelt

U.S. leadership was focused on soft power prior to the Surge, they just failed to marry it
with hard power. This fails to acknowledge that there simply are some people that will not
change their behavior no matter how much attractive power is used on them. Lessons learned
from previous conflicts included the need to include coercive power to stabilize the environment.
Iraqi Security Forces were not strong enough to coerce behavior out of adversarial entities in
Iraq. The consequence was a sharp uptick in violence in Iraq in 2006 and early 2007.
In his interview for this work, A former ambassador who worked with the reconstruction
effort in Baghdad during the Surge stated that soft power was being employed prior to the Surge.
He singled out the MNC-I commander as being an officer who “got it,” meaning the importance
of soft power. The question was how do you win hearts and minds when you don’t control the
land? For example, he described a typical situation where the U.S. would build a health center,
one faction would gain control of it, and the other side would blow it up. He could not usefully
build more health centers if they kept getting destroyed.147 Another Embassy planner described
as faulty the notion that just getting the Iraqis jobs would stop the violence. He said that the
Iraqis were not fighting for jobs, they were fighting for political control. 148
Interviewees continually stressed the importance of hard power as a necessary
handmaiden to successful soft power efforts. An Embassy Chief of Staff during the Surge
likened the situation to the quote by Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of this section. As he
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said, “Who wants to do dumb power?”149 A colonel who was a senior planner in Baghdad talked
about the mantra under General Casey of “As they stand up, we stand down” referring to the
Iraqi Security Forces. The U.S. forces would move from tactical overwatch to operational to
strategic or relinquishing more and more of the close fight to the Iraqis. A strategy assessment
officer pinpointed General Casey’s refusal to make protecting the population part of the
campaign plan as the key element lacking in the pre-Surge strategy.150
A commander in Baghdad prior to the Surge said that it did not make sense to spend
money on large-scale projects that could not even be visited because security was so bad. Water
treatment plants with no pipes or sewage treatment facilities with no connection to homes
became monuments to U.S. stupidity. He said that Iraqi leaders who talked to him simply did
not believe the Americans could be that incompetent by accident; that the U.S. was doing it
deliberately to keep their (Sunni or Shia) side down. A popular Iraqi indictment was how the
U.S. could put a man on the moon but could not manage to fix their water/electricity/clinics/etc.
It just had to be a conspiracy. 151
This should not imply that open season was declared against the Iraqis in the manner of
Downes who went so far as to suggest indiscriminate targeting of civilians supporting
insurgents.152 Chapter Five will demonstrate that the Coalition leadership made the decision to
go in the opposite direction and work more directly with the Iraqis. Easton and Gade concluded
from their study that insurgent strength can actually increase if violence applied against them is
too little, leaving them perplexed to explain the success of the Surge.153 However, they may not
have understood that the initial stages of the Surge actually saw an increase in violence against
the insurgents. Many interviewees for this work describe the first half of their Surge experience
as a “gunfight.”
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Power That Does Not Leave the Compound is Not Smart

Prior to the Surge, all elements of U.S. power were too tied to their installations for
different reasons that will be explored. Inadequate support and oversight to the Iraqi Security
Forces and government were the inevitable result, failing to stabilize the country or provide
viable reconstruction. This was a problem that does not seem to have received great attention in
the literature.
A deputy brigade commander working in Baghdad recognized that this was the strategy
developed by Lieutenant General (LTG) Chiarelli and said his favorite mantra was “Killing
insurgents just creates more insurgents.” However, the commander felt while the Coalition was
ramping up soft power activity, the insurgency, civil war and score-settling continued to
increase.154 A stability commander in Baghdad pointed out that the U.S. was not doing nationbuilding, which is simply helping a country trying to help itself. The conditions of stability had
to be present first before there could be nation-building.155
Interviewee after interviewee echoed the assessment of the PSYOP officer who worked
in Baghdad before and during the Surge that face-to-face was the most effective means of
communicating a soft power message to the local populace. He talked about how it empowers
them and makes them feel like part of the process.156 But how can you interact face-to-face if
you never go outside the wire? Baldwin laid out the importance of being able to measure
military success,157 measures that would be reprioritized during the Surge, particularly securing
the local population.
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MILITARY BIG BASE STRATEGY

The U.S. wanted the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to take charge of security in the country.
A sensible goal, but one that likely led to wishful thinking. The pre-Surge strategy dictated by
Washington was to pull U.S. forces back to a smaller number of larger bases. An Embassy
director with extensive private-sector background felt that this decision may also have been
influenced by logisticians trying to make their job easier. Surveys indicated that most Iraqis had
never even seen an American, 158 a problem exacerbated by pulling the U.S. forces back to a
smaller number of larger compounds.
Interviewees with early experience in Iraq said that the initial invasion had spaced troops
around the country which assisted in providing stability. One said that including contractors
there were probably 250,000 or more people in-country situated at local levels. Big installations
like Camp Victory did not exist. 159 As the smaller outposts were shuttered, insurgents were able
to filter back into those areas and operate against the Coalition. General Casey and the
leadership in Iraq understood the limitations of the big base strategy but were unable to convince
their superiors of the need to disperse.
As a result, it became more difficult for the soft power elements to get outside the wire.
A Civil Affairs officer said that he would tell his own teams about something going on which
they knew nothing about because they never left. He said that there were even a few who were
afraid to leave the FOB. 160 This needed to change in line with Gompert’s idea that flexibility and
opportunism were needed, or Byman comparing Iraq to the classical principal-agent problem of
adequately monitoring an employee. 161
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Civilian Security Limitations

The 1998 al-Qaeda bombing attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya killed
over 200 people, including 12 Americans. Among the ramifications of this attack was the Crowe
Commission’s determination to give more force protection authority to the DoS security
apparatus in Washington and take it away from the Ambassador, the President’s on-the-spot
personal representative, and his Chief of Mission.162 The result was a reduction in the degree of
freedom Embassy personnel had to go outside their compounds. An Embassy analyst prior to the
Surge said that General Casey would not allow the military to provide security for the PRTs prior
to the Surge.163 A Civil Affairs officer said that the PRT he worked with had excellent USAID
workers, but they wanted to dig in. 164
Consequently, the State Department workers were not getting out and seeing what was
truly happening in Iraq. Much of their contact with Iraqis ended up being with the elites, who a
senior Army planner in Baghdad said led to them not getting a true picture of the situation in
Iraq.165 A Marine training team leader also saw DoS as working with the wrong people, Iraqis
trying to ingratiate themselves with the Coalition.166 A leading DoD economics official felt that
the inability of the DoS personnel to leave the compound kept them from being able to develop
their own picture of the true situation in Iraq. 167

Imperial Hubris

A PRT leader relayed the story of a meeting that the co-located brigade commander had
with the local provincial council after they had sent him a letter detailing their requests for things
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such as food and relief supplies. He arrived at the meeting, had his soldiers close and bar the
door with weapons drawn, and walked up to the dais where the council leader was standing. The
commander told him to go sit with the others, told the group they were corrupt, and tore up the
letter they had sent him. 168 The PRT leader did joke with him that he had set up a “good cop/bad
cop” relationship with the locals, that the PRT relationship with the locals could not possibly be
worse than his was.
Leadership can say the right things about soft power even as their actions demonstrate
differently. A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) member said that they were continually
told that their mission of training the Iraqi Security Forces was the main effort. Then when
senior leaders came to visit the area, they never came to visit the MTTs they visited the “straight
leg” (infantry) units in the area. 169

Who to Talk to?

The initial problem was not including Iraqis in planning. A State Department team leader
described a December 2005 meeting with General Casey and his senior staff briefing an 8-pillar
strategic plan for Iraq. Although they all agreed there should be an Iraqi lead for every element
of the plan, he pointed out that there was not a single Iraqi in the room. 170 A USAID official said
meetings were always about U.S. objectives.171 The Surge would align much more with the
subsequent advice of de Tray and Gompert previously discussed that partnering with local
government would be more effective and strengthen the local ties with their own government.
In line with its idea to change the governance of Iraq from being top-down driven to
bottom-up driven, the U.S. tried to push responsibility down to regional and provincial levels.
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The result was the creation of Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NAC) and Provincial Advisory
Councils (PAC). However, the organizations were outside the Ba’athist structure that was not
overturned by the Transitional Administrative Law and the 2005 Constitution. 172 Worse, they
were not staffed by the natural local leadership. A brigade commander described how one of the
NACs was not meeting the needs of the local community. Upon investigation he discovered that
the man placed in charge of running the NAC by the Americans was not even in Iraq: he lived in
London.173
The same commander described another situation where they had been trying to restore
power in part of Baghdad. He would go to the NAC leaders who said inshallah it will be done.
It did not get done. The commander finally asked them who the guy was who used to run the
power. They told him, the commander found him, and within 30 minutes power had been
restored. He said the councils were often amazed that the guy who used to do the job might be
the best person for the job. The situation is similar to that encountered after World War Two
when aggressive Allied de-Nazification often resulted in removal of the only person qualified to
perform a particular job.
An important initiative was the Provincial Reconstruction Finance Committee (PRFC)
which gave small budgets ($15-18 million) to provincial leadership to spend as they decided. An
ambassador working economic issues in Baghdad before and during the Surge said this was a
huge development: Saddam had never asked provinces for their input on spending. He said that
consequently the locals were really into it. The initial problem with the program was that
Washington felt it operated too slowly, whereas the ambassador felt that its strength was
precisely that they were taking the time to do it right. 174
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What to Talk About

Mismanagement of reconstruction funds was a problem from the beginning. Part of the
issue was higher headquarters emphasis on spending money, regardless of outcome. A squadron
commander prior to the Surge said that a commander’s competence was based not on how he
was doing in all the other Lines of Operation, but whether he had spent all his Commander’s
Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) funds. Weekly reports on spending were sent up
the chain of command, and woe be unto the commander who wasn’t spending as much as his
peers. He said that this was the surest way for a commander to get into trouble other than an
accidental discharge (of a weapon, most commonly when a soldier forgot they had a loaded
weapon and discharged it into the clearing barrel located outside the dining facilities). 175
As an example, he said he got in great trouble the week he had a zero for his spending
update slide. He felt that they were reducing violence and making progress economically in his
sector, so if he could do that without spending money wasn’t that great? Higher headquarters
disagreed, saying that if he were spending the CERP money he could be doing even better. 176
A Marine officer who did planning in Baghdad prior to the Surge saw a similar problem
working with the Iraqi ministries. Even when they did spend money, it was not spent wisely.
Hospitals and clinics that should have been built in six months took two years: many were never
completed. Even for the ones that were, the Ministry of Health had no doctors or nurses to put
there.177
Much of what the U.S. was trying to do was a learning process for the Iraqis. A leader of
the U.S. messaging effort before and during the Surge said that the problem with “by, with and
through” (the common U.S. government catchphrase for putting the locals in charge and up
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front) is that it forgets “on.” He said that the core issue is you are working to try and change
them as much as by, with and through them. 178

Whom to Empower?

Greene concluded that elections in Iraq often served to reinforce existing sectarian and
ethnic differences rather than working to overcome them. 179 De-Ba-athification had also
eliminated many of the technocrats who had been running Iraq prior to the invasion, particularly
in the Sunni-dominant areas. There were many cases where the Americans were not working
with the right Iraqis to demonstrate smart power even when trying to apply power in an attractive
manner.
Trying to empower Iraqis with no experience at real power, particularly at lower levels,
was challenging. A former ambassador working with economics prior to the Surge said that the
sheer aspects of responsibility and authority that serious budget authority and managing money
at the local levels would have given was clearly missing. That does open the possibility of
corruption and requires a strong effort at accountability. 180 A senior stabilization commander in
Baghdad prior to the Surge described the American approach as too blunt and insensitive. The
U.S. culture was to try and drive change, mostly through the military. 181
The commander also felt that a monument to incompletion was more damaging in the
long run than the combat losses. It was important for the U.S. to start a project, protect the
project, and finish the project. Do not hand it over and the furniture never goes in, or the
teachers never get hired, or the building blows up, all of which he said happened. 182
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A surprising problem was getting the Iraqis to spend the money they did have. A
commander of a U.S. brigade operating in a provincial area said that decades of oppression under
Saddam had taught the leadership to avoid decisions for fear of getting shot. Consequently,
many fundable projects languished simply awaiting someone to take responsibility and approve
them.183 Other ambassadors working in reconstruction concurred that Iraqis were reluctant to
spend the money they did have or lacked the proper infrastructure and oversight capability. 184
There were corruption and competency issues among the Iraqis as well. Branch and
Wood believe that if host-nation governments was simply better-informed about grievances in
society, then they could implement reforms without the need for military action. 185 This
benevolent government concept is not corroborated by interviewees for this work. Closer to
Marston’s idea, they felt that from Prime Minister Maliki on down, the Shia-dominated Iraqi
government knew the problems the Sunnis were experiencing, they simply did not care or were
even deliberately accentuating them. 186 Fitzsimmons criticized much of the academic literature
of the time for downplaying the importance of sectarian and ethnic strife in a civil war and trying
to recommend rationalist, materialist approaches.187

Losing the Information War

The U.S. wanted to be accurate in disseminating information to the Iraqi people. This
was a noble ideal, but it meant that the insurgents and other unfriendly elements were continually
given the opportunity to get their side of the story out first. Message approval authority resided
at higher headquarters: brigade commanders did not have the authority to approve messaging in
their area of operations.188 As a result of mission authority residing at such a high level, a
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PSYOP officer in Iraqi prior to the Surge said they sometimes ran into problems with higher
headquarters saying “you really shouldn’t be doing that: that’s not in your lane: that should be at
our level.”189
The fact that it was a dangerous environment meant that the press was not always
enthusiastic about direct embedment. An IO planner in Baghdad said that even when the U.S.
tried to invite the regional media like Al-Jazeera they weren’t sure if they wanted to go because
they didn’t want to get shot at either. 190 Journalists are human too.191 Additionally, international
news media were reducing their staff in Iraq due to both insurance costs and declining viewer
interest.
Another problem was making sure that the PSYOP products were actually being aired.
The planner found that he would have the TV on and would see what he knew was a Coalition
product come on and go right off again. He would call the PSYOP chief and say “Al-Arabia just
shortchanged you by about 45 seconds.” He emphasized that they were not cheap and the price
was going up, so he thought it would be very interesting to see how much of what the Coalition
paid for was broadcast.
There were also embarrassing incidents such as the accusations that consultants such as
the Lincoln Group were paying Iraqi media to publish stories favorable to the Coalition or
submitting stories to them while posing as free-lance reporters. The Coalition response was that
the stories were necessary to counter insurgent misinformation. The same planner found the
situation absurd: he felt that it was silly to make him responsible for reporting being done off
someone else’s op-ed page.192
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Sectarian Appeals

Marston and Fitzsimmons were concerned that religion and ethnicity were
underappreciated elements of counterinsurgency warfare, particularly in Iraq. Fitzsimmons felt
that the focus should be less on the governmental structure and more of who was being placed in
charge.193 Chapter Six will demonstrate that the Surge saw a greater effort by the U.S.
leadership to try to develop a more inclusive structure in Iraq to accommodate Sunnis, Shia and
Kurds.
The various factions were skilled at appealing to their respective co-religionists. An
Information Operations officer said that they kept to simple messages. Al-Qaeda told Sunnis
they were there to help them and told the Americans they were there to kill them. The threatened
other action to Sunnis was a gun to the head. The insurgents had videos, pamphlets and even
television and Internet programming. 194
The Shia groups proved effective at messaging to their constituents. They pressured the
Shia-dominated government to marginalize the Sunnis and portrayed the U.S. as an occupying
power. A former ambassador at the Embassy before the Surge agreed said that Muqtada al-Sadr
was good at communicating with the Iraqi Shia, partly because of his father’s reputation and
partly due to his own skills as a speaker, and that the Americans did not seem to know how to
counter it195. An interviewee who developed U.S. messaging in Iraq said that Muqtada al-Sadr
was the most effective civil-military integrator on the battlefield. He believes that this is why
Sadr is still an important player even today.196
Another described how Sadr’s militias borrowed the Iranian trick of claiming credit for
U.S. relief deliveries. They would use their inside knowledge of Coalition activities to learn
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when a delivery was scheduled. They would then show up at that village the day prior and say
“Relief supplies will be delivered tomorrow. They will claim it is from the Americans, but it is
not: it is from Sadr.” This worked because the U.S. did not directly deliver supplies: they were
contracting the work out precisely to try and maintain a low presence. 197 These micro-level
examples of Iranian influence have not been detailed in reviewed literature.
The U.S. would meet with religious leaders, although it was often not about religious
issues. Usually, the religious leaders were acting as representatives of their community to make
sure they were being included in economic development projects or being part of the political
process.198
A Treasury Department official who worked in Baghdad prior to the Surge described a
subtle way that the American presence resulted in sectarian oppression. She worked with an
Iraqi corporate CIO who was also a Christian. Under Saddam Christian women did not have to
wear a head scarf: only Muslim women were required to. With the Coalition in Iraq, it was easier
to brief them that it is a Muslim country and make all the women wear headscarves. An attempt
to be accommodating thus ended up being used against them in a manner too subtle for the
American leadership to understand.199

CONCLUSION

The U.S. effort in Iraq was beset with problems that inhibited its ability to achieve
national security objectives. The very nature of insurgency itself was a challenge, particularly
for a democratic nation.
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Structural problems flowed from the design of the U.S. government, particularly the
Executive Branch. Authority was often unclear, with multiple agencies fighting turf wars for
control of what they felt came under their area of expertise. At the same time, gaps appeared for
missions that neither DoS nor DoD wanted to do. The international community played a role,
from the UN absence or Coalition partner shortfalls to adversary nations that were not willing to
cede Iraqi nation-building to the U.S. Trans-national organizations such as al-Qaeda rushed into
the power vacuum created by the 2003 invasion.
Execution problems hindered even the sincere organizations and individuals in Iraq.
Tour lengths and personnel quality were not conducive to a “long war.” Pre-Surge doctrine
shied away from hard power and was over-reliant on soft power to create stability. The desire to
maintain personnel security frustrated efforts to conduct effective soft power activities with the
Iraqis. Personalities could make the difference between success and failure in carrying out
assigned missions. Sectarianism frustrated U.S. efforts to combine the warring factions in Iraq
into a viable national entity.
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CHAPTER V
THE SURGE PLAN

In some cases, I was supporting counterinsurgency.
In other cases, I was supporting insurgency.
- Brigade Commander in Iraq 200

INTRODUCTION

A new approach was clearly needed in Iraq. A new approach would require a new plan.
General Petraeus would spend most of 2006 preparing that plan while he was assigned to Fort
Leavenworth. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was a major departure from the U.S.
Army doctrine in existence at that time, reflecting the reality of the situation in Iraq. It gave “top
cover” to General Petraeus as he was selected for and prepared to take command at MultiNational Force – Iraq (MNF-I). He would be fortunate to be joined in Baghdad by a like-minded
ambassador, Ryan Crocker. They set the stage by securing more effective backing from the
leadership in Washington D.C. Then they went to Iraq and set the example by their cooperative
attitude that filtered down to both the military staff and workers from State and other agencies.
The new thinking encompassed a number of approaches. More U.S. soldiers would be
sent back into contested areas as the hard power element of the Surge. More Iraqis would be
recruited to help with security, both formal units and militia.
On the soft power side, reconstruction and reconciliation would be increased to try and
deflate the insurgency. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) would be staffed and expanded
to cover every province in Iraq. Better measures of effectiveness would be utilized, and better
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means of communicating Coalition successes would be employed. Reconciliation would be
practiced to a greater degree in the Coalition internment compounds. And good timing and
fortune played a role as well.

THE BATTLE PLAN

The most important military doctrine related to the Surge is Field Manual (FM) 3-24,
Counterinsurgency. Why? Because General Petraeus himself was head of the working group
that developed the manual at Fort Leavenworth prior to his taking command in Iraq. In essence,
FM 3-24 gives us an unclassified version of the battle plan General Petraeus would bring to Iraq.
Field Manuals are Army doctrine while Joint Publications pertain to all branches of the
service. Some topics are most applicable to a specific branch of the service. Consequently, that
branch may be considered the service expert in a particular discipline. For example, the Navy’s
use of E-2 Hawkeyes as an integral part of aircraft attack packages makes them the leading
service in Electronic Warfare. The Air Force tends to be the lead in Cyberwarfare. Over 90% of
all DoD Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capability resides in the Army, thus Joint
Publications on PSYOP closely resemble the Army field manual.
At the time there was no recently published doctrine at any level regarding
counterinsurgency. Doctrine is not just the way to do something, but authorization to do it.
Commanders taking actions not covered by any doctrine open themselves up for questioning or
condemnation by higher authorities. Officers who act beyond doctrine better be right, or they
will find themselves alone if things go wrong. Conversely, no one goes to jail for following the
doctrine, even for a poor outcome. The result is naturally a service that is slow to embrace new
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ideas. The fact that the Army was even willing to allow General Petraeus to promulgate a new
field manual for counterinsurgency is a testimony to how desperate leaders perceived the
situation in Iraq was by 2006, because by implication it represents the Army acknowledging that
they were fighting a war beyond their institutional thinking.
There was a void in the U.S. military approach to counterinsurgency. Voids create
opportunity. Sensing that the other services would be inclined to view the Army as the
counterinsurgency expert, General Petraeus likely saw this as a chance for the Army to “take the
lead” in developing counterinsurgency doctrine for not only the Army, but all of DoD. He
smartly partnered with the other DoD “land force,” the Marines, solidifying the likelihood that
the final product would become the basis of future joint doctrine.
General Petraeus held a planning conference on Information Operations (IO) and invited
a long list of people, including his critics, to attend. He believed that IO would be particularly
important as part of a counter-insurgency effort. He ran into problems with senior Army
leadership with his group’s assertions that all soldiers are information-gatherers, which did not
sit well with the intelligence community. General Petraeus also knew that he would probably be
selected to be the next commander in Iraq, so he only had a year to publish the new field manual,
a process which can ordinarily take several years. Nonetheless he persisted and the manual was
published by the Army (and concurrently by the Marine Corps) in December of 2006, two
months before his assumed command of Multi-National Force-Iraq.
The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 is a 284-page (on the computer) document consisting of a
short introduction followed by eight chapters:
Chapter 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Chapter 2: Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities
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Chapter 3: Intelligence in Counterinsurgency
Chapter 4: Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations
Chapter 5: Executing Counterinsurgency Operations
Chapter 6: Developing Host-Nation Security Forces
Chapter 7: Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency
Chapter 8: Sustainment
FM 3-24 also has the following appendices: A Guide for Action, Social Network
Analysis and Other Tools, Linguist Support, Legal Considerations and Airpower in
Counterinsurgency.
In some ways the format follows that of the established field manuals. A scene-setting
opening chapter, another with calls for unification and cooperation with other government
agencies or nations, the nuts-and-bolts of planning operations in the middle and concluding with
a chapter on logistics. Following traditional field manual layout was a logical move by the
developers. It helps acclimate traditional thinkers to new concepts if the structure follows a
format they are comfortable with and increases the likelihood of acceptance.
Like any introduction, FM 3-24’s is the author’s best opportunity to insert opinion. It
states up front that the US possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority, which
ironically forces our opponents to practice asymmetric warfare. It tells us that militaries
typically start poorly in counterinsuirgency operations, but the ones that prove most adaptable
and overcome their inclination to wage conventional warfare against insurgents are most likely
to prevail. It lays the groundwork for the importance of bottom-up initiative and innovation
focused at local levels of the battlefield. It warns that insurgents are clever and often barbaric,
but that a unified, adapting effort can enable counterinsurgents to prevail.
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Chapter 1, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” is a typical field manual opening
chapter. The third-longest chapter in the manual, it introduces definitions and lays out the
rationale for its unique contribution to Army doctrine. On page 1 it clearly tells the reader that
insurgency is about political power and that long-term success in counterinsurgency depends on
people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to government rule. It points out that
the insurgents get to operate paying less heed to rules of warfare and truth in broadcasting, but
that this asymmetry narrows as they expand their territory and seek to acquire legitimacy. It then
goes into some detail on the history and theory of insurgency, focusing from the beginning of the
twentieth century and particularly on the writings of Mao Zedong. It lays out elements of both
insurgency and counterinsurgency such as means and ends. It then highlights counterinsurgency
paradoxes such as “Sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are,” “The
best weapons for COIN don’t fire bullets,” and “Sometimes it’s better for the local people to do
something poorly than for us to do it well.”
Chapter 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” is one of three
distinctly shorter chapters in FM 3-24. In most field manuals, the second chapter discusses unity
of effort. However, other manuals typically focus on integration with the other branches of
service or foreign militaries, with some discussion of interagency U.S. cooperation. FM 3-24 is
more concerned with cooperation with non-military organizations, with a title even putting
civilian before military. When it speaks of civilian agencies, it does not just mean U.S.
government, but international organizations, non-governmental organizations and even
corporations. It sets the stage by saying that integration of civilian and military activities is
crucial to waging successful counterinsurgency.
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Chapter 3, “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” is the longest chapter in FM 3-24.
Overall, the word “intelligence” appears 433 times in the entire manual. By comparison it
appears a total of only 358 times in FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders
Production, combined. What made intelligence such an important topic to the authors? The
chapter opens with a quote about the importance of intelligence by General Creighton Abrams,
who integrated many of the lessons learned in Vietnam into the US Army. It then tells us that
intelligence in counterinsurgency is about people both in the sense of who has it and its
importance. It follows the standard Army manual format of intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), which again is a smart way to make the manual look familiar to conventional
warriors, but continually stresses the importance of civil structure and functions. Society,
culture, economics and even language are items FM 3-24 tell us must be considered during
mission planning. About halfway through the chapter is when it starts talking about the
insurgents. It talks about their force capabilities, but goes into greater detail about personalities,
media capabilities and politics internal to the insurgent group and ways to exploit them.
Chapter 3 also devotes considerable space to discussing the importance to
counterinsurgency of human intelligence, or HUMINT. It is certainly a two-edged sword:
HUMINT is simultaneously the most unreliable and most insightful intelligence source available.
Conventional force leaders tend to dislike the unreliability aspect of HUMINT: they prefer
satellite imagery or signal intercepts. FM 3-24 embraces the positive aspects of HUMINT,
points out that it often provides intelligence impossible to obtain by technical means, and offers
ideas for protecting and maximizing the value of this resource. In the spirit of Donald
Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns,” HUMINT can provide answers to questions you did not even
know you had.
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Oddly, the increased importance provided the intelligence community in FM 3-24 did not
stop them from balking at one element during the drafting process. They objected to a sentence
that said “All soldiers and marines are intelligence collectors” as an infringement upon
Congressional authority. The objection is not entirely parochial. Most military funding is
sourced through Title 10 of the United States Code: however, intelligence is funded through Title
50. The initial draft did not appear to supersede the analysis responsibility of the intelligence
community and was merely striving to emphasize the importance of field-level intelligence
sourcing.
Chapter 4, “Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations,” is the shortest
chapter in the manual. It adheres closely to standard Army planning guidelines such as Lines of
Operation which continues to establish it as a “legitimate” work in line with the Army way of
doing things. It does talk about the importance of local considerations, adaptability, and
counterinsurgency goals.
Chapter 5, “Executing Counterinsurgency Operations,” is the second-longest chapter in
the book: we can infer that though designing a counterinsurgency campaign in many ways
resembles conventional technique, executing it is a different matter. It immediately lists five
overarching requirements for successful counterinsurgency operations: all five highlight
enhancing host nation government legitimacy and/or integrating operations with host nation
security forces. Chapter 5 also details training and employing host nation security forces and
recommends a vibrant information operations component of the battle plan focused on the
perceived legitimacy of the host nation government by the locals.
Chapter 6, “Developing Host-Nation Security Forces,” is a noteworthy inclusion: an
entire chapter devoted to developing internal defense, a job treated with a large measure of
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disdain by conventional force commanders. “Host nation” appears zero times in FM 3-0 and 50. “Local” only appears in them about 50 times but in reference to security forces or conditions.
The term “host nation” attaches a greater degree of importance to the indigenous population and
dynamics than “local” and subtly reinforces the idea that Americans are the outsiders who should
be operating under authority and limitations developed by the indigenous population, not
ourselves.
Interestingly, the Coalition would subsequently disregard one piece of advice from this
chapter during the Surge, the admonition that security force pay should be distributed through
government channels. One component of the success of the “Sons of Iraq” movement in Anbar
Province was the U.S. “going direct” to pay the local militias instead of relying on the mistrusted
Shia-dominated regime in Baghdad to pay Sunnis.
Chapter 7, “Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency,” is a small but interesting
component of FM 3-24 not found in contemporary field manuals (these will be discussed in
greater detail below). Ethics in leadership is discussed, particularly regarding warfighting versus
policing, proportionality and discrimination, and prisoner detention (think Abu Ghraib). It
reinforces the concept that learning and adaptability will be key to succeeding in
counterinsurgency.
Chapter 8, “Sustainment,” closes the main reading with another familiar topic to
conventional fighters, logistics. It says that logistics in counterinsurgency is different because
there is no traditional rear area. In fact, logistic units may be directly interacting with local
populations and shaping the environment for future military operations. Potential support to
maintaining host nation security forces must also be considered.
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The word security appears 512 times in FM 3-24. It is used in several different contexts,
including securing your own forces and “operational security.” Approximately 146 usages refer
to the national or local security environment and population security. Another 211 usages refer
to host nation security forces, or local police and military units. Local security as provided by
local security forces is emphasized as a vital element of successful counterinsurgency operations,
a departure from the areas of focus for U.S. Army planners prior to the Surge.
We can gain greater understanding of what a change in institutional thinking this was by
comparing FM 3-24 to FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production.
In U.S. military planning, the next 24-96 hours are considered current operations and are planned
and conducted by the J-3, or operations, staff. Time frames beyond that are considered future
operations and are planned by the J-5, or plans, staff. Higher-level echelon units have an
increasing percentage of J-5 staff: tactical units may not even have a J-5. FM 3-0 and 5-0 cover
the full range of contingencies and timeframes the Army expects to plan for.
Between the two documents, the word “security” appears only 229 times, less than half
the frequency of FM 3-24. It almost always refers to the security of US forces. At best 10 could
be stretched to touch on some aspect of security of the local population. And in most of these
cases, it references things such as route and port security which are really a means toward the
end of protecting the U.S. Army force, with only a secondary benefit of securing the local
populace.
Comparisons of other key words further differentiates FM 3-24 from FM 3-0 and 5-0 and
can be seen in the table below:
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WORD

FM 3-24

FM 3-24

FM 3-0/ FM 5-0

FM 3-0/FM 5-0

COUNT

FREQUENCY

COUNT

FREQUENCY

PER PAGE

PER PAGE

Insurgency/insurgent/insurgents

1,254

4.45

0

0

Social

160

0.57

0

0

Population/populace

462

1.34

117

0.19

Civil/civilian

304

1.08

276

0.49

May

604

2.14

845

1.37

Table 7: Word Frequency Comparison FM 3-24 vs FM 3-0 and FM 5-0

Concepts that are crucial to FM 3-24 are barely treated in FMs 3-0 and 5-0. The
frequency comparisons validate General Petraeus’ belief that there was a gap in US Army
planning for counterinsurgency warfare. Even the relatively close use of “may” is still
enlightening. Although “may” is a more frequent word in both FM 3-0 and FM 5-0, FM 3-24
seems about 50% more likely to realize that events on the battlefield will not always occur the
way you planned them beforehand.
Conceptual differences can also be seen by comparing the respective word clusters of FM
3-24 and FMs 3-0 and 5-0:

150

Figure 5: FM 3-24 Word Cluster

Figure 6: FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 Word Cluster
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Operations is at the heart of what the Army does in both cases, and things such as support
and forces are comparably high, but we can see major differences as well. In FM 3-24, leaders,
governments and organizations are training, designing and understanding people and insurgents
to provide support and success. By comparison, in FMs 3-0 and 5-0 commanders, headquarters
and units are offensively maneuvering, conducting decisive actions, and using tactical power to
complete tasks against the enemy.
What explains the differences? It is human nature to try to simplify our complex world
whenever possible, and combat operations are no different. It should not be a surprise that
military leadership has a desire to “sanitize” the battlefield whenever possible. Planning for
combat is complicated enough already. The commander’s preference is that things like weather,
time and popular support are not constantly getting in the way of strictly military calculations.
As a result, commanders can fall into the trap of trying to pretend these problems do not even
exist and developing plans that fail to take them into account.
This thinking is evident in the understated acknowledgement in the pre-Surge Field
Manuals 3-0 and 5-0 of even the presence, let alone importance, of local civilian populations.
Both manuals were published in 2001. Reading through FMs 3-0 and 5-0, they talk about Lines
of Operation, logistics and force security. They delve into details of tactics such as ambushes
and retreats, and even briefly mention factors such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapon employment, but barely acknowledge the battlefield presence of civilians who could
impact operations.
The Army as an institution needed a positive injection of guidance regarding
counterinsurgency warfare to enable it to carry out its mission in Iraq. The last major insurgency
the U.S. had been involved in was Vietnam. The time in-between had been dominated by the
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Cold War, ideal conditions for leadership that wanted to focus on strictly military planning.
Large conventional forces were concentrated in Europe preparing to repel a conventional force
invasion, but never actually being employed. As a contemplated defensive action, planners did
not have to worry about occupying potentially hostile territory. Damage done to local
infrastructure would be inflicted by the enemy. Forces could conduct exercises in isolated areas
free of civilians. The largest U.S. military operation conducted between 1973 and 2001 was the
first Gulf War, which further reinforced conventional force thinking. Operation DESERT
STORM was a Cold Warrior’s dream come true: force-on-force combat in the desert. It was
Central Germany without Germans.
Others paid attention to Gulf War I as well, and often did a better job of assimilating its
lessons. Most saw that a conventional fight against the U.S. is a fools’ errand. When asked what
he had learned from Gulf War I, the Indian Chief of Staff reportedly said, “Never fight the U.S.
without nuclear weapons.”201 The groups who lacked the luxury of nuclear weapons were
driven towards the other end of the spectrum of conflict: asymmetric warfare. Al-Qaeda was
demonstrating the viability of unconventional attacks against the U.S. even prior to 9-11,
conducting assassinations, bombing embassies, and attacking on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden. Even
Saddam adapted. As a result of Gulf War I he retooled the Iraqi armed forces, placing greater
emphasis on forming stay-behind units of fedayeen, roughly “those who would sacrifice
themselves.” These were to become the core of resistance groups loyal to the regime in the event
Iraq was invaded. Although they did little good to Saddam, they were tailor-made to became
part of the insurgent movement that sprang up after the 2003 Coalition occupation of Iraq.
General Petraeus and his working group knew that they had to produce guidance
pertinent to the conflict in Iraq. Getting U.S. Army approval for FM 3-24 was the first step in
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giving him the flexibility he needed to bring a new way of looking at the problem to his new
command in Iraq. With it, he now had the document he and his subordinates could point to and
say, “We’re doing this because that’s what our doctrine tells us to do.”

SUPPORT FROM ABOVE

“…gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical.”
-

FM 3-24

This analysis of FM 3-24 helps better understand the need for writing it and how it would
serve as the foundation for the Surge strategy of General Petraeus. It provides insight to how he
and the U.S. viewed the best response to the threats and problems in Iraq. As with the discussion
of challenges in the previous chapter, this discussion will begin with U.S. political institutions
and the American people. Whatever success could happen in Iraq would require stateside support
across the board. Changes in attitude and leadership helped create an environment more
conducive to a change of strategy in Iraq.

Executive Branch

“The NSC staff, guided by the deputies and principals, assists in integrating interagency
processes to develop the plan for NSC approval.”
-

FM 3-24
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The Surge would not work without clear support at the top. The Concordance Theory of
Schiff was demonstrated not through institutional change, but individuals. Changes in the
Administration’s personnel and the arrival of leadership in Iraq who had the “pull” to coordinate
directly with the President and his top officials resulted in increased willingness to allow the
people on the ground in Iraq input into strategy. Ambassador Crocker said in his interview with
the author, if it is not important to the President, it is not important to anyone. If it is important
to the President, he needs to demonstrate that by having someone empowered by him to make
sure the effort succeeds. This White House support was demonstrated in the form of General
Douglas Lute, Deputy National Security Advisor. Ambassador Crocker considered him a key
player in getting other agencies to provide needed personnel in Iraq. He was empowered by
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, but also by the President. 202
For the military, the Surge above all meant a temporary increase in force by about 30,000
soldiers. Attention was paid to soft power. General Petraeus said that he got at least 1-2
additional Civil Affairs (CA) battalions one of which was put up in the Kurdish region and the
other in Nineveh Province. There was also Public Affairs (PA) augmentation and more PSYOP
elements.203 A senior Information Operations developer said that the Surge by itself did not
cause a major change in what his office did though they did adapt strategy and narrative. 204
Another said that he recalls thinking they had the (soft power) assets needed. What was needed
more than messaging was successful actions with well-coordinated messaging. 205 Metz is
pessimistic that a comprehensive, effective counterinsurgency narrative can be maintained in the
modern information environment, 206 but interviewees in Chapter Six will describe improved
effects related to timely, coordinated messaging.
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The successful actions would come from the combat units that made up the bulk of the
Surge reinforcement. Multiple interviewees talked about the overriding importance of
establishing security as a prerequisite to successful soft power initiatives. A brigade commander
in Baghdad during the Surge said that in his area there were pockets (of resistance) they had to
eliminate that they might not have been able to do without the Surge force increase. He believed
that the higher concentration of soldiers during the Surge got things under control. There were
areas they just could not satisfy, either lethal or non-lethal, without the additional forces because
the troop-to-task207 ratio was just too great.208 The situation in Iraq prior to the Surge supported
the idea of Eastin and Glade that small amounts of counterinsurgency force can strengthen an
insurgency by providing it the opportunity to demonstrate resolve. 209
State Department’s ability to get the right people to Iraq was strengthened by the arrival
of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary, with John Negroponte as her Deputy. Negroponte has served
as the first U.S. ambassador to Iraq upon dissolution of the CPA under Paul Bremer. Both were
solidly behind the Surge. Ambassador Crocker explained that it is traditional in the DoS system
that someone hoping to be an ambassador or who already has her name in play goes to see the
Deputy Secretary to see how the plan lies. What Negroponte did after becoming Deputy was to
say, “If you haven’t been to Iraq, don’t even bother walking through the door.” 210 This was
further effort by the State Department to mitigate the difficulties observed by de Tray of getting
the right people in Iraq.211
Ambassador Crocker also built a more practical security process for the Surge. In Iraq he
worked out arrangements with General Petraeus whereby the command with the appropriate
assets, whether military or civilian, would manage movements. In 98% of the cases that meant
military assets would move embassy people. He signed and the RSOs (Regional Security
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Officers) did not object. It got people where they needed to go, although at an increased risk:
military movement standards are not as stringent as State movement standards. 212
Ambassador Crocker knew that personalities would be important and worked hard to get
the best ones lined up on his side. He said that a lot of it was personal effort, calling everybody
he could think of for the senior positions and that he got terrific responses. 213 As proof of his
effort, there were at least 5 ambassadors working in Iraq during the Surge, reversing trends of the
inadequate State Department manning observed by de Tray.
A military planner on the MNF-I staff felt that AMB Crocker was the hero in the Surge
and that to the extent that the Surge was considered successful, much of the credit can be
attributed to him. He felt that Generals Odierno and Petraeus were great, but the most valuable
player was Ryan Crocker. He ascribed a lot of the Surge success to Ambassador Crocker’s
leadership in overcoming the institutional biases that were present (and that have still not been
reformed in his opinion).214 They would prove more successful at integrating military and
civilian contributions as outlined by Pirnie and O’Connell and Dixon.

Congress

“Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgents manage both.”
-

FM 3-24

General Petraeus understood that Congressional support was crucial to maintaining
budgeting and public support for the Surge. Many representatives would have probably agreed
with Gentile and Metz that victory in direct counterinsurgency warfare was not a realistic
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goal.215 General Petraeus and his staff spent tremendous time and effort preparing for his
Congressional testimony.216 He did not want to create a false expectation, and was blunt in his
initial forecast to them:
I told Congress during my confirmation hearing in January 2007 that the violence, the
situation would get worse before it got better. That our casualties would go up, because we
went into these areas where the violence was the highest, which is where we had to go and
did indeed go and separate the warring factions. They were going to fight back: that is
exactly what they did do. The casualties did go up, although fairly quickly the Iraqi civilian
casualties started to go down, and then over time the sensational attack numbers started to go
down. Then sectarian incidents started to go down: all of that was very important. 217
General Petraeus also wanted to increase funds available for the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP). This was discretionary money that military
commanders at all levels had to spend on local civic projects. According to General Petraeus,
the history of CERP started after they achieved security in Mosul, where the interim provincial
council and governor had a lot of activities ongoing. It was clear that they needed money for a
host of ongoing projects to help restore basic services, to repair damaged infrastructure, to help
repair damage to ministry facilities, to rebuild Mosul University and a variety of other
educational institutions, and to rebuild the police academy. Ultimately the Coalition Provincial
Authority got permission to use the more than a billion dollars found in regime official’s
buildings and so forth. After that was gone, they wanted to find a way to continue to fund these
projects.
He had talked to then-Senate Majority Leader Frist (TN), who represented a state in
which a big part of Ft Campbell is located and who had done thoracic surgery on Petraeus after a
training accident he had as a battalion commander. He said that Senator Frist took a keen
interest in the issue and that’s when Congress passed legislation that authorized the appropriate
funds for what came to be known as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. It was a
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major component of the military soft power effort in subsequent years. 218 One of General
Petraeus’ senior staff officers before and during the Surge agreed that this was a point of
emphasis in the meetings with key Congressmen: General Petraeus asked for additional CERP
money and authority for usage and got it. 219 This demonstrates the high level of access General
Petraeus had to leadership in Washington as observed by Schifrin. 220
Willingness to challenge the rules became more frequent as well. A State Department
manager with private sector experience got frustrated whenever he was told that something was
against the law or required by Congress. When he would ask if anyone had ever called Congress
to explain why the rule was not working in a war zone, they would say no. He would get on the
phone and call a couple of Congressional staffers and they would say, “We didn’t realize that: its
fine.”221 A senior Embassy transition official said that during the Surge policy in Washington
was actually being driven by the field.222 This is another instance of approximating Schiff’s
Concordance Theory although via personal initiative versus structural change.
According to Ambassador Crocker:
I became concerned over Embassy staffing and structure early on. In a perpetual crisis
atmosphere, staffing decisions were often made quickly and without reference to overall
coherence. I asked Pat Kennedy, Undersecretary of State for Management, for help.
Kennedy himself came out to Baghdad for an extended period and produced the Kennedy
Report. It laid out recommendations to alleviate manning and employment issues in
Iraq.223
The Kennedy Report provided for improved training, equipping and staffing of
contracted security, particularly for convoy movement. It increased Regional Security Officer
(RSO) direct involvement in convoy movement. It brought State Department security
procedures more in line with those of the military and increased cooperation between the two. It
also mandated more cultural sensitivity training for contracted security. The result was an
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Embassy that was able to lash up more effectively with its military counterparts and expand its
ability to restore stability to Iraq.

LEADERS IN COOPERATION

Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation.
-

FM 3-24

Surge participants at all levels talked about the importance of personalities in fostering
cooperation between the various elements of the Executive Branch. It is an element of success
that was stressed by participants who published works related to the Surge, such as Mansoor,
Brinkley and Sky. Journalists who covered the conflict also talked about how changing people
could change the effectiveness of relationships. For Kaplan, it began stateside as General
Petraeus was overseeing the writing of FM 3-24.224 Kagan and Ricks both talk about
relationship-building between the Americans and Iraqis.225 The journalists encompass part of the
cooperation concept. However, even they do not talk in as great detail about the improvement in
cooperation within the U.S. elements in Iraq. Academic writings regarding counterinsurgency
understudies the difference having the right person in a position can make.
Interviewees continually stressed the importance of the excellent working relationship
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus maintained. Ambassador Crocker said, “The
campaign plan that Dave and I developed at the outset was something we regularly tweaked and
tuned.”226 General Petraeus spoke in the same light, saying “we actually both signed the
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comprehensive civil-military counter-insurgency campaign plan. We oversaw together the
review of the plan that we inherited … and then did everything together. 227
This should not be read to mean that previous partnerships of Ambassador and General
were not cooperative. A military planner with experience in Baghdad prior to and during the
Surge said that he was surprised at how well General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad got
along. They shared a waiting room. If you were going in to see General Casey, you would go
into the waiting room and turn left: if you were going in to see Ambassador Khalilzad you would
go in and turn right. What was important to him was that General Petraeus took it even further,
because he was “really into the soft power element. 228
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus regularly attended and co-chaired meetings
related to security and reconstruction. 229 They rarely, if ever, publicly disagreed on an issue.
Such a relationship is invaluable in preventing subordinates on both sides of the aisle from
believing there is a “mommy/daddy” situation where they could concentrate on one and be more
likely to get what they wanted. An ambassador working at the Embassy during the Surge said
that the linkup between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus was critical to making sure
dramatic progress was made at every level. 230 Their practice was in line with Kilcullen’s
recommendation that a common diagnosis of the problem might matter more than formal unity
of effort across agencies. 231

INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

As has been seen, by 2007 the Coalition of the Willing had mostly become the United
States, although other countries such as Great Britain were still there in limited roles. The
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United Nations maintained few operations or personnel in Iraq. As a benefit, there was less need
for Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to build consensus for their actions in Iraq,
allowing them to develop a plan that best suited U.S. goals.
A U.S. military force commander has almost no authority to pursue operations outside of
his designated theatre in the manner prescribed by Kilcullen This meant that attempts to limit
Iranian or external Sunni influence were in many ways outside of the control of Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus. “Rat lines” importing weapons, fighters and logistic support to
insurgents or sectarian factions could only be shut down within Iraq. This would make the Sons
of Iraq and Anbar Awakening initiatives so important. Turning the Sunnis in particular against
external influencers meant that those sustainment tracks would turn into rat lines to nowhere.

STRATEGY

The military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those able to overcome their
institutional inclination to wage conventional war against insurgents.
-

FM 3-24

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker understood that smart power had to include a mix
of hard and soft power. Multiple interviewees agreed with this assessment. An Embassy planner
with the Joint Strategic Assessment Team described it as a combination of US and British
military and folks from the State Department both inside and outside the embassy, and some
academic experts. He said they had about a six-week period of doing intense planning and
research to put together the report, then after that report was received by Ambassador Crocker
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and General Petraeus, MNF-I J-5 started turning it into the new campaign plan. 232 A Treasury
official at the Embassy agreed that during the Surge a lot of people with subject matter expertise
were looking at making things work holistically, both from a political and administrative level. 233
A senior staff officer at MNF-I during the Surge said that Gen Petraeus was intent on a
whole of government approach to counterinsurgency. He made it quite clear that he needed
more of everything that the country could provide. Not just soft power: more enablers—more
military police, more aviation, more engineers—but also more IO, more PSYOPs, and more
diplomats. He understood that the Coalition had to get the violence levels down and the only
way to do that was through kinetic action, but any sort of permanent gains would have to include
the nation-building aspects of counterinsurgency as well. This is where the soft power came in.
The officer said that General Petraeus was very hands-on in terms of the IO aspects 234 of the
Surge.235 To one MNF-I planner, General Petraeus did not think of counterinsurgency as just
hearts and minds or just hard power. It was not just offense or defense. It was all of that
together.236
An ambassador working at the Baghdad Embassy during the Surge said that it was not a
solution in and of itself. He described the Surge as a change in tactics, a change in resourcing. It
was a whole-of-government focus on making things work. To him, it demonstrated that you
could make that work: putting a whole-of-government approach together with resources and farsighted management of them. 237 An Embassy Chief of Staff said that unity of effort does not
mean “a Surge,” but a coordinated vs ad hoc effort. For example, he said that there were
numerous buckets of money in Iraq and Afghanistan: what was needed was a jointly agreed upon
strategy with conditions.238
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It started with security. According to General Petraeus, unless you can achieve security,
you do not have a foundation on which to build anything else. You have got to get security.
That could only be achieved in some cases by separating the Shia militia and Sunni insurgents. 239
This clearly required an active Coalition presence aware of the internal problems within Iraq
recognized by Dixon.240
Success would ultimately depend on better application of hard power. A Civil Affairs
officer working throughout the country during the Surge said that hard power never went away
as the punch you needed to have per classic realist theory that you must project strength to
enable the other things you want to do. He said that the units that did it the best brought down
the hammer when they needed to, but they did not overplay it. They then let soft power move to
the fore and work the problem with hard power as the “free safety.” 241 One brigade’s motto put
it bluntly: ““Positive, Polite, Professional; Prepared to Help, Prepared to Kill.”242 Another
brigade commander said that his mantra going into Baghdad was “This is not my problem. This
is your problem Mr. Iraqi Citizen and Mr. Iraqi Governance. I’m here to help, and I do have a
mission, and this is what I will do.” He saw his mission as eliminating violent threats and
criminal activities to set the conditions for a legitimate government. 243 A Special Operations
commander during the Surge period felt that his operations were probably still much more on the
kinetic side.244 This was a lesson General Petraeus had learned during his time in Mosul, going
after the irreconcilables with even more relentless pressure. The special mission forces were
employed in cases of high value targets. 245
General Petraeus did not intend to use the force increase to make the existing installations
bigger. Another lesson he brought from Mosul was living with the people to secure them with
small combat outposts and other bases. He felt that the key for the Surge was to go from big,
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consolidated bases as had been done throughout 2006 back into the neighborhoods because that
is the only way that you can secure the people and combine that with a variety of different
population control and security measures. During the Surge, he actually reversed the handoff to
Iraqis of a variety of security tasks and essentially took control back, which is similar to what he
had done in Mosul.246 Eastin and Gade talked about the soft power element of the Surge but may
not have understood that initially the U.S. assumed a greater security role in Iraq.
A Baghdad brigade commander said that the Surge was about putting in the right number
of soldiers to accomplish what General Petraeus intended. It was not the same in all areas. In
some areas he needed more guys to shoot and be in the close fight. That was what it was going
to take to rule the area and hand it off to the locals. In some it was having enough soldiers on the
ground to interact and do projects. The Surge brought money, projects and some of these
additional multipliers such as the PRTs. It brought in a higher concentration of soldiers and put
them in the right places based on the analysis that was done for hard and soft power. 247
A stability operations commander in Baghdad spoke similarly about what hard power
needed to accomplish. He described the Surge as providing sufficient forces to engage in
clearance operations in a given area and having enough presence to hold it while clearing in
another operational area. The Surge provided more combat units to fight for consolidating the
gains made by clearance operations. He said that prior to that the Coalition would clear an area,
move to another area to clear, and the virus would come back. Clear and hold came from the
combat forces. Clear would be the primary emphasis, the weight would be there, with build
being a sub-emphasis. Hold would take root as clear would lose some of its primacy, becoming
hold and build. Build would then take it over as they reduced the amount of U.S. force presence
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in a given area after it was relatively stabilized. That was the shifting of the weight over time
and an important part of the process of stability operations. 248
It would also be important to increase the civilian side of the Surge. Some of the military
expectations for the civilian Surge may have been unrealistic. A Special Operations commander
during the Surge said that because the military was adding five brigades it was probably
expecting several thousand civilian people, when the real number was about a thousand. 249 As
an example, a Civil Affairs officer described the situation wherein Mosul had a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) and Kirkuk had a military PRT. General Petraeus had set it up as
military because he could not get State Department personnel for Kirkuk. His whole theory was
to let the CA and military guys do it and as they get replaced by State, they will just roll out. 250
A stability operations commander in Baghdad felt that the Coalition had to close that gap
between them and USAID, to help them understand that the military could accelerate, enhance,
secure and protect the work they were doing. 251
But what mattered as much was getting the right civilians into the right positions. A
senior MNF-I staff officer agreed that the PRTs were morphing into a combination of
geographically based PRTs and unit-based, embedded PRTs. General Petraeus wanted those
fleshed out with increased CERP authority which he put a lot of stock in. 252 However, the goal
was to have the PRTs staffed and led by civilians. An MNC-I economics planner said that when
fighting an insurgency, if you put all your cards on hard power you are going to lose. In
Vietnam we talked about hearts and minds, and that became a cynical expression that was
abandoned in our thinking and planning. But it was absolutely correct. 253 Another Embassy
analyst said that there was more of a push to get more civilian officials out into the field and beef
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up those PRTs so that by 2008 they were opening slots around the country for more civilian PRT
positions.254
There were also participants who understood that provinces outside of Baghdad needed
help too. A PRT leader said that at the time, the modus operandi was that if they can tame
Baghdad, then they would get the rest of the country on board. They were trying to surge
capacity on the civilian side in Baghdad including at the PRTs. He successfully argued that he
needed to be in Salah al-Din because the problem was with the Sunnis. The Sunni problem was
more acute: the Shia in Baghdad was something that he felt they had plenty of resources
dedicated to.255
A provincial Civil Affairs officer said that the PRT mission really evolved from the
bottom up more than from the top down. There was a general strategy unveiled in about 2005
that guided PRT development, but they were given very little on PRT operations.

Based on the

collective experiences of PRT throughout Iraq, they saw what was working and what was not
and incorporated the successes into a solid PRT operations template. The entire thing was
informal and after action-driven from the field.256 An Embassy analyst did express a common
concern among the civilians when the brigade PRTs started to pop up. There was a reluctance to
use military security for the civilian efforts. General Petraeus shifted that somewhat as he
implemented doctrinal COIN activities, but there was still much that State Department workers
felt military personnel did not understand about US civilian capabilities.257 The ultimate solution
was simply to increase civilian staffing at the PRTs in keeping with Plakoudas as well as Pirnie
and O’Connell emphasizing the importance of the civilian component or even primacy as
recommended by Dixon.258
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STAYING IN TOUCH

The U.S. Ambassador and country team, along with senior HN representatives, must be key
players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of
command.
-

FM 3-24

Regular joint meetings would be conducted throughout the Surge. According to Ambassador
Crocker, their two full teams would meet on a quarterly basis to review, assess and reprioritize.
He said that at the command level they were tightly knit, and it worked pretty well particularly
given all the turbulence, political as well as kinetic. 259 Another ambassador there agreed that
they had a military/civilian joint campaign plan with frequent review sessions. 260 An
ambassador leading economic development at the Embassy during the Surge emphasized that
every six weeks or so they held meetings of the Conditions Assessment Synchronization Board
(CASB) at Camp Victory. General Petraeus, Ambassador Crocker and about 200 key staff
would spend a day doing a review of where they were on the plan. He described it as a complete
civil-military matchup.261
A senior MNF-I staffer said that soft power coordination was maintained on a weekly
basis as well. In the BUB (Battle Update Brief) there was one day a week that was a “soft
power” day. General Petraeus and his staff flew to the Embassy Annex to take the BUB from
that location. That was the day that all soft power and nation-building activities were briefed to
General Petraeus. 262

168
There was also a greater effort to get the military and civilians planning and working
together. A senior USAID director said that planning closely together allowed them to work
together even more closely during the Surge planning. Discussion was also very important
during the Surge. USAID senior officers were embedded with the military in the hottest areas.
263

An ambassador working economics during the Surge said that he probably traveled to more

places than any other senior officer in the embassy. The trips were almost always with the
military engagements they had coordinated together. 264
Gentile believes the shift in strategy was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. 265
Certainly, much of what was done was a refinement of existing techniques such as arming Sunni
militias and creating more PRTs. Even evolutionary change is not possible without command
support: General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were successful because they were willing to
find strategies that worked and build upon them.

GOOD FORTUNE

Skillful counterinsurgents can adapt at least as fast as insurgents.
-

FM 3-24

Several external circumstances worked to favor the Surge as well. Global oil prices were
rising, meaning there was a substantial increase in revenue available to the Iraqi government. In
fact, by 2007 oil revenue was several times the total Coalition financial contribution toward
rebuilding in Iraq.
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A degree of exhaustion with fighting was also beginning to set in with the local population.
One brigade commander in Baghdad felt that the Surge happened at the point that everyone just
wanted the bad stuff to end.266 Another commander pointed out that the process of removing
incompetent Iraqi commanders had been done mostly in 2006, so that by 2007 there were some
“pretty good guys” leading Iraqi forces.267
The biggest circumstance working in favor of the Coalition in 2007 was the Awakening
movement in Anbar Province and other Sunni areas. Much of the Sunni population had grown
tired of the al-Qaeda presence in their areas. They had appeared initially attractive with their
financial resources and anti-U.S. and Shia stance. However, by 2006 their conservative
interpretation of the Koran had combined with their indifference to collateral damage from their
operations to make them an unwanted presence (forced marriages to the daughters of tribal chiefs
had also become odious to the locals). Most importantly, their financial resources were
beginning to run low. A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) member based in Ramadi
during the Surge said that in his town, al-Qaeda wasn’t really an effective paying customer
anymore. They were instead starting to do a murder and intimidation campaign. 268 An
ambassador working in Iraq at that time said that he remembered their political-military
counselor really pounding hard on the need for population security, not general security. 269
As a result, the Americans found that they were pushing on an open door. A PSYOP
officer in Iraq before and during the Surge thought that the Surge set the momentum where Iraqis
realized that the U.S. really meant it when it said it wanted Iraqis to take the lead.270 The MTT
member said that they were organizing their (local) guys, most of them were “pissed off” enough
at al-Qaeda that they didn’t need to be paid, they just needed the wasta 271 of the tribe and
affirmation of the sheikhs. 272 The PSYOP officer said that it had nothing to do with the plan: it
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was already taking place as early as September 2006. The Surge was really capturing those
events, what was working, put it in an umbrella plan, and then sprinkled in a few more actions.
To him, if it had simply been more “Let’s take into consideration more of what the Iraqis want to
do,” it would have been just as effective. 273
According to Winston Churchill, “Success has a thousand fathers: failure is an orphan.”
The first half is certainly true in the case of the effort to organize and integrate the Sunni militias.
A provincial U.S. brigade commander recalled:
Sons of Iraq was interesting. In the peninsula where my mechanized unit was, there was
a string of IEDs that were destroying Bradleys (vehicles). In Anbar Province the Marines
get credit for starting Sons of Iraq. I give credit to my battalion commander sitting down
on the peninsula who came up with the idea. These folks who had no money to feed their
families would take money from al-Qaeda to plant IEDs. Instead, give them PT belts and
allow them to carry their AK-47 and allow them to ring a bell if there were nefarious
activities. When they rang the bell, everybody came to engage that evil element. We
also paid them to provide protection along key stretches of the MSR. When Sen John
McCain visited, he asked a very pointed question, “How much are you paying these
guys? How much is it costing the government?” I told him it was half a million dollars a
year. He said that that was a lot of money. I responded that one destroyed Bradley
would take care of that, and the U.S. soldier cargo inside was priceless. He agreed. 274
General Petraeus discussed this program as initiating a training and equipping program,
multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian, and using those forces to augment our own forces. They were
under the brigade combat teams performing a variety of missions of fixed site security; for
example, a major ammunition storage point and securing a whole host of valuable infrastructure
assets and so forth.275
Sons of Iraq was largely concentrated in and near Baghdad. The Marines did not see it in
Fallujah (and points west) much, because a lot of those groups were ad hoc militia. 276 However,
the Marines were employing the same core concept of directly funding Sunni militias, which
undercut the counterinsurgency principle of legitimizing government institutions, in this case
military (the Iraqi Security Forces) and political (the Shia-dominated central government in
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Baghdad). A stability operations commander in Baghdad summed up the challenge, saying that
they did not want to displace the Iraqi Security Forces as the trusted entity that helped provide
them the security that made it possible for them to rise.277 Legitimacy was provided by a
promise from Prime Minister Maliki to integrate many of these militia elements into the regular
army, although this promise went largely unfulfilled to the dismay of Sunnis who saw
themselves being shunted aside in favor of the Shia.
The important result would be a dramatic decrease in violent activity. A PRT team leader
said that the Surge numbers are underestimated because what was happening at the same time as
the Surge was convincing the Sunnis not to take up arms, which really doubled the size of the
Surge by decreasing “enemy” numbers. 278 A Special Forces commander in Iraq prior to and
during the Surge considered that as part of a broad soft power effort to pull insurgents off the
battlefield.279 The Embassy was in agreement. A State Department PRT leader said that the new
ethos that was coming online in 2008 was about partnering with tribes: helping them figure out
their own security mechanisms and supporting that through the Coalition’s Brigade Combat
Teams.280 Gentile gives primary Surge credit to Sunnis turning against al-Qaeda (along with
standdown of the Shia militias). 281 Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro are probably more accurate in
stating that the Surge was a necessary precondition for evicting al-Qaeda, pointing out that
previous attempts to do so that lacked U.S. support failed. 282

REBUILDING THE ISF

While it may be easier for U.S. military units to conduct operations themselves, it is
better to work to strengthen local forces and institutions and then assist them.
-

FM 3-24
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Enabling the Sunni militias would be an important part of defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq. At the
same time, the Coalition needed to continue to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to move towards the goal of long-term stability. Metz believes that long-term
stability requires locals to be in the lead with foreign elements in a supporting role. 283 A staff
officer who worked with General Petraeus before and during the Surge said that what they
applied in the Surge was born out of General Petraeus’ work at MNSTC-I (Multi-National
Security Command – Iraq). There was a lot of tension between what he wanted to do at
MNSTC-I and what he was able to do with the constraints put upon him and the tension between
MNSTC-I and MNF-I.284
General Petraeus recognized that the ISF had been beaten up during 2006 by a level of
violence they were not prepared to deal with. He also saw that in a number of cases inadequate
leaders needed to be replaced. They put the Iraqi Police Brigade into 30 days of training which
also included a replacement of almost everybody from brigade commander on up and some of
the battalion commanders.285 In the interim, the U.S. force Surge increase and movement off the
large compounds would relieve pressure on the hard-pressed Iraqi units while they reconstituted.
A stability operations commander in Baghdad before and during the Surge said that it was about
reversing the direction they were going in at the time. It was not to take over more from the
Iraqis: it was to commit the U.S. more fully in addition to the Iraqis.286

RECONCILIATION

Offering amnesty or a seemingly generous compromise can also cause divisions within
an insurgency and present opportunities to split or weaken it.
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FM 3-24

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus also understood the importance of bringing as
much of the reconcilable population as possible back into the discourse. General Petraeus said
that many of the approaches that were used during the Surge were employed in Mosul during his
time in command there. He said that they did reconciliation with Sunni Arabs. In that case it
was reconciliation with former members of the Ba’ath party, Level 4 and below, something done
again during the Surge.287
One of the requests that General Petraeus had for Prime Minister Tony Blair when he
stopped in London on his way to Baghdad was that he extend General Lamb as MNF-I deputy
for a number of months. General Petraeus knew him well from his time in Bosnia while General
Lamb was head of British Special Forces and they had “chased war criminals together.” They
were also division commanders together in the first year of the war and when General Petraeus
was at Leavenworth General Lamb was at the equivalent job in the UK. When the Surge began
General Lamb was the MNF-I deputy and General Petraeus wanted to keep him there to help
convince U.S. leaders that they had to reconcile with as many of the rank and file and lowerlevel insurgent leaders as was possible, and ultimately to do to the same thing with the militia
leaders, while then pursuing even more relentlessly the irreconcilables.
As you might imagine, a number of our brigade and battalion commanders questioned
why we would sit down across the table from people who had our blood on their hands.
And that is a reasonable question, but at the end of the day you cannot kill and capture
your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency. You have to reconcile with as many as
you can, those who can be truly reconciled. 288
Other interviewees agreed that one of the most valuable pieces the British leadership
brought to the table was their hard-earned experience in Ireland where they finally realized that a
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peace that excluded the Irish Republican Army was unrealistic. They helped the Americans
understand that the peace process in Iraq had to be as inclusive as possible. Olson Lounsbery
and Pearson postulate that insurgents are less prone to violence if they perceive the government
acting in a conciliatory manner and feel they can achieve some or all goals by working within the
system.289

RECONSTRUCTION

An essential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these forces can and
should use their capabilities to meet the local populace’s fundamental needs as well.
-

FM 3-24

A viable long term U.S. strategy in Iraq needed to work to put the country back on a
stable footing. The literature is surprisingly sparse on the economic aspects of the Surge
strategy. De Tray talked about previous issues related to poor PRT manning and project
oversight.290 Many authors talk about soft power, and may delve into its political, religious and
cultural dimensions, but few seem to tackle the topic of actual reconstruction. It is a curious
lapse given that authors across the board continuously state that improving the lives of the locals,
implying standard of living increases, is paramount to permanently stabilizing a country.
Conversely, Surge participants felt that poor economic conditions were a core cause of
the insurgency. An economics planner on the MNC-I staff said that his section took the view
that it was more greed than grievance, so if they could accelerate the growth of the Iraqi
economy and increase the number of jobs available for young men, it would increase the
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opportunity cost of joining the insurgency. 291 Even employment as additional security is still an
alternative to insurgency.
We have seen that General Petraeus liked CERP spending and encouraged its liberal use
by commanders. A stability operations commander in Baghdad said that they built some strong
processes for rebuilding Baghdad’s infrastructure and had great success with it as part of the
Surge effort. It was his responsibility to organize CERP spending. One planning concern was
avoiding creating inflation. His preference was not to hand out money but to purchase needed
items. For example, they could purchase 50 small generators, distribute them throughout a
particular district of Baghdad and create a micro-economy.292

MEASURING CHANGE

It is essential that commanders designate a group of analysts to perform comprehensive
insurgency analysis.
-

FM 3-24

One of the changes that occurred with the new Surge leadership was a change in focus on
what constituted success. A State Department analyst in Bagdad before and during the Surge
said that the prior leadership had been very interested in special projects being conducted in Iraq.
Ambassador Crocker showed a greater interest in population security metrics, which at that time
looked very bad. Ambassador Crocker focused on the security metrics and was always
interested in knowing if things were getting better or worse. The State Department analyst said
this went hand-on-glove with General Petraeus’ “take/hold/build” approach in the military
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sector. Prior to that the second Baghdad Security Plan had not been going well. Now the
leadership was unified in viewing the population security metrics as the most important criteria
of success in the Surge. 293
Another State Department analyst said that General Petraeus was great at getting everyone
pulling in the same direction. In his daily BUBs he would put people on the spot to answer
questions and demonstrate progress on a whole host of things he was trying to do, and that his
contribution was achieving the synergy between hard and soft power.294
The unified leadership in common metrics meant the analysts started working closer
together. An ambassador leading economic planning during the Surge said that the Embassy had
a section of about 20 foreign service officers and contractors who worked with the MNF-I
Strategic Effects section every day, participated in the daily BUB with General Petraeus, and
hosted meetings with the Iraqis that usually had military officers present. 295
A brigade commander in Baghdad observed that if you are improving things like
electricity and sewer it has to be to their standards, not yours. It needs to be good for them, not
necessarily good for you. It needs to be something they can sustain after you leave. The U.S.
needed to make sure what was provided to them by way of soft power was sustainable once the
Coalition left.296 A TFBSO official said that they were under constant pressure by General
Petraeus’ staff with their desire to “count stuff, turn it into a bar chart, and measure it.” 297
An Information Operations officer in Baghdad before and during the Surge gave an
example of the importance of metrics that focus on the final goal. He said that the problem with
having a TIPS hotline for Iraqis to call was:
a) Would somebody answer?
b) If someone answered, did they send anybody to help?
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c) If the ISF did show up, would they help or would they shake you down?
Three out of four are lousy outcomes. That is the level of measurement that was really
missing.298 Chapter Six demonstrates that the Coalition would continue to granulate what was
happening in Iraq and improve its ability to measure effectiveness towards U.S. goals and
objectives.

MESSAGING

By publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and counterinsurgent accomplishments,
IO, synchronized with public affairs, can neutralize insurgent propaganda and false claims.
-

FM 3-24

In his interview with the author, General Petraeus emphasized the need to be first with the
truth:
That means you provide the facts as you best understand them, there is no putting lipstick on
pigs. What you do is try to beat the bad guys to the headline. If that is your goal, you have
to do it a lot faster than we did it. We did dramatically increase speed in a whole variety of
messaging and communications efforts in general. 299
One of the senior staff officers at MNF-I during the Surge said that this is what General
Petraeus was adamant would not happen: an event happened on the ground and the insurgents
would make hay of it in their propaganda and the Western media would pick up on it.
Meanwhile the Coalition would launch an investigation that would take days or weeks and would
come out with a much more accurate version of the truth which often exonerated its soldiers, but
by that time no one cared. When he stuck his finger in the chest of the IO guys and said, “we are
going to beat the insurgents to the ticker,” that meant the ticker that goes on the bottom of the
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CNN screen, the breaking news. He wanted the Coalition version of what happened to be there,
even if it was incomplete. It was not going to be a lie, it might be incomplete, and as more
information came out the U.S. would fact-check and rewrite any statements that were incorrect.
The Coalition would be first with its version of what had happened. And that would force the
enemy to react and force the media to use the Coalition narrative initially and then both sides
would be competing for the media battlespace. But he was determined that the Coalition would
be better at that competition by being first with what it knew to be the truth at the time. 300
One of the senior Public Affairs officers (PAO) at MNF-I saw the same thing. According to
him, they went there with the idea that when the Coalition talked to others, it should be at the
speed at which a political campaign moves. 301 To a great degree this was accomplished due to
the flattening of how General Petraeus did business. He believed that in order to do that they had
to have to have the trust from the commanding general, that he trusts the staff to be able to work
within the guidance he provided or knowing what his intent was. For example, if the PAO
needed to get something out, and he knew this was in keeping with current guidance, the PAO
didn’t really ask permission, although he would always give him a follow-up “Here’s what I
did.” The PAO felt that you had to have that trust. 302
There was also more of an effort to try to get product release authority delegated to lower
command levels, which decreases approval time and allows better tailoring of products to local
situations. An Embassy planner saw that what General Petraeus wanted to do was push down
the level of authority to do things like flyers and IO activities. 303 Joseph among others has
criticized U.S. counterinsurgency efforts as consistently failing to link their effort to local levels
of governance.304 Delegating message release authority to lower levels improves the ability of
commanders to shape messaging to their area of operations.
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General Petraeus also wanted the various influence strands to plan and coordinate
together. There is a tendency for PAOs to be reluctant to be aware of the activities of
Psychological Operations in particular to give them “credible deniability.” General Petraeus’
PAOs would sit in on IO meetings as he felt necessary. According to the PAO, early on it was
uncomfortable for them (“Why is the PAO in here?”).305 It allowed for better message
synchronization between all the Coalition elements. He also kept a close eye on Coalition
messaging. A senior member of the Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) described their
first meeting with General Petraeus. As General Petraeus was being briefed, he kept scratching
out questions on his note pad. At the end he half-jokingly said, “I don’t know what you are
doing, but keep doing it.” The IOTF considered that an absolute win. They found him to be an
“engaged, smart decent guy.”306

THE CAMP WAR

Effectively disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating former insurgents and their groups must
be part of the overall COIN plan.
-

FM 3-24

One of the big ideas that General Petraeus brought to the Surge was that the Coalition
needed to conduct counterinsurgency inside the wire as well as outside. They had to identify the
extremists, the irreconcilables, and detain them inside the compound where they were previously
being disruptive and making it impossible to do anything such as rehabilitation job training or
moderation in religion or any other initiatives. They needed to get them out of the enclosures,
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but if they went in with weapons they would fight back as well as the other 800 people in there in
some cases. Once they put them into maximum security facilities, they were able to commence
rehabilitation, a review process, job training, basic skills, basic education, and a variety of other
initiatives to dramatically reduce the recidivism rate of those that were released. The Coalition
goal was to stop releasing such detainees until they had such measures established because the
recidivism rate was very high. 307

Figure 7: Iraqi Children Playing in the Visitation Area of a U.S. Interment Facility

Despite the international focus on U.S. detention facilities such as CIA secret sites and
Guantanamo Bay, U.S. detention facilities in Iraq received little media attention post-Abu Ghraib
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and less academic treatment. Although academic works mention atrocities that garner
international attention, day-to-day operation of detention facilities and their contribution to force
objectives receives less attention. General Petraeus was concerned about recidivism and
considered detention facilities an important part of taming the insurgency.
A detention facility commander in Iraq during the Surge described his contribution this way:
My biggest opportunity to push COIN (counterinsurgency) was family day. I think we
would have it every Friday where family members could come and visit their loved ones who
were incarcerated or detained in our facility. I do not think each prisoner had a weekly visit:
we staggered it every other week. Family members would bring fruits and vegetables, maybe
scarves and blankets, things that they might think their loved ones might need or for comfort.
We vetted it to make sure there was nothing usable as weapons. They would bring a lot of
kids. My guards enjoyed playing with the kids, kicking around a soccer ball a little bit. I
thought that we could take this to a higher level. If family members see we are treating their
loved ones well, they would go back to their villages and say that the Americans are good
people and are treating our loved ones well, versus saying we did not treat them well
depending on what they see. I started have my soldier’s family members send us toys,
coloring books and extra clothing that we gave to the children and families when they came
over. A lot of the family members were not doing very well because their main source of
income was now sitting in an internment facility, so they were facing hardship. The idea was
treating them well, and they will go back to their villages and tell the others how they are
treated with dignity and respect. We also built a playground for the kids to play on when
they came. We tried to spruce up the area, we painted the walls and asked any detainees with
the inclination to draw murals on the t-walls. We went from a drab internment facility to a
much better place to be.308
The compound commander described some of other initiatives such as sewing (there were
prisoners of both genders at the facility) and computer classes. Instruction was also provided on
a more moderate view and interpretation of the Koran. There were also opportunities for
education, as some of the detainees were as young as 14 years old, trying to bring them up to a
high school level of education. 309
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LEVEL OF INFLUENCE

Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally…coordinated closely with governmental and
nongovernmental partners at all command levels.
-

FM 3-24

An important element of General Petraeus’ plan was increasing interaction with Iraqis
below the national government level. At the time, this went against U.S. strategic planning as
normally practiced by the Department of State which was to try and work with Iraqis at a
government-to-government level. It also aligns with progressive interventionist ideas of trying
to remake a national entity out of a collective of villages, tribes and even individuals.
This idea of reshaping a country at a national level is encapsulated in the writings of
Antonio Gramsci, one of the early Marxist thinkers who founded the Italian Communist Party.
Gramsci believed in the unifying power of ideology, and that it could be employed to mold the
citizens of a country. One of his paragraph’s states:
The main problematique of the State is to incorporate the will of each single individual
into the collective will turning their necessary consent and collaboration from “coercion”
to “freedom”. This means that the State functions so as to create “conformist” citizens
who internalize the most restrictive aspects of the “civil life” and accept them as their
natural “duties” without having any resentment.
This passage encapsulates many of the strategic flaws that bedevil interventionist
planning by nation-states.
In his essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,” Isaiah Berlin wrote about “…the fallacy of
regarding social groups as being literally persons or selves, whose control and discipline of their
members is no more than self-discipline, voluntary self-control which leaves the individual agent
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free.” There are about 9 billion human wills on the planet: like snowflakes, no two are exactly
alike. Spouses do not even have a collective will, let alone their children and extended family.
If there is no such thing as a collective nuclear family will, how much more unrealistic is it to
speak of an Iraqi collective will?
Turning…coercion to freedom. In “Two Concepts of Liberty” Isaiah Berlin attacked this
fallacy as well. “To coerce a man is to deprive him of his freedom.” To him, manipulating men
toward goals set by others is to degrade them, regardless of the rationality or loftiness of the
goals. Even universal consent to loss of liberty still results in oppression. Forcing the Iraqis to
make 25% of their parliament women, even if for a noble end, is still coercion and deprives the
Iraqis to learn from making their own choices. Former Congressman Ron Paul said, “Freedom
to make bad choices is inherent in the freedom to make good ones.”
Without…resentment. One truism of human beings is that we do not like other human
beings telling us what to do. The U.S. needed to recognize that although most Iraqis were glad
Saddam was gone, they still resented foreign occupation, and that this resentment would increase
the longer the U.S. was there.
U.S. planners for the first four years of the occupation of Iraq were being unrealistic in
believing that there was a collective Iraqi will to be tapped into, collaborated with or expected to
produce nation-wide control. Iraq is a state with two major ethnic groups and two major Islamic
sects, in addition to Turkmen, Assyrians, Christians, Yazidis and others that probably comprise
roughly 20% of the population. Historically, these groups have been antagonistic to one another,
antagonism exacerbated by outside sponsorship.
The problem played out most visibly in the attempts to hold national elections. Iraqi
Sunnis and Kurds may have been new to democracy, but they were not new to math, and they
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understood that it would be extremely difficult to implement a majority-rule system that
prevented the 60% Shia population from dominating the political landscape. The Sunnis
boycotted the 2005 national elections, which they soon realized was an even bigger disaster than
participating. Although they did participate in future elections, they never developed trust in the
system they claimed with some veracity was dominated by the Iraqi Shia.
A collective national will is probably impossible to find, but the lower one can interact
with a population, the more likely one is to operate within the more successful local parameters
described by Olson Lounsbery and Pearson.310 Accordingly, one element of General Petraeus’
strategy that was probably a step in the right direction was reaching out to Iraqi interest groups
below the national level. Sunnis in Anbar Province, Kurds in Mosul and Marsh Arabs in the
south of the country have different needs and are more likely to work with outsiders if they feel
they are not being treated as part of some abstract greater entity. He would be helped by the
increase in number and quality of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that tailored
reconstruction and political needs to local and provincial levels.
This showed in the various arenas the Coalition interacted with the Iraqis. Even while
supporting a national political structure, there is still room to work economically, culturally and
even militarily at a sub-national level. Oil may be the biggest economic concern at the national
level in Iraq, but a city mayor may think getting the local marketplace reopened is a bigger
priority. A tribal chief may simply be looking for someone to inoculate his camel herd. Civilian
interviewees for this work in particular emphasized their mission of trying to diffuse governance
power to provincial levels and below, a major challenge in a country whose intellect and
initiative had been stymied by 30 years of centralized control under Saddam Hussein.
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The same holds true in the military sphere. The pre-Surge strategy had been continuing
to move U.S. forces into large bases isolated from the population but still mortar attack magnets.
How is that establishing a sense of security and partnership with the local population? Better to
utilize those forces as General Petraeus did: small outposts jointly manned with Iraqi security
located right in the heart of contested cities. With this change, American forces were able to
reach a more meaningful “collective will” that resonated with the local population and made
them feel like they were being treated as more unique.
Level of influence was an important component of the Surge strategy, following the
advice General Petraeus had laid down in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Operations. Specifically, he tied it into the military principle of decentralized execution laid out
in FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. FM 3-24 devoted a section of
Chapter One to stressing that delegating to the lowest levels possible is particularly important for
counterinsurgency operations, particularly for effective information and civil-military operations.
Chapter Five went into further details highlighting the need to operate and interact with the local
population as much as possible.
Strategists should understand that seeking a collective will in a target audience greater
than one person is unrealistic. However, the lower influence and planning go, the closer they can
come to approaching the concept of understanding and reaching common interests and mutually
agreeable goals that permit a certain degree of functionality. This functionality is more difficult
to achieve at a national than regional level, more difficult to achieve at a regional than tribal
level, more difficult to achieve at a tribal than village level, etc. Modification of a collective will
strategy in favor of going around the national Iraqi government, even at times to its displeasure,
was a key component of the Surge strategy and amplified its effectiveness at reaching out to
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lower-level leaders and reducing violence within the country, most notably with the Sons of Iraq
and Anbar Awakening developments. The U.S. did not initiative these movements but
recognized how they meshed with its counterinsurgency strategy and embraced them.

CONCLUSION

The Surge would be built upon the insights found in Field Manual 3-24,
Counterinsurgency, as developed under the guidance of General Petraeus prior to his taking
command in Iraq in 2007. It was a departure from current Army doctrine, although it contained
insights gleaned not only from Iraq, but prior U.S. “small wars” as well. FM 3-24 provided a
blueprint and justification for the change in U.S. strategy that would be implemented during the
Surge.
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus proved to be an able team. They secured
improved domestic support through communication and knowing how to work the system. They
set the example for interagency cooperation by maintaining a visible, unified presence to
civilians and the military alike. They formulated a realistic strategy tailored to the strengths of
the military and civilian workers in Iraq.
Hard and soft power would be mixed to try and stabilize the country and allow political
progress. Strengthening the Iraqis while weakening the insurgency, risks would be taken to take
the fight to the enemy and calm the volatile situation in Iraq. This smart strategy would prove to
be more flexible and adaptable than that previously employed. Better messaging, effective
tracking and putting pressure on anti-government forces would all play a role in the Surge, as
will be explored in detail in Chapter Eight.
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CHAPTER VI
A SMARTER STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter and the succeeding two chapters examine the events and operational
strategies applied during the surge, beginning here with the structure of government operations,
and then continuing in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 with an examination of the use and combination
of coercive and attractive power in smarter ways during the Surge.
The shift in Surge strategy and operations was made possible to an extent by changes to
the support structure of the U.S. government’s Executive Branch. Dahl’s idea that there are
competing power elites who must compromise had been evident prior to the Surge. The
proclivity of the Rumsfeld-led Department of Defense to minimize State Department (DoS) input
and participation in particular delayed development of a robust civilian framework capable of
taking on the role of reconstruction in Iraq. The ascension of Defense Secretary Gates, a more
inclusive leader, and Secretary of State Rice, a more influential person with the Bush White
House, resulted in better cooperation at the national level. Additionally, Secretary Rice in
particular would work to correct systemic flaws within DoS that hindered the effort in
Iraq. None the less, structural challenge was partial, and some issues persisted.
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SUPPORT FROM ABOVE

The Concordance Theory of Schiff talked about the importance of subordinates working
in harmony with their superiors and having meaningful input to the senior level decision-making
process. Getting their ideas into the plan provides them greater flexibility to implement policy
on the ground, and this increased flexibility granted to the Coalition was important in enabling
them to achieve national security objectives.
Both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker enjoyed better access to their superiors
in Washington DC and ability to influence them than had previously been the case. This was
partly due to their track record of success, and partly due to the deteriorating situation in Iraq
creating a greater willingness on the part of the Administration to listen to input from their
subordinates. To an Embassy stability coordinator in Baghdad, policy in Washington was
actually being driven by the field. 311
Working to overcome budgeting issues was an ongoing challenge, although increased
coordination helped to alleviate that. According to a senior Embassy planner, several months of
getting the Surge started were wasted deciding who would pay for what, although ultimately the
American taxpayer will pay so what difference does it make which agency pays? He developed
a two-page memorandum based on President Bush’s wishes, and got the White House, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and DoD to sign off on. His office then spent two more weeks
negotiating with DoD, who turned it into a ten-page memorandum. The lead ambassador said
the process was “tougher than negotiating with the North Koreans.” He finally went to the
Defense Department and his counterpart refused to sign it because it did not spell out who would
pay for getting the State Department dead home from the PRTs. He asked for a pen and wrote
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on the agreement “The State Department will pay to get its own dead home from the PRTs” and
she agreed to sign it. After all that, he said they never got a single bill from Defense Department
for the cost-sharing.312
As another example, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) leader returned from Iraq
and was working in the NSC Iraq office on economics and PRTs when a call came from the
OMB saying that it appeared that the military had just zeroed out the Iraqi police training
funding. They had a very tense meeting with Pentagon comptroller personnel. The PRT leader
said that this was not an MWR (Morale, Welfare and Recreation) program, wholly controlled by
the military and internally focused: it was a presidential directive, a vital national security
interest and that the Pentagon needed to do it. At the time there were about 2000 military
personnel working on training. For the equivalent amount of money the military was spending,
contracting to replace that capability would have gotten 350 people at most. In general, she felt
that Washington never came to grips with the fact that they needed to increase the budget and
redirect funds.313
Increasing State support at the provincial levels meant increasing the number of PRTs in
country. A senior State advisor for stabilization said that the 10 original PRTs were increased to
36 at the provincial and sub-provincial level. The PRTs served as mini-embassies to reach out to
local leaders, be they tribal, business, civil society or local government and strengthen provincial
government, help the moderates push back on the efforts of Al-Qaeda to take down the
government. They were headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer and the deputy head of each
PRT was a colonel. Recruiting was done by State, USAID and DoD.314 An ambassador at the
Embassy said that required national-level presence was met in part by building smaller PRTs. 315

190
Another DoS initiative was development of a Quick Response Fund. Two interviewees
who worked at the Embassy co-authored the fund, which was a $150-250 million dollar program
that allowed PRTs to spend quick money to fund local initiatives as a workaround for
government contracting which tends to be slow. One felt that the most effective way of doing
soft power is through direct engagement with community leaders, getting outside the wire, and
working through local organizations, not only through contractors but also by providing them
resources directly.316 To him the Quick Response Fund was invaluable in this regard.
Experience also played a role in getting policymakers to take advice from the field. A
division stability operations commander had served on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as
co-chair of the sub-committee on Strategic Communication along with the then-Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Larry De Rita. They talked about integrating different
activities and where to maintain appropriate firewalls. Those experiences and practices of
integration would be brought to bear in Baghdad and helped accelerate the process and precision
of their work.317
Some devised clever workarounds to maximize cooperation benefits. A brigade
commander recounted that getting key information into the Pentagon required him to go through
many layers: a division, MNC-I, MNF-I, and CENTCOM before it could get to the higher levels
of government. He found that the State Department structure was much “flatter.” When the colocated PRT team leader sent cables to Washington they went directly to DoS and Secretary
Rice. He used that process to get information into the Joint Staff that may have been lost in the
layers he had to pass through. 318 His initiative is laudable, but what made it possible was the
existence of the PRT and the cooperative relationship he had developed with its team leader.
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Interest from high could be good and bad. A stabilization director at the Embassy
recalled that the enemy began to go after weaker, softer targets, specifically against the religious
minorities of Iraq. That led the President in early 2008 to create a task force protecting religious
minorities in Iraq. That was another interagency effort, military and civilians working together
to come up with a response and assistance programs to protect the minorities against Al-Qaeda
because they were the weakest targets. 319 An ambassador working economics recalled a major
funding handover to the Iraqis in Ramadi attended by Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus,
and, as it happened, Senator Joe Biden, who was visiting at the time, came along. There was a
major tribal engagement with about 60 sheikhs. Speeches were given and both sides exchanged
good wishes on how much had been accomplished, but also on how much more needed to be
done. He recalled it as a “hyper” tribal engagement that was very successful. 320
On the other hand, another ambassador working on economic development recalled that
“Secretary Gates, the White House, everyone was pounding the table asking why they couldn’t
get more than 6,000 watts” (of electricity on a national basis). He said that no matter what they
did it was always the Achilles heel, there were just so many ways insurgents could undermine
success, especially because the Coalition was usually trying to do it quick. As he observed, you
do not build power plants in the U.S. in six months. 321 A Treasury Department official in
Baghdad during the Surge said the military had a difficult time understanding that the budget
cycle was like a pregnancy: it takes two years to go through the cycle of funding, approving and
observing the budget expenditures. The military wanted to speed up the process by adding more
people. She said that trying to shorten or extend that time frame just creates problems like a
pregnancy: “if you add two more women you are not going to get a baby in 3 months.”322
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Structural problems in State Department that hindered employing the full potential of
attractive power tools have been discussed previously. The Surge time period saw improvements
in this area, but problems still persisted. In many cases the military was forced to step in and fill
civilian side manning shortfalls.
A PRT leader in the same province later in the Surge said that even with the Surge it was
still the military in the lead and more of the military taking on soft power activities by pushing
themselves out to the grassroots rather than integrating soft power experts into what the military
was doing at the lower levels. 323 He said that the civilian side was centered on expanding the
number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that had already been established earlier.
These would serve as mini-embassies to reach out to local leaders, be they tribal, business, civil
society or local government and be able to strengthen provincial government, help the moderates
in the effort to push back on the efforts of Al-Qaeda and others to take down the government.
Department of State expanded the original 10 PRTs to 36 PRTs and sub-provincial teams. These
were headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer and the deputy head of each PRT was a colonel.
Staffing at each was meant to cover everything from agriculture to business development.
Recruiting was done by State, USAID and DoD. An Embassy transition director said that the
entire operation from planning and staffing to execution was all jointly done. 324
Civilian personnel shortages meant that Baghdad in particular housed a number of
“brigade PRTs” or e-PRTs (embedded PRT). A Civil Affairs (CA) officer recalled that the
“Baghdad Belt” e-PRTs were much more like a classic CA team attached to a brigade combat
team and told to make the people a little happy, give some PSYOP capability to show we are
spending some money but that they were not intended to expand local capacity. 325 A planner on
the Embassy JSAT team said this came partially out of frustration with the size of the civilian
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Surge and that the e-PRTs were not really provincial. They were commanded by military
personnel and might have one or two civilians but that was about it, a mirror image of the PRT.
They increased the “footprint” in Iraq and were similar to the US military-run PRTs in
Afghanistan. The problem to him was that the military did not really bring the proper set of soft
power skills and they tended to be hard power-oriented, because that was what they knew. To
him, if you put an armor guy in charge of a brigade PRT, he is going to act like an armor guy. If
he had a civilian, he may or may not listen to him. 326
A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge further explained the difference:
I never felt we had enough diplomatic presence. Even early on in the Surge we were
trying to get the NACs and DACs (Neighborhood and District Advisory Councils)
organized. The last time I had tried to organize a governmental-type meeting was when I
was in the fraternity in college. We did OK because we were calling the meetings and we
had the guys and money. But we were not good at understanding the needs, because we
came in with an agenda and stuck to it. The PRTs and the experts that came in with
political-military expertise knew how to run meetings and how to listen and play off the
individuals in the room. They had the skills to negotiate with the locals that we did not
have. Maybe I or my battalion commanders did, but many times it was majors or
company commanders holding these neighborhood meetings and they did not have the
experience to do it. As we moved to higher council meetings, we needed the expertise
because the Iraqis knew politics. Many of them were selected, elected, and appointed
because they had skills and knew how to represent their people. You could screw around
and make promises you couldn’t keep, and it would not help you when you went out
amongst the people.327
A lesson he did learn was to combine Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
missions whenever possible, what the Army calls a TTP (Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures).328 One of the Civil Affairs officers leading an e-PRT said the brigade provided
security convoys (and on-site security) to get his personnel to their engagements, projects, and
functions. He did see value in the effort, with the greatest effectiveness happening when BCT
(Brigade Combat Team) and PRT personnel conducted joint engagements with local leaders –
allowing the PRT to focus on “soft” issues and the BCT to focus on “hard” issues (security). 329
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Missions like this illustrate the potential of combining coercive and attractive power to create
smart power, a goal both military and civilians continually tried to achieve despite numerous
challenges.

LEADERS IN COOPERATION

Kilcullen and Pirnie and O’Connell have been mentioned as understanding that unity of
effort can be just as decisive as a unified command structure. The U.S. military and civilian
leadership in Iraq worked to integrate their structures and activities more closely in an effort to
overcome Joseph’s idea that such strategic interaction is no longer possible. 330
General Petraeus summed up the importance of his relationship with Ambassador
Crocker in setting the example of unity at the top:
Every meeting we had with the Prime Minister was together. We attended the Iraqi
National Security Council Meeting together. We did the video teleconference each week
with the President of the United States together. We did the video teleconference that the
President did with the Prime Minister of Iraq together, and we testified together on
Capitol Hill at the six-month mark and at the 12-month mark. It was totally integrated
into the civil-military counterinsurgency campaign plan. 331
Multiple interviewees were impressed by the close interaction between the two men. A
senior TFSBO official said their interplay was so natural they seemed like Butch and
Sundance.332 A Public Affairs officer at MNF-I said that they knew full well that the
Ambassador was head of the country team but at the same time, it was a very collegial
partnership, and that is the way they wanted it. Typically, one did not say anything without the
other.333
An experienced ambassador working economic issues said that success of the mission
depends on not having one side dominant. If you say the military is in charge and have a few
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political advisors, it helps but it is not going to get the job done because there are so many angles
that a couple of political advisors will not be able to cover them all. He felt that sending in
diplomats to try and solve a complex issue with a large security component and a few military
advisors was not sufficient. 334 The Surge worked to get the division of labor more in line with
Dixon (2009) and his idea that if only 20-25% of counterinsurgency is shooting insurgents, then
the political component of the effort needs to be larger.
The major meeting point became the Effects Assessment Synchronization Board which
was the large ¾ day briefing of the current ambassador and 4-star general. An Embassy planner
described the quarterly meeting as an opportunity for both sides to meet with access to the same
data and information. For him, one month per quarter would be devoted to putting together this
series of briefings.335 An Embassy Chief of Staff who worked to bridge the gap between MNF-I
and the Embassy in understanding the economic situation in Iraq felt that the strategic change
was dramatic once MNF-I and USEMBASSY increased synergizing of their efforts in
combination with the establishment of the Joint Security Stations.336

INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

Many nations and non-governmental organizations continued to attempt to influence
events in Iraq. The challenge for the U.S. was that the number of influencers whose goals
roughly aligned with the U.S. was waning, while the number of malign actors or actors whose
vison for Iraq was diverging from that of the U.S. was increasing. The fragmented nature of
Iraqi society meant that the non-aligned actors were generally able to reach out to Iraqis who felt
an external patron gave them a chance for achieving their objectives.
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Although the number of Coalition partners had decreased since 2003, they still had a
valuable role to play. There were about 15,000 forces from other nations according to an MNF-I
planner,337 in addition to individuals in key roles throughout the country. This was about 10% of
the total Coalition commitment in Iraq. 338 A senior member of the Joint Strategic Plans and
Assessment (JSPA) team recalled that what really mattered was General Petraeus’ ability to
focus all efforts toward achieving goals which included Coalition partners. 339
An ambassador leading economic planning recalled his role in bringing together
Coalition partners that had economic interests in the country, such as the Greeks and British. He
described a Norwegian who focused on agriculture as “right out of central casting.” Because
many tended to live out among the Iraqis, he benefited because they provided insights to him
while he worked to help them understand and reinforce what the U.S. was doing. He also spent a
lot of time with the UN team. 340 Another Embassy planner said that the idea was that the battle
for Baghdad was going to open things up for the UN to be able to come in more broadly. He felt
that they also played an integral role with transnational justice programs, working directly with
the Iraqi government but also behind the scenes in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy on topics
such as Iraqi de-Ba’athification.341
A senior MNF-I staffer described the important role of United Kingdom Lieutenant
General Graeme Lamb, Deputy MNF-I Commander as the one that originally got General
Petraeus interested in reconciliation. He did so by relating his experiences in Northern Ireland.
He said, “You Americans are going about this all wrong. You are trying to reconcile with people
who are already your friends. That’s not the people you reconcile with.” In Northern Ireland, he
would sit down to negotiations with the Irish Republican Army with people who in previous
weeks had been swinging pipes at his “lads,” and he said that those are the people you have to
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reconcile with. Some of them you can reconcile with, and then there are the irreconcilables. The
staffer said that it changed the nature of how they approached the insurgency, moving from
monolithic bad guys to cleaving off the reconcilables and bringing them back into the tent. Then
they would have fewer to hunt down and kill or capture. Consequently, they created the Force
Strategic Engagement Cell to pursue that idea. Lieutenant General Lamb was not in charge of
that cell, but it was always a British major general that was in charge. 342
Another important element of rebuilding Iraq would be attracting foreign investment. Oil
prices were relatively high in 2007-2008, and as a result an ambassador working economic
affairs at the Embassy said that the Iraqis were shipping more oil. 343 According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, Iraqi oil exports had gone from a low of about 1.3 million
barrels/day in 2003 and 1.8 million barrels/day as internal violence began to increase in 2005 to
approximately 2.3 million barrels/day in 2007-2008.344 According to an Embassy stabilization
director during the Surge the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFSBO) under
Paul Brinkley played a role in bringing important business representatives of the US to Iraq. 345
An MNF-I planner who helped oversee the second oil bid round recounted that it brought in 15
oil companies from 13 other countries pledging to spend over $100B of their own money, not
government money. He also pointed out that a positive element of the 2005 Iraqi constitution
was that it provided for allocation of oil revenue to each province based on population. 346
Banking services in Iraq needed to be modernized. An official working with the TFBSO
U.S. Treasury was pushing for an electronic payment system utilizing Montran, a company that
they had previously worked with when assisting modernizing nations. Montran would not come
into Iraq, citing security risk. The official ended up as the person intervening between them and
the Iraqi central bank and facilitated bringing in their equipment.347 An MNF-I planner was
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involved with creating the Public Financial Management Action Group (PFMAG), and bringing
in Grant-Thornton, World Bank, and the UN to help them spend their money better. 348
Another important non-governmental actor was the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). Abu Ghraib had focused their interest on treatment of detainees by Coalition
forces. Negative ICRC reporting could adversely impact domestic and global opinions of the
Coalition effort in Iraq. An interment facility commander described the process:
One of its functions is to ensure detainees and prisoner are being held in civil conditions,
so there was one inspection before I got there and one while I was on leave. I had to get
back to them and either refute or fix their reported deficiencies. Anything from cells
need to have windows (was not realistic) to detainees need to have more exercise, that
kind of stuff. We really did not have a major issue, it was mostly minor issues, nothing
of significance.349
Anyone who ran a detention facility in Iraq was subject to ICRC inspection. 350 Special
Operations was even liable to have the ICRC inspecting their facility. It was a holding facility,
not a detention facility, which a Special Forces commander during the Surge said is different in
the nuances of law and policy. They generally could not hold anybody for longer than two
weeks. According to him, most of the focus in that time was obtaining useful tactical
information.351 Surprisingly little has been written about the interaction between U.S. detention
facilities and these international inspection regimes.
The Iranian effect was still strong throughout the Surge. The same Special Forces
commander said that most of their casualties in 2007 were a result of Iranian-sponsored actions,
Shia militias rather than al-Qaeda. They took fewer casualties against the Sunni insurgent base
in 2007 than in 2006, but it also coincided with fighting Shia militias. EFPs from Iran were
“really hitting us hard, and that’s where we took our casualties.” 352
A stability operations commander in Baghdad described the problem using a sports
metaphor of two teams clashing on the field:
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The referees are involved and engage in the fight, and may trip up a player, deliberately
undermine someone, shoot someone, kill someone, and that could be law enforcement
officials. The stadium officials who gave you authority to come in in the first place are
engaged in their own operations shooting each other in the stands. It is more like that
kind of chaos, with many players coming in and conducting pursuit of what they viewed
as their own interests.353
International interference was never going to be a problem the U.S. elements in Iraq
could solve. Their best hope was to interdict the “rat lines” and reduce the violence between
factions and hence the opportunity for outside parties to become involved, with the hope that
Coalition diplomacy could work to reduce the problems from the outside. An MNF-I planner
described the process. By 2009 al-Qaeda could pull off a high-profile attack about every six
weeks. On the rat lines toward Syria, they would collect fees from truckers carrying Beiji
refinery products up to Mosul. 25th INF DIV had this “down pat,” they knew the places where
al-Qaeda was running tolling stations to fund their attacks. If the U.S. disrupted those tolling
stations, where al-Qaeda would be paid in either money or fuel, then it could disrupt their
attacks. The occasional al-Qaeda operative who may have had two other incomes already would
go away if al-Qaeda could not pay on time. 354

WORKING TOGETHER

Communication is part of smart power. Without it, coercive and attractive power are
being employed without effectively playing on the strong points and minimizing the drawbacks
of each. Nye expressed concern about overreliance on the military in foreign policy and lack of
planning between the elements of U.S. diplomacy and power.355 In Iraqi during the Surge
coordination between DoD and DoS improved and cooperation increased, although some
challenges remained.
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Ambassador Crocker believed that similar to the Army, there may be a lot down on
paper, but personalities and personal relationships were crucial. 356 He and General Petraeus set
the tone for cooperation and coordination. An MNF-I planner explained that when they met with
Prime Minister Maliki weekly, they would talk about hard and soft power activities with the
Prime Minister.357 A Joint Strategic Plans Assessment (JSAT) team leader attended the meeting
specifically focused on the Surge. This fell under one of the benchmarks set up to gauge progress
in Iraq. He recalled that he or another participant wrote the cable and sent it back via the military
side of the Embassy because they could not post cables from their SIPR (Secret Internet Protocol
Router), the classified U.S. government information network) computers.358 An Embassy Chief
of Staff also emphasized the success of this whole of government approach,359 with another
specifying that the Surge was about General Petraeus and his ability to get everything moving in
a coordinated direction, which is different from adding “X#” of additional brigades. 360
Problems still existed. State Department manning was still low. A Marine Corps MNC-I
planner recalled that even in 2008 he would assign coordination meetings to the 12 members of
his staff. Sometimes in the morning he went to the Commander’s brief and USAID was
represented by Mr. X. Two hours later his major went to the camp brief and USAID was
represented by Mr. X. Later a lieutenant colonel went to the PRT coordination brief and USAID
was represented by Mr. X. There was one person trying to plug in at 4-5 different levels and he
basically got no work done going from meeting to meeting. 361 The planner provided his opinion
of other problems regarding coordination:
I can finally get this off my chest. (synchronization with) Department of State (DoS) and
USAID generally went very poorly. I think there were culture differences. In peacetime
we have to practice with the military middle-majors on up training with USAID and DoS
because the cultures are very different. It will not work in reverse. It is almost
impossible to get DoS or USAID people to participate in peacetime training with the
military because there are so few of them. You can always break free a lieutenant
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colonel to participate in a six-week DoS exercise. You cannot break free a mid-level
DoS or USAID guy to work with a military exercise.362 That was a problem: the culture
was very different. For example, when we were talking about things we should push
economically to the Iraqis, it took me a while to realize we were talking about different
things. The military wanted change on the ground, wanted to do something economically
that would reduce the unemployment rate of young men in Iraq to reduce the temptation
for them to join the insurgency. The State Department had the same general goal. But
their purpose was to consult, to advise, to talk to the Iraqi government. There would be
an all-day discussion with certain Iraqi government ministers, and the State Department
would consider it a success because we spent all day talking about these important issues
with the right people in the room. Messages would be sent back to Washington
discussing what was discussed. The military side would see it as a failure because there
was no commitment to act, and in fact 3-6 months later they did not act. 363
A Psychological Operations officer had a similar viewpoint, saying the relationship was
more State providing the military visibility as to the things they were doing, more informationsharing than coordination. It was neither coordination nor competition. He said he never saw
meetings or collaboration that led to actions.364 The problem was not always physical: a Civil
Affairs officer recalled that there were a variety of MNF-I offices located in the old Republican
Guard Palace in the Green Zone, it was just a question of walking down the hall to talk to his
counterparts.365 Writers such as Jospeh have talked about these types of challenges when linking
political and operational concepts.
Despite obstacles, better coordination filtered down in the Coalition. An Information
Operations Task Force (IOTF) leader said that their primary coordination was Saturday morning
reviews. Their OPTEMPO (Operations Tempo) was developed on a monthly cycle and their
polling was monthly, so they would review their Lines of Operations (LOO) at these meetings:
they had an anti-Al-Qaeda LOO, an anti-militia LOO, a security story LOO, and then
democratization. They did a periodic review in which anyone who wanted to show up could. 366
An MNC-I economics planner was one of the regular attendees at the Saturday review, although
he was more focused on messaging to the U.S. 367
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A senior USAID manager agreed that the Embassy PAO had a strong relationship with
the military PAO. Multiple people on her staff worked specifically with the Embassy PAO
because Public Affairs had become so focused with getting out the right message, particularly as
violence and civilian casualties increased, that it was important that there be a coordinated
message. She recalled that every morning there was attention given to public affairs. After the
BUA (Battle Update Assessment) was an Ambassador’s meeting and there was time dedicated to
public affairs issues. There was no question in her mind that interagency coordination
improved.368 To an economics planner at the Embassy and his colleagues, the success of the
PRTs had nothing to do with electricity or the standard of living or crime. It was based on the
colonel running the PRT.369
Improved cooperation meant improved ability to work around structural limitations. A
senior Public Affairs officer at MNF-I said that the military has a lot more leeway in saying
things that the State Department and its Embassy cannot. As soon as an embassy or the State
Department says it, its policy, whereas if the four-star is saying it, it could be considered policy,
but it is not necessarily viewed that way. Oftentimes they said things that the Embassy may not
have been able to, because they operated differently. For example, when they would do a joint
press conference, the Councilor for Public Affairs and the MNF-I PAO would co-host it. Many
times, the PAO took the lead because he had more assets and did not have to deal with as much
bureaucracy as the State Department did. 370 It is ironic that the military found State Department
was often a better medium to get information back to senior leadership in Washington, but at the
same time the military could do a better job of messaging in Iraq.
A leader on the Joint Strategic Plans Assessment (JSPA) team recalled that the original
idea was that the MNF-I strategic planners and his organization would be brought together to
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unify Embassy and military planning. That did not happen, but 3-4 times a week he would meet
with his military counterparts, 371 approximating Kilcullen’s idea previously discussed that
collaboration may substitute for formal unity of effort. Another JSPA team leader working
economics said that having the right players at the Iraqi Steering Committee meeting allowed
him to get his items of issues on the agenda. He could grab General Petraeus before the meeting
and ask him to say this or that. He recalled that some of his finer memories were having General
Petraeus looking across at him back-benching and signaling, “Should I say it now?”372
Some DoS manning and liaison was provided by DoD. An ambassador directing the Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) said that his military aide went everywhere he went,
in addition to the General who was his Director of Operations. During his visits to all of the 10
PRTs he also interacted with the brigade commander paired with each PRT. He also met
regularly with the division commanders, both in Baghdad and at their locations. He believed this
face-to-face contact was essential for pursuing US objectives in Iraq.373 A senior USAID
manager had a similar experience. They had three military liaisons: marine, navy and army.
They worked at the mission and were involved with advising. When she went to Anbar it was
always in the company of the Embassy’s Marine attaché. 374 A lot of the travel she undertook
was to meet with the military at different locations, usually going with another senior leader or a
military member of USAID.375
Improved cooperation percolated to the provincial level. Two Civil Affairs officers
recalled early problems in their province. One said that the brigade who rotated out early in the
Surge would never say anything positive about the State Department people. The other clarified
that in fairness to that unit he was given the latitude to operate, but it was on his own and
unsynchronized. The example he gave was that if he was starting a big “by, with and through”
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initiative the same day the brigade kicked off a major counterterrorism operation and killed 30
people, it was not synchronized and negated what he was doing. The challenge to him was not
that they were opposing his unit, but that they operated independently of him. 376
They further recalled how this changed with a change of brigade and new PRT
leadership. One said that the new commander wanted to know what his grand strategy was and
what he wanted to do and worked with him and his unit. 377 The other agreed that the new
commander asked me what he could do for him. The Civil Affairs officer said that they needed
to show the Iraqis that the State Department workers had some influence with the all-powerful
US military so they could get Iraqi support. The commander set up a meeting with the governor,
brought the Civil Affairs officer with him and “treated me like his long-lost kid brother.” He
told the Governor that “the State Department folks have his ear” and that really set them up for
success. The power that a brigade commander holds was pretty awesome in Iraqi eyes.
According to the Civil Affairs officer, being seen as an adjunct of his gives you wasta that is
very beneficial. He did not say “I’m going to kill you if you don’t listen to him.” It was that
“arm-around-you, this guy I am supporting is not acting in opposition to me” sort of
cooperation.378
Both also agreed that the change in PRT leadership was also critical to success. One
described her as being very professional, not trying to belittle her counterparts or tell them how
things were going to go, but simply being outstanding in partnering with DoD.379 An example
provided by the PRT leader herself was that her Governance Officer (a Reserve Civil Affairs
officer detailed to the PRT) told her one day that the young guys on the security team did not
understand why they were going outside the wire risking harm to themselves and the civilians.
The PRT started adding to the daily pre-mission security briefing conducted by the military
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transport team by giving their own briefing of why they needed to go out, what they intended to
accomplish, and what they hoped to achieve from the engagement. To her the result was
fantastic: then the young military guys wanted to come with because they felt that their action
was accomplishing something and enriched the PRT’s understanding of atmospherics and
context by sharing their own observations and insights.380
The new brigade commander described some of the changes he implemented:
I developed some battle-rhythm events that allowed us to integrate the PRT into the
operations. The team leader, the CA, governance, econ and oil would huddle on Tuesday
evenings to conduct strategic planning. I had dinner every Tuesday evening with the
PRT leader, mainly because she had a real grasp of what was necessary and what a PRT
could do, but she would struggle with leadership issues within the PRT and how to
maximize task organization that I take for granted from being a young platoon leader on
up. It was a good symbiotic relationship. I could help her with leadership challenges,
and she could help me with the gaps I had in the soft power like oil and econ. She did
that very well. I had an LNO (liaison officer) linked up with her team, and she had an
LNO that I placed into our Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC). At the beginning
she was dealing with infrastructure issues that detracted from her mission. My Command
Sergeant Major would help them out with the infrastructure issues, which allowed the
team to focus on the mission, and it helped us build a great relationship with the PRT.
They would invite us over to social events and recognition ceremonies, and we invited
them to all our BCT events as well. I also took members of the PRT with me on many
occasions to events such as governor’s meetings and other key leader events outside the
wire. That way she had security, could hear firsthand my interactions, and have her own
interaction with the key leaders in the province as well. We were cross-talking right there
in real time with the governor/other key leaders and that was valuable.381
One of the Civil Affairs officers said that this cooperation paid off in terms of issues like
project oversight. According to him the prior brigade thought the Iraqis were stealing money,
but from his perspective they gave out money and did not follow up on it. He illustrated that if
you just give somebody a million dollars and do not check on his work, he can do whatever he
wants with it. Then you may blame him, but it is actually your fault for not following up. He
said that following up was the hard job. If they did not enforce it from the brigade, that is their
fault. They blamed the Iraqis for stealing, but from his perspective it was their fault for “handing
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out all the money like its candy.”382 Greater participation from the brigades in overseeing
attractive activities increased their effectives which was necessary as Greene analyzed Iraq and
found it to be one of the most corrupt states in the world.383
Prior to the Surge, there was confusion about what to measure and how to interpret it. A
deputy brigade commander in Iraq both before and during the Surge recalled that despite the
miserable statistics they were seeing, MNC-I continued on the same course of action: they never
changed until Lieutenant General Odierno came in. 384 An Embassy statistician even felt that the
military side wanted to discount some of their own intelligence reporting structures that they had
set up for some time. To him, the Embassy side was more data-driven and cared about getting
the best data possible.385 Another Embassy planner stated that once General Petraeus came in
and saw that the planners were doing it right, the methodology changed. 386
General Petraeus immediately began taking steps to change what metrics they were
looking at upon taking command. One of his senior staff officers said that previously the
leadership in Iraq had been looking at everything. There were dozens and dozens of metrics. He
believed that the key metric of ethno-sectarian violence got lost in the “noise.” By focusing on
that as the key determinant of whether the Surge was succeeding, he thought that it helped them
focus their thinking. Although they kept many of the other metrics, they did not look at them
every day. They were instead briefed in the Thursday BUB (Battle Update Brief). Under
General Petraeus, the level of ethno-sectarian violence became the key measure of the Surge
succeeding, because the assumption was that if the level of ethno-sectarian violence decreased,
they could restart the political process, but until the level of ethno-sectarian violence decreased
the political process was going to be frozen. 387
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Getting out of the big bases meant improved security for the civilians, which also resulted
in an increase in available data. An Embassy stabilization director saw that they were getting
metrics constantly, collecting a massive amount of information indicating that after a few months
the (violence) numbers starting to go down and after a year it was clear that the Surge had
succeeded. The combination of the military and civilian Surge empowering the new government
of Iraq and moderates at the local level worked as shown in the data on attacks and violence. 388
A Joint Strategic Plans Assessment team leader remembered the metric aspect that was
interesting was measuring causal issues. General Petraeus wanted to measure markets opening,
once he even wanted to measure swimming pools because flying overhead you can get that data.
The biggest lesson to him was seeing it through the eyes of capacity development for the locals
because the goal was to get them far enough along that the Coalition could go home. 389 Better
information-gathering and evaluation are critical elements of counterinsurgency according to
Branch and Wood (2010), elements that interviewees felt improved during the Surge.

CONCLUSION

Interviewees felt that reducing the magnitude of the Executive Branch structural
problems helped set the stage for a smarter counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Increased manning
and financial resources provided an expanded capability to apply both coercive and attractive
power in Iraq. Working to maximize the value of remaining Coalition partners while attempting
to blunt malign external influences steadied the course of the Surge. Better relationships
between the Departments of Defense and State resulted in better planning and synergy at the
highest levels and set the example for subordinates.
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Smarter structure resulted in smarter execution in Iraq. Chapters Seven and Eight detail
the smarter execution that resulted from a smarter structure. Soldiers and civilians alike found
that they were able to apply more initiative, reach out more to their Executive Branch
counterparts, and synergize missions toward common goals.
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CHAPTER VII
SMARTER COERCION

INTRODUCTION

There is a common misperception that the Surge was primarily an attractive or soft power
effort. In fact, the reason for bringing in 30,000 additional U.S. troops was to employ them in a
coercive and hence largely hard power role. Some of the additional forces were attraction (soft
power) specialists, but the bulk of it was the six combat brigades brought in to enable the
Coalition to fight and stabilize Iraq along with strengthening attractive efforts. See Plakoudas
for the need for a balanced counterinsurgency approach that includes military power. 390 Marston
observed that every U.S. unit in Iraq from battalion level on up had a high-value target list of
insurgents to get off the battlefield. 391
According to General Petraeus:
Unless you can achieve security, you do not have a foundation on which to build
anything else. You have got to get security. That could only be achieved in some cases by
separating the Shia militia and Sunni insurgents. Shia areas had Sunni populations and
vice versa, although mostly the former. In many cases there were still mixed
neighborhoods. If you can’t reduce the violence between Sunni and Shia, you are
certainly not going to have a unified Iraq. Ultimately one of the big achievements of the
Surge was the reduction of violence by some 80-85%. That was enabled because we
brought the Sunni Arabs back into the fabric of society and gave them a sense that they
would be better off by supporting the new Iraq rather than by actively or tacitly opposing
it.392
It was this security that enabled the remainder of the U.S. Surge plan. Reconstruction,
reconciliation, and empowerment of the Iraqis were all made possible by the reduction in
insurgent as well as sectarian violence. Interviewees continually stressed the importance of
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taming the violence as a prelude and accompaniment to moving Iraq forward on a path of
national integration and growth.

COERCIVE POWER

Interviewees continually stressed the bedrock importance of security and that it had to be
earned. A Marine Military Training Team (MTT) leader who was there at the cusp of the Anbar
Awakening said that the first six months was a “flat-out gunfight.”393 A squadron commander in
Baghdad gave much of the credit to Lieutenant General Odierno, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
commander as well as the additional force strength. He said that kinetic ops were back in vogue,
with a loosening of ROE (Rules of Engagement) and ending of onerous requirements like a 15-6
(investigation for a U.S. Army incident) for every weapons discharge. To him, the change was
achieved through a change of command from (Lieutenant General) Chiarelli to Odierno. 394
The force increase was important, but an MNF-I planner recalled that they had about as
many troops as had been in Iraq at the peak under General Casey, but that they used them
differently. They operated shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqi Security Forces for the bulk of the
Surge.395 This would prove more successful and reflected the ideas of Pirnie and O’Connell for
combined operations with the host nation security forces.
A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge said that the force increase meant
smaller areas of responsibility, or in essence having a large enough brigade to concentrate their
efforts and fight smaller battles. 396 Echoing this ability to concentrate, a squadron commander
said that the squadron they took over for had (the Baghdad districts of) Rustimiyah, Karada, and
half of Rusafa. That is an impossibly large area of a few million people and dozens of ISF (Iraq
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Security Force) units for a squadron of 12 platoons to control. They suffered casualties “just
driving around waiting to get blown up” and could never get to understand the human terrain of
the area. When his unit arrived, for the better part of a year they just had Rusafa. His unit could
live there in the Joint Security Stations, with several SOI (Sons of Iraq) and ISF units that they
could actually train with, mentor, and understand, and became intimately familiar with the
terrain.397
Special Operations forces still focused on high value targeting operations. A Special
Forces commander during the Surge period emphasized that they were not just doing kinetic
operations: the main focus of their day-to-day activity was developing Iraqi military and police
force capabilities to do operations themselves. Training, educating, teaching. Then at night,
they would take some of those forces that were capable out to do operations. He said that
looking at time spent on Civil Affairs and Information activities vice developing Iraqi forces,
developing active intel, targeting and kinetics, during the Surge they were maybe 80/20%, or
70/30%, while acknowledging that it is hard to quantify.398
Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) organized one Stryker brigade that was not
assigned a specific geography. A commander for stability operations said that it was called an
above-ground force. It was not fixed to the ground at all. They would order it to concentrate in a
particular area where they wanted to create favorable conditions. As that area was cleared to the
point that the unit fixed to that area was able to keep it stable, the above-ground unit would move
to another area and partner with a different brigade. To him, consolidation of gains had to be
done by continued presence of the coercive military forces.399
A senior member of the Embassy said that the biggest difference he saw with the Surge
was the ability of the military to support the police in the cities and localities “24/7.” Until then

212
they would own the streets during the day but retreat to their bases at night and the police
stations would get overrun and the troublemakers owned the cities at night. He believed they
could not get security in that sort of context. 400 An Embassy Chief of Staff agreed that the
strategic change was dramatic, particularly once the Joint Security Stations were established and
MNF-I and USEMBASSY increased synergizing of their efforts.401
U.S. forces also worked to implement General Petraeus’ understanding of the need to
separate the warring militias. An MNC-I planner said that Lieutenant General Odierno ordered,
appropriately, to clear areas out, put up giant T-walls and utilize biometrics to secure a market
that had been recently targeted with IEDs so the economic activities could be carried out going
forward. The enemy gets a vote as he said, so they needed coercive and attractive power
adjusted on a broad spectrum on a daily basis. 402 A commander working in Baghdad during the
Surge said that in each area they were investing a force to live in a joint security station or
combat outpost with Iraqi police, or along city fault lines where they put up walls to separate
different parts of the city. Inside those walls were electricity and a microeconomy. According to
him, inside of those places with a microeconomy they had stability.403 These assets had to come
from somewhere. According to a Civil Affairs officer working in the north of Iraq:
I remember being in Salah al-Din and waking up one morning and all our T-walls
(protective barriers) were gone. They came in with forklifts and an endless parade of
tractor-trailers, picked up every piece of concrete and hauled it all down to Baghdad. We
went from endless T-walls to having nothing left.404
This would ironically boomerang on the provinces outside Baghdad later. As the battle
for Baghdad shifted in favor of the Coalition over 2007, insurgents driven out of Baghdad moved
to other areas. Salah al-Din was a Sunni stronghold (Saddam’s former home province) and
natural gathering place for Sunni insurgents. Another Civil Affairs officer there said that a lot of
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insurgents started coming north from Baghdad into the province during the Surge. His brigade
started doing a lot of kinetic operations and lost more soldiers than the previous brigade. 405
There is no clear-cut academic consensus of the “right” ratio of troops to population to
perform effective counterinsurgency. 406 FM 3-24 cited previous studies that estimated that
effective pacification required 20 troops for every 1000 inhabitants of a country, or about half a
million security forces for Iraq. An MNF-I planner recalled that they had surpassed that point in
Iraq during the Surge if the Iraqi Security Forces were included. There were 175,000 U.S.
troops, 15,000 from other nations, about 190,000 total. By late 2008 he said they had built Iraqi
security forces to 750,000 of all kinds, reaching and improving upon that theoretical required
troop density. His criticism was of people who took the theoretical requirement and said, “U.S.
troops.” It did not have to be U.S. troops to him. 407
An MNF-I planner explaining how ISF forces helped get to that number said that during
the Surge said there were about 11 Iraqi divisions under some level of manning, although many
were immobile because they were recruited locally. From 2007-2008 the ISF grew in numbers
and quality and as the Coalition saturated areas with the 20 brigades working alongside the Iraqi
forces, the violence began to subside. 408 See Hammes for discussion of the necessity of an
adequate conventional military force capability for a counterinsurgency campaign to be
successful.409
For the formal Iraqi security forces, there was an increase not just in numbers, but
capability as well. A stabilization commander in Baghdad said that they had been pushing to get
the Iraqis out of the checkpoint mentality throughout 2006, and finally turned that corner with a
deliberate offensive operation or campaign beginning around February 2007, Fard al-Qanoon
(“Enforcing the Law,” an operation designed to protect the Iraqi population).410
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Some of the increase was obtained through the Sons of Iraq program, an initiative in and
around Baghdad to turn Sunnis, many of whom had been previously fighting against the
Coalition, into militias aligned with the U.S. As mentioned, Gentile felt co-opting the Sunni
militias was in fact the primary factor that made the Surge a success. An MNC-I planner
recalled that it meant that 107,000 Iraqis were paid to protect their areas, which was a good way
to get them off the battlefield as an adversary. 411 An Embassy Chief of Staff also stated that
Sons of Iraq was important to providing the force ratio needed to stabilize the country and “keep
a lid” on the Sunnis.412 An Information Operations officer in Baghdad during the Surge recalled
the beginning of the Sons of Iraq program:
The Awakening was happening out west: the Sunni tribes were realizing that Al-Qaeda
was just no good. They’re terrible guests: they’re killing us and it’s their way or the
highway. The enemy of my enemy is my enemy, right? We wanted to get that ink blot
to move east. Lieutenant Colonel P…. meets with the sheikh and asks him why I should
trust you: you have been shooting at my guys for so long. He said, ‘let me take you out
back.’ They go out back, he swings open the door, and there are about 1000 Sunni men
standing there. He says, ‘We just need some weapons.’ Lieutenant Colonel P…. says
‘Let me go talk to my boss.’ That was the start of it. 413
A Marine Corps planner stationed in Baghdad observed the same phenomenon. He said
that the Sunni tribal leaders eventually began to turn against al-Qaeda. When al-Qaeda arrived
they were welcomed, but they overplayed their hand. They took Iraqi women to be wives, they
took young men to be soldiers, they stole. Eventually the tribes turned against them and reached
out not to the Iraqis, but to the Coalition forces. He saw this as a sign of trust that the Americans
could say “Send your leaders to this point and we will meet them there.” The tribal leaders knew
they would not be betrayed: if they made the same offer to the Iraqi officials, they (suspected
they) would be arrested or shot when they showed up for the meeting. There was definitely an
outreach. He said it created hard feelings between the ISF and MNF-I because MNF-I did not
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share with them. They told them about the meetings after, and the ISF were very upset that they
did not know about the meetings before. 414
Part of increasing local security capability was in the form of increased protection for
electric plants, oil refineries and other key economic elements. These were things the locals
wanted to keep operating, or at least easy for them to disrupt if they did not. A former
ambassador directing economic development at the Embassy before and during the Surge said
that one initiative they did that stuck out in his mind was building Iraqi infrastructure security,
which he thought was a key element of how to do hard and soft power together. It shows it is not
one of these things or the other, but how interconnected they are. If you get a refinery back up
and running, and you know how important the refineries were in Iraqi, but cannot protect it then
you have no gasoline at the gas stations. If you get a power generation plant going again and
cannot protect it, you are in trouble. There are plenty of ways to criticize all that effort, but at the
same time you cannot do without it. You are just wasting money in an unsecure environment
like that. To him, development without security is not going to get you there. 415
The inevitable result of more contact with the insurgents would be more casualties among
the Coalition and ISF. General Petraeus recalls that:
The casualties did go up, although fairly quickly the Iraqi civilian casualties started to go
down, and then over time the sensational attack numbers started to go down. Then
sectarian incidents started to go down: all of that was very important. And we did think
that as we handed off more and more tasks to ISF and as they shouldered more of the
burdens on the front lines that their casualties likely would remain high even as U.S. and
coalition casualties began to go down. 416
His premonition was accurate. According to a Special Forces Commander with
experience before and during the Surge, “From our perspective it was a hard fight in 2006 and it
was a hard fight in 2007. Our Iraqi counterparts that we were with were suffering more
casualties than we were, as a SOF force.” 417 An MNF-I planner said that when you look at the
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2007-2008 statistics you see that the violence peaks as they were moving out into the areas they
had conceded, then the violence goes way down.418 A stability operations commander in
Baghdad remembered fall of 2007 as what it means to be in the midst of war that is really hot.
He said that it was hard to tell whether you are winning or losing. There were indications the
Coalition was winning. They were getting greater control of areas and could see weakness, and
they had intelligence telling them they were wearing down all their adversaries. But in his mind,
“it sure doesn’t feel very good. Winning in combat does not feel very good.” To him, that was
the pivot point, late summer 2007. 419
The ISF suffered heavy casualties during this time. There were several reasons for this.
A staff officer at MNF-I pointed out that they had higher casualties simply because they were
taking on a greater share of the fighting and had greater numbers; thus they had a much larger
increase. He felt that a lot of the casualties could have been because they were less trained. 420 In
a similar vein, A Marine Corps MTT leader believed that part of the reason the Iraqis were
disproportionately hit was “their armor was for shit and their protection was for garbage. A
thing that would for us would have gotten a couple of guys with their bell rung and probably
walked away was much more effective against them.”421 A particularly insightful squadron
commander in Baghdad also opined that the increasing ISF casualties had more to do with the
fact that the ISF was interfering with the criminal activity in Iraq and not just because they were
getting better at doing their jobs or thwarting attacks on the Coalition forces or Shia gathering
places by AQI.422
From the coercive/attractive power perspective, an interesting element was several
interviewees pointing out the use of money to facilitate hard power actions. There were several
variants of this. An economics planner at the Embassy talked about how the Provincial
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Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were using the “money as a weapon system” paradigm. 423 This
was particularly evident with what were known as the “Brigade PRTs.” Due to the continued
DoS manning shortfalls, DoD was either manning or creating their own “PRTs” to provide
themselves that capability. In this case, the PRTs would utilize CERP money to fund
reconstruction initiatives in a local area in exchange for better information about insurgent
activity in that area.
A Special Operations commander described another technique of using money as a
weapon system that changed during the Surge. He said that that was in fact what they called the
manual, “Money as a weapon system.” He said that they did get more authority on how to use
money to achieve “soft effects” such as hiring Sons of Iraq as “security guards.” Doing this, they
figured out how to use CERP money to achieve the effect they wanted which was to mobilize the
tribal populations and civilians to come to the Coalition side versus al-Qaeda.424 This indicates
use of money in an attractive mode, going against much academic thinking that money is hard
power.
This was the most reliable technique for mobilizing Sunni militias: the Shia-dominated
Iraqi government under Prime Minister Maliki was reluctant to provide funding to Sunni armed
groups. Maliki did not want the Sons of Iraq legitimized. A leader of the Information
Operations Task Force (IOTF) in Baghdad recalled that some of their early products talked about
the Sons of Adamiya or “Colonel so-and-so.” Sons of Iraq branding came out of Maliki’s desire
to limit them politically and tie them to the Americans. He wanted to deny them the legitimacy
to say, “We are Sunni Iraqis and we are fighting AQ because we are Iraqis and we have a place
in Iraq.” Consequently, the IOTF got guidance to do Sons of Iraq branding. That was not a
problem with the insurgents: to him it was a problem with the Iraqi government and internal Iraqi
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politics. The IOTF leader felt that that problem was far more significant in terms of the fight for
Iraq than anything the insurgents on either the Sunni or Shia sides did. 425
A brigade commander in Baghdad said:
Depending on the timing and JAM (Jayesh Al-Mahdi or Army of the 12th Imam)
organization you were talking about, it was or was not an insurgency. It was a formal
infiltration of the Iraqi government structure, and it wielded a host of influence inside the
government structure, and inside the Iraqi military. In some cases, this Iraqi private who
was actually a senior leader of this Jayesh al-Mahdi who sits at the head of this branch of
the Martyr Sadr. Unless you peeled all this back and understood this, you were
vulnerable to making bad decisions that would lead you down the wrong avenue. We
were not organized going in to understand that culture. It wasn’t until we got into it and
started living out there and listening and evaluating every personality and their activities
that we would see that this guy was actually that guy who works for this guy who works
for Maliki. How does that work? This guy who just blew up my soldiers is working for a
guy that reports to the Prime Minister. We laid all this out for Lieutenant General
Odierno and General Petraeus on the hood of a HUMVEE before they came in and said
that this was what we understood to be true. And we were cautioned about how high we
could go because I knew that as long as we didn’t address these realities through formal
penalty or capture and incarceration, we would long suffer the consequences. General
Petraeus gave me a formal ceiling of how high we could go and we removed a couple of
general officers and field grade officers off the battlefield and put them in Camp Cropper.
It’s such a complex stew of activity it is sometimes hard to understand. 426
The same commander described a situation where they were doing reconstruction efforts
and got into a running gun battle with JAM who had come up from Sadr City wearing uniforms
of the Iraqi Army. What had been a civil reconstruction effort, make work and get streetlights
put in turned into a bloody affair. He was actually in direct conversation with a parliamentarian
asking him to remove JAM from the battlefield who acquiesced. One day he was driving
through Baghdad during heavy fighting and it was relatively quiet, even though there was
fighting where he had come from or fighting at the far end. His interpreter was listening in on
the Iraqi radios and phone calls and said “Saidi, they are keeping you alive.” He asked who was.
The interpreter responded “Both sides. Trust me, they know exactly where you are.” The
militias would report to each other where this commander was on the battlefield. 427
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On another occasion he went to meet with a former assassin who had joined the Baghdad
Patriots, taking a senior officer with him. They could meet him but only after nightfall, and they
had to walk. The general asked if they were safe. He said, “Boss, they know who I am. If they
want me dead, I will die right here. But they respect me enough that they are going to let me
travel to meet this guy. If they like what they hear, they’ll let us travel back. If they don’t, we
won’t.”428 The Americans could serve as a trusted intermediary between the Shia and Sunni
fighting forces in Iraq.
Over time the Coalition was able to quell the violence in Iraq at differing paces in
differing parts of Iraq. A squadron commander in Baghdad said that all deployed units including
his decimated AQI, bled the Shia militias white, and took away their “cash cow,” the Jamilla
market, until they agreed to a ceasefire. He pointed out that there was a major power struggle
going on among the Shia, so it was not necessary to kill or capture them all, just enough to get
their leaders worried that their power relative to the other Shia factions could collapse if the
fighting went on much longer. 429 The phenomenon of insurgent subgroups battling each other
for internal positioning in the midst of civil conflict was observed by Olson Lounsbery and
Pearson.430
An Information Operations planner in Baghdad said that after April 2007 the security
situation improved because they had al-Qaeda on their heels, and they were getting “run out of
Dodge.” The Sunni insurgents were going away because they became part of getting rid of alQaeda. According to him, even the Shia militias had backed off some. 431 A stability operations
commander also in Baghdad said that by January 2008 they saw the number of sectarian deaths
going down. The number of areas not under central and provincial government control were also
going down. He saw an exponential increase in the restoration of services because the process
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was working, and many things being handed over. There were still contests in certain areas,
especially in areas where insurgents were losing influence, particularly Shia insurgents. 432
An ambassador leading economic planning at the Embassy said that between September
2007 to March 2008 there was a significant decrease in violence and SIGACTS (Significant
Actions) around the country. He noted that the big city-wide conflicts like Fallujah, Ramadi and
Baqubah-type struggles were over and things were really quite peaceful. In the north Sunni
insurgents launched actions against the Coalition and against the oil pipelines and power grid.
By April or May things were quiet and stayed that way through the following summer. He said
that there was unhappiness about electricity but there was not much violence. Travel was safer
and there were fewer cases of roadside bombings. 433 An Embassy Chief of Staff recalled that by
late 2008 car bombs had been practically eliminated and TIPS line reporting had increased
dramatically.434
Outside of Baghdad, a PRT leader observed that her counterpart brigade commander
“totally got it.” They were pushing people out to the smaller outposts. She said that they had a
phenomenal leadership team and were 100% supportive of the PRT. 435 A USAID representative
also saw that the level of violence was pretty extreme upon arriving but would hear that things
were improving on the ground when traveling to Mosul or Erbil. She said that the British
starting to see some light at the end of the tunnel in Basra, especially economically, and that
Anbar had the Anbar Awakening movement. 436 A Marine MTT leader in the west of Iraq said
that the last six months were a lot of vacating the al-Qaeda influence out of Ramadi and starting
to work with reconstruction and civil order.437
Similarly, a brigade commander in Baghdad said that he had patrols whose sole purpose
was security for the PRTs or the attractive components like PSYOP or CA. He understood that
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often you do not want those guys to go out “kitted up” with helmets and hardware. In many
cases they would not have guns. They were working on a project, not defending themselves. He
had to give them a safe environment where they could do their job without being harmed: he did
not have any problem with doing that. 438 Another brigade commander’s stability efforts
improved the Iraqi “circuit court” procedure. He recalled that local judges were afraid they
would be killed if they made “the right call” since they had their family right there in the town.
His unit provided security for a traveling judge to arrive and conduct court. He found that they
were bold in their justice. Once they completed their work, he got them out of the area safely.
They “put an Iraqi face on it” by using ISF police and military, but he always had a Quick
Reaction Force close by and prepared to assist if needed.439 This was an effective partnering of
U.S. and Iraqi forces along the lines laid out by Pirnie and O’Connell. 440
A JSPA planner saw that the data showed the death rates and sectarian killings declining,
which he felt was part of the overall Surge strategy. 441 The MNC-I planner who developed the
metrics chart (he referred to it as the “Virginia Chart” due to its shape) said that when you are
there doing it, you do not see that over time you are doing more soft power and less soft power.
Over time he saw less casualties, although on a day-to-day basis they were always fluctuating up
and down.442 An MNF-I planner said that by 2008 he saw a shifting from a focus on kinetics to a
focus on government. He recalled that in March 2007 when he participated in the first Joint
Strategic Assessment, they flew from Victory Base because it was not safe to drive on Route
Irish to the Palace. By the next year he could drive along Route Irish and there were ISF troops
spaced all along the route. 443
A Marine MTT leader recalled his departure from Iraq:
During the last convoy I ran across town in Ramadi, I had approval to depart and was told
by the commander “You have 5 minutes to depart lines because the Ramadan 5K is about
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to start.” Literally from dark and destroyed land to walls painted with murals and
pictures. It was funny to see how transforming public art was to the change in feeling
there. I’ll never think about art the same way after that. We departed, and there were
Marines at the water stations. It had been custom in Ramadi that the day before Ramadi
they would do a 5K race. The Marines set up checkpoints with water. I had to depart
before the starter’s gun, or I would have had to wait until after the race. That was
literally my last view of Ramadi before we redeployed. A 5K run with wall mural art and
an operating bank and open markets and people walking around. 444

REBUILDING THE ISF

The reconstitution of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was a monumental task. The army
had to be rebuilt from scratch after the Coalition Provisional Authority dismantled the entire
armed force of Saddam Hussein. Police forces were not eliminated but needed to be expanded
and trained up to a standard reflecting the need for security throughout the country. 445 Politics
continued to negatively impact the development of an ISF capable of stabilizing Iraq. Writers
such as Olson Lounsbery and Pearson analyzed the security dilemma in terms of an insurgency
and said that increasing armed forces itself is perceived as a threat. 446 However, by 2007 the
Sunnis in particular were viewing al-Qaeda as the greatest threat to them, hence they were more
amenable to an increase in government security forces as a driver of overall stabilization in Iraq.
General Petraeus recalled:
I knew General Babaker Zebari very well because he was my counterpart from the
Kurdish region when I was in Mosul in the first year. He took over as essentially the chief
of staff of the Iraqi military when I was a three-star doing the mission of the MultiNational Security Transition Command – Iraq. We had a very close relationship so there
was no challenge in building one. The problem was that he did not truly control Iraqi
military actions. He was bypassed a fair amount by the Prime Minister, by other senior
Iraqi leaders and so forth. Keep in mind that he was a Kurd and those who were most
significant were the Shia leaders and then to a lesser degree the Sunni Arabs. 447
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An advisor at MNC-I said that an advantage the Americans had was that the
professionalism of US soldiers made the ISF want to emulate them and look like them. 448 A
Civil Affairs officer said that he still has the patches from a number of the units that he worked
with and law enforcement such as Hillah SWAT because they did a lot with them. 449 A
provincial brigade commander tied this into weaving the fabric of trust between the people and
their security forces, especially the police forces, and trying to get them to feel they were
protected by the police force as opposed to being exploited. 450 These stories demonstrate that
military assets can play an attractive role not commonly captured in counterinsurgency literature.
Sometimes the professionalization could take a humorous form. A brigade commander
in Baghdad told an Iraqi general that every time they tried to talk, the general tended to get on
the phone. Why? The general said, “I must talk to my commanders.” The commander asked
why he should believe he was being taken seriously if the general was constantly getting on the
phone. The commander also asked him how many of his subordinates were on the phone at his
meetings, and said that it was a sign of disrespect. The general promptly put out a policy that no
one could have their phones out at his meetings. He would make a big deal out of it when the
commander would come to see him. He would put his phone on a tray, his sergeant major would
retrieve the tray, and he would say “You see, I am removing the distraction.”451
Another Civil Affairs officer felt that ultimately the untold story of Iraq and biggest
success was taking 150,000 of America’s finest and putting them in every town in Iraq. They all
interacted with American soldiers and civilians and they liked them. They realized the
Americans were “pretty nice people.” He recalled being in the desert and pulling into an Iraqi
FOB (Forward Operating Base). An American soldier jumped off the front of the truck and an
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Iraq soldier came up and they are hugging and swapping cigarettes, two big tough looking guys.
Watching, he believed that there is undoubtedly a payoff for that. 452
As the ISF size and capability increased, they were able to assume a larger role. A
stability operations commander in Baghdad credited the Coalition strategy of building the
capability of Iraqi security forces and using their greater amount of force availability and using
that greater force availability to conduct their own operations, not operations in the shadow of
American units which had been the case for a few years before that. He said that they were
becoming sufficiently trained, resourced, armed and equipped with personal protection
equipment such as HUMVEEs, the same sorts of things the Americans had. As a result of
increased contact, the ISF casualties began to rise despite gradual improvement in equipment.
American casualties were also rising, but they were generally being done in adjacent areas. He
recalled that the ISF might be operating down one main highway going into a particular province
and the adjacent community to that main highway might be where the Americans were
operating, so there would be adjacent operations frequently. There were American advisors with
each of those Iraqi units as well.453
A USMC Military Training Team leader recalled that they were doing a lot of transition
security activities while the police were being built up inside of Ramadi. He specified 1/1
Brigade specifically as being popular locally because they had a Sunni commander with a
heterogeneous brigade. The team leader said that this commander was an old Saddam guy, very
secular, in command of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds: it was the American vision for Iraq. Counter to
that was the 1/7 Brigade who were all Shias out of southern Baghdad. According to him that
unit came in effectively waving banners saying, “Hey Sunnis, you’re about to get yours. Your
friends, the Shias.”454
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Better coordination with these assets increased their role as well. A brigade commander
in Baghdad recalled going to the commander of the Multi-National Security Training Command
– Iraq (MNSTC-I) and telling him that the MTTs and PTTs (Police Training Teams) were in his
battlespace and that he had to get the missions aligned, so they needed to report to him.
MNSTC-I concurred experimentally in his sector. Thanks to that, he then had every JSS, MTT
and PTT team comprising both ISF and Coalition forces all under the same roof looking at the
same map, listening to each other’s radio calls, and moving the effort forward. To him it was a
balancing act, identifying pathways toward a common end that everyone could subscribe to. 455
In western Iraq, a USMC MTT leader anticipated change and opportunity as a result of
improved Sunni cooperation:
I briefed our Iraqi brigade that if the Awakening went well, we were going to go into
reconstruction, and how to remodel the brigade to do that. By April or May we had
formed a joint Army-USMC-Iraqi-CA council to go out, do surveys and figure out what
the locals wanted for reconstruction or access improvements so we could begin to
develop the catalog of products and materials that were needed. I would attend with my
team to coordinate and synchronize with the Iraqis properly. Messaging product was
discussed. It was such an onerous process trying to get official message products out was
eventually we discarded participation in that process for alignment with national
messaging and went with the commander’s local messages. We did that for
circumvention because the commander in his AO could communicate with the population
there. We would talk about things like “Support Your Local Gunfighter” and other
simple things at a local production level. We would also advertise recruiting drives for
the police and army.456
Another provincial brigade commander recalled that there were several times where his
Iraqi counterpart brigade and division commanders were a bit light on security. They would
provide security in a fashion he called “smoke and mirrors.” The local citizens would not see it,
but it was there and the Iraqi commander knew it was there and could feel emboldened in his
engagements and not feel threatened that an attack would sneak up on him in some fashion. AlQaeda was very good at showing up in a certain amount of time.457 His unit would watch the
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time and knew the routes in so they could protect the key leader engagement. The Iraqis did not
have to look over their shoulder and could do the engagements themselves. Instead of the U.S.
doing it, it would be the governor and deputy governor talking to key military leaders. 458
ISF capabilities improved so dramatically that an MTT leader recalled that when Basra
had problems during Fall 2007, the British could not contain it and the Iraqi units there
collapsed, so the replacements for his Iraqi units went to Basra. The bottom line is things got so
smooth in his location in Ramadi that they could redeploy the Iraqi army assets out of town. He
was happy to observe this migration to soft power and regular order.459 We have previously
discussed Hammes and his view that this sort of indirect support to the local security forces as
being more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency.
A proving ground for increased ISF capability came in the form of the March 2008 Easter
offensive or Charge of the Knights. To the surprise of the Americans, Prime Minister Maliki
took a large contingent of his refurbished ISF and led it to Basra to take on the Shia militias that
had taken control there. An ambassador working economic development at the Embassy recalled
that although they got into some trouble, US airpower was employed to help him out. 460 It was
probably motivated more by Maliki’s fear that the Shia militias were becoming too powerful
than trying to create a secular Iraq, but it dovetailed with Coalition objectives in Iraq of a
government that was less blatantly sectarian.
None of this change came without cost. A planner at MNC-I said that in general, Iraqi
casualties tended to be about three times the proportion to the U.S. and that that ratio remained
broadly consistent.461 A brigade commander in Baghdad also saw a lot more of the ISF
casualties near the end of the Surge, mainly because he was trying to turn operations over to
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them and allow them to take on their own fight. The Surge was a difficult time for his unit as
well: they lost over 50 people in their area of operations during a 15-month period.462
Some of the rebuilding effort may have even been solely the result of the improvement in
security. A squadron commander in Baghdad recalled that when he arrived in Rusafa and things
were just starting to turn around, whole blocks of Baghdad’s business district were “completely
vacant, bullet-ridden Orwellian wastelands.” Within eight months they were filled with new
businesses, and the main complaint was the price of rent, which went up four times because of
demand. Not one business owner – and he said he spoke to dozens – had received a microloan or
grant, and all credited the improvement in security for the business development. 463 Although the
reconstruction effort played a role, a consistent theme of interviewees both military and civilian
was the need for stability as a prerequisite for anything else.

THE CAMP WAR

Failure to adequately address detention facilities can create problems with international
ramifications for the facilities owner. Fehrenbach and Foley described the major uprisings that
occurred in the Prisoner of War (POW) camps during the Korean Conflict. 464 Although the
media will focus on shortcomings in detention facilities, the process of holding and rehabilitating
captured insurgents receives less attention in media and academic writing.
The Iraq War had already produced the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. To change the
dynamic according to General Petraeus:
We created large rule of law centers which had within them detention facilities, judicial
facilities to use, and even billeting for the judicial personnel, so that they didn’t have to
commute to and from home to these facilities as they would be targets until we
established security.465
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An internment facility commander recalled that “dignity and respect” was the mantra he
repeated and emphasized oftentimes to his organization and the Iraqis. For example,
There were only female guards for female detainees. And that was a whole other thing in
itself. The reason that was so important was in previous years female detainees were
released and when they returned to their villages, the impression was “Oh, you were in an
American prison. The guards probably gang-raped you.” They would be dishonored and
executed. What we had to do was make sure that we had a point of contact to give them
over to. We would find a local sheikh or village leader to sponsor the female detainee
who was released. I was the only male who was present at the pledging ceremony. They
would pledge to do good, not do anything bad, and we would have a ceremony releasing
this person as reformed and no longer a threat and we’re releasing them into your custody
‘Mr Village or Tribal Leader.’ We made a big show of only having female guards there,
only female representatives from the Department of State. By having the overwhelming
female presence, we developed the idea that this young lady was not gang raped. I had to
work with the Iraqi Minister for Women’s Affairs quite a bit, who would check in on the
female detainees and make sure everything was good there. We had a couple of
parliamentarians visit to check on the conditions also. Having the parliamentarians and
others inspecting the facilities and verifying that it wasn’t Abu Ghraib enhances
legitimacy.466
Combat units had their own brigade detainment internment facilities (BDIF) as well. A
brigade commander in the north recalled that they would process the detainees, but we could not
hold them more than 72 hours. Because they had limited time with them, they did not have
opportunities to do educational, vocational or any of the counter-indoctrination mission. Their
task was to complete the paperwork, take care of the detainees, and pass them forward within 72
hours.467
For the more permanent holding facilities an MNC-I planner said that they did build
vocational training for detainees into the plan. Detainee operations in Iraq (and AFG) were part
of the intelligence operation and security function. He recalled that they slightly helped with
“hearts and minds” and vocational training types of things. Detainee operations served to extract
as much intelligence as they could from detainees while housing them in a humane way and not
to have a repeat of “the black eye” of Abu Ghraib. 468 International law regarding treatment of
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detainees such as the Geneva Conventions brought limitations. A senior Public Affairs officer at
MNF-I remembered that they could not show prisoners, particularly their faces. They were not
allowed to be interviewed. Once in a while when the senior leadership would visit those
facilities, they would bring reporters as part of “battlefield circulation,” with the understanding
that they could take some distant footage, because they also didn’t want to give away the layout
of the facility.469
By and large the camps did not detract from the Coalition effort during the Surge. The
detention facility commander had at worst an occasional hunger strike: he did not have riots.
The hunger strikes were not usually coordinated. It was usually an individual or two who
thought their case was stagnating and being forgotten about. He coordinated with the brigade
Judge Advocate General who was liaison to the Iraqi courts, and they would provide the status of
the cases. He would then pass that to the detainees, and a lot of it was explaining that it was a
lengthy process: be patient. It was one-on-one interpersonal skills. He did not think that any of
the detainee tactics were effective at getting them what they wanted. 470
As ISF force capabilities increased, their treatment of detainees also had to be addressed.
A Marine Corps MTT leader recalled that occasionally they had to supervise the Iraqis with
some of the detentions they had, although that mostly fell under the task of his intelligence cell,
which had a major and NCOs. There was one experience where there was a person the Iraqis
had captured, and his team was supervising. The Iraqis thought he had something, so they were
asking, “How about if we bring him up to the roof and douse him with cold water in the middle
of winter?” ‘No, you can’t do that.’ “How about if we do this?” ‘No, you can’t do that.’ To
him it was adding a moral component to their training effort. He said that as the Awakening
progressed there were fewer of those instances.471
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Better coordination prevented accidental detentions from boiling over into major
incidents. A commander in northern Iraq recalled that there was an occasion in Tikrit where
Special Operations made a raid on a very influential imam and captured his son without the
unit’s knowledge.472 Both he and the PRT leader received multiple frantic calls from virtually
every Iraqi of importance in Salah al-Din province to release his son. Protests started in
downtown Tikrit. Special Operations ended up releasing the detainee to his unit and they
released him to the imam. The commander said that although from then on he had to be careful
of any action against this character, at least they now had knowledge of one particularly
influential person in their area of operations.473
Detention facilities provided another opportunity to practice reconciliation. Most people
would probably consider detention facilities as strictly hard power. A senior MNF-I staff officer
talked about General Petraeus’ intent for the long-term detainees. Some of them had been
captured in 2003, and there were about 25,000 of them in Camp Bucca. The biggest thing that
General Petraeus did was create a system where military tribunals would hear their cases every
six months. This was key because a lot of the prisoners had no idea when and if they were ever
going to be released. He took the 5,000 worst offenders and had maximum security facilities
built for them to get them out of the general population of prisoners, because they were turning
them all into hardened insurgents through violence and intimidation.
Then he would take the other 20,000 and try to rehabilitate them. They would sing the
Iraqi national anthem every morning. They would make bricks and on each brick was stamped,
“Rebuilding the Nation Brick by Brick.” The artists among them could paint. There were a
variety of things, but the most important thing was to separate the worst offenders into maximum
security facilities and then allow military tribunals to hear the cases of the others. Often the
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tribunals would release the people, saying, “There is no evidence that this guy did anything. He
got swept up in a cordon-and-search operation that was gathering in all the military age males:
that is not a reason to detain anyone.” When they were released, they were released in
ceremonies. They would have the local governor, mayor or other political leader. They would
have the imam there or the tribal chief, and they would all speak. These released detainees
would go through these rehabilitation ceremonies and they were quite effective. Most of them
did not return to the insurgency after that. Of the insurgents captured and released after that,
fewer than 1% were detained again. 474
A camp commander added that they did some reeducation from among a population of
about 12,000 detainees. They were assisted by imams there who were of the more moderate
view that were trying to reeducate the detainees on Islam. He had computer training classes for
the females and sewing, and reading classes that some detainees participated in. The idea was
that if they could read the Koran for themselves, they would realize that they had been misled by
extremist imams, that the Koran did not advocate violence against non-Muslims that the
extremist imams had previously led them to believe. 475 An Information Operations officer in
Baghdad remembered a Coalition program to work in particular with the youth. One of his
translators went there and would try to get the kids to see that this “was not a healthy choice for
their futures.476”
Systemic analysis of individual detainee cases became a priority. A brigade commander
in Baghdad recalled:
My objective was that every detainee be treated in a decent and humane fashion: that
wasn’t the case when we got there. Privacy needs to be afforded for the humanity of the
individual as we sort out what they had done. We realized that some of them did not
need to go to (Camp) Cropper. Some of them may have been well-intentioned people
that didn’t have another course of action. That is very liberal minded of me, which I am
not. We had a program where we would reintroduce them back by using the links we had

232
established between essential services and security. If I had some dudes that I was going
to reintroduce back into Qadra (Baghdad district), I would link them up with the local
sheikh or NAC and tell them that you need to put these guys to work on the local
community service project. Keep them there for a couple of weeks and report back when
you decide to release them. Put the onus back on the locals. On one occasion, I had a
CODEL (Congressional Delegation) with me and we were in Yarmuk and we were
walking the streets. There was a guy in his orange jumpsuit cleaning the streets. That
was what they wore, not because he had been a prisoner. He came up to me and said,
“Thank you Akeeb ____ for letting me go, I am now working for my neighborhood.”
He was so proud. I ran into that more than once. These guys had been captured and
questioned and it had been determined that they had probably done something dumb. As
long as they had not committed a capital offense or been involved in a bombing, we
normally let them go. We told them that we had our eyes on them, and we were going to
put them back to work earning a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work. That was called
Operation OUR TOWN, where we linked the security apparatus with the essential
services with the reintroduction of people back to society from everywhere. It dealt as
well with confirming who’s actually supposed to be in this house, etc. Operation OUR
TOWN was led by the Civil Affairs team that had the city planner, and former
ambassador, and some CA and PSYOP dudes. It was wildly successful. 477

CONCLUSION

Coercive power had to be applied to stabilize Iraq. This power had to come from
Coalition forces. This was a correction to the prior strategy of drawing down the Coalition
presence while trying to turn coercive power over to an Iraqi Security Force that was clearly
incapable of assuming it. The military forces had a hard initial fight, but once they started to
gain control of the situation it enabled them to gradually bring in Iraqi coercive power and
stabilize the country. They did this with more joint patrolling, bringing the ISF and U.S. military
together which produced attractive benefits while applying coercive power against insurgents.
A detention facility is by its nature coercive. However, the opportunity to practice
attractive power even there exists. The Coalition expanded learning and rehabilitation programs
in its detention facilities to reduce recidivism of detainees upon release and generate goodwill by
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the respectful manner in which the detainees had been treated. This was a prime example of
combining coercive and attractive power into smart power.
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CHAPTER VIII
SMARTER ATTRACTION

INTRODUCTION

Smarter coercive power was half of the Surge. Smarter attractive power was employed
hand in hand with it to increase the gains from each. The Coalition improved its ability to
influence the Iraqi population through better messaging by being faster and bringing
communications down from national to more local sourcing and dissemination. A key part of the
messaging was reconciliation, a willingness to bring more sectarian and ethnic groups into the
conversation and have a voice in determining Iraq’s political and economic course.
Interviewees talked about how reconstruction efforts improved as the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were created and funded to work with local level leadership to
build and maintain projects the Iraqis actually wanted. The PRTs worked to not only bring more
resources to bear at the provincial level, but worked with the leadership to oversee expenditures
and decrease problems with corruption, cost overruns and misallocation of funds.

MESSAGING

Olson Lounsbery and Pearson discussed the “comfort zone” of shared needs and
expectations that people experience that can result in a sense of common fate. 478 Messaging
during the Surge thus faced the challenge of trying to promulgate messages that would resonate
at the local level without further dividing the country along sectarian and ethnic lines. Metz said
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it was unrealistic to expect counterinsurgents to agree on a common messaging strategy. 479
However, since the Coalition at that point had waning international support, the U.S. was in a
good position to develop and implement its own messaging campaign. During the Surge U.S.
messaging efforts became more effective and nimble, although significant challenges remained.
In addition, progress was made on efforts to restrict and limit enemy messaging.
The senior Surge leadership understood and emphasized the importance of messaging as
part of their campaign execution. According to General Petraeus:
We had at least a monthly one-hour session with all those who were engaged in the
information operations. We had daily updates on a variety of topics that would come
under that particular heading during the daily battlefield update and analysis or BUA.480
Ambassador Crocker agreed:
The communications role was tightly controlled by the force commander and myself.
Our tightly knitted view was that this needs to be about Iraqis, not about us. Whatever
you are doing that is going to have a public affairs dimension, we need to have host
country buy-in and host country faces doing the public relations stuff. Not us. 481
A senior Public Affairs officer at Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) during the Surge
described General Petraeus as a “voracious gatherer, consumer of information.” He said that if
he needed something new, as long as General Petraeus was somewhere where he was getting
email, turnaround time was usually less than five minutes. If he didn’t have a response within 10
minutes that was unusual, and General Petraeus was probably doing some heavy thinking about
it or typing out something more specific. 482 An MNF-I planner agreed that General Petraeus
“used the media very well.” The Media Operations Center (MOC) was 24 hour and multilingual,
run by a two-star general. They tracked everything in the news and social media. This allowed
the MNF-I commander to respond quickly and there was a media update every morning in the
Battle Update Assessment (BUA). General Petraeus would understand the media was reporting
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a rumor or car bombing and get ahead of the message by calling the media or Iraqi leadership.
The planner felt that messaging proactivity was very good under General Petraeus.483
This proactive approach was emulated by their subordinates. Major General Richard
Lynch was in charge of Strategic Effects and according to a Marine Corps planner at MNC-I was
“very much into that.” He personally gave a daily press conference trying to influence the
perception of what was happening. At the time there was a great deal of cynicism, not just
among the Iraqis who had reason to be cynical, but among the American media as well. The
planner recalled that General Lynch went through a lot of difficulty to ensure that the message
they were coming out with at the press conferences was consistent with the message provided by
Psychological Operations and Information Operations, because if there was a contradiction or
even seeming contradiction, credibility would be lost.484 Similarly, the TFBSO conducted
weekly press operations out of the Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC) in Baghdad. They
would insist on having an official Iraqi counterpart there, ministry of Finance or Agriculture for
example. They wanted to do everything with an Iraqi and “spin” as many questions as they
could to the Iraqi representative to give it an Iraqi face. A senior official said local media always
showed up for their press conferences.485
There was a considerable amount of media working in Iraq. An MNF-I Public Affairs
officer believed that there were times when the number of interview requests were burdensome
to the command. He recalled his media management system:
I kept a roster of every news organization in Baghdad. The day I arrived I started the
process and listed every news organization alphabetically. 30 days after we arrived, we
arranged and conducted his (General Petraeus) first press conference to baseline all the
media and then we started the battlefield circulations. I would send out invites based on
seats available, and I always had seats available, that was one of the battle drills that we
worked out. I would invite an organization, and if they could not send a reporter, I went
to the next organization. I kept it posted behind my desk on a large butcher board, so
when the journalists from the various news organizations came to my desk, they could
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see that I was trying to keep it as fair and equitable as possible and could see if they had
missed a trip because they were not available. Transparency was the key for this, no
favorites. We really only did two press conferences in Baghdad, one at the beginning
and one at the end. The final tally of interviews both in Iraq and back in the States was
319 according to my tracking sheet. 486
An ambassador leading economic planning at the Embassy said that there was a lot of
media in Baghdad and in the Palace. Most if it was international media, whom he was engaging
with the most. He felt that the local media was better handled by the Iraqis. 487 A stability
operations commander agreed that by 2007 the number of media outlets had “exploded.” Some
were insurgent controlled which he considered very advanced media networks. Some were
spinoffs of BBC, SkyNews or al-Jazeera. Fox also had a presence at that point in time. The
major networks were still there, particularly during the Surge, so the Coalition worked very
closely with them. They moved with U.S forces, and the Coalition embedded them inside of
units again (the networks did the despite some insurance underwriting problems due to the
risks).488 A Special Operations commander felt that messaging in local media often got good
regional “play.” He learned that when they got something into the local Iraqi media company, it
was an opportunity for messaging people in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, across the Gulf, etc.
Consequently, he played heavily with the media as best he could within his sphere of control. 489
Television was the most visible media in Iraq, and great Coalition attention was focused
on it. The same Special Operations commander said that his sense was that Iraqi society was
even more susceptible to be swayed by media messages (than U.S. society), and electronic media
seemed to move people’s opinions. He thought the key element was the speed: it was easy to
turn on the TV and something was on TV immediately.490 Conversely, social media such as
Facebook were not engaged during the Surge, partly because of restrictions from Washington
and partly because of the problems of maintaining one.491492
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Radio was a popular media source in Iraq as well. A brigade commander in northern Iraq
had his PSYOP teams distributing battery-operated throwaway radios to the populace so they
had a means of listening to broadcasts. His unit would broadcast music and messages on those
stations. The feedback he got in his Battle Update Brief was that it seemed to be effective in
getting information out to the populace. 493
Printed media was utilized as well. An Information Operations planner in Baghdad said
that his division provided the resources for the monthly PRT newspaper. There was some
guidance to move it and other print products on-line but there was not trust in their ability to
measure the performance of distribution: for example, who is viewing it? He had seen similar
issues when the Coalition was distributing Baghdad Now. People would criticize it and say the
Iraqis knew it was put out by the Americans. 494 However, when he went out on missions and
handed out Baghdad Now or the PRT newspaper the Iraqis would start reading it. They might
think it “sucked,” but they were reading it. To him, that was a benefit of print, it provided the
ability to facilitate an information patrol and see what people thought of the products. 495
A brigade Civil Affairs officer recalled that the PSYOP team did a leaflet drop about
every month, although he felt face-to-face communication was better as will be discussed
below.496 A squadron commander in Baghdad agreed, describing leaflet drops as “less than
worthless, a complete waste of time.” He said they would periodically get thousands of leaflets
from division with “stupid” messages and be directed to distribute them. They would ask the
ISF to do that at their static checkpoints, but even they refused. He recalled one particularly
“asinine but popular” leaflet as having menacing eyes that said something like, “AQI is bad.
Turn them in” in Arabic. “Jundi” (ISF soldiers) would laugh and tell them, “You think people
here in East Baghdad don’t know that?” Iraqis would take them without looking and
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immediately drop them on the ground. He realized early on that distributing those would cause
them to lose credibility, and he did not want to explain to a parent that their son was killed while
distributing a worthless leaflet on a corner in Baghdad, so he did not do it. After he redeployed,
he met a PSYOP captain who worked in an adjacent unit that had Sadr City in her operational
area. She said that she got those leaflets all the time and told him, “Yeah I distributed
them…into the burn barrel!” Meanwhile at the weekly division update the PSYOP lead would
report on the number of leaflets dropped, including the ones “distributed” into the trash, without
any mention of their effectiveness which this commander felt was not measurable. 497
Improvement in production input improved product quality as well. A PSYOP officer in
Iraq before and during the Surge said that it was about 2007 before they realized that they needed
to hire from within Iraq. They brought in local Iraqis to be their cultural advisors even though
they had lower security clearance levels. Nonetheless, they were still more effective because
they had better knowledge of the area. 498499
Timely, relevant message distribution was a continual roadblock. Preapproved
Psychological Operations products and messages were available, 500 and for a brigade commander
in the north his preference was to “go with the good enough.” His first course of action was
always to dig through the preapproved themes and messages and products to see if those fit the
bill before they tried to push something forward to get it approved. 501 The drawback of
preapproved products was that were typically generic, reducing their impact on the target
audience. A divisional Information Operations officer in Baghdad recalled meeting with brigade
leadership who would say to him, “Don’t take this personal, but some of these things suck.” In
some cases, he agreed with them. 502
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Getting new products approved resulted in improved relevance, but at the expense of
timeliness. According to the same IO officer:
Brigadier General ___ had great ideas on how to flatten and accelerate the process but the
subordinates couldn’t adjust. I understood it but could not convey to others on how to
work collaboratively on it. He wanted the staff sections not reviewing the product drafts
sequentially. It would go to the first person, then the next guy with a college education
would bleed all over it, then the next guy would have a Shia dialect. Some ego problems
and lack of intellectual maturity. This was the one time I kind of disagreed with the
PSYOP team. They seemed put off about altering the approval process. I tried to
emphasize that it was the same people looking at it, just in a different way. But with some
of the issues with the translators, you just could not get past it. I had a lot of shouting
matches with the XOs (Executive Officer) from the brigades. From my perspective, I’ve
got 30 things in the que. You want this approved and you have five things in the que
right now. Do you want me to bump this over the other 5 things you have? 503
Another solution was delegating PSYOP product approval authority to lower-level
commanders. A brigade commander in Northern Iraq recalled that when he first arrived at the
beginning of the Surge, he did not have PSYOP product approval authority, but that it started to
get pushed down to the units in 2007. Products out of the ordinary still had to be approved at
division level or higher.504 As the approval process was moved down to the brigade commanders
an IO planner in Baghdad remembered being glad for them, but he also told them that they were
“going to get what they deserved.” They got their approval process, but now they needed money
for printers.505 Another brigade commander acknowledged that once they could go out and get
PSYOP products, he never felt he had enough, although his patrols were always able to go out
with something. He noted that this was a big change from 2004-2005. His unit had good
interpreters so the message could be understandable in Arabic. Getting good vendors who could
do things fast and inexpensively was important to him.506
Timeliness was important for Public Affairs releases as well. A Special Operations
officer emphasized that every operation had the potential for positives and negatives in the
information domain: they wanted to accentuate the positives and mitigate the negatives. As part

241
of their CONOP (Concept of Operations), they had an information plan for the operation before
they launched it. Products as best they could be were already made. The PAO already had a
press release, ready to fill in the blanks. The IO officer already had a framework of how he
could exploit those operations, successful or not, and accentuate or mitigate. They inculcated
that in the force by talking about it all the time, emphasizing that they really had to expand the
impact of that tactical, kinetic action in the information domain, because in the end it was really
a battle for hearts and minds and will. The vast majority of times, the initial quick look from a
team regarding an operation, which was generally within an hour of getting back to base, what
was monitored on the net, and what the ground force reported after the event, was already over
90% accuracy most of the time. But if there was anything contentious, they could not get that
message out quickly because they just couldn’t get it through the wickets of approval. In the
balance between speed and accuracy, he felt that they always seem to default to accuracy. 507
A senior member of the Information Operations Task Force thought that by the time of
the Surge they had a robust routine for approval. Periodically there were “hiccups” because of
what he saw as a lack of understanding messaging strategy. Depending on the LOO (Line of
Operation), they worked on a weekly to monthly cycle. Television commercials were normally
produced in about 2 months. Most other products were done on two-week cycles, and
sometimes 24 hours. One example of what he felt they did not get right was when the t-walls
were put up to control movement in Baghdad. Because no one told them about it, they were
“caught flat-footed.” Both AQ and Sadr put out messages saying, “they are trying to divide us.”
He explained that if someone had told them a few weeks ahead, they could have prepared the
ground by putting out commercials with a metaphor like “how do you catch a rat? You trap him
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in a corner.” The first requirement is to get the operational conceptualization right of how
messaging and action work together: that to him is co-creation.508
By and large coordination improved. A brigade commander in Baghdad said that before
they even lifted a finger to start their Haifa Street and Visible Signs of Change projects
(reconstruction efforts), they briefed their intent to local Iraqi leadership and handed out flyers
about what they wanted to do. People understood that the Coalition was there to help them and
saw this deliberate shift from hard to soft power. 509 To a Civil Affairs officer who worked with
Special Operations, there was no single breakthrough: it was a cumulative effort. Rather than
something timed well, he thought what was important was what trended well. His unit did things
over time that reinforced messages over time that had impacts over time. It was a sustained
campaign over time that he felt was more impactful. He provided actions that reinforced the
message that PSYOP was scripting. The unit had a non-lethal targeting board to collectively
cross-level their efforts.510
General Petraeus continued to play a direct role in ensuring unity of message throughout
his command. A senior Public Affairs Officer (PAO) described the process:
There were a few cases where subordinate GOs (general officers) didn’t necessarily agree
with the direction that was being given. They might go off and do their own thing, but it
did not happen often. After I brought it to his attention, a correction by the four-star
usually stopped it. One glaring incident was made by General _____. When we started
the Sons of Iraq initiative, he did not necessarily agree with the concept. He periodically
did media roundtables, and in one not long after we said we would pay these folks, he
mentioned in the roundtable that the only way he was going to work with them was when
they were flex cuffed, etc. That went to “above the fold” New York Times: direct
counter to what we had been putting out. I let General Petraeus know what he had said.
And this was his TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures): I would send him the
information, he would reply to me and he would copy several others, such as the
offending individual(s), the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Commanding General, the Staff
Judge Advocate, whomever else he felt needed to know. He would say something to the
effect of “Steve, in this case, don’t think General _____ got it quite right. Get a hold of
him and his folks and let them know what the talking points are and get this corrected.
Thanks. DP.” That is kind of how it went: to me, it is a four-star “eyes right.”

243
Typically, once that occurred, I could count minutes before I would start getting the first
phone call from the subordinate PAO. And that happened in this case, and life gets
interesting. For them, not necessarily for me. 511
An IO planner even described situations where they put hard power on adversarial soft
power. The insurgents were assassinating Iraqi reporters on the steps of the town hall and
sniping at the PSYOP teams complete with messaging from their propagandists. He went to the
lawyers and they said that what the propagandists were doing was illegal. It was against Iraqi
law because they were fomenting violence against security forces. The Coalition could lock
them up. He was even able to get AQI propagandists onto the high-value target list. The
Coalition could go after them, and they knew operational details to assist the intelligence picture
of the battlefield as well.512 A senior MNF-I staff officer agreed, saying that they captured most
of the “media emirs” through a combination of good intelligence and raids. It reduced the
amount of propaganda the insurgents were able to put out, so they focused a lot of intelligence on
finding them and putting them out of business. Then they could put out their own messages to
compete with the narrative that the remaining enemy media put out. 513
A brigade commander in Baghdad described the insurgents as being as good at telling
their story and sticking to it as the Coalition. But he felt that they were lying. They would say
they U.S. was not good guys, were there to make their lives miserable and would not do what it
promised. Because they were living among the people, he felt it was hard to counter. They had
to counter it with mass: believable, achievable, deliverable stories. The U.S. could not say one
thing and do another.514 A squadron commander similarly said that particularly in Sadr City, the
Shia militias took credit for every project, regardless of funding source, even being so brazen as
to cover American projects with posters claiming they were funded by Moqtada al Sadr. Their
biggest and most effective claim was that the Americans were the outsiders causing the problems
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and needed to leave. They would claim they were the good guys and the Americans were the bad
guys but to him, Iraqis knew better. He felt the Coalition did not do a good enough job of
advertising their “extortion racket” and making them own it. Every Iraqi he met complained
about it. Many of the leaders he worked with corrected him when he called them “insurgents,”
as they thought the U.S. was giving too much credit to the thieves and criminals it was facing. 515
Part of the lesson the U.S. learned was to make its messaging Iraqi-focused, not U.S.focused. A PSYOP officer said that by the end of the Surge They worked with the elders to tell
them that the Americans felt threatened and then they were the ones telling the parents, “Hey,
don’t do that. We don’t want any problems.”516 An MNC-I economics advisor emphasized that
this was not always a rapid process. He said that if you wanted your Iraqi colleagues to do
something, you had to meet them regularly, drink a lot of tea, and say the same thing every time.
Eventually after many times they would get it through.517 An economics planner on the JSPA
team remembered Taseen al-Sheikhly being appointed spokesman for the Baghdad Security
Plan. He was a Sunni living in a Shia neighborhood who actually got kidnapped by JAM. He
was afraid Taseen might get killed but said that Ahmed Chalabi got him released a few days
later. Every week Taseen would be at the table and he would be putting out the messages the
Iraqis wanted, and the American PAO officers would coordinate with Taseen. 518
Many interviewees found that in the end the most effective means of communication was
face-to-face. An MNC-I planner said that face-to-face meant yes, you actually meant what you
were saying as opposed to written products where they ask who put it up and what is it all about.
To him these interactions with local mukhtars and civic leaders, providing them honest and
reliable information they could get out to their people, seemed to be the most effective way of
doing things.519 A Baghdad Civil Affairs Team Chief concurred that the bulk of what they did
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were face-to-face engagements – both at the local’s location (government building, market, etc.)
and on the US military location (JSS, FOB).520
Civil Affairs was a valuable inroad to opening these communications. An IO planner in
Baghdad said that they were valuable as they had the opportunity and time to form personal
relationships with civilian power brokers.521 A Civil Affairs officer working with Special
Operations said 99% of what he did was in person and benefitted from a visual set of outcomes,
whether it was a facility or other project. If anything, he felt that the U.S. was not always
effective in conveying that it was a U.S.-enabled effort if that was the intent. He felt that they
wanted the U.S. seen as an ally there to help, but they did not always do that well. 522 Some
initial challenge was logical since introducing a more aggressive Coalition force posture would
lead to greater violence in the short term. One of the messages they had to employ was, “It is
going to get worse before it gets better.”523
A senior staff officer at MNF-I said that a big part of the IO campaign was painting AQI
as an enemy of the people of Iraq, the enemy of everyone. If they could create a common
enemy, then they would all be working in the same direction at defeating that common enemy,
which did happen. They emphasized publicizing a lot of the stuff that AQI did, the atrocities and
so forth, and made sure that it got in Western media as well, so that AQI had to react to the
Coalition’s IO campaign, not vice versa. He said that General Petraeus made an important point
of it and part of it was being first with the truth. They had their own YouTube channel which at
one point in time was one of the most subscribed of any YouTube channel.524
A brigade commander in the north further explained his three local themes. First was
getting dialogue between the provincial leaders and the central government. It was important
because they were disenfranchised Sunnis who needed to link in with the Baghdad Shia
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population and leadership and feel like there was some trust building there. The second was to
drive a wedge between the people and al-Qaeda. The good news story to him was that the Iraqis
were a little more secular than 600 AD Sharia law so they would embrace being a little more
Westernized. They wanted to be a bit more Westernized, although not Western. He could use
that to drive a wedge between the people and al-Qaeda. Third was weaving the fabric of trust
between the people and their security forces, especially the police forces, and try to get them to
feel they were protected by the police force as opposed to being exploited. 525
An interesting opportunity to demonstrate the Coalition’s desire to bring the Sunnis back
into the national dialogue occurred after the execution of Saddam Hussein. His hometown of
Tikrit is located in Salah al Din Province. The PRT leader there assisted with the repatriation of
Saddam Hussein’s remains to Tikrit. That was a big deal. The Sunnis were concerned that his
body would be desecrated if buried elsewhere. He said that the willingness of the Coalition to
talk to the Sunnis signaled to the Sunni population that the U.S. was willing to make a partner of
them, figure out what was important to them and integrate that into what they were doing. He
believed it helped sell them on the Coalition’s long-term democracy objectives. 526
Some subordinates were creative in getting what they felt were the right messages out to
the populace. A Marine Corps MTT leader felt that most of the national-level leaflets were out
of touch with what they needed: regarding inform and influence products, they were largely on
their own. Consequently, they stuck to the Coalition message of the advancement of the ISF as
Iraq’s next protectors. 527 An Information Operations planner said that if he knew the person
well, he might say “Look, you have loudspeaker teams. You do not need anyone’s approval to
use them. If something comes up when you are getting ready to go out the door, you can go
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running back to try and get a new handbill, or you can go use your loudspeaker teams and say
whatever you want within 30 minutes of it happening.”528
A squadron commander in Baghdad remembered:
For a time, my squadron handed out small numbers of leaflets with simple messages that
just noted recent attacks on Iraqis and how the Shia militias didn’t care (like a storyboard
in leaflet form). The intent was to embarrass the Shia militias about their wanton killing
of other Shia, such as rocket attacks on the Green Zone that fell short, or an IED that
exploded on a bus instead of a CF convoy, and perhaps embarrass them enough to stop.
These were local events that were frequently not covered by Iraqi media, so they might
have local interest. I did this 3 or 4 times but it was risky, as in order to be timely I
couldn’t wait for approval from division, which would take days or weeks and who
would inevitably ask me to distribute thousands of their stupid vanilla pre-approved
messages. We stopped because it was just too time-consuming (we didn’t have a highspeed printer) and I had no way of knowing if the effort worked.529
The last problem he mentions does illustrate the perils of going outside of the established
system. Psychological Operations has the training and experience to develop Measures of
Effectiveness to find out if products are working and can also conduct pre- and post-testing of
products to measure the reaction of local target audiences to them.

RECONCILIATION

Maintaining stability required restarting the political process. This meant reengagement
with the tribes and regions that had been marginalized in the aftermath of the invasion. The
military could not handle this alone: the State Department and its PRTs would be the main driver
of this process. Even Iraqis who had participated in the insurgency needed to be given an
opportunity to rejoin the mainstream political process to continue to isolate them from al-Qaeda
and other malign foreign influences. Ricks saw this as a critical way to turn enemies into
allies.530
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Much of the effort for reconciliation was focused on the Sunnis. The Kurds were largely
autonomous and mostly wanted to be left alone outside of regaining control of Kirkuk and
Mosul, which Saddam had spent years populating with Sunni Arabs to attempt to drive out the
Kurdish population. Stability in Iraq was dependent on tamping down the violence largely
initiated by former Saddam loyalists and/or foreign fighters. Some of the challenge would come
from starting or restarting contact with the Sunni tribal leaders. An IO officer working in
Baghdad recalled that in 2004 1st Cavalry Division had a Civil Affairs officer who had been
heavily involved with tribal engagements. When he came back, he wanted to reestablish contact
with his tribal contacts. The IO officer told him that when he left, they all stopped talking to the
Americans.531
The Coalition was fortunate that in the case of al-Qaeda, they were proving most
effective at enraging the Iraqi Sunnis. A Civil Affairs officer working with Special Operations
felt that in Diyala Province the foreign fighter’s overviolent approach did not help over time and
ultimately hurt the insurgents by alienating themselves.532 An advisor to MNC-I said that the
Coalition got much better at messaging that it was in Iraq to bring down the violence so that the
Government of Iraq could move forward with public service delivery and national
reconciliation.533 Schifrin talked about the importance of giving the national government
credibility,534 while Branch and Wood believe that if states are sufficiently informed or
concerned about the needs of the nation, the need for military action decreases. 535
Holding these areas required cooperation from the Iraqi Shia population. A stability
operations commander in Baghdad said that as they were doing those clearing operations they
had to build and hold at the same time. They began to share a lot more of the techniques for that
with the ISF which had been Sunni-driven for many years: their practice was to come in with
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only coercive power, not attractive power. Some of their commanders were Shia and understood
the model, but the U.S. had to be careful. The stability commander remembered that if they saw
some really effective Shia commanders engaged in attractive power, chances were the militia
was attached to them. The U.S, had to conduct deliberate analysis of the environment about who
they were fighting, why, and how to move in a direction to fulfill the long-term objectives of the
Coalition presence in the first place, which he said was a stable, democratic society not at war
with itself.536
In many cases the initial approach came from the Iraqis. A Marine MTT leader
remembered the day he was walking across his compound and one of the “wannabe” sheikhs
who had been out there walked up to the gate and said, “I’m here to tell you where they all are
and I am ready to organize my guys so we can get rid of al-Qaeda.” It was al-Qaeda who had
turned the locals against them. After a while they had stopped paying for food and being “sort
of” a contributor to the economy, they started threatening and murdering people who were not
backing them, and to him it went south from there. 537
A Special Operations commander described the complexity involved in reconciliation:
The other significant thing we spent a lot of time in 2007 on that I would classify as soft
power was influence operations trying to pull insurgents off the battlefield, probably
started about February or May 2007. I remember sitting at our headquarters when the
three three-star generals were there: Graham Lamb, Odierno, and McCrystal. One of the
keys was a Power Point slide my guys had made, I think out of the IO (Information
Operations) cell, that listed all the insurgent groups in Iraq, and where they fell on the
spectrum of immovable/reconcilable/friends (already changed sides). And it also
discussed what we could do to move the reconcilables (sp) further towards us and
separate them from the irreconcilables. A lot of the granularity of that insight was
CJSOTF-AP reporting via our unit contacts and networks, because it was not as clean as,
‘The 1920 Revolutionary Brigade is reconcilable, and we can move it to the government
side.’ It was, ‘The 1920s Revolutionary Brigade is reconcilable in Diyala Province. It is
not reconcilable in Abu Ghraib. In this area we can move a group, but in this area, we
just need to target them kinetically.’ Al-Qaeda in Iraq, obviously irreconcilable. For the
most part it was how do you get all these splinter organizations and either defeat them on
the battlefield or take them off the battlefield using soft power, which was a lot about
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promises of money, economic support to those groups that were literally fighting because
they wanted to maintain a way of life, or just put food on the table? If you take that into
account, maybe the ratio between soft and hard power was more balanced looking at time
spent on those kinds of activities. 538
A brigade commander in Baghdad during the Surge said that the tribal network and
ability to disseminate information and change the attitude of the people was phenomenal. He
worked very closely with them. He invited them to the neighborhood and district council
meetings. That was a bit of a struggle at first, because now they were mixing political with tribal
leadership, and they did not always “jive.” In a couple of cases, his unit went out in Humvees,
picked up the tribal leaders, and brought them to the meetings. He went to their homes, which
could be scary because they did not know how safe it was. They met some guys who claimed
there were tribal leaders but were not, or were the wrong tribal leader, but he knew that they had
to take some risks. He recalled that that was where the Civil Affairs guys helped because they
knew how to get information about people that the average commander or soldier does not have.
He described them as very skilled guys who had multiple deployments to “screw it up, get it
right, and now knew how to do it.” His unit happily leaned on them for information on the
populace and tribal leaders. 539
Another brigade commander said that they worked with the Baghdad Patriots and the
Ghazaliya Guardsmen, who were really an offshoot of the Anbar tribesmen, heavily Sunni. They
did not bring their tribalism with them: just the religion. He said that the Amiriyah (Baghdad
district) leaders came to him after al-Qaeda entered Amiriyah and kidnapped a prominent
citizen’s son for extortion purposes. The leader was a former intelligence officer and likely
assassin for Saddam. Most likely he had been shooting at American soldiers. He went to the
sheikh in Amiriyah and said “I turn my back on al-Qaeda, they have violated Islam and I am here
to support you and kill al-Qaeda. Because the commander had developed relationships with all
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the imams, the sheikh’s imam called us and asked if we would help. His battalion commander
called him and said “Boss, they’re looking for support, ammunition and medical supplies and
activity coordination.” The imam of the mosque opened the door to the blue dome and said,
“You can put your command post right here.” And he did. That came later in the tour after they
had developed these relationships with the imams.
The commander emphasized that they were not being pushovers, nor did they think the
locals were 100% right. He started very early on asking why our soldiers were getting blown up
in such proximity to Iraqi Security Force checkpoints. Ultimately, he realized that the ISF had
been infested by Jayesh al-Madi under Muqtada al-Sadr and downshoots of the office of the
Martyr Sadr. His unit was able to do link-and-node analysis to draw a lot of this back to ISF
leadership. Then his unit could go in and say “J.R. Reiling, this is the information and proof I
have on you. You either knock this off or I’m going to take you to Camp Cropper.” Sometimes
they would comply, sometimes they would not. If they did not, his unit would go knock on the
door about 2 AM. Their guards knew why the Americans were there, and they would generally
come peacefully because his unit would tell them “You’re coming with us or you are going to
die here tonight. We know what you have done, and you will probably go to jail, but you will be
tried, and you will not be able to do this any longer.” As soon as they started pulling the corrupt
Sunni and Shia leadership out of the area of operation, word travelled extremely fast and he
recalled that they got a lot of access to the people that wanted to help. 540
Arming the tribesmen was a tricky initiative. An ambassador working in Iraq during the
Surge emphasized that Embassy funds did not go into the Sons of Iraq initiative. They were
involved in the meeting discussions, but the money that paid for Sons of Iraq was not
reconstruction money. He said that he talked to Lieutenant General Lamb regarding the Sons of

252
Iraq movement, and that he was very interested in input from the Embassies’ PRT people on the
ground.541 An Information Operations Task Force leader felt that the critical aspect of the Surge
was the political movement. Once there was the separation (of Sunnis and Shia), the city
elements needed to be brought into the government. 542
The Coalition was fortunate that once the warring factions were separated, it was actually
a fairly positive time. An ambassador working economics during the Surge felt that his timing
was lucky. Even though there was still violence, he thought it was actually a golden period of
time for U.S.-Iraqi relations. The U.S. had made a big commitment to help Iraq and the
Awakening had reduced violence in the Sunni areas. There was good Sunni-Shia
communication. Not perfect, but he pointed out that it got a lot worse later, so in retrospect it
looks pretty good. On the economic side the numbers were getting better. There were less
blackouts on the electricity grid. He felt he was fortunate to be there at that time. 543
Growing trust among the Sunnis was an important sign of change. A provincial PRT
leader recalled that in 2007 the head sheikh of the province was abducted by insurgent elements
on his return from the Hajj. When he was in Mecca, he had given an interview for Aljazeera and
stated that Iran was not the enemy, the enemy was the al-Qaeda/ISIS terrorists. He was abducted
by them and killed. Many younger tribe members were agitating for action. They felt that the
U.S. had brought the violence into their province. The Deputy Governor General Abdullah
(brother of the sheikh) and the Governor came, and she met with them. The deputy in particular
was personally saddened by the tragedy. He said he was fighting very hard in the tribe to get
them to cooperate with the U.S. and get them to not take up arms or go over to the insurgents.
She believed his intervention was critical to keeping them from doing that. 544
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It was important to get the Iraqi government on board with the change in Sunni attitudes.
An ambassador working on economic issues said that after violence had declined dramatically in
Anbar by midyear 2007, it was apparent that the provincial government needed additional
funding for development priorities. The violence of the preceding two years meant that it had
not been able to program its development budget allocations, which had expired. Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus appealed to Prime Minister Maliki to allocate a budget
supplemental for Anbar to use that fall to demonstrate the value of violence cessation. Maliki
approved a supplemental allocation of $50 million for urgent projects. To him, this was
significant because the Shia-led government was recognizing that Sunni-led Anbar had suffered
intensely.545 It also demonstrates the value of the American presence in forcing the Iraqi
government to reduce its sectarian tendencies.
A Chief of Staff at the Embassy also recalled working with Maliki’s representatives and
others to help plan the rebuilding of markets, conducting reconstruction, promoting rule of law,
providing benefits proportionately between Sunni and Shia, and thereby synchronizing the
kinetic and non-kinetic aspects of the Baghdad Security Plan. To him, once the Coalition got
into Anbar and got the tribal chiefs to turn, Al-Qaeda could not adapt. 546 This adaptability was
one of the elements of successful counterinsurgency advocated by Gompert. 547
Payoff came in the form of better intelligence and independent tribal activity. A
Psychological Operations leader recalled that what they started to realize when they began
engaging with local tribal leaders was that they were receiving information that was very
effective instead of using the “shotgun approach,” which was just throw a lot of information out
there and see what stuck. He said that even though the U.S. took credit for some actions, the
local leaders actually implemented them. They took action as well as the U.S. 548
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RECONSTRUCTION

Academic literature on counterinsurgency varies regarding the importance of rebuilding
the local economy. Writers such as Paul, Pirnie and O’Connell, and Plakoudas were writers who
looked at economic development as part of a smart-power approach to counterinsurgency. Metz
and others were more skeptical or placed a higher priority on political progress. 549 Friis even
describes some of the unintended consequences of reconstruction efforts in a foreign country
such as loss of relative wealth or influence.550 Most interviewees saw economic development as
an important part of the mission in Iraq during the Surge.
The job of reconstruction was aided by the continued standup of PRTs around the country
as well as improving their abilities. This was made possible by the improvement in security. A
Special Operations commander stated that particularly when you look at the 2007 period the
PRTs could not survive without the military because of the nature of the security environment. 551
A stability operations commander in Baghdad recalled the importance of creating conditions of
stability, going after the causes of instability: sectarian violence, education, sewage water, trash,
all the things that contribute to instability. He felt that they needed quick wins so the people can
see that something can be done to address the Iraqi complaints of “Where is the electricity?”
Those were the short-term gains to create a more stable environment so that the long-term
mechanisms like USAID or the Department of Commerce could be put in place.552 Similarly, a
Marine MTT leader knew that when IED statistics and ISF casualties began dropping
dramatically, everybody who just helped get rid of al-Qaeda would be asking, “We just helped
get rid of these guys. Where’s my fence and water and power and all those other things I should
be benefitting from now that those guys are no longer killing us?” 553
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PRT development was still a work in progress. A Civil Affairs officer detailed to work in
the PRTs differentiated between the types of PRTs:
The provincial PRTs were out developing capacity. The e-PRTs, located in the Baghdad
belt, were project building teams. The brigade commander would have “X” dollars and
they would use that to go around making the sheikhs happy to encourage their support in
the military fight. They gave the sheiks what they wanted, a chicken house, a dam, roads.
The role of the CA teams was to spend the money. The e-PRT teams didn’t have the
governance, rule of law, engineering, and agricultural experts on staff. The provincial
PRTs had Dept of Justice advisors, Dept of Agriculture advisors, engineers, and they
were really successful in expanding capability in a higher-level CA mission. That was
not the focus on the Baghdad e-PRTs. They were smaller and embedded with the BCTs.
They didn’t have a separate location. I helped to staff and train the e-PRTs in my third
year, but they were not PRTs: it would be a mistake to call them that. They were Surge
CA units. They operated with varying levels of success.554
However, he recalled that due to the newness of the PRT concept with State Department:
When we rolled into Tikrit there was no instruction on how to operate a PRT. People
from State who showed up to talk about our mission did not know any more about
operating a PRT than we did. State pulled me out and sent me to Karbala as a senior
advisor and we were starting up whole new PRTs through the south and I again had carte
blanche on designing our capacity building efforts for our Karbala team. If you acted
confident and walked in like you knew what you were doing, everybody said go for it. 555
The advantage of the PRTs is they would give the Coalition greater ability to impact
reconstruction at provincial levels and below. An ambassador leading economic planning at the
Embassy felt the small projects were the right way to go. He preferred seeing less “Bechteldesign megaprojects” and more projects selected with local input if not control. While the
projects may not be perfect from a technical standpoint, from a political one such an approach to
him was much better.556 A Civil Affairs brigade officer similarly felt that the smaller projects
that had better oversight were much more effective than the larger projects. The larger ones
were more prone to corruption, graft and outright theft. He said that when the PRT was running
projects with U.S. civilian government oversight and talking to the tribal leaders and politicians,
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town mayors, etc., there was more of a sense of what they needed than sitting behind the Green
Zone walls saying, “I think they need this or that.” 557
They also served to unify Coalition efforts. An Embassy Chief of Staff felt that
previously they had too disjointed of a strategy, too many competing players, limited
conditionality, etc. To him it was a free for all and he believed they could have accomplished
much more by spending much less.558 A provincial Civil Affairs officer agreed that as the PRTs
were developed in the rest of the country, their mission involved mentoring the Iraqis into
developing their own capabilities to operate their own departments of agriculture, their own
provincial councils, governors and courts, all of which he thought were very effective. 559 An
ambassador working on economic development at the Embassy said that USAID used NGOs for
immediate post-kinetic activities very actively to meet immediate needs such as contracts to pick
up trash which would also provide jobs. 560 A senior USAID official in Iraq during the Surge
described working with the NGOs:
They were integrated into Surge planning at the provincial level. It depended on the
work they were doing and whether there was a downside to them being seen with the
military, U.S., British, Iraqi or whatever. That planning would take place at the level of
the head of the organization or the main person in charge of that area, but not to the
extent that it linked directly to the counterinsurgency effort. There were places where it
had to be linked because active fighting was going on. We coordinated a lot with
commanders on the ground. When they had issues why a certain program was not
working better and they wanted to see more, they would come to me with those issues.
We would try to set up discussion between the military and the people actually managing
the development activities on the ground to try to find the right sweet spot. How would
people who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of soft power view an active support
role with the military. There is a downside to that. Most of the commanders were
sensitive to that and understood where we were going. It helped them understand the
area better if they did have these inroads. The PRTs became “the place it happened.” It
was a formal structure that related to the provincial governments. It was also a place that
USAID implementing organizations could be involved. Coordination did improve; it was
not perfect everywhere. In some places the situation was very difficult and challenging.
On the other hand, some of the best coordinating happened in Anbar, the toughest of all
places. For some reason there was a common view of stabilization. When there was that
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kind of common view of what stabilization meant and what the civilian piece of it could
be and how it would function, it was easier to work together. 561
Civilian-staffed PRTs tended to be more effective at bringing non-government
organizations (NGO) into the effort. An economics planner at the Embassy said that they
contracted with the NGOs and used them to carry out assistance projects. The IRI (International
Republican Institute) and the NDI (National Democratic Institute) did voter and political
training. There were NGOs offering microfinance with U.S. funding. There was a program for
training bureaucrats in making the ministries work better which recruited a lot of Iraqi
Americans from places like Detroit and had them teach from a provincial compound. He felt
that the NGOs had more on-the-ground insight, were in touch with the Iraqis around the country,
and were doing good things.562 A JSPA planner saw the contractors working through USAID as
their link to maintaining visibility on reconstruction.563 All of these benefits would have been
much tougher to achieve working from Baghdad.
There were large funds available to finance the activities of NGOs throughout the
country. As part of the PRTs, there were NGO experts to support those initiatives and national
level programs to strengthen NGO development. There were also 5 regional NGO centers to
target those local initiatives. Another Embassy economics planner emphasized that this effort
began pre-Surge but flowered during the Surge. 564
A senior USAID official pointed out that one advantage of working in Iraq was how
advanced it was. She had never worked in a “middle-class” country with things like well-paved
roads, recalling that Iraq had very good roads. USAID does not normally work in countries that
modern.565 This was an ironic benefit, as an Embassy Chief of Staff pointed out that there was
usually no long-term funding for project maintenance such as roads.566 What the USAID official
did say was a disadvantage was the precarious security environment. During the Surge it was
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important to consider what was possible for the NGOs and civilian contractors to do and not do.
The range of risk-taking varied tremendously across organizations. Never in her career had she
worked with such a large budget with so few organizations implementing the projects. Many of
the most well-known USAID contractors had simply decided they could not work there any
longer. A normal USAID contract for a $150M bid would have any number of bidders. By that
time in Iraq, she might have 2-3 bidders: many NGOs were simply not willing to take on that
level of risk.567
The military side was still heavily dependent on embedded PRTs or e-PRTs, although
they improved their process of incorporating them into the overall strategy. A brigade
commander in Baghdad turned the soft power/Civil Affairs activities into enabling operations
that were synchronized via operations orders and FRAGOs (Fragmentary Orders). To him, in
the past it seems like they had all been done indiscriminate of each other. His intent was to link
the essential services effort formally to the security apparatus, and in so doing best ensure the
success of those essential service activities by 1) auditing them to make sure that what they were
doing was within the scope of the contract they had been awarded and 2) to ensure that whatever
efforts were ongoing were not disrupted by people who did not want those contracts to be
completed.568
Another brigade commander emphasized “What’s the story?” with his unit, the story they
were trying to make sure was emphasized on patrol. The soldiers knew that the Coalition was
working to improve sewage, electricity and trash. But these things cannot be done if there is not
security in the area. They would emphasize that the U.S, had money that can help with opening
markets, area beautification and general improvements. But they could not do those things if
they had to fight; they could do both, but not in the same area. He believed his unit could be
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fixing things in one area while fighting in another: they were that “bipolar.” But they could not
fix and fight in the same place. Security was always the first element of his campaigns. Once
security was established, cooperation was established and rules were understood, then they could
go in and start distributing money for business, helping with power and sewer and water, etc. 569
High value targeting of insurgents continued to utilize Civil Affairs to provide short-term
tactical support. A Special Operations commander said that they often used soft power,
particularly small impact products, as a way to generate good will with leadership that then
turned into an ability to better understand that piece of geography. Whoever he is, tribal sheikh
or mayor, if they brought some sort of beneficial economic development project to his region,
and he was more likely to want to keep that relationship going, and more likely to provide
information on enemy activity and social dynamics in his area. It was a quid pro quo; attractive
power was a way of delivering something seen as beneficial by the local leaders and they would
then respond with things his unit needed to successfully conduct coercive activities as needed. 570
The differences in civilian and military approaches to reconstruction could create conflict
between DoD and DoS. An Embassy Chief of Staff recalled that the military’s CERP funding
could be disruptive if not properly coordinated. 571 A JSPA team leader agreed, saying that
CERP funds could be like “crack.” He specified that a new division commander rotated in and
wanted to spend a lot of money. The Iraqis were not cleaning up the streets, so the commander
wanted to go outside the Iraqi government to hire and get the streets cleaned. The Embassy felt
that at that point in the war the Iraqis needed to be doing things like that so instead they would
bring it up at the Friday meeting, and Prime Minister Maliki would yell at the responsible
minister.572
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The greatest cooperative value was achieved when the Coalition worked together with the
Iraqis. A brigade commander in Baghdad recalled that there was a contract for $120,000 the
U.S. was paying an organization to clean up the streets of Shula. However, if you ever drove
through Shula, rarely would you find anybody cleaning up the streets of Shula. Once he found
out who the contractors were by tying the process to the security apparatus, his unit could link up
at the combat outposts strategically placed throughout the city and say, “Hey contractor, here is
Mr. Company Commander, and you are going to leave tomorrow morning from this location,
and you will be cleaning blocks A, B and C in accordance with your contract, and you will be
working starting at 0630.”573
He was also able to employ attractive power to enable coercive power. He recalled that if
they could demonstrate that secular female business owners had opened women’s dress shops in
Yarmuk for the first time in 5 years, were thriving, and the Coalition could protect it from people
that wanted to shut it down, that information moved furiously, to the point that people in say
Qadra would come to his forces and say, “How can we open up a shop?” His unit would respond
that information on insurgents in their area was necessary. He believed that they could not have
had that relationship if they had not been living in the cities and fighting alongside the ISF and
their volunteers. A permanent presence was required for casual conversations to unfold
naturally. No meeting ever starts off with business, as he remembered it had to start with “the
cups of tea and casual conversation.” 574
According to a stability operations commander in Baghdad, the continued presence
associated with build efforts was the U.S.-led structure of military soft power. PRTs would
deploy to those areas as the U.S. got some degree of security in them. The number of PRTs
multiplied exponentially during 2007-2008 for that reason. As they were gaining control, they
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needed more continuous presence and commitment of other US government agencies beyond
DoD. The partnership with USAID and the Iraqi government began to kick in, even in areas
where the Iraqis were in charge. He remembered one example of the road heading out to the
west toward Ramadi that was primarily cleared by ISF. Alongside of it was the famous Gulf
War “baby milk factory.” The Coalition wanted to get that factory back to producing actual
baby milk. He was part of reconstructing it, getting new equipment and getting the baby milk
factory started inside an ISF-controlled area.575
Local challenges could hinder the process. A Marine Corps MTT leader in the west told
a story about a glass factory that needed a spool of copper wire to restart production in Iraq. It
was a big deal for a long time. The last thing they needed was copper wire of a thick enough
gauge to run from the main power line to the power plant. The Civil Affairs (CA) guys had
rolled it to a fence to keep it in a safe area. The fence line they rolled it to was adjacent to the
compound of the 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army division. They got bolt cutters, unspooled the entire
wire, cut it into segments, melted it into ingots, and got it out of there before anyone knew
anything. That lesson learned early on about how pilferable supplies were put the CA teams on
alert and forced them to develop a robust tracking and reception methodology. He said that it
ruined nearly a whole year’s worth of work when that copper wire was stolen. 576
One of the most controversial reconstruction organizations was the Task Force for
Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) described in Chapter Four. It was a DoD
organization with a large budget that did not have to operate under many of the restrictions that
handicapped the Embassy. A Marine Corps economics planner at MNC-I recalled the push by
the TFBSO, also known as the Brinkley Group after its leader Paul Brinkley, to revive the stateowned enterprises and make that the source of employment. He thought it failed because there is
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a difference between the effect of a private or public sector job on willingness to join the
insurgency. If you are working in the private sector it builds a limited kind of loyalty. He was
surprised that during the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad employees came to defend their
employer’s light machine or retail shop because they realized that if the shop was closed or
burned out, they would be out of a job. However, if you work for a state-owned enterprise or a
ministry, you know that even if the ministry is burned out or the factory is destroyed, you are still
going to get a paycheck. Second, he believed that in the public sector your loyalty is not to Iraq,
but it is to whomever got you that job: uncle, religious or tribal leader, perhaps even a member of
the insurgency. Interrogations indicated that a significant number of the insurgents were
receiving a government paycheck. They were working for SoEs (state-owned enterprises) or the
ministries Monday through Friday and planting IEDs on the weekend, or there were ghost
workers who showed up once a month to get paid and give half to whomever got them the job. 577
On the other hand, TFBSO efforts did reopen many businesses in Iraq. To a senior
member of the TFBSO, they were coming in and opening factories, giving people back their
jobs. The local media would “go nuts,” because it was a big story. “They’re reopening the Beiji
fertilizer factory finally!” They tried very much to let the local Iraqi leadership like the Deputy
Governor be “the face.”578 A stability operations commander in Baghdad remembered going
with Mr. Brinkley and some U.S. Congressmen on a trip to reactivate a rug-weaving factory. It
was using old-fashioned hand-weaving making beautiful, brilliant rugs in the ancient Sumerian
tradition of rugmaking. The factory was intact and in perfect condition, but they did not feel
secure enough and lacked the monetary resources to get started. What he saw was the Iraqi
system begin to come back to life as, along with the Brinkley Group, the military helped to
reactivate supply chains, internal and external.579
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One of the leaders of the Brinkley Group gave his opinion on the situation in Iraq:
It was an irony because we were all actual people who had worked in capitalism. We
were not communists. We had people who had never worked in the private sector in their
lives attacking us like we were some sort of Stalinist reinforcement of the Ba’athist
socialist regime. It was so absurd. Our whole point was that these factories employed
thousands of people. They want their jobs back. They wanted to privatize these things.
The way to privatize any industry is to have it up and running and efficient and operating,
and then you bring people in who will buy it. No one buys an empty factory full of dustcovered equipment that has been sitting idle for three years. We made that clear every
step of the way when we were opening these operations. At the end of the day, we did
not care about selling. Our top priority was counterinsurgency. We needed to get local
communities back to normal. Store is secured, I am going back to work. Kids are going
back to school. Life is back to normal. Three years out of work, we had to get people
back to a normal life and show them that America has not come to make their lives a
living hell because that was what they thought. We were clear that our strategy was to
transition these operations and privatize them over time. We did that. A lot of the most
compelling ones such as cement operations and some metal processing plants were
privatized and are still in operation. The process was underway and accelerating when
we were shut down in 2011. A lot of these operations we were able to privatize early
were in safe areas, not high risk. Companies like Lafarge (now LafargeHolcim) bought
two of the big cement plants. There was a big phosphate plant that was purchased. We
helped propel the tenders out publicly for that. 580
He felt that the TFBSO worked well with USAID. What he thought devastated them was
moving USAID from being a separate agency to being under the State Department, right in the
middle of the Surge. Over time State put them into the DSS model for security and they were
moved inside the Embassy compound and that compound they built was abandoned. When that
happened, he felt the USAID mission collapsed. NGO engagements collapsed with it because all
of that was through USAID. He thought that the TFBSO relationship with USAID was OK for a
year and then new USAID people came in and joined the chorus of those saying, “Who are these
assholes from DoD out there doing this?”581
An MNF-I planner felt that a particularly valuable TFBSO contribution was bringing in a
consulting firm. The firm would ask where the experts were and were told in the ministries.
When they went to the ministries, they found that they were primarily junior officials because

264
most of the senior ones took their pensions and left so they would not become a target. GrantThornton employed them as consultants. They understood the Iraqi system of governance under
the still-existing ministries and became worth their weight in gold. It was a $14M contract. An
issue in 2007-2008 was getting a ministry in the Iraqi government that had $20B to spend to pick
up the $14M contract because it was proving to be worthwhile. That was “in competition” with
the typical State Department and USAID processes. But they learned to make use of it. He said
that the Buy Iraqi First program of the TFBSO cost in the single-digit billions, which to him was
a bargain compared to the cost of 200,000 Americans and contractors that were supported in
Iraq.582
As the security situation in Iraq improved, more progress toward returning society to
routine functioning could be made. Improvement would not be linear: there were fits and starts
as opportunities to engage in non-insurgent crime and other issues became available.
Nonetheless many interviewees felt a change in the local environment for the better.
Signs of progress began to be seen. A stabilization operations commander in Baghdad
said that the build phase had to begin when the clearing is beginning, or even before, so that the
humans that live there can feel that change is coming and happening right now. They can now
come out and talk about the few insurgents remaining in the neighborhood. The walls come up,
their kids can come back out. The sounds of children playing inside those areas again was to
him the sound of progress, as well as the sound of construction material and equipment being put
into place. All those things were the sound of progress, that is what it would look like to him.
The build would begin early and be sustained throughout.583
A JSPA team leader talked about chlorine delivery which had slowed down in late 2006
but was required for clean water. Street cleaning and opening markets were seen as a big deal.
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It was stressful all along, but he remembered feeling a sense of progress. Things such as street
openings, whether the T-walls would come down and if it was safe to do that. Cooking oil
deliveries and foodstuffs were important in early 2008.584 An MNF-I planner recalled that Iraqi
oil production was ticking up. He said that the number of satellite antennas on rooftops in what
had been a police state a year before was stunning. By 2007-2008 he remembered seeing a
shopping bazaar in Erbil where there were so many satellite dishes on the roof it made him worry
for the roof.585
Little things mattered. A stability operations commander said that in some places they
were buying paint, which would seem like a very minor element of rebuilding. Someone had
once said to him, “Never underestimate the power of paint.” He thought it was a funny tonguein-cheek point until they began to deliberately plan for where they wanted painting to occur. 586
Routine improvements were found to help restore a sense of normalcy to the population.
A Marine Corps MTT leader talked about the “palpable” differences between pre and
post-Awakening Ramadi and on the east side of the city. It had been largely walled off before
then with long lines at the checkpoints so people could get to the smallest markets to do any
trading, but now it was a much more open city. They could not bulldoze their way through the
streets anymore: they had to be attentive to traffic and politely find their way through. Markets
were open, shops were reopening. On patrol with their Iraqi counterparts they could dismount,
change dollars to dinars and have lunch at the local bazaar. That was the presence that was there,
almost the kind of community policing he had hoped for in the end. By the time he left, the team
he turned over to had “nothing to do in Ramadi but build the force.” 587
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LEVEL OF INFLUENCE

Metz talked about the U.S. problem of assuming that the normal state of affairs is for a
country to control all of its territory. 588 This construct hurt the U.S. during the early stages of
Iraq because it tried to implement centralized control over Iraq, sparking the Sunni insurgency
and setting off the sectarian conflict whose spike in violence led the U.S. to initiate the Surge.
Along with Metz, writers such as Marston, Plakoudas, Branch and Wood, and Paul advocate the
importance of conducting counterinsurgency at the lowest levels of the population possible.
An important smart power element of the Surge was trying to wean Iraq off of the
centralized leadership that had dominated it since its inception. Chapter Seven will explore the
paradox that Afghanistan had the opposite problem, not enough central government control. The
key asset for this was the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Ambassador Crocker talked
about some of the nuances of the PRTs:
Some PRTs had excellent relations with the governor’s office and used those
relationships to bring Iraqis into the process. I would have to say that when you make
that kind of civilian Surge with PRTs in a lot of different places around the case, often
staffed with folks who didn’t really know much about Iraq, it is essentially a foreign
element. It is not organically part of an Iraqi process. Think small and think modest.
Try to figure out where you can make a lasting difference, and that means doing a lot
more listening than talking to figure out where we might have a sustainable, positive
effect for the long term.589
An ambassador leading economic devleopment during the Surge agreed. To him, it
really was not about the reconstruction programs they did, but about how they picked them:
which bridge to rebuild, which road to pave, which buildings in a community to fix. Was it the
district bigwig saying “I want my mayor’s office fixed” or was it a community-based
organization that came together to develop a solution.590 An advisor to the stability program at
the Embassy and a PRT leader in the north both described the $500 million local governance
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program to help provincial leaders do planning, budgeting and execution of programs supporting
the delivery of essential services at the local level to prepare them for the eventuality of
provincial budgets drawn from Iraq’s oil revenues, which took place soon after, and coordinate
with the capital budgets of the national ministries. 591
An MNF-I planner described the PRTs as helpful to lower levels of governance in
helping them understand how to hold a council, how to nominate projects, how to make sure they
were not too corrupt, that the money gets paid on time, etc. 592 A commander in the north agreed,
saying they used the district advisory council to provide them with the list of potential projects.
Microgrant applicants were sent to the district council building to request and collect the money.
The idea was to get the locals to believe that their local government was working for them, train
the officials on how to do their jobs, and hopefully provide some economic benefit. Corruption
was still an issue: he heard that some district council members received kickbacks for guiding
the U.S. to their favored projects. 593
Similarly, a Treasury official working in Diyalah Province believed that the military
people working with the government did not understand enough of how the banking system and
finance worked to know if they were being honestly dealt with. There had been a big battle in
Baqubah, and the issue was timing. The local bank had received the cash for payment to farmers
and for social services. This had happened right before the battle, so the bank could not get to
the money, even though the money was secure. They wanted another batch of cash to make their
payments, and the central bank said no. When she went there, she recalled that the bank was
pretty torn up, including a pile of rubble in front of the safe that kept them from opening it.
Eventually they got the additional money with the help of the civilian experts. 594

268
Some local areas adapted faster than others. The PRT leader in Salah al-Din Province
told people Salah al-Din was a special place because it had a strong insurgent contingent because
most of the former regime leadership was from Salah al-Din as well as al-Qaeda/ISIS. Salah alDin was more violent than Anbar or Baghdad, according to her roughly half the attacks with only
a fifth of the population. But once stability was reestablished, they had a wealth of expertise
available to put to work because Salah al-Din was where most of the Saddam-era national level
government officials had been drawn from. 595 Another bridging piece provided by the PRTs was
bringing the provincial governors, particularly from the Sunni provinces, to Baghdad to meet
with the Iraqi leadership and U.S. government officials. The local PRT leader would accompany
the governor down to Baghdad and go through the meetings with him. That created a connection
between the province and central government that he believed had never really existed before. 596
Better military cooperation enabled better PRT efforts. A brigade Civil Affairs officer in
the north recalled that the local U.S. commander pushed a lot more soft power, in-person
partnering with the PRT and his element, meeting with the governor and local leaders in the
province to talk. To him, they were very supportive of the projects that were going on.597 At the
same time, one brigade commander felt that the tribal leadership was not as influential as he
hoped as a positive enabler to our operations. An example he gave was when one of the Special
Operations raids killed a woman and her daughter and maimed a young boy when a flash-bang
was thrown into the room. The post-event interaction between the commander and the tribal
leaders was able to defuse the situation. The Coalition did the condolence payments and the
tragic event never surfaced again. The tribal leaders were effective in that sense. As far as
denouncing violence and getting toward a theme of nationalism, he believed that that was more
difficult with the tribal leaders. 598
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A stability operations commander in Baghdad remembered that all of the districts had
councils and he would meet with them. The Coalition would provide them with paint and
brushes, and they would begin to beautify key streets. One that was perhaps most significant to
him was Haifa Street in central Baghdad, which had seen tremendous fighting. The fighting had
been stabilized by Coalition and ISF and they were now doing the “hold and build” parts of the
counterinsurgency strategy of “clear, hold and build.” He believed that “build” must begin while
“clear” is ongoing and sustained through “hold” and then becomes the primary effort if stability
is achieved. They needed a combat force that was equipped and organized to help the locals
begin to do things like paint Haifa Street, put plants back into the street, put up playgrounds
again, let children play, and reopen markets. 599
A PRT team leader in the north described her experience:
I was very close to the deputy governor and governor and worked with them all the time.
The very first meeting I had with the Iraqis was with the deputy governor. I tell people it
was like they picked him out of central casting: former brigadier general, devout Muslim,
Ba’athist. Here I am, former Peace Corps, I am not touching any weapons, I am a
pacifist. At that first meeting he was very direct and said, ‘You are military occupiers,
we want you out of our country.’ I said, ‘we want to go too, so let’s work together so we
can get out of here faster.’ He and I became very close, and I worked with him all the
time.
A financial advisor working with the TFBSO said that you can do the grand gestures,
building bridges or giving every woman in the village a goat, but teaching people how to do their
jobs better was what made the Surge effective, and was a lot of what it was about.600
Big projects attract big headlines. They also attract mismanagement, corruption and
insurgent attacks. Robinson and de Tray both believed that smaller level projects and assistance
are more effective. Interacting with Iraqis on a personal level often had the most lasting and
positive impact.601
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One true success was the work done by the TFBSO in cooperation with the Treasury
Department to modernize the Iraqi financial system. A contractor with extensive experience as a
banking supervisor working with the Brinkley Group was there working on payment systems.
U.S. Treasury wanted an electronic payment system with a company that would not come into
the country, so she ended up being the person intervening between them and the central bank and
facilitated their bringing their equipment. 602 She found both Christian and Muslim females
working at the bank. They had 500 women in their employ who did nothing but count money.
They had some of the machines that could count 100 bills, but these were inadequate for the task.
On the positive side, it was a way for women to be employed safely and could provide for their
families because most of their husbands, fathers or brothers were dead. The Central Bank was
interesting to her because 80-85% of the employees were female. Men could not sit in the room
with the women alone, but she could sit anywhere she wanted to. 603
The system in question was known as an RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlements) system.
The Brinkley Group in coordination with the Treasury Department, which was paying for it,
sourced the Iraqi who put the system in. It was put in while she was there, and according to her
it ran great. RTGS usually works with high-dollar items, not settlements. The ultimate object
was to reduce the amount of cash payment and dollarization in the economy. She believes it is
still in place.604
With her work she saw a lot of people being able to conduct commerce and do the things
they needed to do, making that part of the Surge a positive to her. Many of the women she
worked with at the Central Bank had been deeply affected by the war. As things economically
improved, that effect was reduced. She stated that Iraq is a rich country and if the Central Bank
were still operating in the same place they would be doing better, but it burned down three times.
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Part of the problem was a distribution issue. There might be “tons” of money sitting in the
Central Bank but if you can’t get it out, it is no good. Being able to support financial mediation
was good. She recalled them as a very conservative central bank in comparison to some of the
central banks she had worked with. It was all new leadership because anyone who had had
leadership in the old bank was Ba’athist. When she went into the Central Bank in 2004 the
women did not know how to use Excel. She was amazed that she was being paid a lot of money
to teach people how to use Excel to their advantage. You cannot sell treasury bills without
Excel, you cannot manage a reserve requirement without Excel, you cannot do any of that.
However, they all had high school educations, and some had college. 605
Similar systems upgrading occurred in other areas as well. A PRT leader in the north
recalled that there were people working on the budget that were still using hand-written ledgers.
Her team put in a simple Excel spreadsheet that revolutionized the process of tracking where the
money went and how projects were distributed by type (such as education, water, health, etc) and
location.606

EMPOWERMENT

As discussed earlier, Schifrin felt that the Surge itself increased Iraqi belief that the
Americans were serious about stabilizing Iraq and willing to commit resources to make that
happen. Bringing Iraqis at all levels back into the process had to happen for long-term Coalition
goals to be achievable. Plakoudas believed that neither insurgents nor counterinsurgents can
succeed without local support. 607 Olson Lounsbery and Pearson went into extensive detail about
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the need for agreements acceptable to all parties in the conflict in order to achieve success in
“peacebuilding.”608
Multiple interviewees stated that creating a stable security environment was a means to
the end of putting the Iraqis back in charge of their country and enabling normalization of the
political, economic, and cultural functions the country possessed. As will be discussed in
Chapter Nine, Iraq was different from Afghanistan which had little national governance
structure. Iraq had infrastructure and people trained in employing it. The challenge was putting
them back to work and getting them to perform their jobs in an efficient, non-sectarian manner.
An MNF-I planner bluntly said that in the end it is their country: they “do not get to leave after a
year.”609
A PRT team leader described the situation in more detail:
I went to Iraq in September 2003 for a long weekend as an effort by State Department to
assist the Iraqis. I took a group of current and former foreign ministers and ministers of
finance from the former Soviet Union. People like the Serbian Finance Minister, the
former Russian Foreign Minister. I took them to Iraq for a three-day conference to meet
with Iraqi officials. At the time we thought the biggest problem was going to be
transitioning Iraq to a market economy. It was fascinating what the conversations were
about. Two things stood out. An Iraqi gentleman who had been head of the Customs
Union before the sanctions said that their customs union procedures were the envy of the
region. They had been destroyed partly by Saddam Hussein and partly by the sanctions.
Another participant said that Iraq and Italy had the same GDP in 1971. He said that
people will say, ‘That is terrible, what happened?’ Instead, they should be saying, ‘They
were the same in 1971: they were capable of achieving that and could have done much
more.610
A brigade Civil Affairs officer had learned that counterinsurgency or not, when the U.S.
is the occupying country, it needed to treat people as humans.611 At the same time, a PRT leader
felt that Foreign Service training in the U.S. tends to mistake politeness with respect. The leader
felt that although interactions must be polite and civil, you can still respectfully disagree with
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people.612 A planner at MNC-I said it was hard to tie everything together because it had to be an
Iraqi plan, but it was easier to do it through the U.S. chain of authority. 613
The Surge helped foster the conditions needed to rebuild Iraq. Interviewees talked about
the psychological impact the Surge had on the Iraqis, changing their strategic calculus as they
began to truly believe that the U.S. wanted to put them first and let them “take the lead.” As a
result they became more willing to engage with the U.S. and pursue mutual objectives. It was as
much as anything the evolution of a relationship. 614
Many senior members of the Coalition regularly interacted with the Iraqi leadership. An
MNF-I planner was part of the group including General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker who
met weekly with Prime Minister Maliki, the Iraqi National Security Advisor and other senior
officials. He recalled that they would talk about both hard and soft power issues. 615 Similarly, an
Ambassador who was a senior economic planner met 2-3 times per week with Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister for Economics, as well as the Finance Minister and other ministers. His role and
seniority allowed him to talk about budget execution, ideas to propose or people from
Washington to introduce.616 A senior USAID official met with her primary liaisons 2-3 times a
week as well as leaders from many ministries, sometimes accompanied by the Ambassador if the
Ambassador had an issue with a minister. 617
A JSAT planner recalled meeting several times a week with the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi National Security Council, some with the Ministry of Oil or the
Ministry of Education. There were two objectives. One was trying to find out what the Iraqis
wanted to do and were doing. The other was to attempt some persuasion to get them to do what
the U.S. wanted them to do. That was a continuous problem throughout the effort. The key issue
was to build capacity, but to him it was never well-defined if capacity was what they wanted to
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do or what the U.S. wanted them to do. 618 An MNF-I planner recalled that the Deputy Prime
Minister in the Maliki government was Barham Salih, who later became the President of the
Kurdistan Regional Government. He was a U.K. citizen with a PhD in economics from a U.K.
university. He became the “go-to guy” for the Coalition because he did not have the Sunni
Arab/Shia concerns.619
A Civil Affairs officer working in a PRT described his growing relationship with the
brother of a key advisor to Grand Ayatollah Sistani. He recalled that they even invited him to
visit the mosques, but there was a formal agreement that the U.S. would not go anywhere near
the mosques. He had to go to the Embassy to get the Ambassador’s permission, who agreed that
he could go. The biggest concern was that he would be taken hostage. He joked that the rule
was that if he died that was OK, but they did not want to have an American hostage. 620 A JSAT
planner for the Embassy remembered that he learned a few words of Arabic and benefited. He
recalled meeting with the Deputy Commander of the Badr Corps. He said he used his “3 or 4”
words of Arabic, and the commander said, “Oh it’s so good that you know Arabic.” At the
meeting, was a diplomat with a PhD from an Arabic University, he is a 5/5 speaker, 621 and “no
one cares.” The fact that he was even trying gets more credit than someone who is accomplished
at it. He said that like the three cups of tea in Afghanistan, he had to take a more circuitous route
to get to his point and get cooperation. 622
Surprising insights sometimes came from closer cooperation. A PRT leader recalled an
interesting interaction with the principal sheikh for Saddam Hussein’s tribe. Their meeting ran
into prayer time. The PRT leader told him there was a prayer room in the back if he wanted to
go pray. The “sheikh” said no but asked if he had a whisky. Even though he was wearing the
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traditional clothing of a religious leader, the PRT leader learned that it was about listening and
figuring out where the Iraqis were coming from. 623
Coalition members also gained greater fidelity in their areas of interest. A stability
operations commander remembered that as they began to listen to the tribal and district councils
and became much more precise in the help they were providing they were able to use intelligence
to know if we were going into an area where the council was influenced by militias or Sunni
extremist tribes versus someone who was really trying to get the situation stabilized. 624 To an
Embassy Chief of Staff, soft power included getting Iraqis to spend funds in a non-sectarian
manner.625
Several interviewees worked with the surprising challenge of getting the Iraqis to spend
their money. An ambassador working economics at the Embassy said that the whole budget
execution effort was about helping the Iraqis spend their own money, which was why he went so
often to see the Finance Minister. Part of the budget execution problem was the shortcomings of
the Iraqi bureaucracy. The U.S. wanted them to spend $2B a year on infrastructure projects but
they had no capacity to move that much money that quickly. He remembered a colleague saying
that the war was really a series of three-month wars in which the U.S. was always looking to turn
things around in the next quarter. 626 Another ambassador at the Embassy agreed, saying that
many times the problem was not lack of resources, it was getting the Iraqis to execute. Their
experience under an authoritarian regime meant that it was hard to get people to make decisions
below the top. Officials less than a minister did not want to sign any piece of paper, which he
said does not work when the goal is a functioning structure of government. 627 An MNF-I
planner said that the 2003 Iraqi reconstruction fund was appropriated a total $18.3 billion, and
there were economic support funds managed through State Department and CERP totaling about
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$22 billion. Most of this had already been spent by the time of the Surge. By 2007 the oil
money the Iraqis had to spend was around $20 billion per year and growing. 628 Iraqi income at
that point far outstripped U.S. contributions.
Trying to ensure proper funding allocation was also an education issue in Iraq. A
Treasury representative working at the Embassy described trying to get the Iraqi budget passed
on time, a Treasury Department policy priority. A member of the Multi-National Security
Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) told her that she needed to stop the budget. She sent
him away. The next day someone else from that office showed up from that office and repeated
the request: she told him to get out of her office. Then a third, even more senior person showed
up, so she figured this was important to them and asked what they wanted to do. MNSTC-I
wanted to take money out of the non-security side of the budget and add it to the defense budget
to create a housing program and a make work program to discourage young men from joining the
bad guys. She asked if this was buying security. He said yes. She told him it had to come out of
their budget because it did not meet any of Treasury’s policy priorities: further, they had not
asked the other ministries if they wanted to give this much money up. Later the Treasury
Attaché showed her a letter from MNSTC-I he received informing the Embassy and Treasury
office that Generals Dempsey and Petraeus had met with the Prime Minister and they had
changed the Defense Ministry budget to fund their items. She did not feel it met the security
objective, but they were able to get the budget passed on time. 629
Various forms of Iraqi mismanagement remained an issue. A PRT leader talked about
the TFBSO providing a mechanism for bringing important business representatives of the U.S. to
Iraq, but absent the Iraqis themselves making the reforms that draw investment, and absent Iraq
efforts to stem corruption, he was skeptical that it had the desired effect, which he felt was
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ultimately to blame on the Iraqis. 630 An MNF-I planner would be asked why this province had
18 hours of power per day and Baghdad only had 12? He recalled that when he flew over the
country at night in helicopters there was no lack of electricity because they were leaving their
outside lights on. He said that it wasn’t until about 2008-2009 before they got better at asking
questions of the Iraqi people rather than asking the ministry about the hours of power in Basra.
They learned to ask how much electricity they had and where they got it? Were they getting it
from the grid, or a neighborhood generator, or a personal one? There were thousands of small
generators in Iraq: what they needed was diesel. These were different questions from asking if
they were satisfied with the free electricity they were supposed to be getting: the answer of
course was no. As another example, a CERP project would give a factory a generator which they
said would get them to work. The Coalition bought one for them, then the factory still wasn’t
working. He would ask why, and the owner would say that the ministry was not providing them
the raw materials they needed. It really was not the generator, although he knew it was being
used. He took pictures of Iraqi wiring in the streets running from local generators to nearby
houses. It was the same with gasoline. SOMO was the state oil marketing organization, whose
job was to sell the oil Iraq was to produce, and they were the marketing arm. Gas was a penny a
gallon. By 2004-2005 the Coalition was still reporting there was no gasoline, but since liberation
a million cars had been imported. With an artificial price comes a black market. He said that
600-700 trucks pulled up every day at the Beiji refinery. The SOMO stations were not getting
oil, but the black-market price for gas in Iraq was the same as it was in Turkey and Kuwait.
Thus the trucks were selling the gas behind a building somewhere. He humorously recalled that
in 2006 the people who had drawing rights to the fuel all had the same first name, Sheikh. 631
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Sometimes the Americans simply had to adjust to the Iraqi way of doing things. An
ambassador leading economic planning recalled that about 2-3 weeks after the “Charge of the
Knights,” Prime Minister Maliki and many of the ministers were still in Basra. The ambassador
was sent down along with a military counterpart to ask the Prime Minister if they needed the
Coalition to do any re-tasking of our assistance projects in Basra as a result of events. There
were a large number of sheikhs also in the palace at the time. Maliki talked to them first. As he
was being escorted to see the PM, he saw that every one of the Sheikhs was carrying a brandnew briefcase on the way out that they did not seem to have had on the way in. That was how
the Iraqi government did tribal engagement. It was a benefit to the sheikhs for having met with
the Prime Minister.632
Some of the Iraqis appreciated the value of the American presence in their country and
anticipated it would be ephemeral. A Civil Affairs officer working in a PRT described the
following scene:
I was in Tikrit in the governance building and I had an awesome translator. He says,
‘come with me.’ We went to the big theater in the government center and its packed with
sheikhs. It looks like an Indiana Jones movie: the room was full of them. I stepped in
being the only American and dressed in BDUs (Battle Dress Uniform) and armed. The
deputy prime minister is at the front of the room. My guy is translating for me. The
deputy prime minister is giving them hell. His lecture was awesome. He was saying,
‘You better recognize that the Americans are not your enemy. They aren’t staying: they
are going to leave. You need to take advantage of their presence to get the best deal we
can before they’re gone because they’re your best friends.’ He said that he knows that
the sheiks were thinking that these infidels, we don’t need them. ‘Let me tell you about
Islamic piety.’ He reached in his pocket and pulled out a piece of paper and said, ‘Do
you know what this is? There was the Islamic Conference (somewhere in the Near East)
last month. We paid the whole bill for the Iraqis in attendance, including this one. You
know what this one is? This is a liquor bill! Don’t tell me about Muslim piety. You’re
just the same as them: you love your booze; you just won’t show it. You better carry the
ball now because when these guys are gone, things aren’t going to be so good.633
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A stability operations commander in Baghdad recalled the change from American to Iraqi
leadership. At one of the last reconstruction meetings he chaired there had been a new Deputy
Minister for Reconstruction position created. With it several members of provinces with whom
the U.S. worked now had a presence at the table. It had gone from being a purely military
meeting with a couple of Iraqis in the room to primarily Iraqi with the Americans off to the sides
He thought this was a phenomenal morphing in only several months. There was now a deputy
minister who was essentially his counterpart and sat right beside him. The last thing he did was
to hand full control over to the minister. 634

CONCLUSION

Interviewees saw security as a prerequisite for the attractive power activities needed to
put Iraq back on a track toward growth. They could actually travel about the country and work
more closely with Iraqi leadership to explain to the citizens what was being done and why.
Growth was important as stability was restored, because Iraqis being convinced to cease
sectarian militia activities needed to have an alternative way to make a living. Jobs and a
political voice were seen as an important part of that alternative.
PRTs played a major role in weaning Iraq off the centralized decision-making style that
had characterized the Saddam regime. Decision-making was pushed down to more local levels
and gave Iraqis a greater voice in determining the direction they wanted their province or city to
take. This enabled reconstruction projects that better reflected what the Iraqis wanted rather than
what the Americans thought they needed. Increased oil revenues helped make more funds
available, to the point that the challenge was occasionally getting the Iraqis to spend it. Overall

280
the trend moved toward increased employment and growth throughout the economic sector of
Iraq.
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CHAPTER IX
SURGE INTERVIEWEE RETROSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

Interviewees were asked several retrospective questions regarding the Surge, providing
them an open-ended opportunity to reflect upon their experiences and the potential learning
value. Some of the interviewees answered one or more of the questions in great detail, often
relating them to personal experiences after the Surge. Both military and civilian interviewees
had a number of interesting insights they had learned, with many shared opinions regarding their
experiences.
Interviewees were asked if they believed the Surge produced long-term benefits, and why
or why not. Almost all felt it produced benefits for the Iraqis, although some felt the benefits
were short-term in nature. Many of the short-term responses felt that the benefits of the Surge
had the potential to be long term but offered several reasons why this did not turn out to be the
case. For some, regardless of how subsequent events in Iraq played out the world is still a better
place for having done the Surge. Interestingly, Iraq Surge participants who went to Afghanistan
for the subsequent surge there were far more likely to consider the Iraqi Surge successful than
those who did not go to Afghanistan.
Interviewees were asked what soft power lessons they learned from the Surge. The most
common answer would fall into the category of the need to do smart power. Both military and
civilians by and large agreed that reconstruction and political progress were impossible to
achieve in an unsettled security environment. They also emphasized the importance of working
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with and listening to the local population. They talked about the importance of personalities and
working to overcome structural shortcomings which remained even after the change to a more
cooperative posture.
Interviewees were asked if the lessons of the Surge were applicable to other or future
conflicts. Most said yes, many caveated it with the good schoolhouse answer “it depends.”
Many believed small wars are going to be more prevalent in the future than large ones.
Afghanistan provided an instant opportunity for many Surge veterans from both Defense and
State to employ their lessons learned, which they found had degrees of success less than they had
hoped for.

IN-PROGRESS REVIEW

In-progress review (IPR) is a military term for regularly analyzing how events unfold
during the course of an operation and making necessary changes to future operations. It allows
leadership to adjust original planning and expectations to achieve desired objectives.
In July of 2008 MNF-I published a document titled “Multi-National Force-Iraq
Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” 635 The three-page non-classified document is
signed by General Petraeus. It serves as an interesting opportunity to see how MNF-I evaluated
its actions and made appropriate adjustments.
In some ways it is a condensed version of FM 3-24. It contains many of the ideas
captured in the field manual. Coercive power is important. It talks about utilizing all assets to
defeat the insurgency to provide security and protect the population. Unity of effort and
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cooperation are important, along with spending and reconstruction. Initiative and adaptability
are emphasized. All these are similar to ideas addressed in FM 3-24.
One interesting difference is that Sons of Iraq are mentioned three different times in the
MNF-I guidance. As has been seen, Sons of Iraq was an initiative developed by the Coalition to
put Sunni militias on the counterinsurgency payroll to fight against al-Qaeda and other extremist
insurgent elements. It was not welcomed by the Maliki government and often bypassed them
with payment going directly to the militia elements being led by local Sunni sheikhs. This was a
source of friction between the Coalition and the Shia-dominated Iraqi government that
delegitimized the government.
FM 3-24 devotes a full chapter to developing host nation security forces. It does
recognize the possible existence of sectarian divisions within the security forces, and correctly
observes that most host nation governments will resist recruiting disaffected ethnic groups into
their security forces.

It even cautions that ethnic discrimination by security forces can occur

against the population. However, it does not advocate for recruiting and maintaining security
utilizing host nation elements not under governmental control. It lists security elements as
including military, police, corrections personnel and border guards, not militias. Thus, it would
not be expected to incorporate Shia or Sunni militias in Iraq into the government security effort.
A theme continually emphasized throughout FM 3-24 is the need for operations to
enhance host nation government legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. It says that success
requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of “that uncommitted middle.” It
says that the counterinsurgency forces must work with host nation ministries responsible for
national and internal security. It advocates for establishing “Home Guard” units but defines
them as local security forces under host nation governmental control.
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Sons of Iraq was considered so critical to success in Iraq that it is mentioned no less than
three times in the MNF-I guidance, even though it goes against the grain of FM 3-24’s advice
regarding host nation control of the use of force and fostering their legitimacy. Why the major
change?
FM 3-24 acknowledges that a country may suffer from sectarian differences so severe
that it can impact efforts to establish stability. However, it still seems to carry a degree of
assumption that the host nation government will make some effort toward cooperation with
opposing religious or ethnic groups. After it states that host nation governments will probably
resist recruiting disaffected minorities into the security forces, it then holds out the hope that
even moderate efforts to do so will provide enormous payoffs. There seems to be an element of
wishful thinking that perseverance will produce success, a failure to recognize that there are
some governments that are simply not amenable to cooperation with minority groups they may
have battled with for decades or even centuries.
This had become a substantial problem by 2007. The Maliki government continually
dragged its feet on bringing Sunnis into the armed forces. Interviewees have talked about the
proclivity for the Iraqi government to replace competent Sunni leaders with Shia loyalists,
further alienating the Sunnis. There was little effort to create a sense of unity among Iraqi
security forces. At that point there was no realistic expectation that they could stabilize the
country other than through severe repression in Sunni-held areas. Because the Kurds had an
established and capable security force in the peshmerga, they were more insulated from Shia
efforts to marginalize non-Shia Iraqis.
On the other hand one can say that MNF-I was following the guidance of FM 3-24. It
does say that successful counterinsurgents need to be adaptable. General Petraeus saw the
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success of the Anbar Awakening in western Iraq and believed it could be replicated in and
around Baghdad. He needed to separate the warring factions and give the Sunnis some form of
security. Since the Iraqi government refused to provide it to the Sunnis, he likely felt he had
little choice but to circumvent official channels and work directly with the Sunnis to meet their
security needs.
Ironically, the end result closely resembled the warning of FM 3-24 that a desired end
state for security forces is that they be sustainable by the host nation after U.S. and multinational
forces depart. Although the capability to do so existed, the willingness of the Maliki government
to do so did not. This caused a break between the Sunnis and the central government that
contributed to the rise of ISIS in western Iraq and Syria after 2011 when U.S. ground forces
departed Iraq by agreement with the Iraqi government.

DID THE SURGE PRODUCE BENEFITS?

General Petraeus was asked how much of a breathing space he had hoped to accomplish
during the Surge, to which he responded:
We hoped to accomplish at least a few years and I think that we did. If you say that the
Surge ended in the summer of 2008, then it was not until mid-December 2011, after our
last combat forces and the four-star general departed, that Prime Minister Maliki
launched the actions to target, for legal reasons, the Iraqi Vice-President, the senior Sunni
Arabs in government, the Iraqi Minister of Finance who is not a Sunni Arab, and then a
senior parliamentarian for Anbar Province. Peaceful demonstrations were put down
fairly violently. Leaders that we had insisted be fired during the Surge were restored to
command positions in the police and the army. A variety of other actions were taken that
ultimately, once again alienated the Sunni Arabs from Iraqi society and tore it apart
again, something that we had worked hard to bring back together. We really had a good
3 ½ years during which time the security situation and various other situations improved
and did improve further beyond the Surge, but beyond which the underlying struggle for
power and resources was never completely resolved, nor was the progress cemented by
the implementation of laws that were passed by the Parliament by the Prime Minister.
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The reality is that he undid a fair amount of what we did together and that was what
alienated the Sunni population and allowed the al-Qaeda in Iraq remnants to reconstitute
as the Islamic State and move into Syria, gather additional resources, and swing back into
Iraq. And because of the changes he made in leadership and the way that he had
undermined the chain of command and then a variety of other actions, at a time that those
forces needed to be most capable of counter-offensive operations they were incapable of
doing that.636
Most interviewees for this work were asked the following question: “Did you see the
Surge as providing long-term solutions and how?” Interestingly, this was the most likely
question for interviewees to not directly answer. Many chose to discuss short-term benefits of
the Surge without providing a response to the question as asked.
Five of the 36 respondees were uncertain. A Civil Affairs officer did say that he did not
feel that the security environment was any less dangerous when he flew into Baghdad in 2006
than when he left in 2008. The mortaring was still about the same, everything was about the
same. He did not remember having a sense of safety during the time he was there. 637 Another
officer felt that he could not tell from his “small-picture” perspective.638 A USAID official felt
that outside of some pockets of assistance it would be more appropriate to err on the side of
humility.639 Some of the “pockets” included the Ministry of Social Welfare and building the
Iraqi defense capability, which she did feel are in a better place today than they were. She
compared the effort to other parts of the world where USAID worked until the U.S. left because
they did not need assistance anymore, which took decades to achieve. 640
One respondee felt the Surge produced short term benefits that must be weighed against
problems it also created. An ambassador who worked economic issues during the Surge felt it
demonstrated the limits of what the U.S. can do for a long-term occupation effort. Short term
success may have been achieved in terms of security and restarting the political process, but it
was not realistic to think America could keep mobilizing Guardsmen every two or three years for
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two decades. He felt that the Surge also gave external agents such as Iran or al-Qaeda the
opportunity to push their narrative of the U.S. occupation, and they “came back with a
vengeance” after the Coalition departed. 641
Thirty-one of the 36 answered in the affirmative at some level. However, many qualified
their answers in several ways.
Many of the interviewee answers coincided with the literature discussed earlier.
Interviewees would agree with Buchanan and Gentile that the Anbar Awakening and Sons of
Iraq were primary reasons for Surge success. Similarly, the idea of Olson Lounsbery and
Pearson that the Sunnis in particular were desperate enough that even partnering with the
Americans seemed a preferable alternative to continuing to host al-Qaeda. Pirnie and O’Connell
and Schifrin showed the need for partnering with the indigenous security forces and making
population protection the top mission priority. Although Hammes talked about enabling local
forces rather than directly engaging the enemy, interviewees indicated that the early part of the
Surge in particular required more Coalition direct action against insurgents, and Special
Operations maintained eliminating key figures from the battlefield throughout the Surge. There
was recognition like Fitzsimmons that ethnic and religious identities would be difficult to
subsume in a “greater Iraq,” and political and resource constraints limiting Surge success as
discussed by Friis.642
Responses can be placed into three broad categories:
1) The Surge produced short term benefits.
2) The Surge could have produced long term benefits, but circumstances intervened.
3) The Surge produced long term benefits.
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Short Term Benefits

Almost all interviewees felt that the Surge at least provided some form of benefits. A
JSAT team leader had a unique view that the greatest benefit of the Surge was to the American
military and people. Rather than following the Iraq Study Group recommendation to leave, the
U.S. intelligently applied American and military and civilian efforts in such a way that to him it
made a difference.643 His opinion indirectly shows up in the pride many Surge participants felt
for their role and perceived impact in Iraq. A brigade commander during the Surge said that he
was proud of what they did even though they lost a lot of soldiers. They knew they were
increasing risk when they left the FOB, but he saw that as the only pathway forward. He felt that
they had to be willing to show faith toward the common end with the Iraqis. 644
Some interviewees felt it was the change in method that was effective. An ambassador
leading economic planning said that the Surge was not a solution in and of itself. The Surge to
him was a change in tactics resourcing. He felt that it did demonstrate that you could put a
whole-of-government approach together with resources and far-sighted management of them. 645
A Treasury Department official agreed that the Surge had people with subject matter expertise
looking at making things work holistically. She felt that because of the Surge there is an
underlying foundation for government moving forward.646 A Psychological Operations officer
felt that in some ways it was not anything different, just a shift in paradigm. For example, the
Sunni Awakening was already taking place as early as September 2006. To him the Surge was
really capturing those events, putting them in an umbrella plan and then sprinkling in a few more
actions.647 A Civil Affairs officer said that they could not have had the soft power without the
hard power. To him, everybody had their role. 648
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Some emphasized positive short-term effects of the Surge. A JSPA planner observed that
from the point of view of population security metrics, the Surge was effective, but it could not be
done forever. Long-term there had to be a handover to reestablish a sovereign government of
Iraq.649 A provincial brigade commander agreed, saying that the Iraqis did not really embrace
and capitalize on their successes. He saw them stealing copper out of generators and soldiers
selling their weapons. Battalion commanders had to pay for their positions to their brigade
commanders. Troops would get one meal a day, but the commander received enough money for
three and pocketed the rest. There was deep hatred due to the cultural and religious differences
between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia. He definitely saw short-term success, but to him it did not
materialize into long term benefits. 650 Along those lines, an ambassador working economics
believed that the Surge gave the Iraqis a security pause, and time to build a political consensus.
It gave them a security window of opportunity to forge a political consensus which in the end
they did not do.651
A USAID contractor working with the banking system said the Surge provided mediumterm solutions. To her, nothing works long-term if you are talking 20-25 years. When she was
in Iraq, they were working on short-term solutions except for the payment system. 652 An
Embassy planner felt that they laid an effective foundation, posturing the Iraqis for success as
best we could.653

Potentially Long Term

There were interviewees who felt that the gains of the Surge had the potential to be long
term. A brigade commander in Baghdad said that the Surge reduced the number of follow-on
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battles because of the higher concentration of soldiers during the Surge. To him, asking whether
the effects were long-term or transitory is a loaded question. He said that the effects have a shelf
life and that is where the question arises of how much presence you have left over to keep things
under control. He learned the hard way that you can’t give people a capability they can’t sustain
themselves. For example, they put in large generators (“Mother Of All Generators”) that needed
the street cleared to pass. He returned to Iraq many times since the Surge and the generators are
all gone: he said they just don’t exist. 654 A PRT leader agreed that the Surge bought time, but
that progress is not linear and the time bought must be used effectively. 655
A Special Forces commander criticized what he saw as a failure to work more broadly.
He believed the Iraqi Special Operations Forces performed well after the U.S. departure, but
other Iraqi military and police capabilities were not as well-developed by the Coalition. He said
that at the time he joked that the Coalition was creating a “plastic chair army.” They were good
enough to sit in a plastic chair and check IDs at a checkpoint and run population security
measures across the country. What was not created was an army that could withstand a little
contact with the enemy. When ISIS came across the north in the 2012 timeframe, he said that
most of those conventional forces threw down their equipment and ran. 656
A stability operations commander in Baghdad went into detail about the issue of
sustainable effectiveness:
The benefits produced had the potential to be long term. Long term also means they are
attended to over the long term. In other words, the gains are consolidated and not lost:
they must be attended to. This is why you see something like Japan or Germany or South
Korea looking very different than Iraq. The cultures are different, but so are they among
those three countries. What is very different is the presence. There was a large,
continuous presence that had generational effects on professionalism and the conduct of
government. A very senior counterpart who could put direct pressure on the senior
military officials and the president. It was one more arm that did not have to be entirely
diplomatic. The Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, Commander of U.S. Army and
Air Forces in Europe, we had very senior structures there that could put direct pressure on
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German leadership. General McArthur as he established conditions of occupation in
Japan created a constitution and other sorts of things. Is that military? No, that’s
governance. He just happened to have the legitimate authority to do that. We have
gotten away from that since the 1950s, there is a belief that the military should not be
involved in that. But in places where the military has been involved in that and has led it,
it has always worked well. You can use Secretary Marshall with the Marshall Plan for
the reconstruction of Germany, or the continuous presence of U.S. forces in the Republic
of Korea that has led to everything from a highly professional military to a democracy
that can undergo an impeachment without the military being involved. All these things I
have witnessed myself in just the last few years. That came from us being present. Our
desire to reduce presence quickly in Iraq occurred before any of that had set in. It would
have been like withdrawing our U.S. force presence from Germany in 1950. It was not
ready: the systems of government weren’t ready. The military stabilized the emergence
of governance over the next three generations: we did not do that in Iraq. There are many
lessons to be drawn from this. The potential is always long term. The work that we did
was indeed a long-term effect: the gains were not consolidated as a matter of policy. 657
Several interviewees felt that the Surge achieved positive effects that proved transient.
An Embassy planner said that it provided a solution for a couple of years, but a lot of those
accomplishments were lost when the government became more blatantly sectarian. In theory, it
was going to provide political space to facilitate compromise between Shia and Sunni actors, but
he did not see that happen. 658 An Embassy Chief of Staff said the U.S. subsequently got away
from its successes which to him needed one leader developing a comprehensive, persistent
strategy with conditions.659 To an MNC-I planner, the benefits were transitory because the
fundamental politics of Prime Minister Maliki had not changed. He believed that the Coalition
could have achieved more long-term success had it persevered or had Maliki evolved politically
and been less under Iranian influence. With the departure of the military, the U.S. did not have
enough influence on him to prevent his “bad behavior.”660
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Long Term Benefits

Other interviewees were confident that the Surge had positive long-term ramifications.
An IO Task Force leader said that the data on polling, violence and Iraqi confidence all show it.
He said that these gains continued to reflect progress through 2011, years beyond the end of the
Surge.661 An MNC-I planner said that it essentially stabilized Iraq so that from 2009-2011 ISF
acting in a generally politically-neutral way could control the insurgency. 662 A JSPA planner
helped author a white paper in summer 2006 that said the U.S. was failing in all 5 lines of
operation. He believed that without the Surge Iraq was lost, so it was a positive long-term
result.663 A Special Forces commander recalled that they dramatically dropped the level of
violence and changed the dynamic. When he was there in 2010, he recalled Iraq had relative
peace, security, and the beginnings of economic stability, particularly as the oil market and
infrastructure really started to come online, which to him was bought by the Surge in 2007.664
Similarly, an MNF-I planner focused on economics said that from a high of 3200-3300
civilian deaths per month, by 2010 there were days when there were no reported war-caused
deaths. Markets were open and oil companies were coming in. 665 A Marine Corps MTT leader
said that the desired effect was achieved but said that the fact that it was coincidental/planned
with the Anbar Awakening was the only way it would have been achieved. 666 A Civil Affairs
officer who believes the benefits were “strong and long term” points to the struggle Iraq is
having in its relationship with Iran, desiring an Iraqi future independent of an Iranian theocracy.
A lot of 18–19-year-old Iraqi lives were transformed by their relationships and interactions with
Americans according to him. There was a plaque on the wall at the U.S. Army National Training
Center that he said read, “Every soldier is an ambassador.” 667
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Policy Criticism

Many of the interviewees were critical of the decision by the Obama Administration to
pull combat forces out of Iraq entirely. An IO Task Force leader did feel that invading Iraq was
not necessary and “atrociously planned.” He recalled sitting in the living room of a friend prior
to the invasion when the friend got a call from Jay Garner saying, “Can you help me with a
political-military plan?” Apparently, they did not have a plan three months before they went in.
To him, President Obama made a strategic choice in 2011 that was constrained by what President
Bush had done, so the fact that President Obama made a decision that resulted in an undercutting
of sustaining the effort after 2011 was not just Obama’s fault. 668
He also felt that State Department lacked conceptualization that they were going to be in
charge of running a peace process and a continuing political-military struggle after 2011. He was
astounded at the number of times he heard, “we need to be a normal embassy,” even in CPA
days. Another time he was walking through the Embassy talking with the Deputy Public Affairs
Officer about the IOTF’s campaign to counterbalance Iranian interests. The officer said, “Well,
isn’t that really the Iraqis’ problem now?” To him, overall State Department employees are not
doers. They worry that conducting a controversial messaging campaign might get them PNGd
(Persona Non-Grata).669
Other critics of policy included an ambassador who worked economics at the Embassy
said that putting an end date on the U.S. military presence was a huge mistake. 670 Another
ambassador said that under President Obama the focus shifted to the Iraqis doing more for
themselves, then oil prices crashed and Al-Qaeda in Iraq recovered. 671 A staff officer at MNF-I
thought that the change to the Obama Administration hurt badly because they were myopic. 672
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An Information Operations officer believed that the benefits were tied to political gains. Then it
tailed off, the U.S. pulled out, and he felt that everything that had been achieved was gone. 673 An
Embassy official working stabilization and transition felt that when the Obama Administration
decided to pull the troops out, Iraqi leaders lost their insurance policy to take the difficult steps of
transition that would inevitably be a threat to his own life and that of his ministers.674
A Special Operations commander put a certain amount of responsibility on the Iraqis and
the sectarian nature of how they moved leadership around. He said that the inclination to act in a
sectarian manner was always within the system and the thing that stopped it was the US military
or the Embassy’s ability to go to the Iraqis and say “Uh-uh, why are you moving the 7th Infantry
Division commander? Major General Ali had done a phenomenal job: why are you changing
him out? This is not normal rotation, and the guy you’re putting in sucks, we know he sucks.
He’s been here, here and here, we know he’s incompetent, corrupt, etc.” When the Coalition
left in 2011, he believed that the U.S. lost that leverage and ability to protect the Iraqis from their
darker nature.675
An MNF-I planner similarly blamed the pullout for preventing the Surge effects from
being long term. It allowed Prime Minister Maliki to renege on his pledge to bring the Sons of
Iraq into the formal security structure. It also allowed him to replace competent military
leadership with ones loyal to him. When Mosul fell to ISIS, the colonels got in helicopters and
flew back to Baghdad. The captains and lieutenants got into jeeps and hit the road. He had
expected that the Americans wanted about 10,000 to stay to provide the combined arms skills,
secure communications, the honest broker, the things we can do very well. He was surprised that
the negotiated agreement was all the Americans out by December. Without U.S. redundancy,
Baghdad was back to its old ways of ignoring everything it did not want to hear from the field. 676
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A TFBSO manager pointed out the international ramification of the U.S. pullout. He felt
that leaving about 5,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq would not have been for them to conduct combat
operations. He saw their role as the presence of a senior commander in Baghdad. When Kassam
Soleimani (Iranian Quds Force Commander) would try to strong-arm Prime Minister Maliki into
doing things against the interest of the Iraqi people, the U.S. soldiers would give Maliki the
ability to say, “Of course I would do this for you, but I have the Americans here, what do you
want me to do?” He believed that presence would even have forestalled the emergence of ISIS
and destabilization of Syria. 677

STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN

Table 8 summarizes interviewee responses to the benefits question and subdivides them
by various categories:

CATEGORY

YES

LONG TERM
Potential

SHORT
TERM

UNCERTAIN

Army

4

5

3

3

USMC

1

1

*

*

DoS

4

5

4

2

USG

2

*

1

*

Foreign

1

*

*

*

Career

6

10

4

3

Temporary

6

1

4

2

Soft Power Spec

12

9

6

5

Hard Power Spe

*

2

2

*

Prior Iraq Exp

10

7

6

5
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CATEGORY

YES

LONG TERM
Potential

SHORT
TERM

UNCERTAIN

No Prior Iraq Ex

2

4

2

*

Leader

4

5

2

4

Staffer

8

6

6

1

BN-

1

*

*

1

BDE+

11

12

8

4

Conventional

11

11

8

4

Spec Ops

1

*

*

1

Baghdad

9

9

7

3

Iraq Other

3

2

1

2

Left the Base

9

8

4

4

Did not Leave

3

3

4

1

Met with Iraqis

11

10

7

5

Did not MWI

1

1

1

*

Detainee Work

4

3

2

1

No Detaine Wrk

9

8

6

2

AFG Surge

9

2

2

1

Not AFG Surge

2

6

6

3

Soft power app

11

11

6

3

SP N/A

*

1

4

1

Table 8: Interviewee Responses to Surge Benefits Question by Categories

Note that not all subgroups will add up to 36. Responses are displayed roughly in a best
to worst manner from left to right in terms of positive impact. No interviewee said the Surge had
a negative effect, hence “uncertain” is designated as the right end of the scale. In some cases,
subgroupings are too small to draw theoretical conclusions. Subgroupings of note are
highlighted in yellow and are discussed below.
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Afghanistan “Surge” Participants

By far the most interesting category was Iraq Surge participants who subsequently
participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan, which was not even an initial interview question.
14 Surge participants or 38.8% of those surveyed were in Afghanistan in 2009. This is a high
percentage when viewed as conducting consecutive year combat tours. Normally a
servicemember or civilian who is deployed into a combat zone is expected to have recovery time
before being sent back into combat, particularly in another country. It demonstrates the ability of
General Petraeus to exercise his ability to get the people he wanted into key positions.
Ambassador Crocker would become Ambassador to Afghanistan, but not until 2011 or after the
Afghanistan Surge had ended.
Of the 14 Surge participants who went to Afghanistan in 2009, nine can be categorized
as saying the Iraq Surge produced long-term benefits or 64.2%. Of the 36 total interviewees for
this work, 12 indicated that the Iraq Surge produced long-term benefits or 33.3%. 75% of those
responses came from the 38.8% of respondees who went to Afghanistan. By comparison, only
two of the 17 respondees who did not go to Afghanistan in 2009 felt that the Iraq Surge produced
lasting results, or 11.8% (one long term benefit respondee did not indicate service in Afghanistan
either way). Interviewees who went to Afghanistan in 2009 were over five times as likely to say
the Surge in Iraq produced lasting benefits as those who did not.
The nine respondees who went to Afghanistan and said the Iraq Surge produced long
term benefits can be further delineated as follows:
3 Army, 1 USMC, 2 DoS, 2 US Government, 1 foreign
6 career, 3 temporary
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All 9 were soft power specialists
7 had prior experience in Iraq
4 were leaders, 5 were staffers
8 served at brigade level or higher
1 was special operations
7 worked in Baghdad, 2 were in outer provinces
7 traveled outside the wire
8 met with Iraqis
3 worked with detainees
7 felt the lessons of the Iraq Surge were applicable to other/future conflicts
None of these subcategories were significantly different from their percentages relative to
all interviewees. Only three were Army, so the response is not simply being made by close
confidants of General Petraeus. Interviewees who went to Afghanistan and believed the Iraq
Surge produced long term benefits were statistically representative cross-sections of all other
sub-categories developed for this study. In other words, it was not responses of military
members or careerists or staff members that truly explains the disparity. Interviewees who
subsequently went to Afghanistan were far more likely to view the Iraq Surge as successful
independent of who they worked for, what they did or where they did it in Iraq.
It is beyond the author’s knowledge of cognitive psychology to explore in-depth the
reasons why people who were in Afghanistan in 2009 were more than five times as likely to say
the Iraq Surge was successful as those who did not go to Afghanistan. Theories regarding
cognitive relativism can provide potential insight. Cognitive relativism has a number of
competing definitions in the field of psychological study, but does make two primary claims:
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1) The truth-value of any statement is always relative to some particular standpoint;
2) No standpoint is metaphysically privileged over all others.678
Immanuel Kant said that the concept of objective reality is not valid if taken independent
of human experience because it is only because of human experience that thought and
classification becomes possible. 679 Modern relativist philosophers such as Richard Rorty and
Kuhn argue that differing experiences can result in differing paradigms or viewpoints of events
and thus different “truths,” although they dismiss the idea that each viewpoint is necessarily of
equal worth.680 Another possible explanation is the self-affirmation theory of Claude Steele
which postulates that individuals will attempt to protect their self-integrity when confronted with
information that contradicts their sense of self, in this case seeking a positive Iraq Surge outcome
as reaffirming their sense of self-value.
The Afghanistan Surge was ordered by President Obama in response to what was seen as
a deteriorating security situation there, combined with his campaign opinion that more U.S. focus
should be placed there rather than Iraq. It consisted of 17,000 U.S. troops supplementing 68,000
NATO forces already in Afghanistan. 681 Both numbers are about half of the comparable figures
for Iraq in 2007. About half of the PRTs in Afghanistan were staffed by non-U.S. participants,
so there was also less of a civilian “surge.” Consequently, it was sardonically referred to as the
“mini-Surge” or “half-Surge.” It did not receive the media publicity of the effort in Iraq, nor did
it produce results approximating the dramatic change seen in Iraq.
It is reasonable to suppose that a person who experienced two different events may be
more favorably inclined to pick one as the better of the two and even overestimate its success.
Everyone wants to see their life’s work as successful. Having participated in both Surges begins
to accumulate a substantial portion of one’s working life. No one wants to say they wasted a
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substantial portion of their life, so having two different experiences gives them an opportunity to
believe that at least one worked. This would contrast with Vietnam, which was the primary U.S.
effort of its time so that even a person who worked multiple tours of duty “at the front” did them
all in Vietnam and would lack the opportunity to create a perception of “good” and “bad” wars.
This viewpoint shift should not be dismissed as entirely imaginary. Even “short term”
results can be expected to produce gains. A year or two without violence in a stretch of many
years is certainly better than none at all. Less expenditure of lives and treasure will resonate
through the subsequent years. Modernization and infrastructure improvements will remain.
Interaction with Coalition members changes the perspective of the Iraqis toward Westerners.
Many interviewees both military and civilian gave examples of Iraqis emulating their good
habits and continuing to see these changes on subsequent trips to Iraq. Nations contemplating
future partnering with the U.S. would probably be less inclined to do so had it pulled out of a
failing Iraq in 2007 versus a stable Iraq in 2011. Possibly, viewing Iraq from the paradigm of
Afghanistan experience changes the focus of its group members and permits them to develop a
more nuanced or pragmatic viewpoint of the outcome in Iraq.
Conversely, people who did not go to Afghanistan may have a greater degree of idealism
and judge the effort in Iraq by a more stringent standard compared to those who were members
of a different effort that did not produce a noticeable change, even in the short run. To the Iraqonly interviewees there may be more of a perception that since Iraq is not currently a stable,
prosperous nation where all sects and cultures are equally represented and thriving, the U.S.
intervention there and the Surge in particular were not a success. The ambitious Coalition goals
laid out at the beginning of the effort in Iraq were not fully achieved. This does not mean that
good things did not happen, although whether they were worth the price paid is a normative
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judgement. An Iraq Surge participant who did not see the level of change they hoped for but had
no other experience to compare results could be inclined to a harsher perception of the outcome
in Iraq.

Leaders

Six of the 15 leaders provided low end responses of benefits being short-term or
uncertain, for a rate of 40%. By comparison, seven of 21 staffers provided low end responses, or
33%. It could be a statistical anomaly: one less low-end response by the leaders would equate
their answer rate with the staffer’s low-end rate.
The lower enthusiasm rate of the leaders for the Surge outcome could be explained by a
keener awareness of the costs of the Surge. These were the people who had to write condolence
letters home to grieving American families. This could potentially incline them to view Surge
success through a darker lens, injecting a degree of normative opinion beyond that of staff and
support personnel.

First-Time Iraq Participants

All of the interviewees who did their first tour of duty in Iraq during the Surge indicated
some level of positive value to the Surge. None were among the five “uncertain” responses,
which all came from people with prior Iraq experience at a rate of 17.9%. A single “uncertain”
response would have increased the eight first-time Iraq participants “uncertain” response rate to
12.5%, still interestingly below the rate of people with prior experience in Iraq.
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This outcome is the most difficult to explain since it would seem to run counter to the
logic of the Afghanistan participants previously described for whom more counterinsurgency
experience correlated with a more generous view of the Iraq Surge’s success. Perhaps the firsttimer’s lack of prior experience in Iraq during times when the situation did not seem as dire
would incline them to think of the high level of violence as more typical than someone who had
been in Iraq during more stable times, thus leaving them even more impressed by the post-Surge
stabilization of Iraq.

Participants Who Did Not Travel Outside The Wire

Five of the 11 interviewees who did not regularly travel outside the wire rated the Surge
results as low end, or 45.5%. By comparison, only 8 of the 25 interviewees who did regularly
leave the compound, or 32%, rated the Surge results as low end. In this case, changing a single
response for the interviewees who did not travel outside the wire brings them to 36.4%, still
interestingly above the rate of interviewees who did leave the compound.
A case can be made that going outside the wire and seeing Iraq could alter a person’s
perception of the effort there. Seeing markets reopening, projects completed and getting firsthand feedback from the Iraqi general population could leave participants with a more positive
feeling regarding Surge results than someone who only learned about these changes on briefing
slides or cables written for higher headquarters. Someone who never left the compound might
miss that firsthand opportunity to see change, possibly made worse since the bases were all
regular targets for indirect fire attacks from the insurgents.

303
Proportions Difference Testing

The following table depicts proportions testing of data points of interest among
interviewees to the question of whether the Surge produced benefits:

Subgroup 1
AFG participants
who thought the Iraq
Surge was successful
Leaders who thought
Surge benefits were
short term or were
uncertain
First-Time Iraq
participants who
thought the Surge
benefits to be short
term or were
uncertain
Did not travel outside
the wire and thought
Iraq Surge benefits
were short term or
uncertain

Proportion in
Group 1
.642

.40

Comparison Group 2
Non-AFG participants who
thought the Iraq Surge was
successful
Staffers who thought Surge
benefits were short term or
were uncertain

Proportion in
Group 2
.118

T-Statistic

.32

1.48

3.49*

0.0

Returning Iraq participants
who thought the Surge
benefits were short term or
were uncertain

.179

2.76

.46

Traveled outside the wire and
thought Iraq Surge benefits
were short term or uncertain

.32

.76

* p<0.05
Table 9: Significance Testing

The category of significance, as described previously, proved to be Iraq Surge
participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan. Hypotheses were as follows:
A1: Iraq Surge participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan were significantly
more likely to consider the Iraq Surge a success than Iraq Surge participants who did not
subsequently go to Afghanistan.
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of 3.49, a result well
beyond a 95% confidence level and disproving the null hypothesis.
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The other categories tested did not demonstrate a sufficient deviation from the null
hypothesis to prove significance.
L1: Leaders were more likely than support personnel to consider the Surge to have had
only short term or uncertain benefits.
Proportions testing demonstrated a difference of 1.48, a response rate that does not
disprove the null hypothesis.
F1: First time personnel deployed to Iraq were less likely to consider the Surge a success
than personnel who had previously deployed to Iraq.
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of 2.76, however given the
small number of responses, this is insufficient to disprove the null hypothesis at the p<0.05 level
– we cannot be confident that there is a difference between the groups.
T1: Personnel who travelled outside the wire were more likely to consider the Surge a
success than those who did not travel outside the wire.
Proportions testing demonstrated a t-statistic for the difference of .76, a value that does
not disprove the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups.

SURGE LESSONS LEARNED

Interviewees were asked what soft power lessons they had learned from Iraq. As an
open-ended question, there were a range of answers given covering a number of important
topics. There was no discrete categorization of answers lending themselves to statistical analysis
akin to that provided by the query of whether the Surge produced benefits.

305
This work focuses on the important ones that consistently came up. Many talked about
systemic problems that in some cases still persist, feeding into a concern about internalizing the
lessons learned. Working together was deemed important, both in terms of interagency
cooperation and individual personalities. The importance of empowering host nation leadership
with soft power tools such as messaging were also emphasized by interviewees.

Systemic Problems

A short-term hire working economics for the Embassy found that the U.S. was still trying to
overcome organizational and structural issues. He said that when he went back to the Embassy
in Baghdad six months later, he did not know a single person there. Leaders like Petraeus and
Crocker bring with them core staffers that had worked with them before, so they did not have to
worry about whether the team would work. He felt that these teams were an important part of
what made the Surge successful. 682 An ambassador who worked at the Embassy early in the
Surge returned to Washington and responsibility for managing the manning effort in Iraq. He
gives credit to Secretary of State Rice for implementing some level of reform to the system to get
the best and brightest into Iraq. He said that diplomatic service is not about going to war zones.
The military is an organization designed and trained for that, and if you want your military career
to succeed you need to go there from the beginning.683
Many interviewees talked about the importance of a concerted effort. Several officers said
there need to be multiple integrated things happening at length: there is no silver bullet. 684 An
MNC-I planner said that coordination between the senior decision-makers within the government
are needed so it can be implemented. The spectrum between hard and soft power is not a switch:
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to him it is a continuum.685 An Embassy Chief of Staff said that unity of effort does not have to
be a Surge, but rather a coordinated versus ad hoc effort that takes a whole of government
approach.686 An ambassador who worked on economic issues said he was a big fan of close
integration of military and civilian efforts, particularly the PRTs. Joint campaign planning and
integration to him will be very important if the U.S. is ever in a similar situation. 687
A Civil Affairs team chief described the sometimes-discordant nature of the U.S. effort in
Iraq as “everyone and their mother was trying to execute ‘soft power.’”688 Similarly, an
Embassy planner said that the civilian and military sides do not understand how to work
together, and they do not fit together very well. He feels they will not be successful unless they
come up with a common planning schema to understand what their differences are and how to fit
together.689 An MNC-I planner said that the integration has to start early. Joint exercises to
practice soft power would be effective to him. 690 A PRT team leader felt that soft power was not
resourced in Iraq. Even with the Surge he saw it as still the military in the lead and taking on
soft power activities by pushing themselves out to the grassroots rather than integrating soft
power experts into what the military was doing at the lower levels.691
An MNF-I planner went into some detail on some of the limits facing the Executive
Branch. He said that people may talk about increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers
from 6,000 to 9,000, but what are the extra people going to do? To him, State Department is
great at being able to deliver a message. But when they were thrown into a conflict environment
and had to create the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, they discovered that they did not
have the right kind of people. They had leaders to do engagement and people to do messaging
and public diplomacy: what they did not have were farmers who knew how to increase crop
yields or raise better chickens. Even USAID is composed of more managers than front-line
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workers, so the U.S. ends up hiring expertise from the outside on short-term contracts. His
concern was that it can become a grant-distributing agency handing out money and hoping the
results obtain.

The original concept behind the PRTs was that the mission would provide

security. But that became the enormous Blackwater or Triple Canopy operations instead of
operating with the local military forces. 692

PERSONALITIES

Multiple interviewees commented on the human element of success. A Civil Affairs
officer said that there were many things that were personality driven. To him it is not a
particular technique that was effective, it was how those skills were integrated, and the
leadership has to do that. 693 A provincial brigade commander recalled two basic types of State
Department officers. The first PRT commander he worked with wanted to make a difference and
gain experience in Iraq even though disagreeing with the U.S. policy to be there. He believed
that others saw deployment as a way to have a last adventure before retirement whether they
agreed with the U.S. policy to be there or not. He found it more difficult to cooperate with the
latter even if they had a lot of experience and the potential to be very effective. 694 An advisor at
MNC-I summed it up as “Honesty. Relationships. Trust.”695 A Treasury official felt it important
to approach the task with some level of humility, not to go in and say you have the answers to all
their problems. To her it is not a bad thing to take a couple of days before you start “spouting
off.”696 Similarly, a USAID manager said, “Never promise what you can’t deliver.” She
believed that if you overpromise and underdeliver you are making a bad name for everybody. 697
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Empowerment

Interviewees talked about the importance of interacting with Iraqis below the national
level. An ambassador leading economic planning felt that local engagement is important. He
thought it was important to have a few things they did really well and pay attention to what was
happening at the local level. 698 Another ambassador agreed, saying that empowerment must
occur down to the local level: otherwise, you end up with no loyalty, and corruption. 699 A
stability operations commander in Baghdad said that soft power has to happen from the bottom
up and be resourced from the top down.700 Even a detention facility commander felt that part of
his success came from building relationships with local leaders, tribal leaders and sheikhs. 701
Interviewees discussed standards as well. A brigade commander in Baghdad said that
when improving things like electricity, and sewage, it had to be to their standards, not yours.
Painting the curbs, having flowers in the islands, giving them money to open the stores, may be
satisfying, but can they sustain it? Is it important to them? Otherwise, it is just good for us. 702 A
JSAT planner at the Embassy expressed a similar viewpoint on progress. Do you pick up the
trash yourself or do you get the Iraqis to pick up the trash?703
Related to this, an economics officer at the Embassy felt that the most important lesson
was making the host government as accountable as possible. He felt that there must be better
synchronization to ensure that the host nation actually implements the reforms that they
promised to execute that are the basis for so much international support, both economic and
security.704 An IO Task Force leader believed that the only truly national interest the U.S. has is
the production of a functional social order: everything else is subordinate to that. 705 A planner at
the Embassy believed that here is only so much you can do for someone. If they do not want it
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themselves then it does not matter how much soft power you put into an area, it is not going to
be effective.706 A PRT leader said that sometimes it felt like trying to teach a high school council
how to run a meeting. He said they did not have minute or rules of order, things that Americans
take for granted as the way you run a transparent process.707
To a stability operations commander in Baghdad, security and prosperity are twin sisters.
Long term presence mattered to him, including military presence so there is a handmaiden to the
diplomatic arm that if necessary, can create conditions by force to consolidate gains. He was
disappointed to see the Maliki government institute secular oppression that was the reverse of
Saddam’s: marginalizing the Sunni elements by failing to give them roles in government and
withholding oil revenues. He felt that the growth of ISIS was a function of the limit of military
power to create the conditions of government. Even with the world’s largest U.S. embassy, that
was not enough. He thought it must be coupled with the true soft power which is diplomacy and
political pressure applied very directly. 708

MESSAGING

There were also lessons learned about messaging. A Psychological Operations officer
emphasized that words have to be perceived from the receiver’s point of view, not the senders.
Also, to be proactive, not reacting to adversaries. He felt that USIA should be pulled from under
State Department and restored to a more independent status.709 A brigade commander
emphasized that soft power is critical in all operations and must be integrated. Sometimes soft
power is in the lead, sometimes in support, but they must be integrated.710 An Information
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Operations planner believed that there had to be effective actions to message. To him, if there is
not effective action, it does not matter what is said. 711

Internalization

Interviewees had concerns of whether the lessons of Iraq would remain “learned.” A
Special Operations commander believes there is a reason that nations have insurgencies: social,
political, economic, there are root causes, and those root causes have to be addressed by the host
nation. However, the U.S. entered Iraq with a leadership that had been educated to fight
“Krasnovians,” a.k.a. Soviets, in their training and education base, even long after the
Krasnovian, aka Soviet, threat had faded from the woodwork.712 He recalled that even in 199495 all the tactical problems were still being conducted against a Soviet-based threat, long after
the Soviet Union had collapsed. He felt that the U.S. paid the price in the early years in Iraq. 713
A deputy brigade commander was concerned about conclusions that soft power efforts such as
CERP worked. He said that studies reaching that conclusion received their input from the Iraq
Reconstruction Management System which by its own admission was at least 15% inaccurate: he
thinks it may be twice that. If projects were being done in an area and it was quiet, it would be
treated as a “good” area even if it was a staging area for attacks into other areas. His concern is
that the U.S. did not have a strategic AAR (After Action Report) of what worked during the
Surge.714
A TFBSO manager saw one of the greatest benefits of the Surge as the increased
interaction with Iraqis itself. To him, the victory is in the micro, not the macro. A million
different Americans walked the streets of Iraq from 2003-2012. The vast majority of their

311
interactions with Iraqis were positive and helpful and created a better situation at the most local
level. He believes that those things endured and have value. For example, the TFSBO created a
lot of jobs. Maybe because an Iraqi got his job back, his kids got to go to school, he got to feed
his family, and perhaps his son did not join the insurgency. He said that since you do not know
what the downstream effects are, let the macro go and have faith. 715 A Civil Affairs Reserve
officer fell back on his experience as a customer service representative at several U.S. stores
including Home Depot, learning to not immediately say no to the Iraqis when they made a
request. If the answer would be no, he would explain why. For him it worked so well that when
comparing his experiences there with irate Home Depot customers (the ones the manager always
has to deal with), he said that “That was madder than anyone in Iraq got at me.” 716
One respondent who worked banking issues said she did not learn any lessons during the
Surge. For her, what worked during the Surge were the same things that had worked for her in
other countries: sitting down with people, showing them how to collect the data and money they
needed.717 A JSPA planner believed that soft power was useful but not decisive in Iraq. To him
it was about which sect or sub-sect was going to control Iraq’s future and wealth. He said that
the military assumed causation for providing jobs and decreasing violence. To him that was
exactly backwards. When the violence went down, people could go to jobs. There was strong
correlation between violence and jobs, but to him the causation was almost certainly the other
way round.718
A PRT leader saw the military learning a lot of soft power and trying to adjust but
believes there is still no substitution for having a USAID or other expert there. 719 Another PRT
leader talked about the difference in how the military and civilian sides reintegrated people
returning from Iraq:
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For a lot of us when we came back, the Department of State was doing nothing for us. It
was like, “Oh you’re back, there’s your desk: get back to work.” It was a big issue for the
State Department because there was a concern that if you go to talk to someone about
depression or whatever it may be this will have an effect on your security clearance. I
went to someone in the department and told him that we needed to do something because
people were suffering. If the issue was the security clearance, let’s do what the military
does and make a mandatory session for everyone that comes back because then it does
not impact your clearance and think of the resources we have. Unfortunately, the State
Department medical team was not up to dealing with it. The first mandatory session the
State Department medical people were not addressing the real suffering of colleagues
who had been in the field but asking us to help them develop a list of things people
should pack. Crazy stuff like that. I finally said that we could help with that, but we
were all here because we were broken and needed to be fixed. We had none of the
resources that the regular military had. We were more like the Reserves in that our
experiences were not universal: of course now about 25% of the department has served in
Iraq or Afghanistan. If you were in the military and went to Iraq or Afghanistan that was
your job and you were given credit for doing your duty. That was not the perception in
the State Department at the time. The policy was anathema to most people in State
Department. I had only gone because I thought that it was the biggest screwup we had
ever done and I wanted to go help fix it. For the Department it was very difficult: people
were coming back seriously distressed and with no support whatsoever. 720

FUTURE CONFLICTS

The final question of most interviews was whether the interviewee felt that the soft power
lessons of Iraq were applicable to other or future conflicts. In response, many interviewees
echoed sentiments from the literature regarding the future. They reflected the ideas of Malkasian
and Plakoudas that a sound counterinsurgency strategy must conform to the local social and
political environment utilizing a range of policies employed in different combinations as the
situation dictates. Many remarks echoed Olson Lounsbery and Pearson that analysis of a conflict
should examine a gradation of causes from background to proximate. 721 Because of the
limitations of the U.S. Executive Branch, there was less consensus with Dixon that the
politicians should be in charge. 722
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Almost all interviewees responded with some level of positivity to the question. A Civil
Affairs officer felt it is a difficult question to answer, knowing that many people contributed in
Iraq.723 A USAID contractor said that what she did in Afghanistan was not different from what
she had done in the past. Delivering technical assistance is a process: what worked before for
her still worked.724 Otherwise interviewees believed that the lessons of Iraq would be applicable
to other conflicts.

Lessons Mislearned

An Embassy Chief of Staff was concerned that some mis learned lessons were brought to
Afghanistan, like increasing CERP funding versus utilizing Department of State and local
government managed funding. 725 An ambassador working economic issues at the Embassy
feared that the lesson most people will take from Iraq is not to do nation-building. He believes
their issue is not that the lesson should be how to do it better, but that this is not a very profitable
activity for a government.726 An IO Task Force leader had concerns for what he called “the big
gap” between the military and civilian sides, which he blamed on the Army for calling
counterinsurgency “not our real job.” To him, change needs to be framed based on resistors
saying, “We aren’t going to do anything that stupid” even though they will. 727 An Embassy
Chief of Staff agreed there are lessons to be learned from Iraq: the question is did we learn
them?728 Another Embassy executive pointed out that 95% of U.S. deployments the last several
decades have not been for major combat operations, so it needs to figure out how to take softpower, civilian types and integrate them. He does not believe we are doing very well at that. 729
An MNC-I planner believes that the simple fact is the U.S. is going to face this again and again.
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He said that using military force to establish stability “seems a lot like war,” but it sounds a lot
better when you call it a humanitarian corridor or a no-fly zone.730

Cooperation

Two different PRT leaders drew similar lessons learned. One believed abstract lessons
such as trust-building are certainly there, but that each situation is unique because of ethnic
makeup, history of centralized governance, and external influences (e.g. in Iraq from Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Syria).731 The other believed that soft and hard power elements must be at the
table equally from the beginning. She described an occasion where she was a participant in a
war games exercise the military was running. The premise was that the U.S. military goes in for
two years to prop up an unpopular leader. She said that that does not make sense: why go in to
prop up an unpopular leader? What if it is going to take 5 years, or 10? The 2-star participating
in the exercise was very frustrated when she was asking these questions, because they had all
these plans about what they were going to do. He finally looked at her and said, “Ma’am, there’s
going to be a war: don’t stop us.” While she understood the comment in the context of an
exercise in process, it pointed to the crux of the matter – inadequate analysis of objectives and
methods, coupled with a belief that ‘hard power’ was the solution to all problems. 732
A common response was similar to an ambassador who said that it depends on the
conflict. To him, that determines what soft power elements you want to look at most strongly
and back most vigorously.733 An Embassy planner pointed out the “problem” of fighting the last
war. Each area is going to be different, with its own dynamics, so he said that you can take a few
lessons and apply them, but it must be tempered with understanding the new landscape. He
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worked in Afghanistan and said it was remarkable how little they could apply the lessons of Iraq
there.734

Afghanistan

In the process of doing the interviews, the author discovered that many of the
interviewees had participated in the 2009 Surge in Afghanistan. In many cases the same person
was working the same type of jobs within a year of each other, only changing the country. This
provided a ready-made compare-and-contrast opportunity to explore how well the lessons of Iraq
carried over into Afghanistan. It has already been demonstrated that these individuals were far
more likely to see the Iraqi Surge as successful than people who did not subsequently go to
Afghanistan. Their responses to this question below corroborate with their view of Iraq as the
more successful Surge.
A JSPA planner believed that trying to apply the Iraq template in Afghanistan was not
successful, although there were certainly lessons to be learned. 735 An ambassador who worked
in both places said that the big difference was elite Afghans do not think elections are the way to
pick their leadership, so they cheat. He said they were particularly weak on the developmental
aspects of generating support for a national effort to govern, and to show results to the
population that would create the kind of loyalty the U.S. hoped to see happen. 736 An MNC-I
planner who subsequently went to Afghanistan saw that Iraq had a lot more capability, national
connectivity, and unity than Afghanistan which tended to be tribal and regional. In Afghanistan
there was less reliance on the local to provincial to national connections because they were not as
significant as they were in Iraq. 737
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An IO Task Force leader who was in Afghanistan in 2010-2011 said that one of the issues
was U.S. people already in Afghanistan showing some resistance, with an air of “Oh, you are the
Iraq people coming in telling us how to do it.” They were also hamstrung with resourcing.
According to him in Afghanistan the bid was for “lowest cost, technically acceptable” as
opposed to “technically superior” in Iraq.” 738 A PRT leader felt that “we” (the US military and
the US population in general) have by-and-large already forgotten the lessons of Iraq and will
have to re-learn them again (and again and again) during every future conflict. 739
A stabilization advisor at the State Department who participated in a USAID contract to
build up the provincial governments in Afghanistan said the effort failed due to the massive level
of corruption.740 An ambassador leading economic development in Baghdad thought bringing
the PRT concept from Afghanistan to Iraq was helpful but cautions about trying to push too
many lessons between Iran and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has a completely different level of
development in terms of education of the population, structure of the country, history and so
forth. He believes that when President Obama came into power and said we were going to get
out of Iraq and focus on Afghanistan, there was a broad feeling that Afghanistan has not been
tamed in 200 years although there are a lot of others who have tried.741
Transformation is not fast. A USAID manager learned that when you spend a lot of
money planning for something you should not cut it short after one year, a mistake she felt they
repeated in Afghanistan. She pointed out that Afghanistan is at the bottom of the list of every
economic and social indicator. Planners there expected to have at least 5-6 years to carry out
their plans. She felt that in Afghanistan you really needed that time to work on development:
Getting more people in schools, getting them healthier. She saw an almost toxic mix of local and
U.S. elections and saw how that could impact the U.S. willingness to impact an effort like that. 742

317
An Embassy Chief of Staff saw similar shortfalls in Afghanistan in terms of lack of capability
and financial resources. He also believed that the tribal issues were more complex than Iraqi
sectarianism. U.S. efforts were still ad hoc, and too much aid was being given out without
conditions. He thinks a coordinated strategy would probably have been as effective spending 1520% of what was spent on financial aid in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 743 A JSAT team leader at
the Embassy said that it is almost as if Iraq and AFG should have switched constitutions because
Afghanistan is a decentralized country with a centralized constitution and vice versa. 744
A Marine Corps MTT leader who had served in Anbar Province said that Afghanistan
demonstrated utilization of the ink spot theory developed by David Galula. They realized that
ink spots were not forming in Afghanistan because the enclaves were too isolated. When they
did start to see that the locals were putting pressure on the Taliban not to bomb finished roads
because that is how they kept their commerce alive, the Marines initiated some gravel-improved
road building. They watched prices in the bazaars drop 50-75% because the cost of
transportation and bribe networks had ceased to exist. He said that they turned the engineers into
the main effort force. That logic worked, and the effect was tangible once the roads were
completed.745
An Embassy JSAT planner saw some of the same security issues again in Afghanistan.
There was a situation where they had a first-time bidder who did not know what they were doing
and were skimping on the contract. Then the State Dept put a 25-year-old in charge of the
project in DC. When she came out, the State Department did not like the project and said it was
not secure enough to visit. He was amazed: State Department personnel could not even visit
their own project. He was a “3161” hire who found that many of the best people he worked with
in Iraq applied with the Trump Administration in 2016, but the woman in charge of hiring for
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State Department had no idea what the 3161 program was. He believes the modern skill set
needs more of the imperial diplomat similar to the British civil service in the Raj system. He
wonders why there is not a “Civilian Readiness Corps” roster.746
A senior TFBSO manager saw positives and negatives in Afghanistan:
In some cases life did get better there because to him their needs were so basic. It wasn’t
an industrial society. Clean water, life expectancy, a lot of the humanitarian problems
that USAID did really well with. He believes that where it started to break down was
things they saw. The Soviets were much better at this. There are factories in Afghanistan
in the north and west that the Soviets built that are still in operation. He does not recall a
single industrial thing that has been built since the U.S. has been there. Not a food
processing plant, even the most innocuous things. You had a bit of the shut down the
state-owned stuff. Flour mills from southern AFG that were state-owned had been
closed. So you’re brow-beating the local farmers not to grow poppy, but there is no place
to sell wheat. They don’t have a supply chain to sell to. There’s no place to sell wheat,
but we’ll give them a massive amount of free seed so they can create a massive glut of
wheat at harvest season that no one will pay for and you can’t export because there is so
much on the market that the price collapses. There was a lack of business thinking for
creating an end-value chain for those early -stage economic commodities such as crops
and minerals. There was a need, but mostly just to show a vision for Afghanistan that
was positive and advancing as opposed to a horrifically corrupt government structure.
The AFG government structure cannot work. It would be like the President appointing
every governor in the U.S., every city mayor. Imagine how corrupt that would be: that’s
the Afghan government. That is how it works. It makes it horrifically corrupt with a
structural brokenness. Had we been able to stay on we were beginning to hit our stride.
Things like socially responsible mineral asset development, which completely went off
the rails when we were shut down. It is heartbreaking because minerals are being
developed, but in a way that is completely non-transparent and socially and
environmentally irresponsible. 747

Soft Power

Many of the interviewees would have agreed with Byman that aid cannot create a healthy
economy where preconditions of rule of law and social stability do not exist. 748 Adaptability and
opportunism as discussed by Gompert come through in most interviews. Similar to De Tray,
interviewees emphasized working with locals to strengthen ties with the government structure.
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The effort remained one of cooperation, which Kilcullen said was more important than formal
unity of effort. Many would dispute Metz and his belief that the causal linkage between
economic growth and lowering the need to join an insurgency is overestimated. 749
Other interviewees were more assertive in the applicability of the lessons of the Surge. A
brigade commander in Baghdad believed that soft power is here to stay. It is the way to get your
message across, it is the way to win hearts and minds. He believes that using CA, PSYOP and IO
to win, change or fool hearts and minds is invaluable in all environments and can help people
without having to fight.750 A Civil Affairs officer believes that any environment you look at
globally has that civil/soft power dynamic. There are very few pure kinetic types to be had. To
him, learning from the Surge in Iraq is not just the tactics and techniques, but the visualization of
every entity being at the ready to handle a variety of problems that has to be ready to go. 751 A
detention facility commander agreed, saying that progress cannot be achieved solely by using
bullets and guns. For him, it takes the pen and the scroll, it takes mentoring, it takes vision, it
takes training, it takes communication. 752 A Psychological Operations officer believes the
response to ISIS was a perfect example of that. Instead of using ground forces to fight them, the
U.S. does everything we can to get a force that fights them and let them do the fighting. The
U.S. should just enable them as best it can, otherwise according to him it creates too many
problems with the local population. 753 A staffer at MNF-I believes we will see far fewer
conflicts of state-vs-state, and they will be much more insurgency-based, Syria and ISIS and AQ
types of threats.754 A brigade commander recognized that soft power is one of the tools a
commander has to use to effectively accomplish the mission. Important to him is making sure
that in train up and pre-deployment training there is an opportunity to practice not only with role
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players, but ideally to work with the individuals that will be performing soft power during the
fight.755
An economics planner understood the importance of reform from within. The
international community can come in and help stabilize and transition countries, but he feels that
the countries have to make the difficult reforms in order to get their economies going. Aid is not
a substitute for economic growth: good policies are. Stopping corruption, delivering resources,
and instituting and implementing the real legal reforms are what he says will attract
investment.756
A stability operations commander believes that there was a belief that the use of the
military instrument is a last resort, that the U.S. should use diplomacy until there is no
alternative, then sequentially moving into the use of the military. It cannot be sequential to him:
that does not work. Another wrong lesson the U.S. drew from Panama was trying to militarize
the entire process. He said that this is a difficult policy question: what is the end point of an
extensive military commitment? Who is going to stand up as an elected official and say “I’m
signing up for 50 years?” How do you stabilize a region that has gone into such chaos that it has
called your interests into play?757
A Special Operations commander answered the question of the applicability of Iraq’s
lessons to the future as follows:
You think? Look at the two global power-level adversaries we have today, the Chinese
and the Russians. Great power competition is all about soft power. With maybe a little
kinetics thrown in here and there which both sides try to avoid. We don’t want to go to
war with the Russians, and more importantly the Russians don’t want to go to war with
us. But they still want to achieve their objectives. It is a concept we try to put out from
USASOC and SOCOM of the idea of the gray zone – the area of competition between
“peace” and “war.”. We have a US government structure that’s binary: we’re either at
peace or we’re at war. If its peacetime, the State Department is in charge. If it is a war,
it’s a military-led effort until we establish peace, then we go back to the State
Department. We’re all soft power or hard power. But the reality is, and the whole Cold
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War was that way as well, the competition most of time is this gray zone: it isn’t peace,
but it isn’t war either. We aren’t fielding tank-on-tank in Eastern Europe right now, and
we’re not fighting fleet-against-fleet in the South China Sea. All of these various softpower tools are what we have as levers to compete with against China or against Russia.
They know at this point in time that they don’t want to fight us in a conventional war.
The Russians know they’ll lose, and the Chinese know they’re not ready. So they are
trying build that conventional capability, but between now and that point they’re still
trying to achieve their objectives and set conditions. And how are they doing it? They’re
doing it through a variety of soft-power tools. The Chinese philosophy of the “three
warfares” (public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare) is all about how to wield
soft power at the strategic level. Our challenge as a nation is that our structure isn’t
unified until you get to the President, and our interagency process for wielding soft
power in a holistic, synergized way is really hard. Nobody owns information, although
State Department will tell you they do. They don’t really: despite various attempts such
as the Global Engagement Center (GEC) to synchronize messaging, we have not
achieved that. You still hear people talking about getting back to the US Information
Agency days, at least we would be a little bit more coherent. But the reality is no one
owns messaging, everybody does it. All the different tools that we wield are in different
Executive departments, and the interagency process to do that coherently is pretty hard
in our democracy. The answer is to say we’re in a cognitive fight with adversaries that
want to compete with us for real stakes in a world environment of players who are
choosing sides or will eventually have to choose sides, and we better figure out how to
get our act together and compete in that space with soft power at the tactical level. I
think we have good, integrated soft power at the tactical level. We haven’t integrated at
the operational and strategic level with real success against an adversary that is a bit
more advanced than a bunch of guys with AK-47s, cell phones and computers.
When the threat reemerged, the Iraqi army that existed at that point wasn’t necessarily at
the level of capability than it had been in the past. We always talked about bringing the
enemy’s capability down and bringing the friendly capability up, and when you get to
that crossover point where the Iraqi capability is more than the insurgents, you can
leave. But they didn’t account for what I as a good Special Forces guy call “FID
(Foreign Internal Defense) entropy.” You could just as easily call it Security Force
Entropy. Like thermodynamics, systems tend to randomness without energy coming in to
keep the system organized. The other part of the crossover is that you can’t just get the
host nation forces better, you have to get them to the point that their energy into the
system prevents entropy from taking place. For many years we were the energy that kept
the Iraqi capability high enough, but we didn’t get to that crossover point where Iraqi
energy kept their forces ready and capable, having their own processes to train and
evaluate themselves. We did that with the ISOF (Iraqi Special Operations Forces). They
were more advanced. When we left in 2011, they had sufficient internal process to
maintain readiness, and by the way we kept two ODAs (Operational Detachment) with
them assigned to the Embassy manning structure, so we still had contact with the ISOF
all the way up until ISIS returned, and then we came back with additional advisors and
trainers. They had better internal energy, but the reality was we never left them. The
rest of the Iraqi army didn’t have that. They were left to their own means and they hadn’t
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reached that crossover point between US energy to maintain capability to Iraqi energy to
maintain capability.758
A State Department manager at the Embassy during the Surge believed that if you set the
right scenarios and structure and most importantly get the right people it will work better, which
he feels is the responsibility of senior decision-makers in Washington knowing who their best
people are and sending them. His concern is that history has shown that Congress will stop
funding programs or renege on commitments just as it did in Vietnam. He does not want to get
in a situation where the U.S. gets people to trust it and the only way to help them is getting them
back to the States.759 An economics manager at the Embassy said that a lot of what the Surge
incorporated was based on action at the Embassy. To him, DoS sent the “A” team. At one point
there were 5 or 6 ambassadors in Iraq. He saw it as a testament to what America can do when it
brings all elements of national power. 760
A brigade Civil Affairs officer believed that his most important less to apply in the future
was that counterinsurgency or not, especially when the U.S. is the occupying country, it needs to
treat people as humans. Sitting down man-to-man (there were only a couple of women he talked
to in a year), treat them as another human being and things go better. He feels that you will
make a lot of enemies if you don’t treat people as human beings, no matter what they believe. 761

CONCLUSION

Interviewees provided a number of thoughtful reflections regarding the ramifications of
the Surge in Iraq. Common themes emerged around coordination, personalities, smart power and
the importance of close cooperation with the Iraqis.
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Almost all interviewees believed that the Surge produced benefits, although many
considered them to be short term or truncated by the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Iraq in
2011. Many considered the local-level benefits to be the longest-lasting, with national changes
proving more ephemeral. Improvements in security, economics and politics around the country
were highlighted by participants as being made possible by the Surge. Both military and
civilians saw the Surge as creating the “breathing space” hoped for by the political leadership in
Washington. People who subsequently went to Afghanistan were much more likely to view the
Surge as successful than those who did not whether military or civilian, careerists versus shortterm hires or working in Baghdad or an outer province.
A wide variety of lessons were learned by the Surge participants. Variations of the use of
smart power were prevalent throughout the interviews. They found that combinations of
coercive and attractive power produced the best results. Because of the nature of their respective
sizes, the military ended up with an outsized portion of the attractive power mission as well as
their traditional coercive power role.
Interviewees saw the value of their lessons for other conflicts as well. In some cases,
they would immediately get an opportunity to apply them, particularly in Afghanistan during the
Surge there ordered by President Obama. They found that general principles tended to carry
over better than specific techniques, particularly in Afghanistan. Others talked more expansively
about using Surge lessons to better prepare at a national level for future counterinsurgency
situations.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

In the end, the Surge worked. The U.S. was willing to give General Petraeus and
Ambassador Crocker the opportunity and resources to try a new strategy in Iraq. They would
take a smarter power approach utilizing closer cooperation and integration of their military and
civilian assets to better mix coercive and attractive power to stabilize Iraq.
The gamble by the Bush administration paid off in the form of a dramatic drop in
violence in Iraq to levels not seen since the CPA days. Fortuitous circumstances meant that the
Surge coincided with the Anbar Awakening by the Sunni tribes and a rise in oil prices. The
synergy of these events resulted in a stable environment that allowed a restart of stalled political
and economic development which continued years after U.S. troop levels were drawn back down
at the end of the Surge in 2008.
This work utilized the database provided by interviewees to develop a chronological
retelling of the Surge and the role of smart power in Iraq. Chapter Two served as a literature
review on power, counterinsurgency and the Surge. Chapter Three describes the decision to
utilize grounded theory and referral sampling of interviews to develop a data base of perspectives
on the Surge across a variety of executive agencies and other personal experience and mission
criteria.
Chapter Four laid out some of the problems that had plagued previous Coalition
operations starting with poor cooperation between the various Federal agencies. It went into
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detail about domestic support for the effort dropping as well as international backing for U.S.
efforts in Iraq. Interviewees described problems with trying to unite the competing ethnic and
sectarian factions in Iraq even while trying to develop an adequate security force and proceed
with unsecured and unviewed reconstruction projects.
Chapter Five began by analyzing U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, developed at Fort
Leavenworth in 2006 under General Petraeus’ personal oversight. It signaled a change in
strategy as well as in support from the U.S. senior leadership. Interviewees talked about how
they and their counterparts would work to change their method of operation to get closer in line
with smart counterinsurgency doctrine, utilizing coercive and attractive power to stabilize and
rebuild Iraq.
Chapter Six demonstrated how General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker were able to
implement their strategy change and the effect it had in stabilizing Iraq. The military moved off
its large compounds and established Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts shared with its
Iraqi counterparts. Oversight of Iraqi appointment of military leadership was maintained to
prevent capable commanders from being replaced by political flunkies. The civilian effort was
strengthened thanks in large part to the expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept
throughout Iraq. It provided the first real opportunity for the State Department to work below
the national level and build capacity that had been stymied under the top-down rule of Saddam
Hussein.
Chapter Seven detailed the interviewees perspectives regarding the Surge. It presented
several interesting findings regarding interviewee opinions of the effectiveness of the Surge. It
provided the opportunities for interviewees to detail lessons they personally learned about soft
power during the Surge. It also examined opinions on how well the lessons of the Surge
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translate to potential future conflicts. This final chapter is focused on a series of lessons learned,
grouped into three categories: lessons reinforcing the previous literature on counterinsurgency
and the Surge, lessons different from or even at odds with the literature, and new lessons.

THESIS RESTATEMENT AND RESEARCH LESSONS

Thesis

Smart power was an important element of the Iraq Surge, effectively marshalling and
combining attractive and coercive power resources to achieve success. Surge lessons can be
utilized in current or future counterinsurgency environments concerning strategies for effectively
marshalling soft and hard, attractive and coercive, power resources to achieve a
counterinsurgency goal. Almost all of the key lessons and take-aways from this project involve
how to combine these sources of power to address the challenges of a counterinsurgency
environment. This is no matter of mere ratio-setting (e.g. 52 percent hard, 48 percent soft) but a
matter of intelligently combining sources of power to achieve intended results and minimize
unintended results.
This section sums up a number of lessons in counterinsurgency that were drawn from the
interviews and grouped into three categories in terms of whether they reinforce, differ from, or
are new relative to the existing literature on counterinsurgency and the Iraq Surge. Lessons are
summarized sectionally and then expanded below.
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Lessons Reinforcing the Literature

In many cases the interviewees shared lessons that are reflected in the literature on
counterinsurgency. Naturally, these are not new lessons. Prior counterinsurgents had
understood and documented them in the course of their own campaigns. This section discusses
the following items:
1) Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned
2) Counterinsurgency environments are complex
3) Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcile
4) The government is often the cause of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency
5) Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies
6) Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficult
7) Modern transportation/communications make counter insurgency difficult
8) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed
9) Smart power is normative
10) Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly
11) Adaptability is critical
12) Working with the host nation is harder, but in the long run more successful

Broad counterinsurgency lessons do not change, but have to be relearned

Counterinsurgency is hard. Many of its lessons require effort, which may cause them
to be “unlearned” in the interregnum between conflicts. Interviewees talked about the need for
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getting off the large compounds, letting the Iraqis take the lead in reconstruction efforts while
maintaining oversight, and improving cooperation between the military and civilian efforts. All
these things can be found in successful counterinsurgency summaries and lessons learned
published by U.S. and other military forces after their experience in prior conflicts. But they are
hard to do. They are also usually seen as moving a nation’s military away from its “core
mission” of fighting conventional warfare and are typically resisted by the senior military
leadership.
It is easier and safer (in the short run) to stay on big bases, do things one’s own way, and assume
contracted work is getting done. But it is less effective and eventually counterinsurgents become
forced by circumstances to adapt or fail in their counterinsurgency effort. Hoffman saw FM 3-24
as a first step that required a continual effort to revive and update the old lessons to apply to
modern counterinsurgency.762

Counterinsurgency environments are complex

An insurgency is normally going to be the result of irreconcilable differences between
parties of interest within a country. Ethnicity, religion, economics and political repression (or
belief of same) reach a point where one or more groups no longer feels that they formal process
meets their needs and rebels. External actors can be expected to further complicate matters in
pursuit of their own interests. Writers such as Olson Lounsbery and Pearson and Metz described
a number of these issues in their work.
Interviewees in different parts of Iraq and performing different mission recounted a
variety of issues which complicated the U.S. goal of taming the insurgency under a unified,
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representative Iraqi government. They described problems with equitable wealth distribution,
political representation and appointing military leadership with the intent of fairly representing
all ethnic and sectarian groups.

Cultural and religious differences are difficult to reconcile

Antagonisms between differing cultures and religious sects have typically built up over
centuries and seen varying levels of dislike, repression and even outright warfare and massacre.
Most academicians understood even before the 2003 invasion that reconciling Sunnis, Shia and
Kurds would be a difficult task even if the U.S. would be willing to consciously collaborate with
the differing ethnic and sectarian groups. Ahmed and Allawi captured many of the ethnic and
sectarian problems that plagued Iraq, and Fitzsimmons described the difficulties of reconciling
these at a national level. 763
The U.S. principle of separation of church and state tends to carry over into its
international relations. Most American government officials are reluctant to get directly
involved with the religious aspects of foreign countries. Almost every interviewee was asked
whether they or their unit interacted with religious figures. Some said yes, but only one went
into detail. General Petraeus said there was a plan for engagement with religious figures and that
he and Ambassador Crocker met regularly with them but did not expand further on his answer.764
It seemed to be a case where the “right” answer is to say yes so interviewees said yes, but the
reality was there was little systematic effort by the Coalition as a whole.
This may have been a missed opportunity for the U.S. in Iraq. The imams are an
important and influential part of the leadership in the Middle East. They have large weekly
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audiences and people listen to them. Some also share influential leadership positions within the
tribal structure. The U.S. Constitution does not say government officials cannot interact with
foreign religious leaders. The reluctance to partner with foreign religious elements likely
reduces the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East where Islam
plays a critical role.

The government is often the cause of the insurgency, otherwise there would be no insurgency

Shia control of the Iraqi government created an opportunity for them to avenge
themselves against the Sunnis who had ruled them for decades and they promptly took advantage
of it. Sunnis were excluded from political participation, although Sunni electoral boycotting
made some of the damage self-inflicted. Dixon and Gentile described these problems and how
they specifically applied to Iraq.
Interviewees talked about how oil revenue streams flowed the slowest toward the Sunni
provinces. Competent Sunni military commanders were replaced with government loyalists.
Shia death squads operated wearing Iraqi military and police uniforms. U.S. planners had failed
to envision that cutting the Sunnis out of the political process beginning with CPA orders for deBa’athification and eliminating the Iraqi Army would lead to a Shia takeover to a degree the
Sunnis would perceive as unfair and lead to a sectarian insurrection. Insurgency literature
commonly understands that dissatisfaction with the government is normally responsible to some
degree for insurgencies.
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Domestic issues complicate foreign counterinsurgency, particularly in democracies

Iraq demonstrated the difficulties that emerge as a counterinsurgency effort becomes less
popular with the citizens of the occupying country over time. General Petraeus and his key
leaders understood that they were not just buying time in Iraq, but in the U.S. as well. Kaplan
described his invitation to academicians and other outside experts to the initial conference laying
out the groundwork for publication of FM 3-24.765 He and Ambassador Crocker also spent a
great amount of time preparing for their Congressional testimony per Mansoor and made a
conscious effort to be available to U.S. media.
The inclusive nature of General Petraeus’ domestic strategy maintained the spirit of the
concordance theory of Schiff. He identified his key target audiences in the U.S. and made sure
that he influenced their perception of the Surge. He also worked to create and maintain allies in
both the Legislative and Executive branches and get their agreement to his new strategy.

Isolating a counterinsurgency environment is difficult

The literature is familiar with the idea that international organizations both governmental
and non-governmental are going to have interests in a country experiencing insurgency. It is
only to be expected that other groups such as neighboring countries or coreligionists will be even
more concerned about the outcome in a country than the foreign counterinsurgent. Ricks talked
about external actors and their efforts to achieve goals at variance with the Coalition effort in
Iraq.766
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Interviewees talked about turning the Sunnis in Iraq away from al-Qaeda as being a key
element of the success of the Surge and its timing. They talked about efforts by neighboring
states such as Iran to exercise their own influence in Iraq, but even nominal U.S. partners such as
Saudi Arabia were often perceived as attempting to push events in Iraq in directions inimical to
U.S. goals, particularly their efforts to subvert Iraqi unity and spread Wahabi jurisprudence and
practice.

Modern transportation/communications make counter insurgency difficult

In line with the above, it is easier for insurgent elements to maintain contact with each
other and with the outside world. In colonial days occupying powers could conduct brutal
suppression campaigns with few details leaking out. Even if they did, there was no United
Nations to act as a focal point for criticism of their activities to center on. The Internet in
particular makes it difficult for governments to isolate insurgent areas and activities from the
attention of the outside world. Kilcullen described the challenges of trying to isolate an
insurgent environment.767
However, the gate swings both ways. When reviewing the lessons learned for this work,
one interviewee pointed out that in this case, “When we took full and creative advantage of
advances in transport and communication, we were able to leverage them effectively.” 768 He is
absolutely correct: the trick of course is being able and willing to leverage these capabilities
better than the insurgents.
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Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed

History demonstrates that as counterinsurgents conduct operations at smaller and smaller
levels they become more effective. U.S. cordon-and-search operations in Vietnam proved to be
of limited value, whereas working to establish regional and provincial Vietnamese defense forces
inflicted 40% of all casualties on the insurgent forces despite receiving less than 2% of the
military funding. The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in 1979 with a military doctrine that did
not call for employment of artillery below divisional level: within a few years they were
operating smaller detachments coordinating with fire control officers at company or even platoon
level.769
One of the key Surge elements in urban areas was getting Coalition forces off their big
bases and establishing Joint Security Stations or Combat Outposts coinhabited by Iraqi security
forces. Additionally, approval authority for Psychological Operations messaging was delegated
to lower-level units to allow for quicker approval and publication of messages that would better
resonate with the local target audience. PRTs were also stood up to increase interaction with the
provincial governments in Iraq. Interviewees talked about how these initiatives at local levels
increased trust and decreased the ability of insurgents to isolate and control portions of Iraq.

Smart power is normative

This work and others have demonstrated that hard and soft power can be quantified to an
extent. Smart power is a normative term: there is no single correct admixture of coercive and
attractive power guaranteed to produce the desired end state in an insurgency. Keohane, Nye
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and other writers have understood that smart power is a moving target, a concept rather than a
destination. Interviewees for this work continually emphasized the need to use coercive and
attractive power in differing combinations.
Brigade commanders interviewed for this work particularly described the granularity of
their operations. In one sector they might be fighting while in another sector they were
rebuilding. Or they might find themselves fighting today in a sector they were rebuilding
yesterday. They might even find themselves fighting off attacks in a sector while trying to
rebuild it. They had to constantly adjust their power distribution to match the fluid nature of the
environment.
The Civil Affairs teams were usually provided with security elements, demonstrating the
binary nature of the operational environment. In a similar manner, the State Department and
other civilian workers found that establishing stability an providing security for attractive power
personnel was necessary to carry out the mission. Many interviewee statements demonstrated
that progress was not linear and constant adjustments to the security and development inputs had
to be made. Proper use of smart power was very dependent on the decision-maker on the ground
who best understood the situation in their area of operations.

Coercive or attractive power are rarely effective singly

Multiple interviewees talked along the lines of “You can’t kill your way out of an
insurgency, but you can’t buy your way out of one either.” The smart power concept is certainly
necessary to be successful in any counterinsurgency environment, even if the subcomponents
vary. Elements of coercive and attractive power must be present. Friis wrote about the Western
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tendency to focus on attractive power activities without coordinating with a strong security
component,770 while Plakoudas talked about the importance of coordinating a wide range or
response policies.771
Interviewees talked about the situation prior to the Surge as the U.S. was drawing back to
the large bases. Not only was the soft power failing to eliminate insurgent elements, but it also
became less effective as there was no security for State Department to safely get out and conduct
its projects. The leadership wanted to turn the country over to the Iraqis, but they were clearly
unable to effectively take over. Soft power by itself was not going to be the solution no matter
how much the U.S. wanted it to be.

Adaptability is critical

FM 3-24 paved the way for the Surge effort to give commanders more flexibility and
freedom to seize opportunities presented to them by circumstances in their area of operations. It
drew on historical examples of counterinsurgency campaigns that were willing to change their
procedures to better match what needed to be done. FM 3-24 was doctrine, but it was not
doctrinaire. This contrasted with Gompert and his criticism that the typical U.S. response to
problems is to create more bureaucracy. 772
Russell (2013) described the beginning of the U.S. interaction with Sunni tribes in
western Iraq. Interviewees talked in particular about the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq
as developments previous Coalition leadership had avoided but General Petraeus eagerly
integrated into his stabilization plan with great success. Cooperation between DoD and DoS
moved down to provincial and local levels with interviewees talking about the great success they

336
had when they began working together at all levels. Messaging worked faster to exploit
Coalition successes and insurgent failures.

Working with the host nation is harder, but in the long run more successful

The U.S. likes to go it alone. Even the “Coalition of the Willing” put together for Iraq
was overwhelmingly U.S. in makeup. Most countries would prefer to do things themselves if
possible. As discussed previously, then they can do what they think is best, not have to reconcile
planning with a partner who probably does not share the same goals. This includes the host
nation. It is quicker not to bring in local leaders to shape the planning process and who will not
want to do things the way the Americans do. West described problems the U.S. had by not
partnering with the Iraqis and attempting to moderate their behavior prior to the Surge, while
Pirnie and O’Connell previously described the importance of preparing U.S. military forces to
partner with indigenous security.
As multiple interviewee statements attest, the problem with cutting out the host nation is
that resources and activities expended in the host nation are less likely to be effective. Multiple
stories indicated that if the locals do not care about a project, they are not going to care if
corruption, incompetence or theft keep the project from being completed. During the Surge,
more effort was made to involve the Iraqis in the decision process and continue oversight to
make sure things were being done in the agreed-upon manner.
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Lessons Different Than the Literature

A number of interesting commonalities came from the interviews that share a perspective
different than what is commonly found in the literature on counterinsurgency. In some cases the
literature does not seem to fully recognize the importance of the item under consideration. In
some cases the interviews follow a different tack than that found in the literature. This section
discusses the following items:
1) Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time
2) Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DoD nor DoS are enthusiastic about entering
3) There are many ways to incorrectly apply power
4) The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it
5) Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated
6) Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understoodIraq has little
concept of a national will
7) Someone will be unhappy about any change made
8) Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance
9) Part of the fight occurs in detention facilities

Foreign counterinsurgency becomes less popular with the local population with time

Couch observed that when we invade a foreign land, the clock starts ticking. 773
Regardless of the circumstances under which we arrived or how we carry out the occupation, our
presence will be resented. The literature in general understands this concept but does not seem
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to appreciate how fast and hard the resentment builds up. People barely tolerate their own
nation’s leaders telling them what to do, let alone those of another country.
Americans in Iraq had a difficult time understanding why they were never as popular as
they expected. After all, the Coalition had gotten rid of Saddam Hussein and his family!
Americans understood that that gratitude would fade over time. The problem was that the
Americans and Iraqis viewed two different starting points for their relationship. To the
Americans in Iraq and to an extent the decision-makers in Washington it began in March 2003
when American invaded Iraq. To them, overthrowing Saddam should have immediately given
them a large boost into positive perception and the slide down would commence from there.
Iraqis saw the relationship differently. They would date the U.S.-Iraqi relationship from
1990. Not because of being evicted from Kuwait, but from the post-conflict sanctions imposed
on them by the U.S. via the United Nations. The sanctions built up a great deal of resentment
among many Iraqis for more than a decade before the 2003 invasion. Even for Iraqis glad
Saddam was gone his removal only brought them back to a neutral feeling about the Americans,
not a positive one, thus they were soon back to a negative perception of the Americans. The
Americans might be proud of themselves for repairing a power generator, but the reason it was
not working was often because the sanctions had prevented the Iraqis from being able to obtain
parts for it or it had been bombed during the invasion. There was a continual disconnect between
Americans who expected more appreciation from Iraqis for what they did and Iraqis who did not
see why the Americans should be proud of fixing something that was not working because of
them.

339
Counterinsurgency falls into a gray area neither DOD nor DOS are enthusiastic about entering

In a world with infinite resources, it would be easy to allocate the right force to
counterinsurgency. After the Army’s 1 st Corps conquered an area, it would be replaced by the 1st
Reconstruction Corps. This organization would report to the President, not DoS or DoD. It
would have a security division, a reconstruction division, a civic development division and other
elements intended to stabilize a recovering nation. It would not need much artillery, but neither
would it incorporate Peace Corps volunteers. At some point the Reconstruction Corps would be
able to depart leaving the U.S. Embassy as the senior national authority in a “normal” country.
We do not live in a world with infinite resources. The cost of maintaining a Reconstruction
Corps would be closer to DoD costs than DoS costs. Even if the bulk of the members were in a
callup role as opposed to being full-time government employees, they would still get pulled from
their normal jobs for a crisis. Every time Guard or Reserve members get activated, that is time
they are not spending making their fellow Americans healthier, wealthier, or wiser.
For the foreseeable future there is little choice but to continue leaving the military in a
foreign country longer than they want and bringing in civilians earlier than they want.
Consequently, getting the right resources in place and determining who is in charge will persist
as problems the U.S. deals with in a counterinsurgency environment. Both DoD and DoS will
say the right things about participating in a counterinsurgency environment, but in reality, both
wish the problem would just go away.
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There are many ways to incorrectly apply power

The literature talking about smart power will usually talk about developing the right “ratio”
of hard and soft power. Nye goes into this in detail and acknowledges that it is not simply “Soft
Power 2.0.” What does not seem to be deeply explored is that you can get the ratio right but still
not get the result you want if you apply the wrong type of hard or soft power. This issue was
discussed in detail in Chapter Three and highlighted by Table 3.1.
The operationalized concepts of coercive and attractive power help understand the nuances.
Shutting the Sunni tribes in western Iraq out of the political process was a coercive action that
drove them closer to al-Qaeda. It was not until the U.S. began working with those tribes after the
Anbar Awakening and through the Sons of Iraq that the right coercive power was being applied
against the threat in Anbar Province. Likewise, messages to the Iraqi people to support the local
government lacked the attractive power that combining those messages with efforts to make the
government more accountable to Iraqis produced.
Just because soft power is being applied in a situation calling for attractive power does not
mean it is being effective. The “Lion Fountain” story detailed in Chapter Four perfectly
illustrates this point. The Americans spent a considerable amount of money with the best of
intentions to try to do something nice for the local populace. Because they had not bothered to
ask the locals what they wanted, it ended up being money largely wasted and thus was an
ineffective initiative. It demonstrates the difference between soft power and this work’s
definition of attractive power. The project was soft, but since the Iraqis probably would not want
it repeated (mostly because they did not care), it was not attractive. Spending the money on a
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project the Iraqis wanted done would have had a better chance of achieving the desired attractive
power effect.

The importance of FM 3-24 was in its existence as much as what was in it

Field Manual 3-24 provided a number of tactics, techniques and procedures for more
effectively waging counterinsurgency in Iraq. It revitalized a number of ideas that had proven
successful in past conflicts and integrated them into a more pragmatic approach to combatting
violence in Iraq. Kagan described it as not just about non-kinetics, but the synergy between
kinetics and non-kinetics.774 Writers such as Hoffman focus on the content of FM 3-24 and its
applicability to conflict.775
The ideas in FM 3-24 were important. Just as important, if not more so, was the
publication of the field manual itself. It signaled higher level support for the new style of
counterinsurgency warfare. It meant that General Petraeus and his subordinates in Iraq were able
to carry out their strategy without having to look over their shoulders or justify their new tactics
to higher headquarters. Doctrine does not just tell soldiers how to do things: it gives them
permission to do it.

Coercive and attractive power can be differentiated

Some theorists postulate that power is power and can all be put into a category of altering
behavior, getting people to do something they were not going to do or refrain from doing
something they were going to do. For example, Boulding and his “smaller” concept of power as
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discussed previously. By this standard there is no difference between types of power as they will
all induce changes that would not have happened without the application of power.
This work set out operational definitions for coercive and attractive power and provided
examples of each one. Even if both have a goal of behavior change, they each approach it
differently. This was seen as potentially impacting the length and depth of their impact.
Interviewees talked at length about the mix of power during the Surge in Iraq and that each had a
role.

Power elements are both more and less fungible than commonly understood

People are fungible. This work has demonstrated that military people found themselves
thrust into roles better suited for civilians such as manning the State Department’s Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Interviewees talked about doing jobs different than what they
anticipated or trained for prior to arrival in Iraq. Nevertheless, they were largely able to adapt to
circumstance and be a suitable, even if not always ideal, substitute.
The tools available to counterinsurgents have varying degrees of fungibility. Cash is
probably the most fungible. A bulldozer can be utilized to dig an entrenchment for a defensive
military force or clear a field for agricultural use: it can even be used to create a road that serves
both military and civilian purposes. An artillery piece or guided missile has little application
other than death and destruction.
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Iraq has little concept of a national will

Strategic level U.S. planners placed a lot of faith in the idea of forging a single identity
amongst large blocs of Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, in addition to other smaller but distinct groups
such as Christians or Marsh Arabs. Attempts were made to generate a sense of common purpose
through political participation and development of a fair system of government spending,
particularly from oil revenues. There were some elements of common purpose: for example,
Americans probably failed to appreciate and emphasize the unifying nature of the Iran-Iraq War,
where all Iraqis were proud of the role they played in preventing an Iranian takeover of their
territory.
However, theorists from Marx forward have shown a desire to assume unity where it
probably does not exist. The idea of thousands or millions of people sharing common opinions
on a range of political, economic and social issues is probably unrealistic even if they share an
ethnic identity or language. In a country such as Iraq pretensions of a broad sense of common
identity simply led to efforts unlikely to produce the desired results.
Interviewees continually stressed the fragmented nature of the Iraqi body politic. There were
a few instances of Iraqis such as military commanders trying to forge a truly national unit.
However most Iraqi military and civilian leaders the interviewees saw were more concerned with
maintaining or furthering ethnic, sectarian, tribal or family power and influence. Many were in
fact using the levers of government in a manner coldly calculated to further the cause of their
own narrow identity groups.
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Someone will be unhappy about any change made

Political theory seems to assume that intervening nations will be bringing “good” changes.
What it may fail to appreciate is that there will always be someone who benefits from the current
system. Lifting the pre-invasion sanctions may be seen as an unalloyed good, but that viewpoint
was not shared by the tribes who had been making a good living smuggling into Iraq.
Particularly in Anbar Province, it was a factor that led them to support Al-Qaeda infiltration
efforts and serve as their supply and fighter conduit.
Likewise, the requirement placed in the Iraqi Constitution that 25% of the representation in
the 329-member Parliament had to be women. Laudable in its intent, nonetheless it must be
viewed in terms of opportunity cost that 83 men who would have been part of the Parliament are
now shut out of the power structure. This does not say that Iraq would be better off with those
men in the Parliament, simply that they are going to be unhappy with the new system and serve
as a potential source for other malcontents to rally around.

Adaptability can apply to higher level guidance

Napoleon reportedly said that commanders have the right to disobey an order not given to
them by a superior standing next to them. A friend of the author always used to emphasize the
need to provide “Scooby Snacks” to our bosses. They expect certain things to be done, and we
have to meet those needs to keep them happy. After that we could use our remaining time to do
the things we knew needed to be done. Writers may assume that subordinates in executive
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branch agencies are conscientiously attempting to carry out the letter of higher headquarters
directives as well as their spirit.
Several interviewees talked about modifying or disregarding higher level requirements
they believed did not meet the situation in Iraq or their part of Iraq. Messaging in particular was
often designed for the chimeric national audience rather than local populations commanders
lived and worked with. Their concerns were recognized by the continual effort to push message
approval authority to lower levels. Cooperation with the Anbar Awakening began as a series of
lower-level initiatives by subordinate commanders acting without formal authority or guidance,
although the change in strategy brought higher headquarters around to supporting these
initiatives.

Part of the fight occurs in detention facilities

Detention facilities should be thought of as the holding area for people most likely to
become future insurgents upon release. The ability to decrease the recidivism rate of prisoners
can directly and immediately reduce the effectiveness of the insurgent effort. The positive image
that can accrue from released prisoners telling friends and loved ones that they were treated with
respect is a valuable component of counterinsurgency legitimacy.
Press reporting on prison facilities focuses on scandals such as Abu Ghraib and rarely
seems to cover day-to-day details of detention and rehabilitation. Academic writing on the topic
is also sparse. Perhaps it is simply an uncomfortable subject people do not care to explore and
discuss in detail. Or it could be that to researchers there is a mental shift that seals those people
off from the insurgent body once they become detainees.
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New Lessons

Interviewee themes emerged that are covered in sparse detail in academic literature or are
not understood. Interesting findings include:
1) Capabilities are not inherently hard or soft
2) The importance of personalities is often underestimated
3) Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq
4) Surge participants thought the lessons learned are applicable to other conflicts

Capabilities are not inherently hard or soft

Academic writing on power generally inclines to placing national capabilities into
categories of either hard or soft.
Interviewees bore out the idea that State Department was capable of conducting coercive
power just as the military could conduct attractive power. Part of the role of the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) was keeping their Iraqi contacts exercising power and spending
their budgets responsibly. The implied threat was the loss of future funding or support if they
failed to do so. They were also willing to hire security teams, although this was intended to
provide security for attractive power operations.
The military was also put into a number of attractive roles because they had the bulk of
the assets available in Iraq. Most or in some cases all of the PRT manning consisted of military
personnel. Interviewees ended up being part of the attractive power mission of the Surge, if not
by choice then by availability. A military person conducting attractive power was considered
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better than no attractive power at all being conducted. They were also largely responsible for
training the Iraqi Security Forces. As a salaried position, there was never a shortage of recruits.
The training was intended to instill pride and professionalism in the Iraqis, making them want to
emulate the U.S. forces through their personal example.
Counterinsurgents who are willing to employ assets in nontraditional roles find that they
have more options available to them than those who do not. Even an imperfect solution helps
advance national security objectives and takes better advantage of the resources available.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker both demonstrated the ability to employ the resources
available to them innovatively.

The importance of personalities is often underestimated

Numerous psychological studies exist regarding the role personalities play in
relationships. Literature discussing the importance of personalities abounds when discussing
private enterprise. Interviewees for this work who came from a business background
consistently spoke about establishing and maintaining good relationships as being key to
effectively doing their jobs in the private sector as well as Iraq. Careerists as well agreed that in
many cases replacing one person could have a dramatic effect on cooperation and accomplishing
U.S. goals in Iraq.
The issue has been discussed earlier in this work. It is certainly easier to assume that
replacing one colonel or foreign service officer with another person of the same grade will not
alter performance of the mission. Compiling data and analyzing it is less afflicted with
subjective valuations that can make statistical calculations much more problematic.
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Counterinsurgency literature reviewed for this work talks about changes brought about by
changing personnel but did not seem to reflect the contention of interviewees that such changes
could be the difference between success and failure in performing one’s job. It does not seem
that experience or competence mattered as much as simply having someone in the position who
genuinely tried to work with their counterparts from other organizations. In many cases a willing
if inexpert leader can be supported by their own experienced subordinates who understand that
the organization is expected to act in a cooperative manner by the example set by the leader. As
organizations get to know each other they develop trust which will further deepen coordination
and cooperation.

Surge participants thought their effort made a difference in Iraq

As detailed in the previous chapter, 31 of 36 interviewees felt that the Surge produced
some form of positive benefit. Positive responses were spread across all subgroups interviewed:
military and civilian, staff and leaders, those who worked in Baghdad versus outer provinces, etc.
To most the benefits were long-term or had the potential to be so. They pointed to the
decrease in violence as the primary indicator of success. The Shia militias reduced their level of
violence and the Sunni tribes turned against al-Qaeda. This return of a secure environment
allowed the Iraqis to restart the political process and begin to rebuild the economy and return to a
sense of normalcy.
The coercive effort was a combination of the increase in size and posture of U.S, military
forces in combination with improvements in Iraqi Security Force capabilities. Partnering
together at Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts, they brought the levels of violence
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down to the point that one interviewee recalled that there were days with no war-related deaths in
Iraq.
The attractive effort was aided by the expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to
allow the Americans to have capabilities to practice attractive power below the national level of
government during the Surge. Interviewees felt that the efforts they made working with regional
governors and mayors were part of trying to change the top-down leadership of Saddam Hussein
and the Ba’athists.

Surge participants thought the lessons learned are applicable to other conflicts

Surge participants almost all felt that what they learned in Iraq during the Surge was
applicable to other and/or future conflicts. There was concern that the lesson would not be
learned or even mislearned. They believed that better cooperation among the various agencies
produced a more effective counterinsurgency effort. They also appreciated the importance of
soft power and saw it as part of an integrated strategy.
As has been discussed, many of the interviewees subsequently participated in the surge in
Afghanistan. They believed that some of the Iraq lessons did not transfer over to Afghanistan,
but many did, particularly the need for adequate security and the necessity of cooperation among
the U.S. participants.
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FURTHER RESEARCH

This work has multiple possibilities for further research. Obviously more of the same
types of interviews could further solidify data sets and bring in other job specialties or regions of
the country. Other potential research avenues include further study of the perceptions of people
who participated in multiple counterinsurgency efforts and closing research gaps left by this
work.

Multiple Insurgencies

The finding regarding Iraq participants who subsequently went to Afghanistan would be
interesting to explore in more detail. Because this work focused on Iraq, perceptions on
Afghanistan were not explored. Interviewees were not asked if they thought the Afghanistan
Surge produced results. Such a question would require a control group of people who
participated in the Afghan Surge but not the Iraq Surge.
Another research option might be other instances of being able to compare and contrast
viewpoints of people who participated in counterinsurgent efforts in different countries. Some
historical examples might include:
1) France 40s-60s: Vietnam and Algeria (possibly WWII as an insurgent)
2) U.S.: 1900s-30s: China, Philippines, Central America
3) British 1890s-1910s: S Africa, AFG, Zulu, Egypt
4) British 1940s-1960s: Palestine, Malaysia
5) Russia: 50s-90s: Baltics, Czech, Hungary, AFG, Chechnya
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6) Israel 60s-present: West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon
7) China 50s-present: Tibet, Uyghurs
Some would have to rely on records as the individuals involved have passed. Interesting
differences could be explored. Some cases might not have an effort that was distinctly more
successful. Some may not have occurred in close chronographic proximity like the Iraq and
Afghan Surges, which might impact the subject’s perception (insurgency might look different
when one is a colonel rather than a lieutenant).
Attempting to find insurgents who participated in multiple efforts would be more difficult
but not impossible. Most insurgents will tend to operate in their own country until they gain
control of it. People like Che Guevara who participated in the successful Cuban insurgency but
subsequently went to a different insurgent effort, in his case Bolivia, are unusual. Vietnamese
who fought against the French and subsequently the U.S. could also be considered. Islamists
who fought in multiple insurgencies would also provide a wealth of experience, if difficult to
find and interview.

Research Gaps

In the course of this study two particular gaps were of note. One was dealing with access
to material which is in many cases still classified and not likely to be released in the next few
years. The other was shortfalls in the pool of interviewees gathered for this study. Although a
credible number of U.S. military and civilian personnel participated, there are other groups
whose perceptions could bring a different perspective to similar future studies.
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Classification

During research the author contacted the Historian’s Office of Central Command (the
major command responsible for Iraq) and was told that they were still in the mid-1990s for
document declassification and release. Much of the information regarding messages is
classified. Although the document itself becomes unclassified upon release, the staff work of
selecting target audiences and intended effects are classified. The same problem exists with
reconstruction and development projects. Future access to these types of information will help
provide researchers insight into the thought process behind product development.

Interviewees

Studying the effects of soft power during the Surge would benefit from including the
following categories of people in Iraq during the Surge:
Iraqis – Snowballing proved difficult. Some of the interviewees had maintained contact
with Iraqis they worked with during the Surge but were reluctant to pass along their contact
information. This was usually due to concerns that it could open the Iraqis to retribution,
particularly the ones still living in Iraq. Broader perspective on the effects of soft power in Iraq
would be obtained by soliciting information from the intended target audiences and Iraqi
decision-makers.
Coalition Partners – Many of the Coalition of the Willing partner states had reduced their
role in Afghanistan by 2007. In the case of NATO members, some had shifted their focus of
effort to Afghanistan which they saw as the greater national security threat due to the increase in
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heroin importation. Attempts to contact individuals proved largely unsuccessful. Information
from Coalition partners might have demonstrated different approaches and goals to soft power
efforts during the Surge.
Junior Participants – Snowballing tended to roll sideways and up. Interviewees were
more likely to recommend a peer or supervisor as a follow-on interview rather than a
subordinate. The 13 Department of State interviewees included 5 ambassadors. Noncommissioned officers, junior officers and younger foreign service officers might have a
different perspective than that of colonels, generals, and chiefs of mission. In the interest of
brevity, such research could encompass an ordinally-scaled questionnaire versus the more openended questions used for this work.

AUTHOR THOUGHTS

What do I believe were the important elements brought out by the interviews? Certainly,
none are unimportant. Whether already commonly understood or brought out in a new light in
this work, all play a role in successful counterinsurgency. As this work has tried to show, there
is no single magic element. The best strategies integrate a complex and adaptable series of
capabilities working together. Nonetheless, three areas stood out as reminiscent of my own
experiences on active-duty service: cooperation, delegation and learning.
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Cooperation

When everyone cooperates, it is amazing what can be done. When they do not cooperate,
it is amazing what cannot be done. I served as an installation Protocol Officer in Saudi Arabia
in 1998. As such I was responsible for the tents where we quartered our Distinguished Visitors
(DV). The nearest bathroom facilities were located about 100 feet from their tents. The
installation had poor outdoor lighting, creating a hazard for any personnel making head calls in
the middle of the night. I asked the installation supply officer if we could get some flashlights
for the tents. She told me to put in a requisition request and they would consider it at the next
budget meeting. I asked if I could sign some out temporarily, that we had appointed service and
defense secretaries tripping over tent ropes at 2 AM. She refused. She was not being mean or
vindictive, she just could not see the issue as a problem that needed prompt attention.
She rotated out before I had to make it a general officer issue or just go to the PX and buy
$10 worth of flashlights myself. After her successor arrived, I brought up the issue with him: an
hour later the DV tents had flashlights in them. Steve continued to be a “can do” officer for the
remainder of the time we served together. To me, the frustrating part of that experience (and a
thousand like it in my military career) was that the time I was spending on a trivial issue like half
a dozen flashlights was time I was not spending tackling bigger problems. All it took was a
change in personnel and the problem was solved!

Delegation

This ties together two concepts brought out by the interviewees:

355
1) Counterinsurgency is more effective the lower the level at which it is executed
2) Iraq has little concept of a national will
I was a staff officer at the Defense Language Institute at the time that smoking was in the
process of being driven out of the military workplace. There was a point where the installation
smoking policy changed three times in two days. It was a frantic two days for us at headquarters.
We were drafting revisions, running them through the necessary staff at breakneck speed, then
burning out the copier trying to get the most current version down to the different schools and
service units. After all, we cannot have our servicemembers comporting themselves based on a
superseded policy, right?
Several months after this I was reassigned to one of the schools for language training. As
I was lounging around the school’s main office looking at their bulletin board, I saw that the
version of the installation smoking policy posted there was one older than the three we had
promulgated. I would bet that half the people stationed there did not even know there was an
installation smoking policy. All the effort we had put in at headquarters was invisible outside
our building.
The farther up the chain policy is trying to be made, the less likely it is to connect with
individuals. Particularly with messaging, the idea of developing a message of any depth that will
appeal to all of Iraq is unrealistic. A boss of mine once said that when a new contingency
operation comes up, you have to get the first PSYOP product right because it is going to the front
page of the New York Times. After that you can develop products that will resonate better with
the locals. The Coalition learned that the best way to do this was pushing message approval
down to the lowest levels.
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Along the same lines, the large-scale reconstruction projects in Iraq tended to not do well.
Smaller ones were more successful. Getting the local factory up and running, fixing the roads,
and expanding the ISF brought local leadership and desires into play and ensured there was not a
magnet for corruption and theft being created. PRTs played a big role in making this happen and
were a great smart power concept.
If you leave your people alone and let them do their jobs, they will usually make you look
good.

Learning

If we do not learn the lessons of the past, we are doomed to repeat them (although a wag
has observed that those who do learn from history are doomed to make the opposite mistakes).
Most of the basic principles properly applied during the Surge were not new. Technology may
change, political systems may change, economies may change, but people and their core beliefs
and behaviors do not.
It can be frustrating to go through a relearning process. Among the duties of my first
assignment was serving as the unit Awards and Decorations Monitor, tracking and processing
award submissions for the unit. I was given the current tracking log that had about two dozen
status columns in it. I decided this was too many and developed a new tracking log that just told
when notification of award eligibility went to the subordinate unit and when we sent the
completed package up the chain for approval.
I immediately began having problems with packages not getting done, not getting
corrections done in a timely manner, or just getting lost and I did not know where they were. As
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each stage of failure reared its ugly head, I modified my tracking log to prevent it from
happening again. Things eventually calmed down. After about a year I happened to come across
the previous tracking log. To my chagrin it looked almost identical to what I had built after 12
months of mistakes I could have avoided by simply following the recipe my predecessor had left
for me. After that I avoided making major changes to the job for the first 30 days after I
assumed a new role.
Listening to experienced individuals is a good idea: there is a reason they are
experienced. I used to tell my IO classes that if experience was the sum of my mistakes that
were not quite bad enough to get me fired or killed, then I had a ton of experience to share with
them. Once the U.S. was willing to acknowledge there was an insurgency in Iraq and started
paying attention to experienced people past and present on how to deal with one, the situation
began to change. But it is hard. How many times did I hear “This time is different” when it is
really just old wine in new bottles? The coercive lessons of counterinsurgency are particularly
hard to accept: people would prefer not to use them. But in the meantime, people are dying.

CONCLUSION

During a progress review for this work one of the committee members asked me what I
hoped this study would contribute. My response was that my hope is that if the U.S. or any
nation finds itself in a similar situation in the future, this work might reduce the number of deaths
and level of destruction before the counterinsurgents become smarter in their application of
power.
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The challenge with grounded theory work is it does not readily lend itself to statistical
analysis. We cannot take ten lab rats, inject them with CERP money, and study the results.
Isolating an independent variable in a counterinsurgency filled with a mosaic of actors each
operating with their own set of goals is an enormous task. Every one of their stories is unique.
Every project each interviewee pursued was unique. Every day of pursuing the same project was
unique. The interview questions were deliberately designed to be as open-ended as possible to
allow the interviewee to take the answer in a direction they felt was of interest. It can be risky to
take a datum and try to draw a larger conclusion from it: it may be an outlier.
This does not mean that their words should be dismissed. The value of these interviews is
that they are real-world experience. There are no artificial laboratory conditions. They are not
the outcome of a computer simulation. They are not training exercises. In fact, multiple
interviewees talked about training they did prior to deploying, in some cases training developed
by Iraq veterans and designed specifically for their upcoming mission. They commented that it
was better than no training, but usually they found a different situation on the ground and had to
quickly adapt. In many cases I would be hard-pressed to debate their insight based on a
statistical print-out.
Fortunately, many of their experiences had shared commonalities. Many of these
commonalities were close enough to be grouped together. Some permitted broader conclusions
to be drawn tying together the situations addressed by the interviewees. The goal of this work
was to sift through these interviewees and search for those commonalities with the objective of
developing a set of lessons to be learned from their experiences. Open-ended questions meant
not all the commonalities are equally sized. Some lumps are bigger and richer than others.
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The Iraq war was a difficult time for everyone involved. The Iraqis had their country torn
apart with conflict and economic dislocation raging for years. Coalition members found
themselves conducting lengthy tours apart from their families. If you came into the office early
you often had to listen to one of your coworkers in an argument with their spouse back home.
Both were probably nothing more than good people in a difficult situation. Not all my friends
made it home. Not all of the ones who did were able to comfortably readjust to their old lives.
Physical and mental illness are an expected byproduct of living in a stressful environment.
The cost to America was immense and the bill continues to mount with each disability
pension or too-early funeral service. Perhaps a “smarter” strategy implemented sooner with
high-level support could have reduced the costs to everyone. Perhaps a stable Iraq could have
been achieved earlier, with all the U.S., Iraqi and international ramifications that would have
entailed. Perhaps less violence would have resulted in less bitterness among the warring factions
and more willingness to work together.
It is my sincerest wish that U.S. forces never become in involved in another
counterinsurgency effort. However, if or when the next such conflict arises, it is my great wish
that the lessons of the past can be a guide to the future.
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